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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to deconstruct the ethical framework, in which 
the theological community deliberates the new reproductive 
technologies (NRTs) and to interrogate the constructions of woman and 
the embryo that have correlated into the ensuing discourses from 
ecclesiastic traditions. The foundational premise is that the church does 
not fulfil its pastoral and prophetic role in this increasingly vital socio-
cultural area, predominantly because woman's subject position of 
invisibility in theological discourses prevents the church from speaking 
differently to the secular world. The methodology establishes the validity 
of using critical discourse analysis as a tool of deconstruction based on 
the insights of Michel Foucault. This is then deployed to interrogate the 
constructions of woman and the embryo circulating in the popular NRT 
narratives of the media in order to ground a secular baseline. From this 
vantage point, critical discourse analysis is undertaken on two church 
reports and three theological texts. The concluding chapter sketches a 
different framework of moral perception, within which the church would 
be enabled to offer greater empathy in its pastoral care and also to 
prophetically challenge macro-systems of power more effectively. 
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THE PROLOGUE 
My Story 
Strangely enough my story of infertility begins with a normal conception and 
an uneventful pregnancy. I was a week overdue when my waters broke all over 
the sofa at one o'clock in the morning. Nervous and excited, I rang the 
maternity hospital and they advised us to come in straightaway. I was well 
dilated and they thought the baby would be born by the morning. After 
seventeen hours however, I was still not into the second stage of labour. The 
smiling midwives showed their concern by fetching more and more senior 
personnel, each one examining me for themselves, then leaving me to whisper 
outside the door as I strained to hear what was wrong. I always had to ask. 
Finally the registrar decided I needed to have a caesarian section and by this 
time I was too tired to care or protest and was even secretly relieved that it 
would all soon be over. My first-born son was delivered, a healthy baby 
weighing 91bs 80zs. 
My recovery was hampered by a dreadful wound infection that oozed pus and 
required dressing three times a day. A high vaginal swab showed that the 
virulent strain of bacteria responsible had been present in the cervix when I'd 
gone for surgery. When I expressed my incredulity at how such a bug could 
have been there in the first place, the medics implied that someone's aseptic 
technique had been less than scrupulous. As it turned out I was left with an 
undiagnosed stitch abscess for a further three years, but everything appeared 
healed at the time. After about eighteen months we decided to try for another 
baby. I was very relaxed about getting pregnant, unlike the first time of trying; 
after all, I knew that we were fertile. However, nothing happened. Eventually I 
went to the doctors and started the long haul of fertility testing. 
I had a painful lump near the uterus, which they said was endometriosis and 
the cause of my infertility and I was given a course of Clomid for six months. A 
year passed, nothing happened. Eventually, they took me to theatre and 
discovered my endometriosis was an infected stitch, which, unbelievably, they 
left in situ. My consultant told me that I would never have any more children 
and there was nothing more he could do for me. I was too shocked to ask why 
and felt utterly demoralized with the care I'd received from him, especially as 
my painful lump was now a running sore. I went back to my GP. Thankfully he 
was appalled at my treatment and referred me to another consultant for my 
infertility and to a general surgeon for my infected stitch. My GP was worried 
that under the circumstances of professional etiquette, other consultants in the 
area would be unwilling to treat me, but as he knew both doctors personally, he 
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thought they would do so as a favour to him. He was right and they both took 
me on. 
After waiting for the six-month ancillary strike to end, my plastic stitch was 
finally removed, apparently not before time as the surrounding muscle tissue 
had started to become necrotic. Meanwhile the gynaecologist at each 
appointment would repeatedly ring my previous consultant's secretary, in my 
presence, to ask for my notes but was unable to obtain them as seemingly they 
had got 'lost'. He had no alternative but to take me through all the tests again. 
Another laparoscopy, another hysterosalpingogram, but thankfully the post-
coital test was not repea ted. This involves examining the motility of the sperm 
in the vagina following sexual intercourse. You have to have sex no more than 
twelve hours before your hospital appointment. When I had undergone this 
most embarrassing of tests, I had been due at the hospital at around nine thirty 
am, so sex the night before would have been fine. However, things didn't work 
out that way. After placating a hungry and curious toddler, we finally managed 
an unromantic, rushed, but successful quickie at about nine o'clock. 'When did 
you last have sex?' the doctor had asked as he retrieved the fluids from my 
vagina. 'About twenty minutes ago', I had replied. 
Fertility testing is a peculiar phenomenon, which becomes apparent as time 
goes on. 'Everything's fine', they say with a smile as each inspected body part 
comes up trumps. 'Your tubes are open', 'The sperm count is well within the 
limits', 'You are ovulating normally'. But obviously everything is not fine. I was 
not pregnant because something was wrong. And with each successive test that I 
passed, there was that sinking feeling of desperation that another procedure 
had been grimly borne for nothing. I was no further forward. My consultant 
thought that the wound infection might have damaged the fallopian tubes 
microscopically, but there was no way of proving this. Doctors are quite 
guarded about implicating their colleagues. 
Eventually, despite still desperately wanting another baby, I decided to accept 
the inevitable fact that this wasn't going to happen and told my gynaecologist 
so. He told me he thought I was wise to take this attitude. My husband was 
relieved and was quite happy to settle for an only child. My family thought this 
was a sensible approach. I grieved alone. I wept when we moved house and 
brought the baby clothes down from the 10ft. I gave them away. I wept in secret 
when I found out friends and sisters-in-law were pregnant. I wept knowing I 
had been the last person to be told. Then a story hit the headlines. 
My son had been born in 1979 a year after Louise Brown. I had been following 
the stories of IVF with interest due to my secondary infertility, but not, in those 
early days, with much expectation of using this method for my own 
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predicament. The exact details of this newspaper story are blurred by time, 
although the feelings it engendered in me, I can recall with much greater 
vigour. I think this was the gist of it; a mother of three children had chosen to be 
sterilized and then divorced her husband. She had subsequently met someone 
else and wanted to have his baby. She had been accepted for IVF and they had 
put four embryos back, which had all implanted and she had given birth to 
quadruplets. I was very, very angry. I had thought it was selfish to go for IVF if 
you already were a mother, but if a mother of three could try it, then why 
couldn't I? Worse still, this woman had chosen to become infertile and I felt that 
I'd had my fertility stolen from me. I went back to my gynaecologist and told 
him I'd changed my mind and asked him if he would refer me for IVF. He was 
kind enough not to make any adverse comments abou t my earlier decision and 
suggested that we tried for Hammersmith Hospital in London as they were 
pioneering the new technology at the time and had had some success. 
I was overjoyed when the little, blue appointment card came in the post, despite 
the fact that our initial consultation wasn't for another twelve months. What I 
hadn't realized was that Hammersmith had to make their own assessments and 
I wasn't automatically going to be given an IVF attempt. When, at last, we made 
it to that first appointment we felt as if we'd finally arrived, but it was only the 
end of a chapter and the beginning of yet another journey. The next step was to 
go on the laparoscopy waiting list at Hammersmith, so that my suitability for 
treatment could be ascertained. 
Time goes by and the date for my laparoscopy loomed. I arrived at the hospital, 
as requested, at nine thirty in the morning the day before I was due to go to 
theatre, having travelled from Birmingham since the early hours. I was told to 
change into my nightclothes, and despite the incongruity of such a request, I 
duly complied. I had my history taken, pulse, temperature and blood pressure 
recorded, but was left without the ubiquitous jug of water. I remember being 
quite thirsty and asked the nurse if she could fetch me one. She gave me a 
withering look and told me to get one myself from the kitchen. As I was 
searching through the cupboards to find them, the Sister came in and told me in 
no uncertain terms that patients were not allowed in the kitchen and to get out. 
Tears pricked my eyes, I felt utterly humiliated, all I wanted was a glass of 
water. 
My memories of the laparoscopy are confused as each one is mixed with the 
others and specific details are hazy with time and drugged recoveries. I know 
each time it hurts like hell afterwards and I am always sick after a general 
anaesthetic. However, I can remember with clarity the following day when 
Professor Robert Winston led the ward-round in his smart suit and soft voice, 
stopping by every bed to give his verdict on whether or not each healthy, 
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young, female occupant could be given a chance for IVF. I don't know if he was 
aware of the electrifying tension on that bright, sunny morning as we all sat 
waiting in our pyjamas, but I shall never forget it. I was one of the lucky ones to 
be given a chance and a date, another year, my son would then be six years old. 
I was definitely the driving force for going on with this, but to be fair to my 
husband he went along with it and supported me through it all. Infertility is 
like a secret that takes over your life, whilst you pretend to everyone, including 
yourself, that you've got it sussed. You wait. You wait for your 'fertile' time of 
the month - just in case. You wait for your period - just in case. You don't have 
to check your diary, you always know. You wait for hospital appointments to 
come around. You wait in hospital corridors pretending to read. You learn to 
fend off people's nosey inquiries and you become secretive abou t why you need 
time off work. I struggled with myself not to be so overtaken by it all that I 
would let trying for the baby that I might never have stop me from enjoying the 
childhood of my son, whom I did have. It was hard, but it probably helped keep 
me sane. 
Finally, finally, the wait for our first attempt was over. We had to travel down 
to London every day to be at Hammersmith Hospital for six 0' clock in the 
morning. I was always surprised at how heavy the traffic was on the M40 in 
those pre-dawn hours. We'd had to attend a lecture before we started where 
they'd explained the procedure and emphasized the low chances of success and 
pointed out how a man's normal sperm count can fluctuate from quite high 
levels to sub-fertile levels over the course of a year. To demonstrate this, a man 
had been persuaded to ejaculate every three days for a year so they could chart 
his sperm count on a graph. I've always wondered if they made this up. The 
lecture was quite cosy and genial, everyone was happy to be there, we had all 
known that we were the lucky few who had made it thus far. 
In contrast to that meeting, anxiety marked that first attempt. Stomach churning 
tension in the car, in the hospital corridors, endless waiting, waiting to be seen. 
It starts with superovulation. You are given high doses of follicle stimulating 
hormone, which acts as its name implies, so that several eggs will be mature 
enough to mix with sperm in a petri dish giving the best chance for fertilization 
and subsequently, implantation. Techniques have become more sophisticated 
since those early days but the principles remain the same. At Hammersmith 
they gave you a detailed itinerary of steps that you were destined to take 
towards egg collection if you passed each stage of the process. This seemingly 
innocuous set of instructions was referred to by medics and patients alike as the 
'Programme'. The Programme was everything. If your follicles weren't the right 
size or your blood oestrogen levels weren't up to scratch, then you would be 
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'off the Programme', relegated to the waiting list of up to two years for your 
next attempt.1 
At six 0' clock in the morning, having travelled down from Birmingham 
dodging the heavy lorries, I sat in the crowded corridor along with the other 
anxious women sipping, constantly sipping water from a plastic cup. In those 
days they scanned the ovaries to measure the size of the follicles from outside 
the body. Unfortunately, in order to do so effectively, the ovaries had to be 
moved into place by a full bladder, full but not too full. Pain was no indicator to 
this magical amount; the pain barrier was passed very early on. When it was 
finally your turn, if you had overdone it you had to let out a little - too much 
and you would be sent to the back of the queue to begin sipping once again. 
Later with vaginal scanning, mercifully, a full bladder was not required. 
I remember lying there, anxiously, trying to make sense of the screen, trying to 
see what they could see, trying to follow the gritty, grey, ghostlike shapes that 
held my eggs. Would they be the right size? Would there be enough? Would I 
make it to the next stage? Were my oestrogen levels okay? Smiling, pleasant, 
amenable, I would make polite conversation, perhaps adding a humorous 
comment to lighten the tension within me. To my delight, my body responded 
well enough to go forward to egg collection. You had to be available to the 
hospital around the crucial time of ovulation, because if this occurred naturally 
all those precious eggs would be lost to the fallopian tubes. In addition, the 
timing of the final injections was critical so we stayed down in London at this 
stage. 
There were several couples who were at the same phase as us and we became 
friendly with one couple in particular, I'll call them Candy and Den. This was 
their second or third attempt and would be their last as they had been told that 
if it didn't work it would be the end of the road for them. They took us under 
their wings and showed us where to go, literally, taking us through the maze of 
corridors to the night canteen and telling us what to expect. Tragically, their 
attempt failed, and having mothered and fathered us so well, it still seems to 
me eighteen years on, so very unfair. I did go to see the IVF counsellor once, but 
the most effective emotional support came from other couples. 
1 From my interview with Dr Jamieson (see Appendix IV, pp. 272-3) things are very different 
now. NHS patients wait for a first attempt, but after that they are encouraged to have all their 
attempts in quick succession. In addition, if they are lucky enough to have a cluh:h of fertilized 
embryos, the subsequent transfers are not included in their prescribed number of attempts 
(freezing techniques have improved tremendously to make this a viable prospect). If this had 
been the case in my time, it would have mitigated a lot of the stress of the whole process. 
VlII 
In those days egg collection was done under general anaesthetic and I can 
recollect coming round feeling woozy and very sick, but being sharply aware of 
my husband's dejected face. 'Whatever's the matter?' I had asked him. The 
man's role in IVF is a supportive one, except for the little, but obviously critical, 
task of producing the sperm. When the woman is whisked off for egg collection, 
her partner has to queue with the other guys outside the toilets where they wait 
as each man masturbates into a small, labelled laboratory pot. For privacy, this 
is a hospital toilet with a lock; when the job is finished the key is passed down 
the row to the next man. The sperm is then inspected and prepared by the 
technicians for mixing with the recently collected ova. The doctor had taken my 
husband to one side and informed him that his sample had been 'ropey but 
adequate'. My husband had felt that he had failed in the one and only, tiny task 
that had been his to do. 
We returned to the hospital to find out how many eggs had fertilized in 
preparation for having them implanted. In contrast to the hi-tech image of IVF, 
incongruously, the dilapidated, overcrowded conditions of this ancient hospital 
always seemed out of place. This day was no exception. We had been ushered 
into a day room at the end of a Nightingale ward that was full of 
gyaenocological patients and their suitcases waiting to be transferred to another 
ward. Only a few of us were IVF couples waiting for our results. A young 
houseman resplendent in his white coat and stethoscope came into the crowded 
room and called me over to him. 'None of your eggs fertilised', he said matter 
of factly. I remember bursting into tears and feeling all those uninvited eyes and 
ears witnessing the drama that was unfolding before them. Despite the kindly 
protestations of the other IVF women, I ran out of the room. I just had to get 
out. Even now, it beggars belief that this man didn't have the sensitivity to 
speak to us in private. 
I am a stereotypical eldest child, a people pleaser. If I want something I will 
work hard to get it. But fertility is fickle; it eludes you. I had sex at the right 
time, ate the right foods, lay in the correct post-coital position, prayed, had 
hypnosis, went for tests, was a good patient, remembered to take my drugs, 
travelled hundreds of miles, underwent countless embarrassing procedures, 
juggled child care and work commitments, relaxed ... and still nothing 
happened. Frustrated and demoralized, why couldn't I just give up? Perhaps 
because it is so fickle, like roulette, you think next time I just might win. Like so 
many others before and since, I was determined to try again. 
The second attempt was less fraught than the first, although the accompanying 
tension was always present, but knowing what to expect definitely helped. This 
time one egg fertilized. I found having an embryo returned to my womb was 
very exciting, despite the fact that I was well aware that it might never implant. 
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Just for a moment in time I was pregnant. Fancifully, ridiculously, my baby had 
come home. I remember lying on the bed, relaxing as you are told to do, willing 
my uterus to receive this tiny speck into its soft, warm, bloodied lining. Sadly, I 
didn't need to go for a pregnancy test; my period arrived early. 
The frustration of this failure overwhelmed me. I changed my job, the colour 
and style of my hair and even how I dressed. In hindsight, perhaps I needed to 
feel in control of something. But I couldn't give up. Time had not only moved on 
for us, but for IVF too. I was lucky in that I had started out on this treadmill in 
my twenties rather than in my middle to late thirties, as is the case with so 
many women. I was still young enough to keep trying and IVF was becoming 
more accessible. Some friends of ours had tried a local clinic and had been 
successful so we decided to go there for our third attempt. Whilst it feels 
disloyal to Hammersmith, I can only say the difference was stark and the 
experience was far, far less stressful. 
The Midlands Fertility Services at Little Aston was a private facility, not an 
NHS establishment. Being local to this clinic made life much simpler, it meant I 
could go alone for appointments and work and childcare were easier to 
manage. But amazingly, I never had to wait around; I was always seen 
straightaway. I cannot emphasize enough just how much difference this made 
to the build up of tension that interminable waiting engenders. But, by far the 
most critical difference was that you paid to get to egg collection. So if your 
follicles didn't respond to the drug therapy, you simply stopped it, waited a 
month and began again. I had been so indoctrinated by the rigidity of the 
'Programme' that I had to get them to explain this to me three times before I 
could believe it. 
By this time the use of Buserelin had been introduced. This is a drug that 
dampens down the body's own hormonal responses before superovulation is 
started. It is administered by droplets through the nose and it was imp era tive 
that you didn't miss the four hourly dosage. I bought a cheap digital watch with 
an alarm so that I wouldn't forget to take it and used to slip out of meetings 
surreptitiously sniffing my drugs in the toilet like a fervent cocaine user. 
Luckily, things ran smoothly and I reached egg collection on this first drug run. 
Unlike my two previous attempts, this time the ova were to be extracted 
through the vaginal wall under a local anaesthetic instead of via the umbilical 
site under a general anaesthetic. I was told that I would be given a drug that 
would induce amnesia so that I wouldn't have a memory of the procedure. I 
remember feeling very uncomfortable about this at the time, wondering what 
on earth they were going to do to me that would require my memory to be 
swiped clean. Whilst I did query this, I'm ashamed to say that I raised no real 
objection to it at the time, despite the fact that in all my years of nursing I had 
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never heard of such a thing. My husband was permitted to stay with me and 
apparently I yelled out a lot with the pain and then kept apologizing for doing 
so. 
They were slightly disappointed to have only collected four eggs. After mixing 
them with the sperm, three fertilized. When I arrived for implantation, I was 
welcomed by my midwife, Yvonne, who seemed almost more delighted than I 
was. At Little Aston, you were allocated a staff midwife throughout the whole 
attempt, unlike Hammersmith, and this was another personal touch that lifted 
the tension. I was always pleased to see her familiar face and had grown quite 
attached to her. 
'How many embryos are you going to put back?' I had asked her. 'All three, 
why?' she had grinned back at me. 
I knew that returning three embryos would give me the best chance of just one 
implanting, but I was scared of having a triplet pregnancy. I hadn't really 
thought about what I would do in this situation as getting this far had seemed 
an impossible dream. Now I was faced with it. Thankfully, with 
cryopreservation techniques being so much improved and the new HFEA 
guidelines on placing only two fertilized eggs in the uterus, this dilemma 
should no longer be a problem for women currently undergoing IVF.2 
However, despite my reservations, I let them put the three embryos into my 
womb. All I had to do now was wait and give myself progesterone injections 
over the following two weeks. It is much harder to plunge an intra-muscular 
needle into your own flesh than to receive it from someone else, but my 
husband couldn't do it and I had been a nurse after all. 
I have memories of getting quite violent stomach cramps and silently slipping 
ou t of people's company to sit on the toilet checking for signs of bleeding in 
absolute dread. Not a spot, despite the pre-menstrual symptoms I was 
experiencing. They are able to give you a pregnancy test just two weeks after 
embryo transfer, which is about the time menstruation is due. We kept the 
allotted appointment bringing my early morning urine sample to the clinic, 
despite the fact that I was convinced by now that my period was imminent. The 
consultant Peter Bromwich and Yvonne formed a little welcoming committee of 
two. Peter chatted away to us about how the first pregnancy tests were done 
using frogs as he dipped the test paper into the urine. I can't for the life of me 
recall how amphibians were used to do this, but suddenly in the middle of this 
2 According to Dr. Jamieson, frozen embryos have a 20% live birth rate at the Glasgow Assisted 
Conception Unit, although this is one of the highest statistics in the country. See Appendix IV, 
p. 271. On 8/08/2001, the HFEA reduced the maximum number of embryos to be transferred in 
a single treatment from three to two. h!!r.J/www.hfl'a.gov.u!sLPrpssOffice/Archivc, p. 6. 
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scientific history lesson he said,'It's turned blue.' I was pregnant at last. Two 
weeks later I returned for a scan to find out how many embryos had taken. 
'Can you see them?' Yvonne had said to us. The fog-like shapes on the scan's 
screen have always mystified me. 
'Them?' we whispered. 
'Two spheres the size of a ten-pee, look here's one and here,' she said, moving 
the scanner so that the whole picture seemed to turn upside down, 'is the other 
one.' 
'Twins', she beamed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ESTABLISHING THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
I am not just amusing myself by making the game more complicated for a few lively minds. 
I am trying to define in what way, to what extent, to what level discourses, and particularly 
scientific discourses, can be objects of a political practice, and in what system of dependency 
they can be in relation to it.1 
M. Foucault, 1968 
My thesis began with my story of infertility and my subsequent involvement 
with the new reproductive technologies (NRT' s). I have deliberately chosen to 
include these recollections in the Prologue, because I believe they are a 
significant resource for theological reflection. Yet, when I started my research, I 
did not perceive the relation between my participation in in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) and my written account of it, in quite this way. Rather, I simply felt that 
having an embodied understanding of a particular topic would give me greater 
insights as I started to explore it, than would be the case if it were something 
alien to my own experience. However, as I began to examine the wealth of 
theological, philosophical and scientific literature that abounds on this subject, I 
became increasingly concerned with the way in which the issue was being 
discussed, especially as I belonged to the group objectified by this scrutiny. 
Firstly, the discourses from official texts and treatises are couched in 
impersonal, disembodied language appealing to universal principles and citing 
abstract doctrines. Moreover, the churches' official documents are written by a 
predominantly male leadership, who mayor may not at some time be 
personally afflicted by the condition of infertility, but who will never have to 
undergo the procedure of IVF itself.2 The Roman Catholic priesthood is even 
further removed from the context of IVF treatment, as their childfree status is a 
lifetime choice. Secondly, the construction of these discourses established an 
agenda of what was deemed to be important and what was not. In other words, 
not only were a hierarchy of issues created, but also, the very selection of which 
issues to include at all, was at stake. For example, the moral worth of the 
embryo is perceived as a critical aspect of discussions on IVF, whilst the 
1 M. Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' in Ideology and Consciousness 3, pp7-26 [Fr 
1968],1978 p. 23. 
2 K. Kelly states that the Church of England's Working Party for Personal Origins was made up 
of four men and one woman and the Roman Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee on Bioethical 
Issues comprised thirteen men and four women. Life and Lave: Towards a Christian dialogue on 
bioethical questions,( London: Collins, 1987) p. 103. 
pastoral care of women undergoing treatment receives little, if any, 
considera tion. 
Thirdly, the so-called objectivity and impartiality of the texts led directly into an 
ethical deliberation, which appealed to the common assumptions and 
seemingly obvious conclusions that the discourse itself had founded. Finally, the 
media discussions surrounding IVF in newspaper accounts and on television 
programmes followed this pre-set agenda, couching it in everyday language 
and homely stories. Any dissenting public voices appeared to be as strictly 
selected as the dominant ones and whilst these perspectives were quite 
antagonistic to each other, nonetheless, they had a commonality in their 
androcentric worldview. 
In consideration of these points, I began to employ a hermeneutics of suspicion 
and started to ask, 'What is being left out of the discussion?' and 'Whose 
interests are being served by this occlusion?' and finally 'Can other discourses 
be appropriated to challenge the obvious, the given and the common 
assumptions concerning IVF?' My PhD is different from the way that Christians 
have approached this topic in the past, as it will not be framed by the discourses 
of this hitherto accepted, formal and generalised format. My theological 
reflection on the NRTs will take on board my stated suppositions and I will 
begin by considering the first of these contentions. What or, more specifically, 
who is being left out of IVF discourses? 
The surprising answer is woman herself and her account of her experiences. I 
say 'surprising' because it would seem obvious on a firs treading of any article 
on IVF that woman is included by the very fact that her body is the locus for 
IVF and without her there would be no discourse. However, on a closer reading 
of the texts, she is there by implication as necessitated by her reproductive 
organs, but her presence, her standpoint and her subjectivity are missing, 
eclipsed by other, apparently more pressing concerns in the popular narratives. 
Because the language of these discourses is so familiar to the reader, her 
absence passes unnoticed, thereby maintaining and securing her invisibility. 
But, I wish to ask, how would it be if woman became visible? What if the NRTs 
were to be considered from a woman's perspective and if her voice were to be 
heard? It is my contention that such an inclusion would not only reshape the 
discourses, but also the whole ethical framework in which these discussions 
take place. 
In order to formulate this challenge to the dominant, traditional discourses of 
science, medicine, philosophy and theology, I shall begin by drawing on the 
contemporary work of the feminist theorists, who have provided strong 
2 
arguments demonstrating that the privileged views in contemporary ethical 
debates do not present the whole truth. I propose to continue this challenge 
through to its logical conclusion, by asserting that just as a strong case can be 
made for standpoint epistemologies, then it follows that there is a case for 
considering standpoint ethics and embodied differences in moral deliberation. I 
shall then discuss the influential work of Michel Foucault with particular regard 
to his understanding of the relationship between discourse, power and the 
subject and how his insights can be appropriated in my research. I shall end this 
chapter by describing the practical procedures entailed in discourse analysis 
and how I intend to use this method to interrogate a variety of media and 
provide insights into my project to generate alternative ethical frameworks. 
J ••• 1 know what 1 am saying:' Feminist Epistemology 
But God forbid that you should take me for a teacher. Such is not my intention and never 
has been. I am a woman, ignorant, weak and frail, but I know what I am saying: I have been 
shown it by the sovereign teacher. In truth, charity moves me to tell it to you, for I wish God 
to be known and my fellow Christians aided, as I would be myself, in the greater hating of 
sin and loving of God.3 
Julian of Norwich, 1413 
The older women were confused by the new movement's obsession with fairy stories being 
sexist or history being biased and many felt alienated when feminists attacked language and 
hit out with what seemed weird and unnecessary nitpicking, inventing words which seemed 
strange then but now roll off the tongue. At the time there was no vocabulary to describe 
what women were on about. They had to invent the jargon to explain their analysis. 
Identifying with the national liberation movements in the 1960s, they borrowed some of 
their vocabulary, using such words as male 'chauvinist', women's 'liberation'.4 
Angela Holdsworth, 1988 
Can knowledge ever be value-free? 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is doubly fitting that I should turn to the 
feminist epistemologists who have challenged the employment of 'factual 
knowledge' and 'value-free' objectivity in the discourses of science. For, not 
only do their insights bring into question the whole concept of impartiality, but 
also their painstaking research has struck at the heart of the cultural myth that 
scientific knowledge is beyond reproach. In an age where it is commonly 
3 Julian of Norwich, 'Revelations of Divine Love' translated from British Library Additional 
MS37790 in Julian of Norwich; Revelations; Motherhood of God ed by F. Beer (Cambridge: D. S. 
Brewer, 1998), p. 33. 
4 A. Holdsworth, Out of the Doll's House, (London: BBC Books, 1988), p. 198. 
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· recognised that theology, philosophy, history, economics and politics can be 
perceived differently, science remains on a pedestal of established 'facts'. Even 
when it is acknowledged that the interpretation of findings are susceptible to 
prejudice, the finger is often pointed at 'bad science', rather than at 'science-as-
usual', which is deemed to have a methodological objectivity derived from the 
physics model that is without social bias.5 
I claim it is doubly fitting because one of the most contested areas of the natural 
sciences is biology and its controversial by-product, sociobiology. As the NRTs 
form a central thread of this research, exposure of the dominant, scientific myth 
as gendered is especially pertinent. Studies have illustrated just how much 
social, historically situated ideologies have re-employed scientific concepts, not 
only in the selection of what and whom should be objects of research, or the in 
the espousal of theories, but also in the descriptive language used to classify 
objects and processes. Moreover, these concepts can then be appropriated in a 
circular fashion to prove the cultural notions from which they first originated. 
Ruth Hubbard, in her essay 'Have only men evolved?' demonstrates how 
Darwin drew on ideas in the cultural milieu of his era to formulate his theory of 
evolution.6 She quotes from both Marx and Engels to illustrate that this had not 
been lost on contemporary thinkers. The passage from a letter by Engels is 
illuminating: 
The whole Darwinist teaching of the struggle for existence is simply a transference from 
society to living nature of Hobbe's doctrine of 'bellum omnium contra omnes' and of the 
bourgeois-economic doctrine of competition together with Malthus's theory of population. 
When this conjurer's trick has been performed ... the same theories are transferred back 
again from organic nature into history and now it is claimed that their validity as eternal 
laws of human society has been proved.7 
The crucial point here is not to discredit evolutionary theory per se, nor to 
discount every scientific discovery because it may be biased, nor even to 
criticise Darwin for drawing on the historically situated notions of his time, for 
this is how people make meaning of their lived experience both consciously and 
unconsciously. Rather, it is to illustrate that critique of scientific endeavour is 
imperative, because like every other human narrative, it is constructed, and 
5 L. Code states that the concept of a methodology that is free from social influence is' derived 
from a rarefied conception of physics, which is seen as the purest of all sciences, distinguished 
by a methodology that is immune to social influence.' (her italics) L. Code, What can she know? 
Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University 
Press,1991), p. 32. 
6 R. Hubbard, 'Have Only Men Evolved?' in Discovering Reality: Female perspectives on 
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed by s. Harding and M. 
Hintikka (Dordrecht, Boston, London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 45-69. 
7 Quoted in R. Hubbard, 'Have only men evolved? p. 50. 
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therefore not above interrogation. Moreover, this provides a good example of 
the circularity of ideas that pass through the 'value-free' guarantor of science, 
which then become fixed as truth. As evolutionary theory became an accepted 
law of nature it was applied to social theory, becoming social Darwinism, which 
was assimilated into Western culture in the late nineteenth century and remains 
popular today. An excerpt from a Sunday school address by John D. Rockefeller 
demonstrates how the original social theories became reinforced by this 
process: 
The growth of a large business is merely the survival of the fittest ... The American Beauty 
rose can be produced in the splendor and fragrance which bring cheer to its beholder only 
by sacrificing early buds which grow up around it. This is not an evil tendency in business. 
It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law of God.8 
Emily Martin demonstrates how the first part of this dynamic has taken place in 
the reproductive biological discourses of egg and sperm.9 She undertakes an 
analysis of the way the discourse constructs the role of egg and sperm, noting 
how it relies heavily on cultural stereotypes of male and female roles, the 
former being more significant than the latter. In her essay she poses questions 
such as 'why must menstruation be necessarily be viewed as a failure?' and 
'why is oogenesis regarded as a failure because it is finished at birth and not the 
vast production of sperm, of which one trillion are unused in a lifetime?'10 Her 
close reading of the language illustrates that the commonly assumed passivity 
of the egg is reinforced by verbs describing its movement such as 'is 
transported', 'is swept' or 'drifts' as opposed to the agency of sperm which 
'deliver' and' activate the developmental programme of the egg' being 
'efficiently powered' with their' strong' tails. The cultural myths of rescuing a 
damsel in distress are transposed onto the 'perilous journey' that the successful 
sperm must make to 'assault' the egg that will' die within hours unless rescued 
by the sperm'}l 
Martin quotes from the work of Ruth Herschberger, who, as early as 1948, had 
recognized the spurious, scientific perception of sperm as autonomous agents. 
She explains the biological processes required for sperm to function and 
concludes with the following observation. 'The sperm is no more independent 
of its milieu than the egg, and yet from a wish that it were biologists have lent 
their support to the notion that the human female, beginning with the egg, is 
8 Quoted in R. Hubbard, 'Have only men evolved?', p. 52. 
9 E. Martin, 'The Egg and the Sperm: How Science has Constructed a Romance Based on 
Stereotypical Male-Female Roles' in Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader, ed by J. Price and M. 
Shildrick, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp. 179-189. 
10 E. Martin, 'The Egg and the Sperm', points raised on pp. 180-181. 
11 E. Martin, 'The Egg and the Sperm, descriptions of language use pp. 181-182. 
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congenitally more dependent than the male.' {my italics)12 The sociobiologists 
complete this loop by citing the processes of human reproduction to prove their 
case (with highly refutable logic) that such things as 'man's requirement for 
many partners' and 'woman's desire for a high status male to provide for her 
progeny', are directly connected to biological facts. In a similar way to 
evolutionary theory, the stereotypical gender roles have become sanctioned as 
natural law by being regarded as the established 'facts' of science. 
Is value-free knowledge the goal to be sought in any case? 
In a series of pioneering texts, Sandra Harding explores the gendered and racist 
nature of science that goes far beyond the equal opportunity issues suggested 
by feminist empiricists, which intimate that when more women and people of 
colour become scientists, their rigorous application of method would be 
sufficient to counter androcentric and racist bias in the interpretation of data.13 
Harding suggests, however, that this does not go far enough. 'It appears to 
challenge mainly the incomplete practice of the science method, not the norms 
of science themselves.'14 Feminist empiricism may be able to call to account 
scientific inquiries that are used to further sexist, racist, homophobic or classist 
social policies, or question why different policies are formulated from particular 
data for different social groups as in the case of reproductive agendas for elite 
and poor women. But if it does so, whilst still insisting on the suitability of 
existing methodological norms, it subverts the very concept of empiricism that 
it is aiming to defend.Is For, if the methodology per se were as watertight as the 
feminist empiricists claim, then the gender and race of individuals applying it 
should be of no consequence. In other words, if objectivity really could be 
correctly implemented in a value free way, then how would it be possible for 
people from a variety of backgrounds to make a difference in the first place? 
Surely it is the value free claims of the method itself that are found wanting in 
the light of so many biased accounts of scientific assertions. 
12 R. Herschberger, 1948, quoted in E. Martin's article, 'The Egg and the Sperm'.p.182. 
13 I do not mean to belittle the very serious problem of equal opportunity issues for women 
entering the science professions, which, according to a recent Guardian article, 'Why are there 
so few top women scientists?' (G2, 21/04/03, p. 8-9) is still a major problem. Lack of maternity 
leave, the expectation of long working hours and difficulty in returning after childbirth to a 
similar position all contribute to a wastage of highly trained women scientists in the academe, 
who have also chosen to have a family. 
14 S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from women's lives, (Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press, 1991), p. 113. 
15 This point is discussed by S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, (Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press, 1986), p. 25. 
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Harding demonstrates that further interrogation of the methodological norms 
of science reveals that they rely on the rigid dichotomies of white, elite, 
masculinist, Western thinking, which are gendered to the detriment of woman. 
She says: 
Objectivity vs. subjectivity, the scientist as knowing subject vs. the objects of his inquiry, 
reason vs. the emotions, mind vs. body - in each case the former has been associated with 
masculinity and the latter with femininity. In each case it has been claimed that human 
progress requires the former to achieve domination of the latter.16 
Ironically, the rationale behind the feminist standpoint theorists, based on the 
work of Hegel and his insights into the master/slave relationship, turns this last 
point upside down. Nancy Harstock in her development of a feminist 
standpoint explains how, in fact, it is subjugated groups who have a clearer 
view of a situation than their rulersP She claims: 
If material life is structured in fundamentally opposing ways for two different grou ps, one 
can expect that the vision of each will represent an inversion of the other, and in systems of 
domination the vision available to the rulers will be both partial and perverse.1S 
She explains further that because those who hold most power are those who 
structure the material relations in which both they and the oppressed must 
participate, then this vision cannot be disregarded as wholly false. However, 
the vision from beneath is determined by the struggle to change those relations 
and in this way the inhumanity of them is exposed and a deeper understanding 
of their mechanisms can be understood.19 One of the principle difficulties with 
standpoint epistemology is the venturing into relativism that having a variety 
of standpoints may precipitate. Simply put; can there be a feminist standpoint 
in any case, when woman's social experience is so utterly varied? How can 
splitting the view from beneath into smaller and smaller parts be helpful to 
defining reality, as each individual brings their own specific otherness to bear 
on the truth? What is the benchmark for judgment; are all standpoints equally 
well-grounded? Perhaps it would be pertinent at this point to scrutinize both 
'objectivity' and 'relativism' and how they are defined in order to critique their 
effectiveness in any methodological enquiry. 
16 S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, p. 23. 
17 N. Harstock, 'The Femininst Standpoint Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist 
Historical Materialism' (pp. 283-310) in Discovering Reality: p. 285. 
18 N. Harstock, 'The Feminist Standpoint' p. 285. 
19 N. Harstock 'The Feminist Standpoint' p. 285. 
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If value-free knowledge is an oxymoron, can reality ever be realized? 
Harding critiques traditional objectivity, which she prefers to call' objectivism', 
as being weak by asserting that paradoxically it is both too narrow and too 
broad. She suggests that a strong objectivity, which takes account of situated 
knowledges, would prevent the false dichotomy that places value-neutral 
objectivity and judgmental relativism as a form of Hobson's choice.2o 
Objectivism, as she sees it, is too narrow because it seeks to eliminate partiality 
from those undertaking a research project without taking into account that if 
these individuals are from similar elite positions, then they will be equally blind 
to their own biases. It is also too broad because it seeks to eliminate all social 
values from research, yet not all social values are a bad thing, indeed some may 
be imperative to good research practice. (One only has to consider the horrific 
experiments on Nazi concentration camp victims to appreciate this latter point.) 
Harding puts forward her proposition of strong objectivity, which she claims is 
a critical requirement of standpoint theory. In a strong objectivity it is necessary 
to analyse micro and macro tendencies that underpin both good and bad social 
beliefs in order to expose those assumptions and practices which appear 
unremarkable to the dominant perspective. The prime locus to initiate this 
enquiry begins from listening to neglected and marginalised voices, from 
women, strangers and 'natives', from the lives of others who are the losers or 
outsiders in any given enterprise. Harding concludes, 'Strong objectivity 
requires that we investigate the relation between subject and object rather than 
deny the existence of, or seek unilateral control over, this relation.'21 
She points out that judgmental relativism does not arise within marginalized 
groups, for example, 'Women do not have the problem of how to accommodate 
intellectually both the sexist claim that women are inferior in some way or 
another and the feminist claim that they are not.'22 Rather the problems occur, 
not in the inclusiveness of the other into research or curriculum programmes, 
but when that inclusiveness threatens the dominant centre by challenging its 
most cherished beliefs. 
The American Donna Haraway criticises mainstream objectivity, not least that it 
is a myth only 'non-scientists including a few very trusting philosophers' 
believe anyway.23 Moreover, the critical tools in constructing scientific 
knowledge claims are rhetoric and practice. 'Practice is persuasion, and the 
20 S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? p. 142. 
21 S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?' p. 152. 
22 S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? p. 154. 
23 D. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association 
Books Ltd, 1991) p. 184. 
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focus is very much on practice.'24 She charts the feminist trajectory in pursuing 
an effective tool for deconstructing the truth claims of anti-social scientific data, 
which sought to go far beyond reducing the problem to one of bias vs. 
objectivity or good science vs. bad science but which did not, in the end, 
provide a better account of the world. Crucially, the problem, as she sees it: 
... is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all 
knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own 
'semiotic technologies' for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful 
accounts of a 'real' world, one that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide 
projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and 
limited happiness. (her italics) 25 
She advocates the redeployment of vision as a solution to this problem. Not the 
disembodied vision, the 'conquering gaze from nowhere'26 that is the 
privileged, dominant projection, which can see all, but has the power of self 
invisibility, rather vision that is both situated and accountable, that does not 
promise transcendence, but which takes responsibility for what it sees. If vision 
is embodied, it must be particular, located and specific and it will always be 
partial. In the same way that her dogs and flies have different ways of seeing, 
reality is based on the perceptual system of the creature that sees. 
Haraway, like Harding, believes, therefore, that situated knowledges are 
imperative to the practical application of objectivity. Yet, whilst she 
acknowledges that the subjugated have a clearer vision than the powerful due 
to their understanding of how denial and repression are used to render them 
silent, nevertheless, learning how to see from beneath still requires skills to 
interpret that knowledge. The problem of relativism is alleviated by 
acknowledging the partiality of viewpoints, but insisting that they must be open 
to critical enquiry and accountability; why should an acceptance of there being 
no single vision mean that every partial perspective should have equal validity? 
Haraway says, 'Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the 
ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and 
partial perspective; both make it impossible to see well.'27 
Yet, when value-free objectivity is challenged by the acknowledgment that a 
range of partial perspectives may legitimately exist, some theorists, in common 
with the social constructionalists, conclude that no objective reality is possible. 
Stanley and Wise, in their pioneering work, Breaking Out, challenged the 
24 D. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, p. 185. 
25 D. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women, p. 187. 
26 D. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women, p. 188. 
27 D. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, p. 191. 
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concepts of universal truths and facts by asserting that each individual has their 
own reality, which must be continually managed and negotiated.28 However, 
such radical subjectivism conflicts with the rationalist argument, which asserts 
that a fact, such as the gate is shut, exists independently of whether or not it can 
be seen. Lorraine Code critiques this absolute denial of objective social truths, 
which she believes maintains the fact/value dichotomy rather than begins to 
deconstruct it; furthermore, she states, if men's analyses about women are 
wrong, then there must be some facts to get right. She continues: 
Now Stanley and Wise would surely reject any suggestion that sexism and racial injustices, 
women's oppressions, or women's biological experience are 1/ all in their minds." Hence they 
evidently believe in social realities that are less individually constructed, managed, and 
negotiated than they imply. Were there no facts about women's circumstances, there would 
be nothing to investigate, criticize and know.29 
Whilst feminists might argue the point, Stanley and Wise do expose the 
difficulty of achieving this in an information-bound society that is dependent 
on forms of cultural discourse for disclosing those facts. In a study conducted 
by Philip Macnaghten, which considered the discourses of nature in a series of 
transcripts and official documents related to a public enquiry into a planning 
application for a landfill site that had initially been turned down, the different 
concepts of what 'nature' means were explored.30 It became apparent that the 
very different constructions of what constitutes the meaning of 'nature', ranging 
from being a 'wilderness', to a 'passive visual harmony' to a 'visual harmony of 
activities' had significant consequences for the local community. In summing 
up, Macnaghten reveals that whilst the wilderness construction was singularly 
unhelpful in judging the appeal proposals, nevertheless it was the one deployed 
in the interviews when nature was discussed. He says: 
This aspect, I interpret, led to the major difficulty in the analysis: i.e. how to umavel usages 
of constructions of nature where those same arguments did not (or indeed could not as this 
would be a self-defeating strategy) make the term 'nature' explicit.31 
Plants and animals exist, so there must be facts about them to get right; the 
question remains, how can this best be achieved? 
28 L. Stanley & S. Wise, Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 108. 
29 L. Code, What can she knaw? Feminist Theory and the Construction o/Knowledge, (Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press,1991), p. 44. 
30 P. Macnaghten, 'Discourses of Nature: Argumentation and Power', pp. 52-72, in 1/ discourse 
analytic research. Repertoires and Readings o/Texts in Action", ed by E. Burman & I. Parker 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1993). 
31 P. Macnaghten, 'Discourses of Nature:' p. 70. 
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Exploring different ways of seeing and knowing 
Code asserts that rather than considering objectivity/subjectivity as a 
dichotomy, it is more helpful (and more honest) to consider it as a continuum, 
in which some knowledge acquisition is better suited to greater subjectivity or 
objectivity at either ends of the spectrum, whilst other epistemological data is 
more appropriately obtained by the intermingling of subjectivity and objectivity 
at the centre.32 She also challenges the Kuhnian-type paradigm of observing 
objects as foundational to knowledge construction; why, she poses, was this 
model chosen in preference to one based on knowing other people, which is a 
vital human capacity practised from babyhood? For, as she points out,' An 
infant learns to respond cognitively to its caregivers long before it can recognize 
the simplest of physical objects.' (her italics) 33 
Her question invites several responses, not least, that it is far easier to quantify 
'objects' than people and also simpler to devise universal rules for doing so. 
Moreover, I would suggest that, whilst less acknowledged, human beings 
continue to use a complex subjective method for understanding how to relate to 
other people throughout their lives, but because of its reliance on emotion, 
intuition and empathy, it is much harder to define as a model. Her assertion that 
different methodologies serve different purposes is especially apt in this 
example. Code continues her argument by discussing the work of three 
prominent thinkers, Annette Baier, Caroline Whiteck and Sarah Ruddick, who, 
despite the inherent difficulties of such a venture, have all attempted to create 
an epistemological model based on interpersonal ways of learning. Code points 
out that despite the fact that Aristotle wrote extensively on the merits of 
friendship in his Nichomachean Ethics, contemporary exponents of relational 
models have largely been feminist theorists.34 In each case, her cited examples 
have all eschewed the masculinist preoccupation with autonomy in favour of 
the concept of interdependence, which they perceive to be a more accurate 
dynamic of human learning. 
Annette Baier has expressed her understanding of interdependency by asserting 
that people develop into unique, creative individuals of integrity through the 
continual affirmation of others. She says,' A person, perhaps, is best seen as one 
who was long enough dependent upon other persons to acquire the essential 
32 L. Code, What can she knaw?, p. 30. 
33 L. Code, What can she knaw?, p. 37. 
34 It is interesting to note two ironies of Aristotle's work on friendship. Firstly, his claim that 
man's (sic) rationality was his raison d'etre and yet he devoted two whole books to the 
philosophical treatment of friendship. Secondly, his understanding of rationality has been 
traditionally upheld, whilst his work on friendship has been largely ignored or even denigrated. 
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arts of personhood. Persons essentially are second persons.'35 Whitbeck echoes 
these insights in her conception of personal development being through the 
nexus of multiple relationships that shape and form us through listening and 
speaking, identification and differentiation.36 Ruddick advocates 'maternal 
thinking' as a paradigmatic practice, both politically and epistemologically, 
arguing that, far from being the instinctive, natural, feminine (and therefore 
inferior) construction of the prevailing ideology, mothering requires a mode of 
reasoning that can reflect effectively on practices of child-rearing.37 
Whilst there are problematic aspects to these theories, nonetheless, their impact 
has been extremely useful in bringing attention to several facets of 
epistemology. Firstly, they begin to deconstruct the value/ fact dichotomy by 
pointing to the interrelatedness of ethics, subjectivity, agency and epistemology. 
For, who the knower is, the mechanisms for how they gain their perception of 
social reality and the credence given to their cognizant status, all have 
implications, on not only how they choose to act, but moreover, on the very 
perimeters of choice itself. Secondly, they bring the concept of emotional 
reasoning out into the open. In common parlance, it is usually distinguished 
from the 'physics model,' that is, the one accorded paradigm status as the 
purest scientific method, by being characterised as 'wisdom' as opposed to 
'knowledge' . 
Wisdom is gained through experience, reflection and insight, often relying on 
intuition, and is not perceived as being achievable through an accumulation of 
facts or from controlled experiments. By fostering an awareness that feelings 
can be influenced by reasoning and that agency can be guided by emotion (as 
Hume elicited) illustrates that the emotion/reason dichotomy is not just an 
androcentric construct, but also a falsehood.38 Paradoxically, however, this 
feminist alliance with relational ontology in some ways further entrenches the 
emotion/ reason dichotomy. For as emotion is ideologically positioned as 
feminine and therefore inferior to reason, feminist advocacy of emotion can 
35 A. Baier, 'Cartesian Persons' in her Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 84. Quoted in L.Code, What can she 
knaw?, p. 82. 
36L. Code, What can she knaw?, pp. 87-88. 
37 Discussed in L. Code, What can she knaw?, p. 89. 
38 David Hume (1711-76) contended that the passions (feelings), not reason, influenced the will. 
However, reason has an important role to inform the passions and determines desire and 
motivation, not in an adversarial relationship, but rather by being the 'eyes and ears' of the 
passions, for 'the alteration of a relevant belief may also result in an altered passion.' p. 172. 
David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature, ed by D. Norton & M. Norton (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 170-172. 
12 
simply be dismissed by the prevailing, rationalist ideal as woman's self 
justification of her own 'irrational' thought processes. 
Whilst applauding the appeal of her theories, Code, nevertheless, critiques 
Ruddick's model of I rna ternal thinking' for its lack of analysis of the 
socioeconomic construction of motherhood, for its location in elite, white, 
educated women's experience and for its failure to take account of the 
frustrations and ambivalent pressures that effect women in varying situations.39 
The problem of racial bias in white feminists' challenge to patriarchal 
traditional modes of thinking has not been lost on Black wornanists, who have 
to contend with the triple jeopardy of gender, race and class discrimination and 
who have criticized the tacit racism in white feminist thought that is analogous 
with the tacit sexism in androcentric ideology. Patricia Hill Collins, in her 
assertion that Black feminists are only too aware of the connection between 
knowledge and social power, offers a clearer view of the complexities that 
interweave race, gender and class into an overarching system of domination 
and repression. She states: 
By objectifying African-American women and recasting our experiences to serve the 
interests of elite white men, much of the Eurocentric masculinst worldview fosters Black 
women's subordination. But placing Black women's experiences at the center of analysis 
offers fresh insights on the prevailing concepts, paradigms, and epistemologies of this 
worldview and on its feminist and Afrocentric critiques. Viewing the world through a 
both/ and conceptual lens of the simultaneity of race, class, and gender oppression and the 
need for a humanist vision of community creates new possibilities for an empowering 
Afrocentric feminist knowledge.40 
In her proposition for arriving at a more accurate and truthful epistemology, 
she acknowledges Haraway's claims, stated earlier, both that situated 
knowledges are paramount, but also that subjugation alone is not grounds for 
epistemological status. Imperative components of a standpoint epistemology 
are critical analysis, acceptance of one's own partiality of vision and an owning 
of one's voice whilst listening and responding to others, which for Collins is 
reminiscent of the Afrocentric call-and-response tradition. Furthermore, 
accountability lies in positioning these voices in their socioeconomic and 
political context, not keeping them apart as a system of ideas to be discussed in 
the purity of the abstract.41 
39 L. Code, What can she know? pp. 90-91. 
40 P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowennent 
(New York, London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 221-222. 
41 P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, pp. 233-237. 
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I would contend that the requirement for contexualisation is a primary 
difference between feminist and androcentric thought, exemplified by the 
rigidity of philosophical codes of practice, whereby the paring down of 
situations to their most decontextualised form is considered to be the best wa'y 
to provide a universal maxim. This inscrutable methodology is found wanting 
when that maxim is then recontextualised into social realities, for, it cannot take 
on board the vast differences in human behaviour that exist and consequently 
many people's lives are placed outside the (flawed) boundaries of normality. 
Collins asserts that the decentring of the dominant group is essential for other 
partial views to be really heard. It is the hegemony of the dominant mode of 
unemotional, objective, abstract, impartial, universal truth claims that must be 
challenged as, ironically, being subjectively suffused with its own sense of 
providing an accurate account of the world. 
My epistemological standpoint 
I propose to take the epistemological insights of this feminist scholarship 
forward into my thesis by developing a standpoint epistemology that gives my 
experience a valid position. My accountability lies in the owning of my story 
related in the Prologue, and is openly available for critique both by the reader 
and by my own reflective dialogue with the discourses of science, philosophy 
and theology. It is knowledge situated historically in the early days of IVF, and 
must take account of specific changes, such as, currently improved success 
rates, increased availability and social acceptability. However, it still has much 
to offer on the cycle of hope and failure, the emotional aspects of infertility and 
the sense of experimentation that continues to blur the boundaries of research 
and clinical practice in the NRTs. It is a partial view that must also take account 
of my personal circumstances of being a white, middle class, well-educated, 
reasonably wealthy woman, which cannot incorpora te all women's experience 
of IVF. Indeed, many of these particular qualities place me in a highly 
privileged position and consequently obscure the view from beneath in terms of 
race, class and poverty that can offer further understanding. However, it is an 
embodied standpoint that can speak to the cherished beliefs at the gendered 
centre of mainstream discourses, and for this reason, it has epistemological 
worth. 
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' ... weaving her house with love from her marrow ... ' Feminist Ethics 
Like a silkworm weaving 
her house with love 
from her marrow, 
and dying 
in her body's threads 
winding tight, round 
and round, 
I burn 
Desiring what the heart desires. 
Cut through, 0 lord, 
my heart's greed, 
and show me 
your way out, 
o lord white as jasmine. 
MAHADEVIY AKKA42 
... it is taking a life, and it is. Even though it is not formed, it is the potential and to me it is 
still taking a life. But I have to think of mine, my son's and my husband's, to think about, 
and at first I think that I thought it was for selfish reasons, but it is not. I believe that too, 
some of it is selfish. I don't want another one right now; I am not ready for it. 
A Catholic woman's deliberations on her decision of whether or not to have an abortion.43 
Having established criteria for a standpoint epistemology, I now wish to 
explore further the correlation between ethics and epistemology that was 
discussed in the previous section. As already stated, ethics and epistemology 
are inextricably intertwined by virtue of how knowledge is gained, the context 
in which it is gathered and interpreted and the consequences it has on social 
realities. Furthermore, the highly contested subject! object dichotomy, which 
pervades the establishment of scientific data, becomes more controversial in the 
promotion of truth claims that depend far more on values than facts. It seems to 
me that if there is a case for standpoint epistemologies, then it must surely 
follow that there is a case for standpoint ethics, even if only on the basis that 
moral reasoning is, in effect, a specific epistemology in its own right. However, 
I wish to explore in this section the proposition that the valid evidence 
42 Taken from the anthology Of Women and Angels; The Virago Book of Spirituality, ed by S. 
Anderson (London: Virago Press, 1996), p. 176. 
43 Quoted from Carol Gilligan's study into women's moral judgements based on interviews 
with a group of women contemplating abortion in 'In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions 
of Self and Morality', pp. 67-103, in Feminist Ethics ed by M. Gatens, (Vermont Ashgate 
Publishing Company & Aldershot Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1998), p. 85. 
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supporting the critical requirement of situated knowledges in a strong 
objectivity may be directly applied to the apparent gender differences in ethical 
deliberation without having recourse to a problematic essentialist agenda. 
If traditional ethics is acknowledged to hold impartiality in high regard (both 
by its advocates and its critics), how then can it be gendered? 
It is a central irony in the history of philosophy and ethics that what has been 
held to be abstract, impartial, disembodied, universal concepts have by no 
means been gender neutral. When Aristotle claimed that the purpose of man is 
rationality, he did not mean that to apply to the women of his era, whom he 
openly acknowledged to be both cognitively and morally inferior to free men. 
In one sense, his standpoint (and those of male thinkers of similar cultural 
disposition) is acceptable, if the historical context of the epoch in which their 
philosophies were framed is taken into account. Their ideas were centred 
around the polis, not the hearth and were created for the ethics of autonomous 
men, who could exercise choice and therefore were deemed capable of doing so, 
not for dependent people, women, slaves and children who were not permitted 
this freedom and were consequently deemed incapable of such a capacity. 
My point is that not only was their view partial and predicated on the cultural 
notions of their era, but that they might well have agreed that this was indeed 
the case themselves, for who would construct an ethical framework for persons 
considered unable to participate in it? Unfortunately, not only is their 
'universality' in reality a norm for autonomous men, but also the foundations of 
ethical enquiry have imbibed the ideological ontology of woman's inferiority 
that was also inherent in their conceptualization of humanity. Virginia Held 
succinctly sums up the implications of this when she says: 
The associations between the philosophical concepts and gender cannot be merely dropped, 
and the concepts retained regardless of gender, because gender has been built into them in 
such a way that without it, they will have to be different concepts. As feminists repeatedly 
show, if the concept of "human" were built on what we think about" woman" rather than 
what we think about "man", it would be a very different concept Ethics, thus, has not been 
a search for universal, or truly human guidance, but a gender-biased enterprise.44 
The gender bias that has been preserved by this trajectory of androcentric 
thought has spawned a series of dichotomies of association whereby that which 
equates with the masculine is judged to be superior to that which belongs to the 
feminine domain. Consequently, despite rational arguments and new insights, 
44 V. Held, 'Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory', pp.3-26, in Feminist Ethics, ed by M. 
Gatens, (Vermont Ashgate Publishing Company & Aldershot Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, 1998), p 5. 
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these dichotomies have become entrenched in their gender camps, held firm by 
the social construction that follows in the wake of the dominant ideological 
consensus. So, all that is traditionally associated with the feminine, such as 
emotion, nature, the body, sex, childbirth, practical caring for children, the sick 
and the dying and domesticity has been devalued. Whereas their masculine 
counterparts, rationality, culture, the mind, technology, and the bastions of the 
public sphere, economics, science, religion, philosophy, law and civic 
governance, have been accorded greater merit.45 
The feminist challenge to this orthodoxy is problematic for several reasons. As 
these ideological differences have infused cultural codes, the social construction 
of gender roles and institutional norms, as Harstock pointed out, the vision of 
the dominant, organizing power base is not wholly false. Feminist scholarship, 
as the enabling vision from beneath, has challenged the hegemony of these 
dichotomized polarities, and in so doing, radical feminists, in particular, have 
denigrated the patriarchal aspect and promoted the worthiness, and indeed 
superiority, of the feminine associations. Whilst some of these have been more 
extreme than others (Daly, Firestone), nonetheless, an appreciation of woman's 
traditional attributes has created a fresh perspective on these hitherto neglected 
capacities for a significant number of theorists.46 
However, Elaine 5torkey neatly points to the ambivalence of this stance when 
she says, 'We cannot both dismiss gentleness, sensitivity and warmth as just 
socially-constructed stereotypes when attacking patriarchy, but recall them 
when wanting to construct a woman-centred alternative.'47 For, an appreciation 
of difference, if gendered, further entrenches the prevailing view of gender 
essentialism that stokes the nature/nurture debate of biology vs. social 
construction, which is currently resurging with the genetics phenomenon. 
There is an irony that a feminist challenge to male ethics may strengthen the 
male/ female dichotomy that underpins the very associations that patriarchy 
has created. Furthermore, as Black feminists have pointed out, white feminists 
can be as unaware of their racial blindness as men are of their gender bias and 
so perpetuating a male/ female dichotomy may obscure the multiplicity of other 
45 Rosemary Radford Ruether discusses the nature-culture hierarchy and its repercussions for 
woman, which was highlighted by Sherry Ortner's renowned article 'Is Female to Male as 
Nature is to Culture?' in chapter 3 of Sexism and God-Talk: Taward a Feminist Theology, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1983), pp.72-92. 
46E. Storkey, What's Right with Feminism, (London: SPCK, 1985) discusses the politics of radical 
feminism. pp. 90-110. M. Daly espouses her theories in Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical 
Feminism (Boston: Beacon, 1978) and S. Firestone puts her case of biological determinism in The 
Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, (London: Paladin, 1972). 
47E. Storkey, What's Right with Feminism, (London: SPCK, 1985), p. 104. 
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partial visions that exist.48 For, if feminist scholarship has proved nothing else, 
it has surely demonstrated unequivocally that the creation of any dichotomy is a 
falsehood; the complexity of human becoming is far better viewed as a 
spectrum where the polarized extremes at either end provide for stereotypical 
examples, rather than evidence of definitive, perimetered difference. 
On the other hand, it is also the case that woman does have a different situation, 
which is positioned by her gender per se as the moral agent of the domestic 
realm. Whilst it may be that patriarchy has constructed this locus for woman 
that does not mean that the view from this place should not be heard, for as 
human beings we can only make meaning from the place in which we stand. 
Feminists cannot begin from a clean slate, but must hold a corrective, critical, 
questioning stance from where patriarchy has located them. Furthermore, the 
patriarchal denigration of those aspects of life that have suffered from 
philosophical neglect because of their feminine associations, need to be brought 
into the moral debate and reassessed. As it is the gendered view from beneath 
that has clearest vision on those facets that have been constructed into their role, 
then their voice is imperative. I believe it is important to acknowledge these 
ambiguities as I consider the pioneering work of those who have confronted the 
androcentric foundations of normative ethical reasoning. 
How have traditional ethics disadvantaged woman? 
The primary indictment, again, of Western, normative ethics has been its claim 
to speak for all human beings, when, in reality, it has been based on the partial 
vision of elite, white, heterosexual men. Carol Gilligan, in recognising that these 
theories have eclipsed the lives of women and silenced their voices, states: 
I saw that by maintaining these ways of seeing and speaking about human lives, men were 
leaving out women, but women were leaving out themselves. In terms of psychological 
processes, what for men was a process of separation, for women was a process of 
dissociation that required the creation of an inner division or psychic split.49 
In the 1970s Gilligan began her now celebrated book, In a Difforent Voice, which 
initiated a revolutionary reappraisal of woman's moral reasoning that, in turn, 
48 Audre Lorde challenged the racism of white feminists in her address 'The Master's Tools Will 
Never Dismantle the Masters House' originally presented in 1979 during a panel discussion 
entitled 'The Personal and the Political' in This Bridge called My Back: Writings by Radical Women 
of Color, ed C. Moraga & G. Anzaldua (Watertown, MA: Persephone Press, 1981). Alice Walker 
later coined the term womanist to differentiate feminists of colour from white feminists who 
ignore the differences in the lives of Black women when critiquing patriarchy. In Search of Our 
Mothers' Gardens: Womanist Prose (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983) pp.xi-xii. 
49 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. xiii. 
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spawned a plethora of feminist scholarship culminating in the formation of an 
alternative framework - the ethics of care. In the wake of its establishment, the 
normative, androcentric model has been typically referred to as the ethics of 
justice. Whilst she was working with Lawrence Kohlberg, Gilligan challenged 
his theory of six stages of moral development, in which women scored less well 
and only seemed to reach stage three, wherein morality is conceptualised in 
terms of pleasing others.50 Women were considered morally deficient because 
they were unable to go beyond this to stage four, where relationships are 
subordinated to rules and to stages five and six, where rules are subordinated 
to universal principles of justice. Kohlberg's theory was formulated on a study 
of eighty-four boys conducted over twenty years, but claimed universality for 
all human moral reasoning. 
Gilligan's research demonstrated that women tended to perceive moral 
dilemmas from a different vantage point that focused much more on conflicting 
responsibilities rather than on competing rights. They were more inclined to 
eschew a question of rights with its emphasis on separation and abstract 
theories for a contextual approach that placed relationships at the heart of their 
deliberations. Gilligan drew on the work of Nancy Chodorow, who claims that 
the empathetic nature of women is tied into their gender identification with 
their mothers, and boys, recognizing their gender difference, separate 
themselves from this intimate, primary relationship in order to identify with 
their fathers. Gilligan continues, 'Since masculinity is defined through 
separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender 
identity is threatened by intimacy, while female gender is threatened by 
separation.'51Yet, despite this fundamental differential, she maintains an 
empirical stance and says the distinction 'is characterized not by gender but 
theme.'52 Mindful of the way her theories have been used to justify essentialist 
differences and wary of a relativist agenda, Gilligan, in her 'Letter to Readers' in 
the 1993 edition of her book, has stressed the crucial, embodied power of the 
relational voice that gives woman a selfhood from which to speak OUt.53 
In confronting the history of the traditional, androcentric frame of reference, 
Held has identified three of its most disputable aspects which have 
disadvantaged woman. These are: the separation of reason and emotion with 
the privileging of reason, the publici private divide and the equation of the 
private with the natural and the concept of the self constructed from the 
50 Discussed in C. Gilligan'S, A Different Voice, pp.18-19. 
51 C. Gilligan, In a Difforent Voice, p. 8. 
52 C. Gilligan, In a Difforent Voice, p. 2. 
53 C. Gilligan, In a Difforent Voice, pp. xii -xiii. 
19 
masculine perspective.54 I will briefly look at each aspect in turn. Firstly, Held 
claims that the traditional approach to ethics, in the modern era, has been 
inspired by either Kantian or Utilitarian thinking. The Kantian overview 
regards any emotional involvement as clouding the issue and insists that only 
an impartial search for the rational, deontological principle will suffice. In any 
particular dilemma, it seeks the general principles involved in order to then 
apply an abstract rule to the situation. The Utilitarian frame of reference does, 
in fact, recognize the importance of desires and feelings, but only in so far as 
their requirement for maximizing human happiness. It still maintains a 
rationalist, almost mathematical, calculation of the issues involved in any given 
moral problem. Emotions are to be considered in the equation, but under no 
circumstances are they to be part of the deliberation. 
Women, for the most part, argues Held, do not appear to approach moral 
complexities in this way. For them, the context in which a dilemma arises is 
crucial, bound up as it always is, in relationships between embodied persons. 
For women, empathy is not merely a nicety that may demonstrate kindness; it is 
a crucial tool in the practical application of moral agency. It is not a given that 
appears from nowhere, but is worked at through listening, caring and 
understanding. Rationalist grounded ethics not only eschew emotion, they 
often eclipse it in the same way that other aspects of feminine associations are 
made invisible, taking for granted such facets of life as 'love' and' trust' , 
particularly in the case of mothering, which is assumed to be an instinctive 
given, rather than the emotional hard work that it is. 
The second of Held's contentions, that of the publici private separation is 
similarly affected by the downgrading of the domestic realm to the 'natural', 
wherein woman's caring practices are viewed as being part of her biological 
inheritance as opposed to the public domain, where man is perceived to be 
transcending his animality in the building of culture. As Held asserts, human 
mothering nurtures cultural practices and is far removed from animal 
behaviour, which whilst often complex, does not involve the shaping of 
language, moral guidance and creative agency. She continues with regard to the 
multifarious approaches to infant feeding, 'There is no reason to think of human 
nursing as any more simply biological than there is to think of, say, a 
businessmen's lunch in this way. Eating is a biological process, but what and 
how and with whom we eat are thoroughly culturaL' 55 
Susan Moller Okin demonstrates these factors of androcentric conceptualisation 
in her critique of Rawls' treatise, A Theory of Justice. Rawls predicates his vision 
54 v. Held, 'Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory', pp. 10-11. 
55 V. Held, Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory', p. 18. 
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of a just society on the indispensable precondition of a secure childhood within 
a loving family without addressing two fundamental ironies, upon which this 
rests. Firstly, as Okin points out, 'At the foundation of the development of the 
sense of justice, then, are an activity and a sphere of life that -though by no 
means necessarily so - have throughout history been predominantly the activity 
and sphere of women.'56 So the crucial moral capacities required for a just 
society are nurtured primarily by those whose ethical abilities are considered 
deficient or merely instinctive. Secondly, Rawls makes an assumption, without 
explanation, that the constitution of the traditional family is just. But as Okin 
succinctly demonstrates, far too frequently this is not the case. She says: 
If gendered family institutions are not just but are, rather, a relic of caste or feudal societies 
in which roles, responsibilities and resources are distributed, not in accordance with justice 
but in accordance with innate differences that are imbued with enormous social significance, 
then Rawls's whole structure of moral development seems to be built on uncertain ground. 
(her italics )57 
It seems to me that these inconsistencies illustrate the pervasiveness of the 
polarized, gendered assumptions, which position woman as not just inferior, 
but also, often invisible, as a cultural agent in her own right. 
Held's third proposition that the male conception of self has been harmful to 
woman is based on the traditional notion of the autonomous, separatist, self-
interested ego being pitted against the universal, generalised perspective of 
everyone else. It has not encompassed the morally significant aspect of personal 
relationships that exist in families, between friends and which form 
communities, and especially not from woman's vantage point. Drawing on the 
work of Gilligan, (building, as mentioned earlier, on Chodorow 's insights), 
Held asserts that woman's self-perception is affiliative.58 Feminists exploring 
this self-in-relation conceptualisation of subjectivity do not view it as 
constituting a loss of self, but rather perceive it as a reciprocal, empathetic, 
intersubjective identity that gives validity to both self and other by the 
recognition that embodied relationships are the fabric of social realities. 
56 S. Moller Okin, 'Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice', pp. 45-65, in Feminist Ethics, ed 
by M. Gatens, (Vermont Ashgate Publishing Company & Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, 1998), p. 53. 
57 S. Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice,' p. 53. 
58 V. Held, 'Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory', pp. 22-24. Both Held and Gilligan also 
draw on the work of Jean Baker Miller, whose book, Taward a New Psychology of Women , re-
evalulated woman's psychological qualities, judging them to be strengths rather than 
weaknesses. 
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Far from being restricted to the locality of the hearth, this way of seeing can 
encompass embodied relations with unknown persons, such as those suffering 
from famine, poverty and widespread disease overseas and future persons as 
yet unborn. Furthermore, it is both, in fact, a more honest and healthy account of 
human interaction. For in taking the masculinist view to its most ideal, Held 
cites the legal theorist Jennifer Nedelsky's observations and says, 'She sees the 
traditional liberal view of the self as implying that the most perfectly 
autonomous man is the most perfectly isolated, and finds this pathological.'59 
Is it ethical to use a discourse to determine ethical behaviour that denies the 
specific subjectivity of woman? 
If it is the case that normative ethics has been founded on a notion of 
subjectivity that is inherently male, then two fundamental questions must be 
asked. The first one, initiated by modem thinking, which begins the gender 
critique of ethics, simply asks if this partial framework is an appropriate format 
in which to guide woman's moral decision-making. However, the second 
question, which is prompted by postmodern thinking in its critique of the 
critique, begins to undermine the concept of ethics itself, by plunging gender 
definition into a state of incoherence with its truth claims severely disrupted. 
The second question is this, 'does woman, ideologically speaking, have a 
subjectivity at all?' 
Susan Frank Parsons, in a meticulous exploration of these issues, identifies 
three ways in which feminism (in itself dependant upon humanism and 
Enlightenment thinking) critiques ethical thinking with gender.60 The first 
approach is an ethic of equality, which resonates with the stance undertaken by 
the feminist empiricists in epistemology. It holds to a universal human nature 
borne from the thinking that liberalism spawned and rejects essential 
differences, demanding, under a human rights banner, equality of opportunity 
for women and their equality of representation in all spheres of life. The 
problem with this approach is that difference is seen as something, not intrinsic 
to our humanness, but rather as a failure of meeting its most basic ideals, so that 
in Parsons' words, 'Thus women are to appear only to disappear. They are to be 
present as women only to efface themselves as women in particular.'61 
Moreover, this approach, by denying difference, does not appear to recognise 
the difficulties that seeking an equal place in a social fabric, which has been 
imbibed with male subjectivity, may incur. 
59 V. Held, 'Feminist Transfonnations of Moral Theory', p. 25. 
60 S. Frank Parsons, The Ethics of Gender, (Oxford, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 
pp.25-42. 
61 S. Frank Parsons, The Ethics of Gender, p. 30. 
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The second approach is an ethic of difference exemplified by Held's challenge 
to masculinist ideals, offering Gilligan's concept of self-in-relation as a 
paradigm for woman's account of her own subjectivity. Yet in the 
commendable desire to make woman visible, an ethic of difference can bind 
woman as effectively as patriarchy has in labelling, positioning, controlling and 
naming her subjectivity, restricting her from the freedom of simply being who 
she is.62 In an era that offers woman choices to escape the domestic realm, she 
may find a prescriptive, feminist-defined subjectivity as stifling as the 
traditional one accorded to her. 
The third approach is an ethics of liberation, which is primarily concerned with 
change, borne out of a Marxist understanding that we are SOCially constructed 
in our human being and becoming. It purports that we are shaped by language 
and practices and our notions of goodness and truth are historically situated. In 
this reading of gender difference, there is no essentialist nature, rather there is a 
quest to discover how it is that we are constructed into the roles that we 
perform and how power manifests itself in systems, discourses and language to 
implement our social moulding. The weakness with this ethic of gender lies in 
its vulnerability in trying to find an unconstructed location amidst the hugely 
powerful monoliths of human history and social systems. The desired, changed 
life that we strive for may not conform to 'the pattern of two genders imposed 
upon us by social convention and tradition.'63 
Parsons draws our attention to the central importance of the self in constituting 
the discipline of ethics. She says: 
This self, who comes to be the subject of ethics, becomes a kind of mediating figure. It 
mediates an ethical vision for the rest of humanity who may be caught up by the same 
insights and carried along into a better life as a result of following the advice given. So it is a 
kind of mediator of humanity to itself, representing us to ourselves for the betterment of our 
lives.64 
But if that self is not a universal self as it has claimed to be, but rather a self 
expressing embodied, male experience, then several implications surely follow. 
Firstly, such an insight creates a space for woman to consider her own 
subjectivity, initially, thinking about how she has been traditionally named by 
patriarchy and then to decide how she wishes to name herself. Secondly, it 
disrupts the comfortable security on which ethics as a discourse concerning the 
good is based, for if its mediator is a falsely inclusive self, then it must be the 
62 S. Frank Parsons, The Ethics of Gender, p. 35. 
63 S. Frank Parsons, The Ethics of Gender, p. 40. 
64 S. Frank Parsons, The Ethics of gender, p. 43. 
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case that all ethical taken-for-granted assumptions will need to be reassessed 
and reformulated. Thirdly, it proclaims the mediating self as gendered, and in 
so doing, suggests that, not only has ethics constructed woman as ontologically 
other, it has constructed, controlled and regulated man as subject. The truth that 
man is also a gendered subject has a positive aspect, in that, he too has a 
standpoint, rather than a universal, normative humanity. From this vantage 
point, he can also critique the hegemonic system that has named him and 
investigate the impugned territory of his masculinity in the same way that 
femininity has become disputed. However, such a venture may prove 
problematic, for, as Parsons cautions, this opportunity may allow him to return 
humbled back into the system that gave him power, reinforcing his dominant 
position within it.65 
But if woman's subjectivity has been falsely included in the universal self, 
who has she been in the ideological framework? 
In the ensuing years since the publication of her pioneering book, The Second 
Sex, Simone De Beauvoir's famous declaration, 'One is not born, but rather, 
becomes a woman,' has become a mantra for feminists.66 Drawing on the 
anthropological insights of Levi-Strauss, she demonstrates that, whilst creating 
otherness is a primordial facet of human consciousness, the alterity of woman is 
different to contrasting categories, because in terms of, say, racial otherness 
there is a reciprocity of alterity, but in the case of woman, she has no subjective 
referential of her own with which to reciprocate. De Beauvoir says: 
For him she is sex - absolute sex, no less. She is defined and differentiated with reference to 
man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the 
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute - she is the Other.67 
Moreover, woman's opposition to her otherness is fragmented in a way that is 
unique compared to corresponding groups of people who oppose their 
subordination, by the fact that she is bonded through her allegiance to man 
through sexuality, familial or economic ties. These cultural constructions are so 
strong that woman, whether due to the interiorisation of her position or to the 
benefits that she may enjoy from the arrangement, is often complicit in 
maintaining the status quo. 
Throughout history, woman has never claimed, or been able to claim her own 
subjectivity. She has been the medium of exchange between men, for even in 
65 S. Frank Parsons, The Ethics of gender, p. 50. 
66 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated and ed by H M Parshley, (London: Vintage, 1997, 1st 
pub in English, 1953, 1st pub in French as Le Deuxieme Sex, Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 295. 
67 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 16. 
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marriage, there has never been a reciprocal bond between the sexes, but 
between men and men with women as the goods to change hands.68 Nearly 
twenty years before Gilligan began her book, De Beauvoir recognised the 
investment that woman makes in her own moral code, which she knows is not 
men's, and that this creates a psychic divide within her. She asserts: 
Woman knows that the masculine code is not hers, that man takes for granted she will not 
observe it since he urges her to abortion, adultery, wrongdoing, betrayals, and lies, which he 
condemns officially. She therefore calls upon other women to help define a set of 'local 
rules', so to speak, a moral code specifically for the female sex. It is not merely through 
malevolence that women comment on and criticize the behaviour of their friends 
interminably; in order to pass judgement on others and to regulate their own conduct, 
women need much more moral ingenuity than men do.69 
In this excerpt, De Beauvoir addresses the moral complexities that woman's 
otherness creates in relation to male ethics that Gilligan does not. For De 
Beauvoir, woman's moral decision-making is a response to her constructed 
otherness, which recognises the ambivalent position in which patriarchy has 
placed her. In order to claim subjectivity, to be a 'true woman', woman has to 
accept herself as other. But as other, woman is condemned to immanence, for 
she has no subjective capacity for transcendence in her own right. However, her 
desire for transcendence can be accomplished in ways that have implications 
for theology and ethics. De Beauvoir demonstrates how salvation for woman is 
inextricably bound up with servitude. Religion provides woman with a God, 
who can grant her an escape from her imprisoned immanence through 
practicing a sincere faith that she may freely choose. De Beauvoir observes: 
Man enjoys the great advantage of having a God endorse the codes he writes; and since man 
exercises a sovereign authority over woman, it is especially fortunate that this authority has 
been invested in him by the Supreme Being.7° 
In consciously accepting her otherness, and by an obedient devotion to 
children, husband, home, Church and country, woman may ensure her 
salvation and transcend her designated earthly inferiority by God's grace. By 
these rules, man transcends through his agency, whilst woman transcends 
through her obedience. De Beauvoir says, 'To sanctify this ranking in the name 
of the divine will is not at all to modify it, but on the contrary to intend its 
eternal fixation.'71 Despite the secular nature of Western society, the influence of 
Christianity on what is deemed to be good remains prevalent in the popular 
consciousness. It seems to me that the feminist paradigm of woman's morality 
68 S. de Beauvoir, The second sex, pp. 102-103. 
69 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 557. 
70 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 632. 
71 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 261. 
25 
being predominantly relational is compatible with De Beauvoir's theories. But if 
this is the case, then woman's sense of goodness is predicated on her being the 
other. 
Furthermore, such a psychic disassociation of selfhood creates difficulties for 
woman when she crosses over the publici private divide into the world of 
work, where men are to treat her as an equal, but still regard her as the 
inessential. For man, the more status he acquires in the public domain, the 
greater is his standing in the home. Yet, De Beauvoir asserts, 'Whereas woman's 
independent successes are in contradiction with her femininity, since the 'true 
woman' is required to make herself object, to be the Other.'72 In a feminist 
challenge to these public codes and to woman's disputed subjectivity, I propose 
to consider the work of Michel Foucault to explore the relationship between 
subjectivity, knowledge and power in the construction of social realities. 
' ... 1 have built me a body whose ways are all open ... ' Foucault, the 
Philosopher and Historian of Otherwise.73 
Birth 
Lord, I am born! 
I have built me a body 
Whose ways are all open, 
Whose currents run free, 
From the life that is thine 
Flowing ever within me, 
To the life that is mine 
Flowing outward through me. 
I am clothed, and my raiment 
Fits smooth the spirit, 
The soul moves unhindered, 
The body is free; 
And the thought that my body 
Falls short of expressing, 
In texture and colour 
Unfoldeth on me. 
The first two stanzas of Birth by Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935)74 
72 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p. 291. 
73 The second part of the title of this section is taken from A. McHoul and W. Grace's preface to 
A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject, p. viii. 
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Why is Foucault so important? 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a philosopher, historian and political activist, 
whose work was, and continues to be, enormously influential for theorists from 
a variety of academic disciplines. His, now famous, counter-history of ideas was 
a response to the ideological crisis of the1960s and 1970s, when the then 
contemporary concepts of knowledge, discourse and power were proving to be 
problematic. 75 The predominating philosophies of Foucault's era were 
structuralism and hermeneutics, the latter being derived from phenomenology. 
In the traditional Marxist interpretation of the history of ideas and structural 
linguistics, notions such as the 'continuous progress of science' and the 'heroic 
creative agent' were in jeopardy, which initiated a space for thinking outside 
the concurrent systems of the time. This afforded Foucault the opportunity to 
develop his counter-history of ideas, which he preferred to describe as 'systems 
of thought' and considered them to be an object in their own right. Foucault 
referred to these systems as 'discursive formations' and to their analysis as 
, archaeology.' 
In addition to this ideological crisis, the Marxist concept of a base 
superstructure with its inherent economic determinism was fragmenting in the 
post-industrial culture and became increasingly unable to deal with the 
emerging struggles of race, gender and ecology. The rise of information 
technology replacing traditional manufacturing modes of production did not 
displace the capitalist power bases, but rather entrenched them in ways that 
had not been envisaged. In response to this cultural change, Foucault's 
understanding of power as relational and involved in the webs of everyday 
living, rather than imposed from the top down, offered an explanatory dynamic 
that the hitherto limited, mechanistic notion could not. 
Moreover, Foucault's theories of discontinuity, particularly of science 
discourses, demonstrated that ideas do not have a steady onward progression, 
or a directed trajectory, and that by being dependant on particular, locally, 
historically contingent factors, they could have been otherwise to what they 
were and are. The notion of difference began to emerge, replacing hierarchies of 
superiority and inferiority in comparing theories and the sense of multiplicity 
as opposed to progression in the realm of competing ideas within a given 
74 'Birth' by CharlottePerkins Gilman in V. Zundel, Faith in her Words: Six Centuries of Women's 
Poetry (Oxford: Lion Publishing pIc, 1991), pp. 14-15. 
75 A. McHoul and W. Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Pawer and the Subject, (15t pub 
Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1993; this edition, London: UCL Press, 1995), pp. 1-25. 
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discipline gained acceptance. Changes in ideas no longer needed to be tied to 
individual thinkers or 'economic realities'. 
Foucault's work as a historian was focused primarily on an ontology of the 
present and its purpose was to demonstrate the historical fragility of 
commonsense concepts. His concept of an 'ontology of the present' meant 
offering a perspective of the 'now' based on an archaeology of historical 
knowledges that have brought about certain ways of looking holistically at 
specific topics?6 For example, common concepts, such as 'labour' or 'sexuality' 
came into existence framed by normalising borders containing what is 
acceptable knowledge within them and what is not. Foucault might ask 'how 
did this happen?' In addition, an understanding was taking root tha t theories 
could not be compared with each other using the object in question as a 
yardstick, for how can we know the object in its pure form? We can only know 
anything through the body of knowledge or the set of ideas that already 
describes, contains and produces it as an object or category. Foucault defends 
this stance when he says: 
It is fruitful in a certain way to describe that-which-is by making it appear as something that 
might not be, or that might not be as it is. Which is why this designation or description of 
the real never has a prescriptive value of the kind, 'because this is, that will be'. It is also 
why, in my opinion, recourse to history-one of the great facts in French philosophical 
thought for at least twenty years- is meaningful to the extent that history serves to show 
how that-which-is has not always been; ie., that the things which seem most evident to us 
are always formed in the confluence of encounters and chances, during the course of a 
precarious and fragile history ... It means that they reside on a base of human practice and 
human history; and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as 
we know how it was that they were made.77 
In his book, The Order of Things (1970), Foucault undertook an archaeology of 
the human sciences with a special regard for their relation to language (the 
French title, Les mots et les choses, means 'words and things'). The concepts 
behind structural linguistics had been fairly static during the upheaval affecting 
the traditional notions described earlier, only widening the theoretical confines 
of semiologicalj structuralist thought founded by Ferdinand de Saussure. 
However, political critiques of structural linguistics linking it to bourgeois 
idealism led to a changed perception of discourse, in which it began to have an 
autonomy and materiality of its own. Its ability to produce social realities, 
rather than simply represent them gave it the impetus of a political tool. 
76 I use the term 'holistic' to mean the whole knowledge about a topic, which includes the 
discursive techniques and practices which interconnect with the discourses concerning any 
given entity. 
77 M. Foucault, Politics Philosophy Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 37. 
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Foucault's interest was in rethinking the relationship of language to the world. 
How did language become perceived as a structure of representation? How do 
bodies of knowledge function? In Madness and Civilisation, for example, 
Foucault is not concerned with the history of psychiatry per se, but with how 
such a discipline came into being at all. 
In the course of his work, Foucault was also concerned to reveal historically 
contingent, subjugated knowledges, which had been discredited by the official 
histories. These are the stories that the patients, criminals or lunatics tell about 
themselves. He says of these 'naIve' histories; 'It is through the reappearance of 
this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified 
knowledges, that criticism performs its work.'78 Foucault was particularly keen 
to demonstrate the methods by which official knowledges create boundaries of 
normalization, and in so doing, illustrate how subjugated knowledges have 
been eclipsed by the hegemony of authoritative discourses. His insight that 
power is inextricably woven into this hierarchy of discourses is stressed when 
he says: 
When the prisoners began to speak they possessed an individual theory of prisons, the penal 
system and justice. It is this form of discourse which ultimately matters, a discourse against 
power, the counter-discourse of prisoners and those we call delinquents-and not a theory 
about delinquency.79 
Foucault's conception of how power operates continues to remain outside the 
popular, welI-embedded notion of a top down, consciously applied, oppressive 
force. Rather, for Foucault, power is a discursive relation, encompassed in 
techniques, practices and processes, that functions between competing 
discourses and can, perhaps unwittingly, be appropriated and applied by the 
subjugated. As McHoul and Grace observe, 'Critique can sometimes, therefore, 
consist in ceasing to do something; in ceasing to repeat the official technique.' 
(their italics) 80 He is less interested in who wields power, rather seeking to 
understand how power manifests itself, how it governs and subjectifies human 
bodies and behaviour in concrete social realities. Foucault's critique is focused 
on the loci of power's extremities, where officialdom overexerts itself, such as 
the confessional or the prison. He is concerned with the field of power and how 
it functions, how through discourse and practices knowledge is investigated, 
accumulated and recorded and its material effects on the human and social 
body. Crucially, it is this approach to both the macro- and the micro-cultural 
78 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interoiews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1980), p. 82. 
79 M. Foucault, Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interoiews, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1977), p. 209. 
80 A. McHoul and W. Grace, A Foucault Primer, p. 21. 
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aspects of a particular social practice that is so beneficial to my thesis and I 
propose to apply these avenues of investigation to my analysis of the NRTs. 
Foucault and the body 
Foucault's capacity to use different axes from the established notions to form 
his questions has proved to be fruitful in generating other ways of thinking 
about everyday, taken-for-granted aspects of life. He says, ' As regards 
Marxism, I'm not one of those who try to elicit the effects of power at the level 
of ideology. Indeed I wonder whether, before one poses the question of 
ideology, it wouldn't be more materialist to study first the question of the body 
and the effects of power on it.'81 Bryan Turner applies these Foucauldian 
insights to his research on the body, which is perceived as the site for, and the 
product of, political! power relations.82 Turner notes that for Foucault, the 
influences of power on the body come from two separate but interconnected 
sources; the first being involved with the individual body itself, described as 
'anatomo-politics', which centre on the techniques and disciplines that foster 
'docile', 'practised' and 'useful' bodies, fitting them for production and 
reproduction. 
The second being the policies on the social body, referred to as 'bio-politics', 
which focus on the regulations that could be applied to the population. He cites 
Foucualt's critical understanding that medical science is a focal point where 
these two axes meet, bringing the disciplines of professional medico-care 
practitioners into relationship with the controlling techniques of institutional 
establishments, such as hospitals, prisons and schools. Both techniques are 
often referred to as 'bio-power'. Foucault's insight that, 'The disciplines of the 
body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around 
which the organization of power over life was deployed,' is directly relevant to 
how a society deals with issues of fertility. 83 
In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault demonstrates that sociology and medicine are 
intertwined, indeed, sociology and social medicine (from which modem 
medicine is founded) both originated from the knowledge and control of 
populations, made possible by appropriating Bentham's panopticon techniques 
of surveillance.84 As Turner notes, 'The implication of Foucault's perspective is 
81 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interoiews, p. 58. 
82 B. Turner, The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory, (London, California, New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1996 [lst ed pub by Basil Blackwell, 1984]), p 63. 
83 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction, (London: Allen Lane, 1979 
[FrI976]), p. 139. 
84 Bentham's Panopticon was a central tower in the prison, from which all prisoners could be 
seen. It had the effect of controlling behaviour despite the fact that obviously not all prisoners 
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that sociology is applied medicine and its target is the regulation of bodies.'8s 
The industrial revolution with its need for an accumulation of docile and useful 
bodies necessitated the monastic habits of asceticism to be incorporated into the 
population. The dynamics of the panopticon were reflected in the popular 
embrace of the protestant work ethic, in which both public and private duties 
became individual callings without the overseer of the priest. The extent of this 
religious asceticism, which was reinforced by capitalist practices in an 
increasingly secular culture, stretched far beyond the factory gates into the 
marriage bed, where sexuality for pleasure was usurped by sexuality for 
procreation only. 
Using Foucauldian analYSis, Susan Parsons considers the social techniques that 
construct us as embodied subjects to fit into the historically contingent needs of 
any given society.86 It is through our interaction with, and critically, our 
confession to, doctors, counsellors, teachers, ministers and our exposure to 
media expositions from such authorities that we come to know things as they 
see them. We then subject our bodies to the regimes of this knowledge, we take 
up its routines, and we become disciplined altering our behaviour to suit its 
conditions. In her interpretation of Foucault regarding ethical perimeters, 
Parsons elicits, 'The moral codes of a society articulate its investment and 
expectation, its accounting of bodies, and these take up residence in its 
members, in a colonization of its docile bodies.'87 
Those who dissent from the morality of the status quo will enunciate the 
competing discourses in any given discursive field, but they will be 
disadvantaged by the normalization techniques inherently attached to the 
dominant discourses that renders critique to the margins. For Foucault, ethics is 
primarily concerned with 'the relation one has to oneself .88 He is concerned 
with how truth can be spoken, especially by those who are the object of study, 
such as the patient or the criminaL In researching The History of Sexuality, he 
says, 'I will be doing the same thing with sexuality, only going back much 
could be observed simultaneously. The process has filtered into the current socio-cultural 
mechanisms of control, a good example being the speed camera, which can regulate the speed 
of motorists even when the camera is not operating. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison, (London: Penguin Books, 1977, trans. By A. Sheridan, [1 sl pub as Suroeiller et puni: 
Naissance de la prison, by Editions Gallimard, 1975]), p. 200. 
85 B. Turner, The Body and Society, p. 75. 
86S. Parsons, The Ethics of Gender, pp. 68-70. 
87 S. Parsons, The Ethics of Gender, p. 69. 
88 A. McHoul and W. Grace, A Foucault Primer, p. 24. 
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further: how does the subject speak truthfully about itself, inasmuch it is the 
subject of sexual pleasure? And at what price?'89 
Lois McNay discusses the Foucauldian body and applies a feminist critique to 
this thinking.90 She describes how Foucault, in The History of Sexuality, 
elucidates a theory of the body that manages to be anti-essentialist without 
denying its corporeality. In this text, Foucault claims that sexuality, far from 
being a natural phenomenon of unruly passions, is, in fact, a cultural construct 
produced through relations of power with the express intention of regulating 
sexual behaviour. McNay acknowledges the relevance of his theories to recent 
feminist scholarship and continues: 
Following Foucault's point that the sexual body is both the principal instrument and effect 
of modem disciplinary power, feminists have shown how the various strategies of 
oppression around the female body - from ideological representations of femininity to 
concrete procedures of confinement and bodily control- were central to the maintenance of 
hierarchical relations.91 
She discusses Foucault's understanding of how this was applied to the female 
body in the nineteenth century through the hysterisation of woman. A series of 
fragmenting discourses came into being that relied in part to the pre-existing, 
traditional concepts of woman, but which incorporated a new connection with 
the medical discourses of the period. The importance of reproduction, with its 
aim of population control was at the crux of these relations, which brought the 
medical rationale of hygiene to split cleanliness and pleasure in woman's 
sexuality. Working alongside Turner's description of the protestant work ethic, 
it is not hard to imagine how effective this was in creating the construct of 
woman's sexual passion as immoral and her desire for procreation without 
sexual pleasure as good. Furthermore, Foucault's understanding creates 
different ways of approaching an analysis of masculinity as a socio-historically 
contingent construct, rather than simply being 'normative humanity'. 
Foucault and discourse 
I know how irritating it can be to treat discourses in terms not of the gentle, silent, intimate 
consciousness that is expressed in them, but of an obscure set of anonymous rules. How 
89 M. Foucault, Politics Philosophy Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 30. 
90 L. McNay, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 
pp.28-38. 
91 L. McNay, Foucault and Feminism, p. 31. 
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unpleasant it is to reveal the limitations and necessities of a practice where one is used to 
seeing, in all its pure transparency, the expression of genius and freedom.92 
I have already stated why Foucault's approach is relevant to my thesis; I now 
wish to begin to specify how I intend to utilise his perspective as an analytical 
tool. I would assert that discourses are the most easily accessible data that can 
encompass a wide-ranging study of micro- and macro-cultural assumptions, 
which are inherently enmeshed in bodies of holistic knowledge. I intend to 
demonstrate initially what Foucault understood by the term discourse, and then 
to draw together from his work critical themes that will enable me to construct 
my own investigative method for analysing discourses. 
The first step must be to establish what Foucault means by his historical 
discourse analyses as opposed to other forms of discourse analysis that 
predominate in linguistics, socio-linguistics and sociology. McHoul and Grace 
explore this distinction, and whilst, by and large, it can be said that Foucault's 
approach is a social critique, whereas the other forms are not, this is not always 
the case and therefore needs clarification.93 Non-Foucauldian approaches to 
discourse analysis are either formal or empirical. The formal perspective 
incorporates both a method from the school of French structuralism, which 
applies a social critique to texts called social semiotics, reading them for their 
gendered, racial or class bias, and also, a mechanistic style that searches for 
systemic rules lying behind and underpinning a text. The empirical stance is 
mainly a sociological one, and whilst it shares Foucault's concern for 
knowledge, it is more focused on technical expertise as opposed to the holistic, 
social knowledge of a given era that is Foucault's prime mission. It also centres 
on the dynamics of conversation, dissecting the ways in which participants 
correct or interrupt each other. 
In contrast, Foucault's interest in discourse is as a body of knowledge, whether 
that is from an academic perspective, such as psychiatry, or from an 
organisational context, as in the disciplinary codes of a school. He is not 
interested in the language used per se, but rather in what is permitted to be 
said. Neither is he concerned with the rules of conversation with regard to such 
things as turn-taking to achieve a specific objective, instead, for example, his 
analysis would be to discover how medical discourse produces the social 
subject of 'patient.' His concept of a historical archive would be a collection of 
historically contingent discourses that could demonstrate the limits and forms 
of knowledge, expression, memory, conservation and reactivation of a 
92 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1991), Trans by A. Sheridan 
Smith, originally pub as L'Archeologie du Sauoir, (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 210. 
93 A. McHoul and W. Grace, A Foucault Primer, pp. 26-31. 
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particular discipline or institution.94 For Foucault, a discourse is a specific, 
perimetered, category, which simultaneously constrains and enables writing 
and speaking within its boundaries. Through his historical analyses, he has 
illustrated that concepts such as labour, madness and humanity are historically 
contingent. Therefore, it must follow that, truth is something that can only be 
known in the context of what can be thought and said in a given body of 
knowledge. Truth is circumstantially conditional. 
Foucault distinguishes his shift from a linguistic approach by conceptualizing a 
discourse as being constructed by a group of' elements' referred to as 
statements. It is important not to confuse the statement with the sentence or the 
proposition, which are quite different. A statement is primarily a functional, not 
a representational entity and does not even have to be linguistically expressed. 
The statement can be a map, a graph, an icon or a spreadsheet, in fact, it can be 
anything that fulfills the second criterion for a statement which is that it must be 
a component of knowledge. The third criterion for a statement is that it should 
form part of a technique for the production of a human subject. It is not the 
same as a speech act, although a speech act can be part of a statement. A good 
example of a series of statements would be the admission procedure that is 
enacted when a person enters hospital. In reference to the Prologue, where this 
is mentioned, the speech acts, questions, form filling, instructions and 
staff/ patient interaction fulfill each of the criteria of a statement that I have just 
listed. 
Foucault describes the statement as 'not itself a unit, but a function that cuts 
across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, 
with concrete contents, in time and space.'95 The function of the admissions 
procedure encompassing a range of interpersonal and institutional techniques 
firmly initiates the stranger into her subjectified role of patient, a docile body, 
objectified by bodily tests and intrusive questioning, labelled and placed in her 
uniform of night attire by her territorial space, the hospital bed. In Foucault's 
conceptualisation of discourse, it always functions within relations of power, 
and language itself is one of the forces of the discourse, rather than its source. 
Jeremy Carrette underscores the relevance of the statement to Foucault when he 
says; 'Foucault's entire work examines these' statements' in order to suspend 
the a priori assumptions of knowledge and uncover the laws that govern our 
knowledge.'96 So in considering the statements that comprise the components of 
94 M. Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse', pp. 7-26, in Ideology and Consciousness 3, 
1978, (Fr. 1968). 
95 M. Foucault, The Archaeology o/Knowledge, p. 86. 
% J. Carrette, Foucault and Religion: Spiritual corporality and political spirituality, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000), p. 11. 
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a given socio-historic archive, Foucault advocates that the conditions in which 
these statements are formed are analysed and that there is an appreciation of 
fluidity and difference in the archive itself, through which power flows. In this 
way, a discourse can be connected to its political influences and implications. 
In considering discourse from a Foucauldian perspective, different criteria 
become significant. Ordinarily a critical reading of a piece of text would require 
an appreciation of the objects studied, the operations by which these objects are 
treated, the inherent concepts of the discipline and the theoretical options which 
are available to challenge them. A Foucauldian reading, on the other hand, 
would identify the criteria of 'formation', 'transformation' and I correlation' as 
being crucial in its analysis. Rules of formation require an investigation into the 
context, whereby the objects and ideas of the discourse are first brought into 
being. Transformation refers to the way in which the discourse can adapt itself 
and bring in new aspects and correlation describes the range of relations that 
the discourse has with other discourses and the non-discursive environment 
within which it is situated. According to McHoul and Grace: 
Foucault suggests that history is differentiated and fragmented into particular discourses, 
and that each fragment (each discourse) has a threshold, a process of birth and an equally 
complex process of disappearance which can be analysed and described.97 
In Foucauldian terms, these disappearances may mark a change in power 
techniques, where locally, historically contingent practices have induced a 
different social consciousness, subjectivity or perspective. For example, 
according to Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic, the emergence of modern 
medicine was elicited, not by inevitable scientific progression, but by the 
demise of the passive, typological description, giving rise to the interactive, 
domina tory medical gaze. The discourses of classical medicine discontinued 
because a totally different way of thinking about illness had appeared, in which 
symptoms had to be interpreted rather than their presence being indicative of a 
pre-determined, pathological essence. 
Feminist critiques of Foucault 
Before, I bring together the usefulness of Foucault's work to my own 
methodology, I need to address Foucault's androcentric standpoint, already 
alluded to earlier, which has been a bone of contention for feminist scholarship, 
embracing his work, as it has, with some tension and ambivalence. As Susan 
Hekman states in her Introduction to Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault; 
'The feminist question, Can the master's tools dismantle the master's house? 
97 A. McHoul and Grace, A Foucault Primer, p. 51. 
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applies to Foucault as well as to the more orthodox authors of the canon.'98 
McNay cites several feminist scholars who have criticised Foucault for the 
gender blindness in his work. For example, Sandra Lee Bartky points out that 
not all disciplinary practices are institutionally bound, and that woman, with 
particular regard to notions of beauty and body shape, is often constructed by 
more ethereal, open structures than the prison or the asylum.99 
Furthermore, Patricia O'Brien demonstrates how in Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault makes the tacit presupposition that the disciplined body is a male one 
and consequently misses fundamental differences in the cultural perceptions of 
male and female criminality.1oo More significantly, such neglect becomes crucial 
in those studies that directly affect woman. For example, in his extensive 
research concerning sexuality, he does not conduct an examination of gender 
construction or indeed have much to say explicitly about woman at all.101 In 
addition, Jon Simons points out that, 'In none of his analyses of that" form of 
power which makes individuals subjects" did Foucault pay any attention to 
women's enormous role, especially as mothers, in the process of 
subjectification.'l02 Not only does this exclusion leave out (by implication) vital 
data on a subject position that all humans have passed through, i.e. that of 
dependent child, but it also misses the crucial role of empowerment that mothers 
perform in the nurturing of humankind. 
Moreover, Foucault, like Lawrence Kohlberg, conducted his studies exclusively 
on men. As Kohlberg's oversight has demonstrated, such an omission can have 
serious implications for the conclusions of far-reaching studies. Despite 
stressing the importance of subjugated knowledges, particularity, local context 
and historical contingency to the construction of truth claims, Foucault does not 
apply this to the most fundamental differential of all, that of gender. Ironically, 
this rendering of woman to invisibility is itself a technique of patriarchal 
normalization, which, as discussed earlier, situates male humanity as the 
universal norm and woman as other. In point of fact, Foucault, like the other 
male, post-structuralist thinkers, Lacan and Derrida, do not acknowledge their 
debt to De Beauvoir's pioneering work, The Second Sex, which established this 
ontological phenomenon. 
98 5. Hekrnan (ed), Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1996), pp. 1-2. 
99 Discussed in L. McNay, Foucault and Feminism, pp. 33-34. 
100 Discussed in L. McNay, Foucault and Feminism, pp. 34-35. 
101 S. Hekrnan (ed), Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault, p. 2. 
102 J. Simons, 'Foucault's Mother' in Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault, ed by S. Hekman" 
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In Chapter 5 of The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault traces the development of 
modem medical education through the establishment of teaching hospitals, 
which began its formation at the end of the eighteenth century. Hitherto, the 
practice of medicine had been unregulated and concern had been expressed 
about the numbers of' quacks and charlatans' offering their services. Following 
the uprising of 1793, the practice of medicine by untaught persons had reached 
such alarming proportions that the Directoire had recalled the Assemblee des 
Cinq-Cents, and on two occasions, the government had asked for legislation to 
prevent further casualties of unsafe practice. Eventually, after a series of 
complex, social and legal restructuring, the practice of medicine became a 
closed profession requiring examination success, which resulted in the 
following declaration: 
Any person practicing medicine who has not passed the examinations of the schools, or who 
has not appeared before the special juries, will be fined or, if the offence is repeated, 
committed to prison.l03 
Foucault's gender blindness is apparent in the absence of woman from his 
account. The practice of midwifery or the administrations by the 'wise woman 
of the village' receives no mention. Did the work of' unqualified practitioners' 
include these aspects of medicine? Foucault does not say, yet his quotations 
from official documents of the time demonstrate that the phrase 'practicing the 
art of healing' is often used interchangeably with medicine, suggesting an all 
encompassing category of medical practice.104 If the above decree included 
women healers who gleaned their knowledge by oral tradition, then women 
would have been excluded from any medical practice, as entry to the profession 
would have been closed to them. The custom of condemning women for 
witchcraft had demised in France since 1624 when automatic appeals to the 
Parlement of Paris had resulted in widespread acquittals. lOS As many such 
women were often in a powerful position as village healers, is it not reasonable 
to apply the hermeneutics of suspicion and ask if legislation was being used 
where burning had failed? 
In fairness to Foucault, however, the focus of his account, as discussed earlier, 
was in establishing a change in the documented and official medical practice 
that had not been predicated on scientific progress, but on a change of 
103 Cabanis, Rapport du conseil des cinq cents sur un mode proviso ire de police medicale, 4 Messidor 
Year VI, pp. 12-18. Quoted in M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception, trans. By A. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd, 1973), p. 78. 
Originally pub Naissance de la Clinique (Presses Universitaires de France, 1963). 
104 M. Focault, The Birth of the Clinic, Quotations on pp. 76 and 77 use this terminology. 
105 F. Cross and E. Livingstone (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997 [3rd ed, 1st pub 1957]), p. 1757. 
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perception. However, it still may be the case that I am expressing legitimate 
concerns, for at the root of my challenge lies the normalisation techniques that 
separated medical knowledge as taught in the hospitals from that which was 
deemed to be from other sources. Furthermore, surely the exercising of power 
relations involved would be worthy of further examination as they rendered 
women with some authority and independence to further subjugation. 
However, again in fairness to Foucault, his extensive work on power came later 
than the publication of The Birth of the Clinic, and commentators, like myself, 
tend to apply an ad hoc critique of Foucault, encompassing the quotations and 
insights that he gleaned over a lifetime to particular aspects of his entire canon. 
In addition, his own work is eclectic rather than systematic occasioning 
contradictions in his thinking that have been challenged and caused contention, 
as in the following critique. 
A commonly held feminist tension in Foucault's work is his seemingly 
ambivalent stance towards power and the subject in relation to a progressive 
politics of change. Firstly, in deconstructing the subject, Foucault deconstructs 
'woman' and thereby problematises feminist politics in a similar way to the 
feminist empiricists and those espousing the ethics of equality, in that if the 
category of woman disappears, then there is no entity to oppress or to liberate. 
Secondly, the notion of constructed, 'docile', self-policing bodies suggests a 
closed system of power and McNay states; , ... Foucault provides no way of 
going beyond the minimal notion of the subject as a purely determined category 
to a fuller understanding of the subject as a thinking, willing, responsible agent 
of choice.'l06 
Yet, in many instances, Foucault does suggest that individuals have agency. In 
an interview which appeared in Concordia in 1984, Foucault elaborates on his 
understanding of the ethics of the self, whereby he discusses freedom, ethics 
and the imperative to care for oneself.107 Critically, his understanding of 
autonomy is different from traditional, normative, androcentric thinking in two 
specific ways. Firstly, he conceives of power in relation and considers care of the 
self a pre-requisite of care of the other, rather than as an end in itself. Secondly, 
he acknowledges the active role played by an individual in constituting his (sic) 
own selfhood, but continues to point out that the practices employed by that 
individual are not invented by him, but are those that he finds in his culture or 
106 L. McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 103-104. 
1(17 M. Foucault interviewed by H. Becker, R. Fomet-Betancourt, and A. Gomez-Muller on 
20/01/1984, entitled 'The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom', in Michel 
Foucault Ethics Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume1, ed by P.Rabinow, (London: 
Penguin Books Ltd, 2000), pp. 281-301. 
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social group.lOB He concludes this interview with the following declaration in 
answer to the question, 'Do you think the role of philosophy is to warn of the 
dangers of power?' 
This has always been an important function of philosophy. In its critical aspect- and I mean 
critical in a broad sense - philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every 
level and in every form in which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, 
or what have you. To a certain extent, this critical function of philosophy derives from the 
Socratic injunction "Take care of yourself," in other words, "Make freedom your foundation, 
through the mastery of yourself." 109 
Utilising Foucault's male-centred philosophy for a methodology that is 
concerned with woman's subject position in the NRTs 
Perhaps it is fitting to begin with Foucault's own response when asked once 
about drawing upon Nietzsche's work: 
For myself, I prefer to utilise the writers I like. The only valid tribute to thought such as 
Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest And if 
commentators say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no 
interest 110 
I would assert that it would have been most unusual for Foucault not to have 
had an androcentric perspective in his work. The extensive scholarship 
concerning feminist epistemology has surely demonstrated, even in the brief 
overview given at the beginning of this chapter, that all human perspectives can 
only ever be partial. Furthermore, despite their own experience, it still appears 
that when marginalised groups critique a hegemony relation that oppresses 
them, they can still fail to see the way in which their view is blinded by the 
dominant position, which they hold in relation to other subjugated positions. 
The Black womanists' challenge to the implicit racism inherent in some aspects 
of white feminists' work is a good illustration of this. 
Moreover, in reference to the earlier part of the chapter, Haraway, Harding and 
Collins insist that recognizing partiality and undertaking a critical, contextual 
analysis, whilst being accountable for one's own voice, is a vital component of 
standpoint epistemology. In advocating an interdependent learning model (as 
suggested by Baier, Whitech and Ruddick) surely these epistemological themes 
apply to the knowledge of others as well as to one's own reflective stance. Is not 
1~ M. Foucault, 'The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom', p. 291. 
109 M. Foucault, 'The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom', pp. 300-301. 
110 M. Foucault, 'Prison Talk' in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interoiews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, ed. C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 53-54. 
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the practice that Foucault describes in his anecdotal aside an exemplification of 
such learning techniques in the academe? For, paradoxically, the 
'commentators' are only extending the process of listening and response that 
Foucault eloquently describes as ' deforming thought making it groan and 
protest'. 
In point of fact, it is only a relatively recent phenomenon that woman has been 
admitted to the academy and so it would impoverish feminist scholarship 
indeed, if one were only to utilise the work of those thinkers who were not 
gender blind. However, it is important to distinguish why I believe his work 
can be appropriated into a feminist agenda and yet why I do not consider, in 
my earlier critique, that normative ethics is the most felicitous framework to 
deliberate moral issues, particularly those that concern women. For surely, it 
might be said, I could similarly challenge the intrinsic androcentrism of 
traditional ethics and place it in the context of a feminist perspective, thereby 
creating a forum for more balanced moral reasoning. My brief response to this 
is primarily a question of size. In the case of using Foucauldian insights, I wish 
to underpin a workable methodology with a theoretical perspective, which 
encapsulates the interrelationship of knowledge, power and the subject through 
discourse and discursive practices. In the case of the history of Western 
traditional ethics, I wish to demonstrate that an ongoing, damaging ontology of 
woman, which disadvantages her, is imbibed in its very structures. The quest to 
deconstruct this centuries old framework is massive and will need the 
collaboration of many voices, of which this work is but one. 
Incorporating Foucauldian insights into an analytical method 
Having established the underpinning foundations of a Foucauldian 
methodology, I will summarise these insights into four primary themes that 
will guide my research questions for discourse analysis. I will then describe 
how I intend to gather and use data for analysis and discuss why this method of 
collection is appropriate to the task in hand. 
Theme 1. An ontology of the present 
The ontology of any current situation can be elicited by considering the 
historically contingent trajectory that has brought a certain body of knowledge 
into its present way-of-being. The historical context of discourses and their 
associated discursive practices, which form, and are formed by, that body of 
knowledge, provides an understanding of their creation or demise that may 
hold clues to techniques, functions or changes in local practices. Often common 
assumptions abound within a body of knowledge that are taken for granted to 
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such an extent that one is genuinely surprised to discover that these are only 
relatively recent concepts. In revealing such assumptions, one can demonstrate 
that certain ways-of-being, not only could have been different, but also, could 
now be so. 
Theme 2. Relations of power with regard to the body 
Foucault conceived of power as being primarily relational and his focus was 
always to discover how power was wielded, rather than by whom. In order to 
do this, his research was undertaken at the points where power relations were 
extreme, such as the prison and the asylum, consequently exposing the 
techniques of disciplinary power. His insight that bio-power was a feature of 
the modern society led him to reveal the changed power structure that focused 
on controlling 'biological life' through separate techniques of managing both 
the individual body and that of the population as a social body. The implication 
of Foucault's understanding is that the female body in its reproductive capacity 
is a crucial site for bio-power, where the two axes of anatamo- and bio-politics 
meet, suggesting that the NRTs would be a social practice worthy of 
Foucauldian consideration. 
Theme 3. The relation of discourse to knowledge 
For Foucault, there exists a complex and intricate relationship between 
discourse, power, knowledge and the subject. In undertaking an archaeology of 
any given topic, Foucualt was concerned to discover the statements that 
comprised the discourses of the time in order to examine not just what was 
known, but more importantly, what was permitted to be known. Statements are 
often comprised of more than just text, but nevertheless, a given text can be 
highly revealing of what constitutes acceptable knowledge and offer evidence 
of disciplinary techniques and how they function. (For in a historical archive, 
access to texts may be the only data available). It is through an analysis of 
discourses that the relations of power, which generate subject positions can be 
ascertained. In this respect, subjugated knowledges are important as a source of 
counter-discourse, revealing much in their vision of how disciplinary 
techniques are deployed. 
Theme 4. The subject position of woman in the NRTs 
In this final theme, I propose to apply Foucauldian insights to the construction 
of gender that is evident in the discourses of the NRTs. Foucault's 
understanding that discourses generate subject positions is crucial here, for the 
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subject position of woman is a site of contention within the multiplicity of 
discourses that surround her body. For, as previously stated, not only do the 
two axes of biopower meet in the NRTs, but the ideological, traditional notions 
of woman, that have been briefly referred to in the sections on epistemology 
and ethics, also surface in metamorphosed complexity. Crucially, Foucault 
believed, in his later works, in an ethic of the self that was a priori to, or perhaps 
even a condition of, a care of others. Theme 4, therefore, will be concerned with 
the proposition that, if a feminist ethics of care requires firstly an ethics of self, 
then the subject position of woman in the NRTs must give her the conditions for 
this possibility. 
Research questions 
In the interrogation of both secular and theological texts, which I shall 
undertake in Chapters Three, Four and Five, I will be guided by the following 
research questions. I have deliberately set the questions in a generic, 
Foucauldian format, permitting the particularity and context to be ascertained 
by the subject matter contained in the discourse itself. 
Q.l What is the historical context of this discourse? 
Q. 2 Can any correlating or opposing discourses be identified in the selected 
text? 
Q. 3 Are there any common assumptions being cited in the discourse? 
Q. 4 Are there any statements in the discourse functioning in a similar way to 
the panoptic on, fostering the process of internalisation of' good' behaviour? 
Q. 5 Are there any gaps, misconceptions, silences or contradictions in the 
discourse that are unchallenged by common consent? 
Q. 6 Who is speaking in the discourse and who is silent? 
Q. 7 Are there any disciplinary techniques being applied in the discourse? 
Q.8 Can a subject position versus its other be identified in the discourse? 
Q. 9 What type of language is being used and who is the intended audience? 
Q. 10 Can relations of power, knowledge and the subject be identified in the 
way the discourse is structured? 
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Selection' of samples 
The purpose of a Foucauldian analysis is to identify a statement or series of 
statements in order to determine how they are functioning in any specific 
discourse. The primary factor in determining both the choice and size of the 
selected samples refers back to my foundational research premise that woman-
as-subject has been left out of the multiplicity of discourses that abound on the 
NRTs (see page 2). However, it should be noted that discourse analysis diverges 
most radically from the traditional view in that the accumulation of a large 
amount of data does not enhance the research; conversely it may well hamper 
the process. Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell emphasise the point when 
they state, 'For discourse analysts the success of a study is not in the least 
dependent on sample size.' (their italics)1l1 The second criterion for selection 
refers to the related question as to whose interests this omission serves. 
Consequently, I have chosen a variety of data from varying and wide-ranging 
social and cultural spheres in the macro-culture of the media, the Church and 
scientific texts in order to elicit examples of NRT discourses in the public 
domain. Some of the examples will be small, as in the clips from newspaper 
articles and journals, but others will be more substantial, as in the analysis of 
official church reports, Christian publications and the transcript of a television 
programme. 
Coding procedures 
With regard to coding, I intend to take different approaches according to the 
particular requirements of both the texts and the context. For example, in 
comparative studies like the interrogation of church reports, or the theological 
publications, I will maintain the same categories of investigation. In the church 
reports, a word count of pertinent words will be a useful device to demonstrate 
emphasis over a large area of text. In undertaking the coding of the television 
programme, I intend to select the clips that focus on the critical theme that I 
have already deduced from watching the programme as a whole. In coding 
samples from a variety of newspapers and journals to illustrate the public 
consciousness, I shall do so according to the cultural significance of a specific 
event like the birth of Louise Brown, in order to analyse the ensuing discourses 
that indicate society's response to such occurrences. 
111 J. Potter and M. Wetherell, Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour, 
(London; California; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987), p.161. 
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Evidence, analysis and validation 
Erica Burman and Ian Parker rightly point out, that discourse analysis is not a 
value-free activity.112 My response to this is fourfold. Firstly, my perspective is 
clearly elicited in the Prologue and in my epistemological standpoint on page 
eleven; consequently my position is open to critique and examination. Secondly, 
the foundational premise challenging woman's subject position and the 
research questions have both been underpinned by a sound theoretical 
foundation. Thirdly, unlike many other research projects all the selected data 
have been taken from the public domain (some of which have been reproduced 
for the reader in Appendix I), which not only offers the reader open access for 
further exploration, but also serves to prevent researcher influence. 
Furthermore, the discourse is the data, and significant pieces are re-produced in 
the body of the thesis for readers to see for themselves. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most crucially, analysis is not complete without its own 
validating procedures. In discourse analysis, coherence is both a self-reflective 
test for the researcher as well as a later tool of scrutiny for the reader. Simply 
put, coherence is explored through asking; 'does this reading make sense?' or 
'are there any loose ends?' or 'is there any part of the discourse that doesn't fit 
this interpretation?' Potter and Wetherell encapsulate the process when they 
say, 'If the explanation covers both the broad pattern, and accounts for the 
micro-sequences, then we will take it more seriously.'113 In other words, whilst 
my standpoint reflects the perspective that I am taking, nonetheless, it cannot 
validate a hypothesis if there are inconsistencies in my analytic interpretation. 
Conclusion 
This foundational study has provided the investigative tools with which to 
deconstruct the discourses of the NRTs, with the primary aim of analysing how 
woman is being constructed and reconstructed. For, I believe it is not possible to 
offer a credible theological alternative to current Christian responses without 
first scrutinising in depth the complexities of the status quo. In the next chapter, 
I intend to turn to the work of other scholars, who have incorporated a 
Foucauldian-based methodology into their own research. This will not only 
serve to strengthen my case for applying Foucauldian systems of thinking to the 
discourses of the NRTs, but moreover, it will also provide the reader with 
examples of how functioning statements work in practice, providing a 
comparative yardstick for my own analyses. 
112 E. Burman and 1. Parker p.162. 
113 J. Potter and M. Wetherell, Discaurse and Social pSlJchology, p. 170. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
USING A FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN THEOLOGY 
We know that discourse has the power to arrest the flight of an arrow in a recess of 
time, in the space proper to it It is quite likely as Homer has said, that the gods send 
disasters to men so that they can tell of them, and that in this possibility speech finds 
its infinite resourcefulness; it is quite likely that the approach of death - its 
sovereign gesture, its prominence within human memory - hollows out in the 
present and in existence the void toward which and from which we speak.1 
M. Foucault 1963. 
In Chapter One, I established the reasons for using a Foucauldian 
methodology to critique the moral framework upon which the ethics of 
the NRTs are deliberated. Foucault's work provides valuable insights for 
thinking differently and this axis of counter-thinking creates alternative 
questions that can be asked of text, discourses and bodies of knowledge. 
The relationship that exists between discourse and the webs of power 
that interconnect with it, the knowledge it mediates, the cultural 
practices that it legitimates and the subject positions that it offers, have 
proved fruitful to many theorists interested in cultural studies. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that a growing number of theologians have drawn on 
Foucault's ideas as a useful hermeneutic tool in their work. In this 
chapter, I intend to explore how Foucauldian theory and tools for 
discourse analysis are becoming an increasingly significant resource 
within Practical Theology. 
Foucault as Hermeneutical Tool 
Jeremy Carrette and Stephen Moore are two theologians, who have 
drawn on Foucault's work directly, although in differing ways, to 
explore Christianity from a critical vantage point. Carrette seeks to read 
Foucault's engagement with theological themes as a disruptive and 
radically transforming activity. He does not claim that Foucault, who 
was an atheist, was a closet theologian; rather, Carrette attempts to show 
'how he transforms the map of religious thinking.'2 Principally, he 
1 M. Foucault, 'Language to Infinity' (originally published in Tel quell 15 [1963] pp.44-
53) in Michel FOllcault aesthetics: essential works ofFOlicault 1954-1984 volume 2, pp.89-101, 
ed by J. Faubion, (London; New York; Victoria; Ontario; Aukland: Penguin, 1994), p. 
89. 
2 J. Carrette, FOllcault and Religion: Spiritual corporality and political spiritualih}, (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 142. 
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describes Foucault's work on religion as falling into two categories, that 
of a 'spiritual corporality' and a 'political spirituality' .3 
He traces five interconnected themes from Foucault's work on religion. 
These are: an analysis of the cultural climate, the historical and social 
location of discourse, the predominance of the body and sexuality, the 
relations of power (particularly with regard to speech and silence) and 
the disciplinary technologies of the self. Foucault's primary concern with 
religiOUS discourse was in its location in the day-to-day practices of 
human existence, that is, with the techniques of religious immanence, not 
religious transcendence. Carrette states: 
Foucault's work provides a way of exploring the operations of religious discourse as 
a part of the ritual and practice of 'limitation' and' exclusion' within a culture - it 
marks out the boundaries of life and death, the possible and the impossible, the 
acceptable and the unacceptable. Religious doctrine, like political and philosophical 
doctrine, shapes the 'utterances' and 'subjectivity' of an individual-it'subjectifies' 
an individua1.4 
Moore draws on Foucauldian, poststructuralist insights to offer a fresh 
reading of the power of the cross in Christianity. He takes Foucault's 
pioneering work, Discipline and Punish, as a hermeneutical tool in his 
project to construct a critical dialogue with Pauline writings. Moore's 
understanding of these two thinkers is not that they need an 
introduction, but rather, as he hopes to demonstrate, 'that they are 
already deep in conversation.'s Foucault's contention that the demise of 
public torture and prison reform was a change from overt to covert 
disciplinary methods, rather than an enlightened, humanitarian 
progression, is a key factor for Moore in conceptualising the dynamics of 
power. He sees parallels with Christianity, inextricably bound to the 
cross, with power exercised on the body through dietary and sexual 
practices, but reaching into the psyche fashioning acceptable thoughts 
and feelings. This is what Foucault termed 'pastoral power'.6 A power 
that began its trajectory in the Jewish conception of an omniscient God, 
was further enhanced by Pauline texts (Rom. 2:16, 29,8:27; 1 Cor. 4:5, 
14:25) and has become honed by centuries of discursive practices in the 
confessional. 
3 J. Carrette, Foucault and Religion, pp. 4-5. 'Spiritual corp orality' refers to the critique of 
the silencing powers of religion and 'political spirituality' refers to the critique of 
religious authority in the practices of confession. 
4 J. Carrette, Foucault and Religion, p. 145. 
5 S. Moore, Poststructuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of tlte 
Cross, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), p. 94. 
6 S. Moore, Poststructuralism and the New Testament, p. 110. 
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Foucault as Methodology 
Whilst these ways of utilising Foucault's work are illuminating, 
nonetheless, they are not examples of using a Foucauldian method. 
Principally, they have drawn on Foucault's insights to critique the 
content of texts, bringing his counter-thinking to bear on established 
interpretations of familiar passages and orthodoxies. My concern, 
however, is less with the content of texts but rather how power relations 
are mediated and sustained through discursive practices. More relevant 
to this project is the work of Practical Theologians who have used 
Foucauldian insights to interrogate the production and reproduction of 
cultural norms. I begin with Elaine Graham's macro interrogation of 
representations of alterity in popular culture. I then focus upon more 
detailed analysis of specific cultural texts in the work of Clare Walsh, 
Mary McClintock-Fulkerson and Susan Dunlap. Finally, I consider 
Stephen Grimwood's revealing microanalysis of the way power relations 
are displayed within the pages of a single text. 
Understanding discourse in the wider context 
Elaine Graham has undertaken an extensive, critical study of the current 
Western socio-cultural context in her recent book, Representations of the 
postjhumanJ In this pioneering work she interrogates the new digital, 
genetic, biomedical and cybernetic technologies of the 21st century with 
regard to the shifting boundaries defining what it means to be human. In 
this increasingly permeable categorization between human, non-human 
and machine, she also contends that a similar process is occurring in the 
dichotomy between fact and fiction. She undertakes her exploration by 
critically appraising popular films, literature and art in order to analyse 
the discourses of technoscience and science fiction, which are circulating 
in the social milieu. Her quest is profoundly theological with its mission 
to discover our identity and spirituality as human beings as the 
boundaries of ontological familiarity are being eroded by our 
technological expertise. Science fiction narratives inspired by 
transhumanism (the transitional or modified human) have consequently 
become pivotal to this challenge as Graham asserts: 
Yet transhumanism betrays a doctrine of humanity informed fundamentally by a 
distrust of the body, death and finitude, issues which, as I shall indicate, have 
ethical, political and theological implications.s 
7 E. Graham, Representations of the postjhuman Monsters, Aliens and Others in popular 
Culture, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002) 
8 E. Graham, Representations of the post/human, p. 9. 
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Graham's methodology 
Graham draws on Foucault's archeological methods (the critique of the 
structures of knowledge) and genealogy (the critique of institutional 
regimes) to ground her interrogative approach. The marked acceleration 
and proliferation of the new, varying, yet often interconnected 
technologies, has created a 'Foucauldian' locus of extremity analogous 
with the prison and the asylum, offering an opportunity to explore taken 
for granted assumptions concerning the perimeters of what is 
understood to be human normality.9 Graham puts it succinctly thus: 
If the demarcation of modem seIfhood can be undertaken within a diversity of 
institutions such as the clinic, the prison, the asylum and the confessional, then why 
not via the soap-opera, the virtual chat-line, the internet or the science-fiction 
fanzine?10 
From these sites of popular discourses, Graham focuses upon the genre 
of science fiction as it presents a teratology, which she contends has 
particular cultural significance.ll The fabulations that abound in film and 
television programmes, which are replicated in newspapers and 
advertisements, constantly act upon our imaginations in the 
reconfiguring of ontological categories. Graham applies the Foucauldian 
insight that it is here, in commercialised popular culture that techniques 
of power can be uncovered and subject positions can be constructed. She 
asserts that: 
Monsters have a double function, therefore, simultaneously marking the boundaries 
between the normal and the pathological but also exposing the fragility of the very 
taken-for-grantedness of such categories.12 
Graham does not pursue her analysis through a close reading of textual 
evidence; rather she views through a broad frame contemporary icons, 
myths and stories, such as Frankenstein, the Star Trek narratives, and films 
such as,eXistenZ and GATTACA. She illustrates the mixed public 
response to the explosion of technological innovation in terms of a 
spectrum between techno phobia and technophilia, which provides an 
ideal methodological perspective for investigating the perimeters 
between machines, humanity and non-human creatures. Her quest is not 
9 One example of the synergy of different technologies has been the use of computer 
technology in genetics, which has created the new discipline of bioinformatics. This 
combination accelerated the sequencing of the Human genome Project beyond all 
scientific predictions. 
10 E. Graham, Representations of the post/human, p. 13. 
11 Teratology is the study of what constitutes monstrosity. 
12 E. Graham, Representations of the post/human, p. 39. 
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so much to discover 'who we think we are', but to seize the 'Foucauldian 
opportunity of otherwise' to ask questions about how we have been 
constructed, so that we might discern more readily 'who we may 
become' . She says: 
As refractions of the same, as evidence for the ascribed and not essential na ture of 
human nature, monsters, aliens and others provide clues for the moral economy or 
'ontological hygiene' by which future categories of the human/post/human might 
be decided.13 
Graham's application of her methodology to the text 
Critically, Graham exposes just how much of our categorisation of what 
we consider to be human and non-human has depended on corporeal 
barriers. The horror of crossing a species/ genetically-defined delineation 
is exemplified by the enduring myth of Frankenstein and its recent 
attribution to genetically modified foods. Graham offers a detailed 
interpretation of Shelley's novel, but admits that the popular myth will 
have been fuelled more by the Hollywood and Hammer movie images, 
which are not entirely faithful to the original story in several crucial 
aspects.14 She contends that: 
The choice of such a term as 'Frankenstein Food' relies, consciously or not, on long-
standing associations which draw genetic modification into a wider discourse of 
dangerous knowledge, uncontrollable nature and mad scientists.15 
Graham explores the crossing of the human/ machine border through the 
Terminator and Robocop films, where she interrogates the way in which 
cyborg technology frees the imagination to escape vulnerable and 
clumsy embodiment, posing as it does, the consequent questions about 
what constitutes 'invincibility'. She notes that: 'Many of the most popular 
representations of cyborgs appear as hypermasculine killing machines, 
more Marvel Comics than cyberfeminism.'16 Yet, essentially, Robocop is 
an injured human being whose healing has not been possible without the 
addition of prostheses. In the case of Robocop, both his prostheses and 
his weapons have been internally applied to transmute his physical 
integrity. 
13 E. Graham, Representations of the post/human, p. 13. 
14 A notable difference, for example, is that in Shelley's original story the creature was 
able to speak articulately, this aspect of his humanness was denied him in the film 
versions. E. Graham, Representations of the post/human, p. 66. 
15 E. Graham, Representations of the postjhuman, p. 26. 
16 E. Graham, Representations of the post/human, p. 208. 
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Contrast this with the benign image of a bespectacled grandmother 
knitting a jumper for her grandchild. Her glasses and her knitting 
needles, both required for the job in hand, have not become part of her 
body, but otherwise there is no difference in the concept of using aids to 
assist human frailty and tools to undertake work. However, in crossing 
this hitherto impossible boundary, Robocop appears on the 
technophobia/ philia spectrum as an entity to question human values. 
Graham notes, 'Despite his grotesque bodily invulnerability, Robocop's 
superficial toughness conceals a deeper fragility.'17 He remains haunted 
and tortured by his memories of both his attack, which without his 
transformation would have killed him, and of happier times with loved 
ones. Graham states that these feelings invoke a ' ... sense of the 
irrevocable loss of his humanity', but conversely, one could argue that 
such feelings suggest that despite his technological enhancements, his 
humanity remains. 
Critically, as exemplified by the questioning of Robocop's humanity, a 
Foucauldian approach requires an investigation not of what is being 
represented per se, but rather asks, what entity of human ontology is 
being constructed through these specific dynamics of power, discourse 
and discursive domains which these icons of popular knowledge 
inhabit? Graham applies her methodology with the following 
considerations: 
If an interrogation of the values currently informing representations of the 
post/human is to proceed, therefore, similar critical methods may usefully be 
deployed to those of genealogy and teratology. Just as the past is of interest to 
Foucault insofar as it provides him with clues (but never precedents) for the 
conditions under which the present may be produced, I would suggest that 
literature which dwells upon the fantastic, which summons up alternative 
universes, which imagines things differently, is engaging in a similar process of 
challenging the fixity of the status quO.18 
Capitalist Power 
Jeremy Carrette, in his critical reflection of Representations of the 
post/human, focuses on the' ... intriguing relationship here between the 
means of production and representation ... ' and argues that ' ... this is 
itself the silent technology or the silent machine in Graham's work.'19 
Carrette takes a perspective that plays on the concepts of technology, 
17 E. Graham, Representations of the postjhuman, p. 209. 
18 E. Graham, Representations of the postjhuman, p. 40. 
19 J. Carrette, 'Cyborg Politics and Economic Realities: Reflections on Elaine Graham's 
Representatives of the postjhuman', pp.45-55, in Theology and Sexuality: The Journal of the 
Centre for the Study of Christianity and Sexuality, Vol. 10.2, March, 2004, p. 46. 
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production and machinery that Foucault used as metaphors to articulate 
his understanding of how discourses and discursive practices function in 
the construction of subjectivities. He says: 'Knowledge itself becomes a 
technology in Foucault, a means of production. Foucault's anti-humanist 
and historical positioning of knowledge cannot therefore be separated 
from the machine.'2o Carrette uncovers the irony that Graham should 
deploy this metaphorical framework to critique the dynamics of these 
very same entities in the socio-cultural context. He alludes to Graham's 
insight 'that models of artificial intelligence (AI) run deep into the fabric 
of not only who we are but also how we think about who we are.'21 (his 
emphasis) and suggests that if thinking itself is a technology, then the 
concepts of assimilation and agency become imperative in the politics of 
knowledge embodiment and how we co-evolve with our environment. 
Carrette teases out the tension in Graham's work, which he discerns as 
her supposition' . " that we are both' co-evolving and intermingled 
agents in the construction of the post/human' (p.198) and subjects to 
'corporate capitalism' (p.195).'22 Carrette acknowledges that Graham is 
fully aware of the economic subtext of late capitalism, but he believes 
that the relationship between technology and capitalism goes still further 
and speculates as to how much the constructions, which spring from 
existing bastions of production such as Hollywood and the military, are 
driven by a deterministic, economic worldview. In summing up he 
contends that there is a deeper foundational question to pose in the 
exploration of ontology than 'who am I?' - that is to ask, 'how do I relate 
or exchange?'23 Consequently, he continues: 'If those exchanges are built 
upon capital, on the accumulation of capital to make more money, then 
the question of 'representation' must itself be suspended inside the 
history of capitalism.'24 
In what ways has Graham's methodological framework of Foucauldian 
analysis provided different insights? 
In her formidable work, Graham has reconfigured Foucault's 
genealogical and archealogical processes to interrogate the 
representatives of the post/human in the current socio-cultural context, 
20 J. Carrette, 'Cyborg Politics and Economic Realities' p. 47. 
21 J. Carrette, 'Cyborg Politics and Economic Realities', p. 48. 
22 J. Carrette, 'Cyborg Politics and Economic Realities', p. 50. The numbers in brackets 
refer to pages in Representatives of the post/human. 
23 J. Carrette, 'Cyborg Politics and Economic Realities' p. 54. Carrette adds that both 
Winnicott in psychoanalysis and Marcel Mauss in anthropology have made the point 
that it is only in the act of relation that we become aware of who we are. 
24 J. Carrette, 'Cyborg Politics and Economic Realities' p. 54. 
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producing a complex and insightful study into the ontological 
constructions of what constitutes human becoming. Her use of 
Foucault's conceptualisations illustrates how his counter-thinking can be 
consistently applied to varying cultural contexts providing an alternative 
perspective, which can, in turn, offer political tools for agency and 
change. She has provided me with an insightful framework for 
investigating the stories, icons and myths that imbue the discourses of 
the NRTs in order to discern the techniques of biopower in the exploding 
technological landscape of the 21st century. I will now turn to the work of 
scholars who have applied Foucauldian approaches to discourse theory 
in their various readings of specific texts. 
Using discourse analysis to discern gender differences in the public 
sphere 
Although Clare Walsh is principally a feminist theorist, not a theologian, 
her methodological framework using discourse analysis is built on 
Foucauldian foundations and provides insightful direction for applying 
this approach. Moreover, her thesis, concentrating on gender and 
discourse in the public sphere, is relevant to the feminist perspective of 
my investigation, particularly as religious discourse features as a 
significant component of her research. Following an appraisal of her 
methodology, I intend to focus, briefly, on one aspect of her work, which 
is the case study she undertook on the discourses of woman's ordination 
in the Church of England. Her survey of textual sources encompassed 
the era that led up to, and continued after, the historic decision taken by 
the General Synod on 11 November 1992 to admit women to the 
priesthood.25 Walsh draws on a variety of textual data taken from 
newspaper accounts, quotations from senior clerics and from her women 
priest interviewees. 
Walsh's methodology 
Walsh describes her critical discourse analysis as distinctly feminist, 
which draws on a Foucauldian view of discourse I as inextricably bound 
up with the social and, more radically, as constitutive of social identities 
and relations.' (her italics)26 She acknowledges the poststructuralist 
feminist challenge to an overarching metalanguage, which contends that 
gender has become increasingly unstable as an identity category within 
25 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse: language and power in politics, the Church and 
organisations, (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Ltd, 2001). Her study on women priests is 
discussed in Chapter 6 'Speaking in Different Tongues? A Case Study of Women Priests 
in the Church of England', pp. 164-203. 
26 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 27. 
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this broad, universal structure. In response to this assertion, Walsh 
claims that her perspective of metalanguage is one that is both 
contextually constrained and localised, in addition, it recognises the 
permeability of linguistic and semiotic boundariesP Her primary goal is 
to apply such linguistic and social semiotic understandings to an analysis 
of broader discursive practices and social change in her dissection of 
gender. Critically, she emphasises her approach to selected texts as 
follows: 
In my case, I am interested in looking for textual traces of shifts in gendered 
identities and relations that occur in periods of rapid discursive and institutional 
change. One needs, of course, to be alert to the dangers of tautology, but my 
intention in this book is not simply to use texts to describe these changes, but to help 
to explain them in a more nuanced way than would be possible in the absence of 
close attention to linguistic analysis.28(her emphasis) 
Walsh advocates an integrational approach to the micro-reading of texts 
and the need for a flexible framework that can incorporate the 
particularities of the textj context interface, which she underscores by 
preferring to label the surrounding linguistic and non-linguistic elements 
as co(n)text. She discusses the importance of treating language, not as a 
descriptor but as a functioning dynamic in a network of relations, where 
meaning is conditioned by the specifics of the text in question. In this 
regard, reading the sequencing of words is important, but so too is the 
paradigmatic axis upon which the text is positioned. She explains the 
significance of this as: 
Thus each item chosen can be set against choices that were not made, leading to a 
focus on structured absences from texts. Gaps in syntax, for instance, may be 
ideologically significant, because readers/listeners are invited to infer connections 
left implicit 29 (her emphasis) 
Such a close reading of both spoken and written co(n)texts, along with 
textual traces and varying interpretive cues (such as visual images or 
facial expressions depending on whether it is read or heard) often reveals 
contradictory and fragmented ideologies. With regard as to how such 
competing discourses may be assimilated, Walsh discusses the 
importance of the positionality of the reader/listener. For, despite the 
fact that textual traces and cues may be both unconsciously given and 
received, relying on stereotypical, commonsense assumptions in the 
socio-cultural context, nonetheless, a compliant readership cannot be 
guaranteed. For example, Walsh alludes to the fact that texts very often 
27 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 28. 
28 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 28. 
29 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 35. 
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position the reader as male (as in a similar fashion, films are inclined to 
perpetuate the male gaze) and whilst women may unconsciously absorb 
this, nevertheless, it can also serve to make them feel excluded.3D (As is 
the case when ecclesiastical discourses overtly refer to people of faith as 
'God's sons' rather than 'God's children'.) The use of the pronoun 'we' 
can similarly invite or marginalise the reader j listener, depending on the 
co(n)text and their positionality within it. 
In order to offer an interpretation that makes sense of these conflicting 
interests, which, despite their ambivalence, often serve to promote the 
dominant, normative viewpoint, Walsh proposes that her analytical 
method 'will take functional categories as a point of departure for 
analysis.'31 (her italics) She claims that language serves two primary 
functions, the interpersonal and the ideational, and that these 
metafunctions have subcategories variously relating to the text 
producer's identity and the addressee's positionality. She has tabulated 
these in a diagram to clarify her approach to discourse analysis, by 
illustrating the functional categories in an easy to follow framework, 
offering definable points of reference for the varying linguistic 
mechanisms that text producers employ in the structuring of a 
textj speech.32 Her reasoning for the construction of such a tool is as 
follows: 
The aim is to explore patterns of habituated use that function to reproduce 
normative gendered identities and relations. Although the meaning attached to 
these forms and categories in specific contexts is contingent on the interpretative 
assumptions that interlocutors bring to the speech situation, I intend to suggest that 
the range of meanings attached to given (inter)textual traces and cues is 
predictable.33 (her italics) 
She contends that the interpersonal function is the driving force of 
language, which is contrary to the more traditional line taken by male 
linguists who, with the notable exception of Toolan, promote the 
ideational function as predominant.34 In defence of her stance, Walsh 
demonstrates that there are very few texts, even in the public realm, that 
have no interpersonal aspects. She suggests that this is due to the fact 
30 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse: Walsh contends through her research that,' ... the 
producers of the majority of media texts are more likely to employ a mode of address 
that is inclusive of the lifeworld of male readers.' (her italics) p. 40. She also points out 
on p. 36 that readers may choose to read against dominant readings of texts. 
31 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 36. 
32 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 39, reproduced in Appendix I, p. 241. 
33 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 36. 
34 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 38. Toolan regards 'orientedness to others' as the 
pre-eminent function of language. 
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that as ideational values and beliefs are inherent in the social identities of 
text producers, therefore in promoting them, they will be likely to use 
interpersonal cues to phrase these sympathetically. 
From the vantage point of text analysis, her next point is particularly 
helpful; , ... framing devices act as interpretive cues, encouraging 
listeners/ readers to take up compliant or resistant subject positions, 
which, in tum, helps to shape their identities.'35 (her italics) With regard 
to the performative choices that women make in public service roles, 
Walsh's research has noted that they are constrained not only by 
institutional and societal constructions but also by the investments that 
the women have made in their own 'discursively produced femininity.'36 
Yet, the media resist these complexities of subject negotiation by 
persistently locating women in the public sphere in a preconceived, 
gendered framework. She suggests that in sites of popular culture, such 
as men's magazines (and I would include the tabloid press), women are 
more likely to be constructed predominantly by their gender than men 
areP 
Likewise, metaphors have a relational function, but because they link the 
text with notions and genres from outside its context, Walsh emphasises 
their intertextual power. Not only is the choice of metaphor by the text 
producer integral to her/his beliefs and values, and therefore, offers 
clues in analytical interpretation in the same way as a framing device 
serves to do, but also it has the capacity to construct discursive domains 
and can often incite an emotive response to an ideational text. In her 
appraisal of textual evidence leading up to the ordination of women to 
the priesthood, Walsh cites the work of both Cameron, who researched 
women's exclusion from religious ritualistic language, and Furlong, who 
studied the speeches of opposing clerics in the Church of England's 
debates. Cameron had expressed the antagonism to women performing 
. sacramental acts as 'irrational dread' and Walsh adds: 
'Irrational dread' manifested itself in metaphors of disease used by opponents to 
describe women supporters and their campaigning style. For instance, Furlong 
(1994:23) notes that speakers in the 1984 General Synod debate spoke of women as' a 
virus in the bloodstream' who were engaged in 'destroying' and' disembowelling' 
the Church.38 (my emphasis) 
35 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 38. 
36 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse p. 38. 
37 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse p. 40. 
38 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 167. 
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A summary of Walsh's findings in her study on of women priests 
Her findings depict the Church as an institution constructed on male-
gendered discursive practices, whose competing ecclesiastic discourses 
on woman herald her as both chaotic and sexually predatory or self-
sacrificial in service to others. The study also reveals continuing 
difficulties around inclusive language, an issue that when challenged is 
paradoxically considered either too negligible for discussion or to be 
verging on the demonic. The discourses that privilege the maleness of 
the priest standing in for Jesus, whilst heretical, nevertheless, remain 
influential. Ironically, these stand in juxtaposition with the feminine, 
private role that a priest performs in the public institution of the Church. 
Consequently, entry to the profession by 'real' women is deemed very 
threatening, especially, when they are also expected to be agents of 
reform. 
With such confusion surrounding role performance, it is little wonder, 
therefore, that Walsh should conclude with the following comment 
concerning women priests: 
What is clear is that their language and behaviour is more likely than those of male 
colleagues to be fractured by competing, and often contradictory, norms and 
expectations. From the outset, stereotypical assumptions about what their ministry 
would mean has constrained the subject positions available to women priests, 
leading some to adopt feminine norms that are at odds with their preferred 
discursive style.39 (her italics) 
In what ways has Walsh's methodological framework of discourse 
analysis provided new insights? 
Primarily, the difference that Walsh's framework has made is one of 
illuminating more fully the landscape upon which the performance of 
gender is negotiated in the public sphere. Her methodology was able to 
produce results that explained the way women's choices about their role 
were constrained, but also, it was able to demonstrate the ways in which 
women were, and are, able to make an impact on masculinist discursive 
norms, provided they followed a 'critical difference' approach. By 
'critical difference' Walsh means an advocacy of gender inclusiveness 
policies as opposed to simply stopping at a critique of androcentric 
practices. Specifically, in her concluding comments on the study of 
women priests, Walsh could identify a positive outcome in the 
relationship between dominant and dominated discourses. She suggests 
that contrary to the common assumption that either the dominated 
39 C. Walsh, Gender and Discourse, p. 201. 
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discourse is subsumed into the dominant one, or alternatively, works as 
a reverse discourse to its more authoritative other, rather, she claims 
there is a creative dialectic between the institutional structures and the 
transforming agency of individuals. 
The crucial benefit of adopting discourse analysis as a methodology in 
this instance has been the illustration of how power performs in human 
relations, revealing the intricacies of conscious and unconscious 
negotiations that individuals undertake in realising their agency. The 
co(n)text, and its associated discursive practices, emerges as a crucial 
locus in this interplay, both as the field upon which human becoming 
takes place, and also, more significantly, as an integral part of the action 
itself. A methodology that considered text from a 'content and 
description' only perspective would not have been able to reveal these 
understandings of relational power. 
In Chapter One, I described how Foucault conceptualised this process. 
Contrary to the understanding of passive docility that some of his 
writings may suggest, Foucault does claim that individuals have some 
agency in their own subject construction.40 To recap, crucially, an 
understanding of this phenomenon is dependent upon the conception of 
power as relational and that the individual cannot invent new practices 
ex nihilo, but is always constrained by those that she finds in her own 
cultural context. This interplay of power, discourse and agency, is for 
Foucault, the basis for self-mastery, that is the foundation of an ethics of 
self. In the next section, I shall turn to the work of Mary McClintock-
Fulkerson, who incorporates these insights into her application of a 
discourse analysis methodology for feminist theology in preference to 
the traditional approaches that rely predominantly on women's 
experience. 
Using a Foucauldian method to elicit subject positions through 
discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis versus women's experience as an analytical tool 
Mary McClintock-Fulkerson promotes the application of critical 
discourse analysis in feminist theology, because she claims that the 
traditional, feminist appeal to 'women's experience' has a universalising 
element, which is false, as it cannot account for the multiplicity of subject 
positions that woman occupies in her localised, particular context. She 
cites Tania Modlski's critique of this criticism, who says, 'but surely for 
40 See Chapter One, pp. 38-9. 
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many women the phrase 'women's experience' is shorthand for 
'women's experience of political oppression' and it is around this 
experience that they have organized and out of this experience that they 
have developed a sense of solidarity, commonality, and community.'41 
McClintock-Fulkerson's response to this is twofold. She acknowledges 
that when an appeal to experience rests with these criteria, it is more 
analogous with standpoint theory, and therefore, must take account of 
the specific, socially constructed power formations. Whilst such a 
reading may not fully analyse the linguistic aspects, nevertheless, it 
moves women's experience away from an essentialising category. 
However, she claims that Rosemary Radford Reuther's adjure to 
experience is problematic because it includes a self-authenticating, 
revelatory aspect of the inner self that alludes to the pre-linguistic, 
shared consciousness of humanity, or more specifically in Reuther's 
definition, a shared consciousness of woman. McCintock-Fulkerson 
states, 'Self-authenticating subjectivity is hardly adequate to the 
commitment to social location feminists seek.'42 
McClintock-Fulkerson's concern is that feminist theology has 
essentialised woman, and in the process has lost the ability to hear her in 
the varied range of identities in which she is located, especially in those 
of women who do not share feminist aspirations. Her plea to 'change the 
subject' is a clever interplaying of key themes; her premise is not to lose 
woman-as-subject, but to recognise her as 'subjects', comprising myriad 
identities and being constituted in a multiplicity of positions. In this way, 
one can approach the discourses of Christian women, who do not overtly 
challenge the androcentric structures of the Church, without doing so in 
a spirit of freeing them from their shackled realities. Succinctly, 
McClintock-Fulkerson points out that in attending to the other as a social 
subject, rather than as an individual, then 'hospitality to the other is not 
the vocation of helping, liberating the oppressed other; it is work to 
liberate ourselves in relation to the oppressed other. '43 (her italics) 
How is McClintoch-Fulkerson's critical discourse methodology 
different from a feminist liberation theology one? 
Throughout her comparison of the two methodologies, McClintoch-
Fulkerson pursues her case that not only is a feminist theology method 
41 M. McClintock-Fulkerson, Changing the Subject: Women's Discourses and Feminist 
Theology, (Minneapolis: Augsberg Fortress Publishers, 1994), p. 53. 
42 M. McClintock-Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p. 56. 
43 M. McClintock- Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p. 4. 
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unable to fulfil its goals due to its reliance on the false universal of 
women's experience, but it actually maintains the very structures it seeks 
to displace by deploying a method of analysis that fails to take account of 
the multiple discursive totalities that create a myriad of subject positions 
and practices for women. Simply put, by not attending to the 
interconnected relationship between power, discourse and the subject, 
the traditional method misses vital understanding that is bound up in 
the very evidence it is analysing. For example, in taking a Foucauldian 
approach to discourse a perspective emerges, which resists the 
traditional dichotomies that feminist theologies seek to challenge, but by 
their methods, are incapable of disrupting. McClintock-Fulkerson 
elaborates further: 
At every point tenns of oppression and liberation require that the intelligibility of 
reality be understood in tenns of its creative instability - an instability displayed in 
all discourse. Dominant discursive fonnations neither silence all dissent nor present 
themselves with no boundaries or seams for the defining of an entity.44 
She continues to explain that the concept of a I sexist text' correctly 
implicates language with power, but hitherto, feminist theology has not 
been able to demonstrate the located relation of language and power to 
gender oppressions and liberations. She reaffirms the point underscored 
by Walsh, that if language is constitutive, then critically, it must be 
imperative to discover how it situates the subject. If that subject is 
uncoded, as in the basic proposition of woman's pre-linguistic 
consciousness, then it will be impossible to establish the affiliation with 
the interconnected web of discourse, systems of meaning and power 
relations that are so culturally and historically variable. 
Similarly, whilst feminist theology underscores that social structures are 
inherent in the creation and maintenance of gender oppression, this 
remains unconnected from the discursive practices that inform the 
minute detail of how these structures are perpetuated. So, as McClintock-
Fulkerson puts it, 'The gap between the hegemony of capitalist 
patriarchy, for example, and the discursive practices of the poor woman 
is not filled in.'45 Furthermore, McClintock-Fulkerson claims that 
feminist theologies continue to perceive language as representational as 
opposed to the poststructuralist view that it is relational and differential. 
Consequently, their account of language production is through a variety 
of historical-critical methods and appeals to Christian tradition, which do 
not acknowledge that these methods are themselves encapsulated in a 
social system of meaning. 
44 M. McClintock- Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p.107. 
45 M. McClintock- Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p.110. 
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Discourse theory directs a challenge to the heart of the cherished belief 
(by both androcentric and feminist traditions) that ' ... even as meaning is 
social and gets mediated through communal traditions, it is after all an 
individual consciousness that is the origin of religious traditions and 
their renewals.'46 She demonstrates that the prevailing logic must 
suggest that women's collective experience is an analogous 
consciousness that can generate new traditions. However, she contends 
this is problematic by continuing: 
As the destabilizing of the subject indicated, presenting the subject as the originating 
site of meaning production universalises women's experience with an uncoded 
subject and perpetuates the very practice feminists sought to expose and undermine 
- the false universal, man.47 
With these justifications, McClintock-Fulkerson undertakes an analysis 
of the discourses of two very different communities of Christian women. 
Firstly, from the Presbyterian Women (PW), a group of mainly white, 
middle-class women from the Presbyterian Church in the USA, and 
secondly, from the Pentecostal, Church of God, Assemblies of God and 
independent holiness denominations, who comprise a group of 
economically marginalized churchwomen living in the rural and 
mountain communities of the USA.48 
I have chosen to explore her research on the first group as her 
methodology here has produced significant insights relevant to my own 
research. Her work on the latter group, whilst providing some 
illuminating findings, nonetheless, was more problematic. Her case 
rested on the ability of Pentecostal women to negotiate subject positions 
through a Spirit-filled existence that accorded them personal 
empowerment, which, as economically marginalised women in a male 
dominated religion, would not have been open to them in any other 
capacity. My misgivings arise from the fact that these women believed 
utterly that this power came from God and, therefore, by suggesting that 
they used it as a way to achieve agency, actually serves to undermine 
their faith perspective. 
46 M. McClintock- Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p.l09. 
47 M. McClintock- Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p.l09. 
48 M. McClintock- Fulkerson refers to the Presbyterian women as PW in her quotations 
butl have chosen to retain the full wording so as not to cause confusion with the 
publication of the same name. 
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A summary of McClintock-Fulkerson's findings in her study of the 
Presbyterian women 
McClintock-Fulkerson considered a variety of discourses in her study of 
Presbyterian Women. She traces the trajectory of their development from 
the late nineteenth century through an appraisal of their literature, which 
predominantly constitutes their magazines, Presbyterian Women (1946-
1988) for the southern communities and Outreach (1947-1958) and 
Concern (1959-1988) for the northern branches.49 From these primary 
sources, she identifies the discourses of capitalist patriarchy, 
conservative Princeton theology, class and religious tradition and the 
role of the middle-class homemaker as being central to this community. 
The Reformed theological vision, with its insistence on a scriptural basis 
for faith praxis, is also at the heart of the discursive arena, which these 
women inhabit. Alongside a firm justification by faith strand to this 
theology is an insistence on the societal nature of salvation, rather than a 
focus on private, personal faith. Women were not permitted to hold 
positions of authority till ordination was achieved in the northern and 
southern denominations in 1956 and 1964 respectively. However, for 
many women, this had not been a matter of particular contention or 
importance. 
Discerning the field, mode and tenor of the Presbyterian Women's 
literature and practices 
In conducting her analysis of the Presbyterian women's discourse, 
McClintock-Fulkerson acknowledges the complexity of the task and 
describes what she was seeking to discern: 
It is not simply one (written) text, nor is it simply the organizational activities. Our 
task is to discern patterns or subgemes within the written and organizational 
totality that is the Presbyterian Woman's discourse-the connections, the cohesive 
pieces that offer regularities comprising an overarching register (field, tenor, and 
mode). What we seek are utterances that are regular enough to allow us to perceive 
the expectations that accompany them and, the alterations of those expectations.50 
The categories of field, tenor and mode may overlap, but McClintock-
Fulkerson sets out her definitions of the terms and discusses how these 
aspects shape the Presbyterian women's discourse as a performance or a 
reading regime. Her purpose is to determine the interconnectedness with 
the dominant canon and to demonstrate how tllis relation operates. 
49 It is interesting to note that the words 'outreach' and 'concern' encapsulate the 
Presbyterian women's most basic faith propositions, as will become apparent as their 
story unfolds. 
50 M. McClintock-Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, pp. 209-210. 
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The contents and ideas of the discourse comprise the field and these are 
predominantly not feminist, but rather depict motherhood and 
homemaking as, not just the epitome of the faithful Christian woman, 
but moreover, as her identity. The threads of cosy, privatised privilege 
are challenged by other strands in the field of critiquing material success 
and of taking responsibility for global transformation. By focusing on the 
scriptural call of welcome to the stranger, the Presbyterian women were 
able to create their own canonical response of Christian praxis that was 
centred initially on the affective domain of the hearth, but then reached 
out, through the mission field and the concept of Women's Work for 
Women, into the communities of the world. 
The tenor alludes to the setting and process of speaking and practice. 
This aspect of the performative whole refers to the way interaction is 
established and McClintock-Fulkerson states: 'The kind of relations that 
are assumed and evoked by PW literature will have an important impact 
on its production of women as subjects.'51 She identifies four principal 
tenors used for differing genres in the Presbyterian women's literature, 
firstly, a personalised mutuality in the conversational pieces, secondly, 
an egalitarian didacticism in field related issues, thirdly, male-gendered 
authoritarianism in the expert addresses and fourthly, a self-
interrogative tenor found in issues of personal accountability. The mode 
of the monthly magazines refers to the medium of communication and 
includes the imagery, photographs, page layout and hierarchy of 
contents in their literature. 
These factors working alongside each other construct a complex 
imperative exhorting the Presbyterian Woman to be simultaneously a 
powerful agent who is personally accountable to God for her agency, yet, 
by implication in the expert, paternal addresses, is incapable of deciding 
for herself, by virtue of her gender, from a full range of options for this 
agency. McClintock-Fulkerson neatly summarises this position when she 
says: 
The tenor is one of respect for PW and a climate honouring the domestic and the 
ordinary in an unresolved tension with subjection to the domination of an authority 
and the interrogation of self-scrutiny. It is not just the identity of the Christian 
homemaker as responsible for the world neighbor that accounts for the discourse; 
the woman herself is being produced.52 
51 M. McClintock-Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p. 217. 
52 M. McClintock-Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p. 228. 
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In what ways has McClintock-Fulkerson's methodological framework 
of discourse analysis provided different insights? 
McClintock-Fulkerson has been able to illustrate the ambiguity, 
complexity and confusion of subject positions that the Presbyterian 
women have to negotiate, which would not have been illuminated by a 
traditional feminist theological approach. She has demonstrated that the 
constraints put upon these women have not reduced them to passive 
docility. They have selected discourses from their social group that are 
mandatory to all members (of both genders), such as having a biblical 
foundation for a habitus of faith praxis and a societal concept of 
salvation. They have taken the freedom that this subject position affords 
them of constructing an ethics of self that is not in constant struggle with 
their men folk. In so doing they have been able to enjoy the pleasures of 
the public sphere without derision and criticism. 
Furthermore, as Karen Lebacqz says, 'I am inclined to agree with Sara 
Ruddick that the most profound change we could make to counteract the 
oppressions of sexism is not the inclusion of men in the private sphere 
but rather the inclusion of this discipline of compassionate thinking in 
the public sphere'.53 From this vantage point, the work of the 
Presbyterian women might be perceived as radically transforming, 
which is something that would have been missed by a traditional 
feminist theology method. McClintock-Fulkerson concludes, 'Even as 
they are produced, Presbyterian Women are producers of wisdom from 
whom we have much to gain./54 
In the next section, I wish to explore whether discourse theory can also 
provide a more productive way for pastoral care-giving/ sharing than the 
traditional model. It is clear that Christian discourses both empowered 
and disempowered the Presbyterian women, for, whilst it can be said 
that they overcame the constraints put upon them to a certain extent, 
nonetheless, sanctioned restrictions remained in place that did not allow 
them to flourish unfettered. Consequently, it is vital to ask if discourse 
theory can provide tools for critically appraising how Christian 
discourses contribute to the political landscape that shapes the socio-
cultural context. 
53 K. Lebacqz, 'The Weeping Womb: Why Beneficence Needs the Still Small Voice of 
Compassion' in Shelp, E. (ed.), Secular Bioethics in Theological Perspective, (Dordrecht, 
Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), p. 94. 
54 M. McClintock-Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p. 238. 
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Using discourse analysis in Pastoral Theology 
In her article, 'Discourse theory and Pastoral Theology', Susan Dunlap 
makes a case for the reinterpretation of pastoral care grounded on the 
revelations that discourse theory provides concerning the impact of 
social and cultural structures on human dilemmas, which have, hitherto, 
been considered to be personal problems.55 She draws attention to the 
work of other practical theologians who have been advocating this 
approach, citing John Patton, who' ... has called this a shift to a 
"communal-contextual" paradigm in which attention is given to the 
impact of corporate structures, both ecclesial and cultural.'56 Dunlap 
claims that the critical issue in pastoral care lies in linking the inner 
world of thoughts and feelings with the sociocultural context in which 
one is situated. She prefers to conceive of the 'self' as a 'subject position' 
as this rendering is more conducive to the Foucauldian discernment of 
individuals constituting and reconstituting a fluid subjectivity in the 
midst of competing discourses. Whilst the passions, desires and rages of 
individuals are keenly felt within, it is the positionaZity of discourse 
theory that locates them in a certain time, place and context. 
Dunlap recognises the pastoral role of empowerment in this reading of 
subjectivity. She draws on Chris Weedon to support her case that 
individuals are not cast adrift in the ensuing discursive battles, but can 
be agents of choice, as multiple discourses create plurality of meaningsP 
Pastoral carer-givers are also conveyors of Christian discourses, and 
these too, are not exempt from contradictory strands, employing 
differing authority structures and discursive practices. She guards 
against perceiving individual subjectivity as an 'empty space', bu t 
invokes Kristeva's conceptualisation of the subject as a 'work in 
progress.'5S With this in mind, empathy takes on a greater force. The 
affective component of standing alongside another's suffering is 
enhanced by a cognitive component that can challenge discourses that 
are harmful and damaging. This latter aspect relies on developing the art 
of asking contextual questions, which is for Dunlap, a crucial therapeutic 
skill. 
55 S. Dunlap, 'Discourse Theory and Pastoral Theology' in Feminist and Womanist 
Pastoral Theology, ed by B. Miller-McLemore & B. Gill-Austern, (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1999), pp. 133-147. 
56 S. Dunlap, 'Discourse Theory and Pastoral Theology' in Feminist and Womanist 
Pastoral Theology, ed by B. Miller-McLemore & B. Gill-Au stern, (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1999), p 134. 
57 S. Dunlap, 'Discourse Theory', p. 137. 
58 S. Dunlap, 'Discourse Theory', p. 138. 
64 
Types of political discourse 
Dunlap takes the application of discourse theory further by considering 
the discipline of Pastoral Theology as a discourse in the socio-political 
arena. She cites the work of Nancy Fraser, who distinguishes between 
three different, politically functioning types of discourses. Christian 
discourses can fall into each category, but more often than not, they 
belong to first two. Reprivatisation discourses serve to keep issues private, 
personal and apolitical. An example might be viewing domestic violence 
as a family, rather than, a societal issue. Secondly, expert discourses are 
those arising from authoritative institutions, such as the university or 
public bodies. In an echo of Foucauldian insight, Dunlap citing Fraser 
states: 'Experts tend to objectify those who needs are debated, who can 
be /I rendered passive, positioned as potential recipients of predefined 
services rather than as agents involved in interpreting their needs and 
shaping their life conditions./I'59 
The final category is that of oppositional discourses. These are discourses 
that are marked by a change, by the contesting of a situation and 
challenging the previously held status quo. Often this marks the point 
where an issue moves from the domestic realm to the political, as in the 
defiance of Christian married women who were formerly told to accept 
deeply, unhappy domestic circumstances. Dunlap confronts pastoral 
practitioners and theologians and asks if it is not possible to choose to 
function as an oppositional discourse, to challenge the narrow definitions 
that the expert discourses create of the normal and the deviant, the 
righteous and the unworthy? To this end she advocates drawing on 
resources of cultural critique and resistance literature and to recognise 
the shared vulnerability of those of us who are the bearers of Pastoral 
Theology discourses falling prey to delivering an expert or 
reprivatisation discourse. 
How does using discourse theory in Pastoral Theology make a 
difference? 
Dunlap's article demonstrates two important differences from traditional 
understandings for pastoral theologians to consider. The first lies in the 
role of giving pastoral care and learning to discern the nuances of 
discourse. Dunlap says: 
As we listen to those to whom we give care, we can listen for the competing 
discourses in their words and in their actions. In one moment we may hear 
Christian discourse regarding love of neighbor and welcoming the stranger, at 
59 S. Dunlap, 'Discourse Theory', p. 142. 
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another we may hear strains of capitalist ideology that more-is-better, or we may 
hear pop psychological language of codependency or Mars/Venus talk.60 
Her advocacy to raise awareness of the differing subject positions that 
her clients find themselves beset by is resonant of McClintock-
Fulkerson's work in defining and negotiating agency in these terms. Her 
second proposition is that as pastoral practitioners we are also 'bearers of 
discourse' and should therefore be concerned in raising our own 
awareness of the way in which we occupy subject positions and are 
active in the social construction of both ourselves and others. In drawing 
upon the work of Fraser, Dunlap has demonstrated how discourses can 
operate in the socio-political context, serving to silence opponents and to 
render issues into the private arena, shielding them from public scrutiny. 
I will now turn to the work of Steven Grimwood who has applied a 
Foucauldian perspective to an expert ecclesiastical discourse, exploring 
the way in which the knowledge it contains is constructed to become a 
dynamic of power rather than an illumination of meaning. 
Using a Foucauldian method to elicit power relations in an expert 
discourse 
In Grimwood's exploration of the House of Bishop's report, Issues in 
Sexuality, published in 1991, he sets the scene by stating that although 
this text is the 'Church of England's unofficial official view', 
nevertheless, 'it carries with it an authority derived from the status of 
those men who stand responsible for it.'61 For Grimwood, questions 
surrounding power and authority are critical in the construction of 
subject positions, and more specifically, in the objectification of the other, 
who is acted upon by the field, tenor and mode of the discourse itself. 
Grimwood begins with an overview of the statement, the structure and 
contents, which I shall briefly outline here. 
The outline of the statement 
The introduction gives a background to the issues and expresses that the 
aim of the statement is '''to address certain practical questions" within 
the Church of England and" to help forward a general process, marked 
by greater trust and openness, of Christian reflection on the subject of 
60 S. Dunlap, 'Discourse Theory', pp. 136-7. 
61 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives on Issues in Human Sexuality' in 
Theology and Sexuality: The Journal of the Centre for the Study of Christianity and Sexuality, 
ed by E. Stuart & H. Walton, (Vol. 16 [2002] pp. 97-119), p. 98. 
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human sexuality."'62 (Note here Walsh's point regarding the use of 
interpersonal cues to drive the ideational thrust of a public document.) 
The second section offers a biblical perspective and an acknowledgement 
of the intricacies involved, especially in the light of current cultural 
thinking. However, the challenge that this presents is not discussed 
further in the document. The statement continues with a celebration of 
heterosexuality, a confirmation of the complementarity and essential 
difference of the sexes and the affirmation of the sacred nature of 
marriage and procreation. The next section reflects on homosexual 
relationships in correlation with Scripture and concludes with the 
following comment: 
There is, therefore, in Scripture an evolving convergence on the ideal of lifelong, 
monogamous, heterosexual union as the setting intended by God for the proper 
development of men and women as sexual beings. Sexual activity of any kind 
outside marriage comes to be seen as sinful, and homosexual practice as especially 
dishonourable.63 
The text then states that celibacy is an option for those who are called to 
it. This leads into the next section in which Christian heterosexual 
marriage is privileged as the zenithal intimate relationship against which 
all other sexual states of being are defined and measured. Two separated 
sections then follow, these are: 'The Phenomenon of Homosexual Love' 
and 'The Homophile in the Life and Fellowship of the Church' . 
Grimwood points out that the first of the couplet, as the title suggests, 
'considers homosexuality as a thing to be studied and explored'. 64 The 
second part and final section of the statement explores the pastoral 
implications. To summarise, refraining from sexual activity in same-sex 
relations is praised, but the individual's moral capacity to discern 
whether or not to do so is ratified. However, homosexual clergy and 
ordinands are called to abstain from sexual behaviour, not for the 
scriptural reasons given earlier, bu t because it was assumed that parishes 
would not accept it. 
Grimwood's methodology 
Whilst Grimwood draws on Foucault's insights, nonetheless, he 
emphasises that there is no definitive 'Poucauldian method', but rather 
an approach based on his counter-thinking. By taking the interlinking of 
62 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives' p. 99. This quotation is taken from the 
statement itself, Issues in human Sexuality: A Statement by the House of Bishops (London: 
Church House Publishing, 1991) para. 1.9. 
63 Issues in human Sexuality, para. 2.29 quoted in S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian 
Perspectives', p. 100. 
64 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 101. 
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discourse, power and subjectivity as a basic premise, coupled with the 
persistent challenge to commonly held assumptions, Grimwood's 
questions revolve round the functioning aspect of the statement rather 
than its intrinsic meaning. He draws upon Foucault's enduring 
discernment of the centrality of the body as the locus of disciplinary 
techniques and notes Christianity's centuries long trajectory in the 
mastery of this power. He points out that in this struggle in which 'the 
body has become the battlefield', the fighting is silent, relying on the 
Foucauldian elicited weapons of 'anonymity 
., . classification ... 0bjectification.'65 These weapons, he claims, are 
fundamental to the bishops' armoury. 
The pivotal crux of his method is in applying Foucauldian counter-
thinking to the questions he asks of the text itself. Rather than searching 
for meaning and truth in the content, he prefers to ask, 'for whom does 
this work?' and 'what does it do?' He continues, 'In this light, analyses of 
discourses - of what is said and who is permitted to speak - acquire a 
new urgency and importance, for what we are dealing with is not 
'meaning' but power.'66 By isolating excerpts from the body of the text 
and subjecting them to deliberations of function rather than reading them 
as traditional educational methods have taught us, the capacity of the 
statement to order' a regulative worldview' becomes discernible, despite, 
or perhaps because of 'the appearance of (its) dispassionate objectivity.'67 
Grimwood discerns a prime Foucauldian counter-cultural insight 
regarding the machinations of power when he says, "power' does not 
equate with force; part of the exercise of power depends upon the 
freedom of the subject upon whom power is brought into operation.'68 
From this vantage point, the minutiae of the mundane, everyday, taken 
for granted aspects of life take on a heightened significance, what 
Foucault termed the 'micro-physics of power.'69 Furthermore, Grimwood 
describes power's relational ontology and cites Foucault to demonstrate 
that we are all implicated, complicit and capable of resisting and 
exercising power relations. For, we cannot help but be so as social 
creatures interacting with each other within the cultural environment 
that we inhabit. However, we are unaware, for the most part, of how we 
play our role in this process and the success of power mechanisms is 
proportional to the capacity they have to hide themselves. 
65 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 105. 
66 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 103. 
67 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 97. These collocations are taken 
from the article's abstract. 
68 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 105. 
69 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 105. 
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Grimwood's application of his methodology to the text 
Grimwood discerns this phenomenon operating in the bishops' 
statement. The power behind the statement is masked by its lack of 
definitive, authoritarian proscriptions and its refusal to restrict the liberty 
of an individual to choose. He notes that the 'freedom of conscience' is a 
technique with a twofold function, in that not only does it create a 
condition of agency essential to the dynamics of power, it also draws in a 
wide circle of potential subjects from beyond the confines of the Church. 
Moreover, Grimwood discerns the disciplinary technique of Bentham's 
Panopticon at work in the statement by the way that the visibility of the 
cleric is emphasised, thereby highlighting that his or her behaviour is 
under the constant scrutiny of their parishioners and local community. 70 
Foucault describes the technique thus: 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious 
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.71 
Referring to candidates for ordination, the bishops' statement declares: 
[W]e do not think it right to interrogate individuals on their sexual lives, unless 
there are strong reasons for doing so. Ordinarily it should be left to the candidates' 
own consciences to act responsibly in this matter.72 
By these means, the choice of individuals to regulate their behaviour in 
line with the statement's recommendations is secured. 
How the boundaries of normality are constructed in the text 
For the panoptic technique to be effective, there must be a consensus of 
opinion within a community about what constitutes normal behaviour. 
Grimwood discerns the mechanisms within the bishops' statement that 
serve to construct and maintain the borders of normality that are 
permeable and fluid. In this instance the condition of heterosexual 
marriage is normalised, thereby creating its other, homosexuality, - to be 
objectified, studied and problematised. Grimwood cites Foucault's 
observations of the Ecole Militaire in Discipline and Punish, in which 
individuals were regimented by a series of privileges and punishments 
to conform to the same mode of being in order that they would become 
70 As discussed in Chapter One, p. 30-31, footnote 84. 
71 • M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 201. 
72 Issues in human Sexuality, para. 5.22 quoted in S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian 
Perspectives' p. 107. 
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indistinguishable from each other. To achieve this end, they were 
compared to each other, rather than to a set of independent criteria, by 
being placed in a hierarchy of above or below an average gauged on the 
performance of their own group. Consequently the effect of this 'value-
giving measure' was for them, as it is for others, 'the constraint of a 
conformity that must be achieved.'73 
In a circular effect, Grimwood observes, that under these circumstances, 
there is less need for censure. The construction of a norm creates a 
boundary that, by implication, delineates a deviation. In the section 
entitled 'The Christian Vision for Sexuality' it is clear that heterosexual 
relations are privileged as ideal and that the context for this sexual 
expression is marriage. As in the Ecole Militaire, individuals are 
measured against each other in relation to the desired model. The 
bishops' privileging of marriage is quoted thus: 
Marriage being a part of God's good gift in creation, both the married state and 
others which are defined in relation to it can have this power for good [ie. to 
transform fallen human nature] in all human life, wherever they are inspired by the 
same values and ideals, and can be a means of advancing the Kingdom of God.74 
Consequently, from the perspective of the bishops' statement, being 
single (as opposed to being called to celibacy) is considered a privation. It 
is worth quoting here the bishops' description of singleness as a 'sad 
experience that, for whatever reason, the person they could and would 
have loved and married, and who could and would have loved and 
married them, has never entered their lives.'75 This construction incites 
pity, and despite its apparent sympathy (or indeed because of it), it 
implicitly bears the silent, but pernicious, suggestion that there is 
something intrinsically 'not quite right' with the person who 'can't find 
anyone to marry them'. Unfortunately, the bishops' report is typical of 
ecclesiastical discourses giving this impression, rather than resisting it by 
heralding the scriptural affirmation of the God-given worth of every 
condition of human becoming. Grimwood refrains from structuring a 
hierarchy of conditions around the norm of marriage, but he continues: 
73 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 108. In a further footnote to this 
point, a recent article in Weekend, the accompanying Saturda y magazine to the Guardian 
newspaper, entitled 'Haven't I seen you somewhere before?' (17/01/ 2004, p. 25) 
describes how definitions of physical beauty according to Hollywood and the surgeon's 
knife, have become the criteria of uniformity to which we are being culturally 
constructed to follow. 
74 Issues in human Sexuality, para. 3.16 quoted in S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian 
Perspectives' p. 100. 
75 Issues in human Sexuality, para. 3.11 quoted in S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian 
Perspectives' p. 109. 
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... however it is clear that marriage is represented as the definitive norm and that 
other conditions are exceptions to this rule. It is a norm that seduces us to 
conformity. Is it too much to say that heterosexuality is here set up as a compulsory, 
normative state, from which a special dispensation is required in order to be 
exempt?76 
How the other is silenced in the text 
Foucault claimed that in order for a norm to succeed, it required an other 
against which it could be defined. For example, against the norm of 
sanity, madness needs to be explored, categorised, analysed and 
constructed as inferior. Robin Skynner and John Cleese use humour to 
highlight the incongruity of this, when they discuss the fact tha t very few 
studies are ever conducted on the mentally healthy. Cleese says: 
You'd think that shrinks would discuss it, but they don't. But then the odd thing 
about psychiatry is that it's entirely based on the study of people who aren't doing 
very well- folk with 'problems'. I mean, if you wanted to write a book about how to 
paint or play chess, or be a good manager, you'd start by studying the people who 
were good at those things. And you wouldn't expect heavy sales of a book called 
Play Championship Golfby Learning the Secrets of the Worst Twenty Players in the World. 
(his italics)77 
Furthermore, in creating the other to be scrutinised, heterosexuality 
escapes the same treatment. Grimwood states, 'In short, the subject 
privileges itself by being able to define itself over and against that which 
it constructs as its other.'78 This technique creates non-personhood by 
transferring the label attached to the behaviour or condition on to the 
group of people who behave in a certain way. Thus, as Foucault 
demonstrated, up until the nineteenth century 'homosexuals' as a 
discrete group did not exist, rather, there were men who practised acts of 
sodomy.79 The act was labelled, not the person committing it. In a similar 
way, common parlance refers to schizophrenics, not people suffering 
from schizophrenia. 
The practice of regulation causes the number of discourses around the 
object in question to proliferate, as the bishops' text demonstrates in the 
call to take into account medical and scientific research on 
homosexuality.80 However, the people who have been objectified by this 
76 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', pp.l09-110. 
77 R. Skynner and J. Cleese, Life and how to survive it, (London: Methuen London, 1993), p 
1. 
78 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives' p. 11l. 
79 The issue of women's same-sex relationships is not discussed. 
80 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 112. 
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labelling technique are, effectively, silenced. For, even if they contribute 
to any study, they are always hampered by being the object of that study. 
At no time could the other ever be on equal terms with its subject, 
because not only is the subject never scrutinised, but also moreover, such 
a notion would be considered unthinkable. The bishops refuse to take 
responsibility for their construction of homosexuality as other, by the 
following insincere appeal to 'common humanity'. 
The general tendency in public discussion is to concentrate on the differences, real 
or alleged, between heterophiles and homophiles. We regard it as of the first 
importance to take the opposite line, and to emphasize the common humanity 
which they share.81 
This quotation is particularly disingenuous when one considers the point 
of the whole document is precisely to accentuate the 'essentialist' 
differences between homosexuality and heterosexuality in order to create 
borders of normality in which homosexual practice is firmly located 
outside. Juxtapose this quotation with the one taken from paragraph 5.2 
of the document 
Heterosexuality and homosexuality are not equally congruous with the observed order of 
creation or with the insights of revelation as the Church engages with these in the 
light of her pastoral ministry. 82 (my emphasis) 
How can a common humanity be emphasized in paragraph 4.5, whilst 
simultaneously claiming that there is a divinely appointed hierarchy of 
human ontology in paragraph 5.2? 
Grimwood hones in on the linguistically unusual in his textual analysis, 
by highlighting the use of the word 'homophile' rather than the more 
common term, homosexual. The bishops state that their reason for using 
a different word is so that it can be free of the negative connotations that 
surround the word homosexual. (It is interesting to note the meticulous 
care with language that the bishops admit they have taken in 
formulating their text.) However, Grimwood points out that this strategy 
also gives the bishops a 'clean slate on which to represent their other.'83 
The function of this controlling technique serves to further silence the 
homosexual subject, whilst the bishops can be heard loud and clear. This 
in turn has the effect of reinforcing the bishops' polarized, male, 
heterosexual normality. Of course one is free to challenge their position, 
81 Issues in human Sexuality, para. 4.5 quoted in S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian 
Perspectives' p.l13. 
82 Issues in human Sexuality, para. 5.2 quoted in S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian 
Perspectives' p.l02. 
83 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 115. 
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such agency is part of the power dynamic, but insidiously, it becomes 
more and more unthinkable to do so. 
Foucault described this phenomenon by an analogous comparison with 
the painting Las Meninas by Velasquez, whereby the painter, in the act of 
representing could not both be portrayed in the picture and 
simultaneously be painting it. The insight drawn from this is that when 
one is representing the other as object, one's own subjectivity becomes 
concealed. Grimwood speculates as to how a document would read if the 
bishops were to reveal themselves as they began their exploration of the 
other, '(Imagine, for instance: 'we - that is a group of mainly white, 
European, heterosexual males -need to question ... ')' .84 Whilst difficult to 
digest, it would be illuminating nonetheless. 
Ecclesiastical power 
Although, on page 116 of his article, Grimwood states that the bishops 
control of what is said 'enables them to act both as 'Father and Judge", 
nevertheless in his paper, he does not underscore the fact that the 
bishops wield greater power than a comparable secular consortium 
would dO.85 For, whilst the Foucauldian discerned techniques might be 
the same in a medical or scientific treatise, they will not be upheld by a 
divine arbiter as they are in an ecclesiastical document. The seductive 
and ambivalent power of spiritual belonging is expressed well by 
Richard Holloway in the following anecdotal account of his visit to St. 
Peter's Square: 
I was overwhelmed by St Peter's and was made to feel puny and irrelevant in its 
confident vastness. I told John [the guide who was a Catholic priest] how I felt, how 
I almost wanted to hold up my hands in surrender and submission saying, 'OK, I 
give up, take me in.' 'That's what the bastards want you to do,' John replied, 
throwing a look of exasperated affection back over St Peter's Square.86 
Holloway demonstrates the psychological relief of being able to 
'surrender' one's fears and to be enveloped within the protective and 
invincible power of a divinely appointed sanctuary. By saying, 'OK, I 
give up' Holloway also acknowledges that obedience to the institution's 
codes is part of the package of his deliverance. Consequently, it can be 
inferred that the churches' stance on same-sex relationships creates a 
~~- -~------.. -
84 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 117. 
85 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 116. The phrase 'Father and Judge' 
is cited by Grimwood from M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. xv. 
86 R. Holloway, Godless Morality: Keeping Religion out of Ethics, (Edinburgh: Canongate 
Books Ltd., 1999) p. 153. 
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psychic crisis in the internal struggle of homosexuals in determining 
their subject position.87 
In addition, the role of the Catholic priest in the anecdote illustrates a 
recognition of the destructive ability of the church's power when he 
refers to 'the bastards' wanting you to give in to them. Yet, as a priest, he 
is a gatekeeper to the system and by implication, therefore, he is part of 
it. The ambivalence of this subject position is illustrated by the phrase 
'exasperated affection'. However, the sense of rebellion implied in his 
response is indicative of how the boundaries of 'normality' need to be 
constantly reaffirmed, challenged as they are by oppositional discourses 
both within the Church and from the secular society. Indeed, the fact that 
the bishops' statement was produced in the first place, may have been 
directly precipitated by the current discourses of tolerance (both secular 
and ecclesial) towards same-sex partnerships. ' 
In what ways has Grimwood's methodological framework of discourse 
analysis provided helpful insights? 
By applying an analysis of the discourse in the bishops' statement, 
Grimwood was able to uncover the techniques of construction that 
continue to place homosexuality outside the church's boundaries of 
inclusion. What becomes apparent is that this exclusion is not bound by 
issues of Scripture or 'nature', but by how those discourses function to 
categorise and displace the other. For, clearly, oppositional discourses 
illustrate how these entities could otherwise be conceptualised. The quest 
to seek 'greater trust and openness' in the statement's aims is 
demonstrated as false because those whose subjugated knowledges 
could edify heterosexuals, are silenced. Consequently, homosexuality, as 
Foucault declared of sex, becomes spoken of' ad infinitum, while 
exploiting it as the secret.'88 
In addition, the techniques of power are highlighted by Grimwood's 
methods demonstrating Foucault's insights that, 'The history which 
bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a 
language: relations of power, not relations of meaning.'89 These 
techniques would have escaped exploration in a content-only analysis. 
Finally, in consideration of Dunlap's argument about the politicisation of 
discourses, I would contend that this discourse is not only an expert one, 
87 Issues in human Sexuality, para 2.29 see endnote xl. 
88 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality. 1. An Introduction (trans. R. Hurley, (London: 
Penguin books, 1990), p. 35. 
89 M. Foucault, 'Truth and Power' in P. Rabinow (ed) TIle Foucault Reader (London: 
Penguin Books, 1991), p. 56. 
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but is also a reprivatisation discourse, pushing the whole question of 
homosexual partnerships into the private sphere. In so doing, the Church 
does not have to face uncomfortable aspects of justice concerning the 
rights of long term homosexual partners with regard to such issues as 
pensions, inheritance and custody claims, which the secular world is 
currently debating in its legislative proposals.9o 
In summary: How this range of Foucauldian methodologies have 
provided guidance for my own research 
By giving close attention to the way that cultural and theological scholars 
have drawn on Foucault's theories of discourse, power and the subject to 
construct an alternative methodological approach, I have established that 
this can produce substantially different results from more traditional 
investigations. Whilst each scholar tailored their use of Foucault to suit 
the specific constraints of their study, nevertheless, each one creatively 
applied the same insights of searching for function rather than content 
and for technique rather than meaning. These methodologies provide 
helpful pathways for the next section, in which I shall apply the research 
questions, compiled at the end of Chapter One, to varying discourses on 
theNRTs. 
Graham succinctly puts the case for studying the popular socio-cultural 
icons, myths and stories to discover the borders of what constitutes 
human norms. Whereas she selected teratology to interrogate these 
questions of ontological hygiene, I intend to choose those contemporary 
narratives surrounding the NRTs to discover how biopower is operating 
to construct norms of reproductive behaviour and family construction. 
Graham also establishes, by her findings, a strong case for utilising a 
genealogical and archeological approach to these investigations of 
function. Carrette, in his helpful critique of Graham's work, 
demonstrates that 'how do I relate or exchange?' (or 'how am I 
constructed to exchange?') is a more productive question than 'who am I?' 
in the light of a capitalist metasystem. His foregrounding that 
biotechnology is itself, first and foremost, bound within the capitalist 
system of commercial power, is a pertinent reminder that this should be 
predominant in any analysis of the NRTs. 
- .. -~.---~ 
90 On 31 March 2004 the Civil Partnership Bill was published awarding gay and lesbian 
people the right to same-sex civil ceremonies, guardianship and pension rights. (H. 
Carter & M. White, 'Rights for gay couples-but not marriage,' The Guardian, 1/04/2004, 
p.9). The institutional Church has been silent about the societal injustice to those in 
long-term same-sex partnerships, leaving the struggle for parity with married 
heterosexuals to organisations in the secular domain. 
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Walsh, McClintock-Fulkerson and Grimwood provide examples of how 
a close Foucauldian counter-reading of selected texts can elicit findings 
that illustrate not only how discourses function, but also how, in turn, 
varying subject positions are created in the complex dialectic of 
individual agency, oppositional discourses and dominant structures. 
Furthermore, these findings also demonstrate that the techniques of 
power, which Foucault first described, have evolved with socio-cultural 
changes, thereby continuing to produce similar consequences in the 
construction of norms, the categorization of the other and the silencing of 
those objectified by the speaking subject. In addition, Dunlap has 
demonstrated how this alternative perspective can elucidate the pastoral 
situation by providing socio-cultural insights that can empower clients 
through their own struggles in negotiating an ethics of self. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNDERTAKING A GENEALOGICAL APPROACH TO THE 
DISCOURSES OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Mill, he said, obscured, indeed denied the difference between the desirable and the 
desired, between what people do want, and what it is good that they should want. 
This argument was an object of great fascination to later philosophers and we spent 
much time in our undergraduate essays discussing it.1 
Baroness Warnock, 1998. 
Men are controlling not only what choices are open to women, but what choices 
women learn to wantto make.2 
Janice Raymond, 1988. 
In this chapter, I propose to conduct an analysis of the discourses 
surrounding assisted conception that have abounded in the media 
reports since the birth of Louise Brown. The birth of the world's first 
IVF baby was a landmark, not just for its biomedical significance, but 
also for marking the beginning of public debate of what had been, 
hitherto, a phenomenon largely confined to research communities 
and scientific fiction. Since that day on 25 July 1978, a quarter of a 
century ago, the stories of procreative successes and controversies 
have consistently made headlines and front-page news, and this trend 
shows no sign of abating. Consequently, the competing NRT 
discourses have become commonplace and have assimilated into our 
socio-cultural environment, as familiar to us all as the mobile phone, 
the DVD and the Internet. 
I shall follow a similar approach to Graham in conducting my own 
genealogical analysis of contemporary icons, myths and narratives, I 
intend to select articles from a range of tabloid and broadsheet 
newspapers to interrogate, not so much 'what people are saying, but 
rather how they are saying it) I am interested in how the discourses 
are being constructed, what techniques are being deployed, who is 
speaking and who is silent. What sort of interpretive cues are being 
used? In the light of Walsh's helpful methodology, I would define 
anything as an interpretive cue that the text producer has used to 
indicate emphasis or evoke sympathy and could include the 
1 Baroness Warnock talking about the influence of G. E. Moore and his opinions 
regarding John Stuart Mill's moral philosophy on her student days. M. Warnock, An 
Intelligent Person's Guide to Ethics, (London: Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 1998), p.13. 
2 Quoted in G. Corea, TIre Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial 
Insemination to Artificial Wombs, (London: The Women's Press, 1988) p. 233. Corea 
does not cite in her text which particular publication this quotation came from, 
consequently, the date given is from Corea's book. 
3 See Chapter Two, pp. 48-49. 
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following: words written in capitals or placed in inverted commas, 
emotive words and phrases, visual images and headlines.4 
Furthermore, just as Graham demonstrated the cultural significance 
of common phrases like 'Frankenstein food' (which has become 
synonymous with genetically modified produce) so I shall investigate 
what can be discerned in the similarly familiar epithets that define the 
new reproductive procedures. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to include all the developments of 
the NRTs, which have taken place in the last twenty-five years. The 
act of separating the embryo from woman has had repercussions, 
which have reverberated through society impacting upon, not just 
biotechnology, but on the boundaries of expectation, possibility and 
the constitution of cultural norms. In a similar way that Graham's 
interrogation of teratology focused on what it means to be human, I 
would contend that the NRT discourses would be an equally 
revealing site of exploration, encompassing also the cultural 
ambivalences on what it means to be a family. In selecting texts for 
analysis, it will be impossible to cover every controversy or every 
genealogical connection that exists between all the aspects of this 
procreative innovation; consequently, it is important to state what my 
specific aims are. 
Firstly, I wish to demonstrate my premise, as stated in chapter one, 
that the personhood of woman has been eclipsed from the competing 
mainstream NRT discourses and, in doing so, to elucidate the 
techniques and statements that construct her disappearance. 
Secondly, I wish to examine how the embryo has been constructed 
and how the discursive practices of the IVF clinic are interconnected 
with this construction. Thirdly, I will consider the repercussions for 
the family, but will centre this on woman and motherhood in order to 
provide a coherent boundary to the study and offer a depth of 
analysis to its findings. Finally, I intend to deduce from these analyses 
how techniques are being deployed, in the Foucauldian sense, 
through the formation, transformation and correlation of discourses 
in order to elicit the changing perimeters of culturally given human 
norms. 
With this in mind, I have selected for analysis a small number of 
articles from the plethora that have been written, beginning with the 
announcement on the front-page of the Scottish Daily Express 
proclaiming Louise Brown's birth. All the articles are reproduced in 
Appendix I. I will present the analyses in chronological order so that 
any changes in the discourses used can be noted as IVF becomes 
assimilated through the years into the socio-cultural normality that it 
4 See Chapter Two, p. 53. 
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The Front Page and Continuation Page of the Scottish Daily Express 
Announcing the Birth of Louise Brown 
THE NIGHTMARE , o! a 
boy- accused' of murder 
ended ' yesterday , -whexv 
he was' told; "You are 
free." , 
"EdwardCalaer, i 6, was 
given 40p tor hls bus , fare 
.home and released from 
the remand centre where 
,h.e had been held for ll, 
weeks. .' . . ,,', 1:.' ; 
pr~~i"~~lai~ :n;'h~ ~~ 
;;et. frM, ,.,' , 
'f For his solicitor . dld" not 
know th~t the ·!xfy " 'ad been 
-.released. ~ .' ... .:~~ .... 
:~ \ A$toni ~he(j 
L~,;;,;~~~,a,"""--..,.... ,:: h;t " SWii 
'!'be iuml!s Quickly riiteied 
u~taln; lnt6the bBltils area; 
~::'.,~:,,~,! ,-::'t "nl~nnn" .• ,,,'~, •• f ~~e:O:n bl~~td:~~·;,~h001 .. 
, 'an.til3 QffiCIIl)$ q\liOliI¥ ;Mic\J. 
- ateil bhe :area and 17 0{ t he 
b.~ll.rs along with <hre. bMhs 
"ffici.l. wel'C tnl«iil Ix> Dum· 
'Irll;. I nfirmarY (or ailterition, ' 
'rbi'c. young II'lI'ls '.,nd Rl\ 
OIlult were debo.incd lor obser· 
",vatlan,' All were ,later released, 
has now achieved. It will not be possible to document every 
significant biomedical and social breakthrough, but where these are 
pertinent to the selected text, I will refer to them. 
Critical Discourse Analysis No. 1:The front-page of the Scottish 
Daily Express, Thursday, July 27, 1978, written by H. Pugh & F. 
Welsby.5 
THE WHOLE WORLD IN HER HANDS 
Test-tube baby 'just beautiful' -Steptoe 
The privileging of science 
The significance of this first article is that it set a precedent for the 
way in which the NRT initiated its public discourse, thereby, setting 
the scene for the multiplicity of discussions that followed, and 
consequently, it is worth examining in detail. This is demonstrated 
effectively by the headlining of the now familiar epithet, 'test-tube 
baby', which, despite being overtaken by the more correct phrase' in 
vitro fertilisation (IVF)', nevertheless, was received into popular 
parlance as an unchallenged catch phrase that became part of the new 
discourses. In terms of their ability to construct, relay and evoke 
images, as Walsh demonstrated metaphors are able to do, both 
epithets privilege science-as-producer by their use of laboratory 
language. The common usage of these terms does not feel strange 
because they have been used and accepted by all commentators in 
both dominant and oppositional discourses. Yet, there are many 
medical breakthroughs that would not be possible without scientific 
intervention, such as a kidney transplant, but the names given to 
these procedures do not give the onus to the laboratory techniques. 
Indeed, the fertilisation of an embryo, whilst cruciaC is only a small 
part of the process, yet the vital nurturing of its development in the 
uterus by the mother is overlooked in both familiar phrases. 
The term 'Frankenstein', with its associated horrors, could not easily 
be used in an epithet about a human child as it is with food, but the 
myth is evoked by the use of phrases which point to Steptoe's 
'fatherhood' as the human being responsible for Louise's conception. 
He is referred to as 'the man who made it all possible' and like any 
new 'father' he was described as 'showing the strain of the last two 
days' and being 'absolutely whacked out'. Like a 'good father' not 
only was he present at the birth, he even went one step further and 
delivered the baby. The article opens with the classic' mother and 
baby are both doing well' discourse, but then Steptoe's comments 
5 The article continues over onto p. 3 of the paper. The full transcript is reproduced 
in Appendix I pp. 227-230. 
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precede those of the husband. After two thirds of the front-page 
article, the reader is introduced to Mr. Brown by the following 
comment, that despite his tiredness, Steptoe; I ••• still managed to look 
as delighted as the baby's father, 38-year-old Mr. John Brown.' 
Whilst Edwards is present alongside his colleague, it is Steptoe who is 
given prominence. In fact Edwards is only mentioned once on the 
front page and does not feature again till the last section of the article 
on page 3. Steptoe is always mentioned first in the pairing of the two 
(except in the photograph, but this is because Edwards is on the left of 
the picture). In one sentence, he is not even named but simply 
referred to as Steptoe's partner and his quotation is in the penultimate 
paragraph, all of which lessens the impact of both his words and his 
role.6 
By putting Steptoe in the limelight, the clinical application of IVF is 
highlighted - indeed the whole article is geared towards a clinical 
stance by the inclusion of another woman undergoing IVF, the 
statistics of infertility and the hope expressed in the article for the 
'20,000 women who go to their doctor every year unable to have 
babies.' Yet, it was Edwards, the embryologist, who first approached 
Steptoe and persuaded him to try to replicate his successes with 
mouse embryology in humans? He obtained his doctorate by 
perfecting IVF in mice and does not have a medical degree. However, 
by being referred to as Dr. Edwards, the less prominent partner in a 
clinical procedure, it is easy for readers to assume that he is a junior 
medical colleague rather than the driving force behind the research. 
The hint of the importance of Louise's birth to the research 
community is given in the following couplet, which is in the final 
section of the article. 
Mr. Steptoe, who carried out the 10-minute caesarean operation, was able to prove 
the breakthrough to medical observers. 
They were able to see that Mrs. Brown had no fallopian tubes and couldn't have a 
baby normally. 
This is the first, tiny suggestion in the article of Lesley Brown's role as 
I guinea pig' in the research aspect of IVF, which has been given a 
clinical fa<;ade in the article so far. The lack of fallopian tubes proves 
beyond any doubt that fertilisation had to take place outside the 
6 The part played by the embryologists in the NRT has remained in the shadows 
ever since - a fact acknowledged by Dr Jamieson in my interview with her. See 
Appendix IV, p. 279. 
7 Discussed in L. Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning, Genetic Engineering and the Future of 
Humankind? (London: Phoenix, 1999), p.79. 
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P. Steptoe & R. Edwards, 'Birth After the Reimplantation of a 
Human Embryo', in JLeUers to the Editor' of The Laucet August 12, 
1978, 1,.366. 
Letters to the Editor 
BIRTH AFTER THE REIMPLANTATION OF A 
HUMAN EMBRYO 
SIR,-We wish to report that one of our patients, a 30-year-
old nulliparous married woman, was safely delivered by 
cresarean section on July 25, 1978, of a normal healthy infant 
girl weighing 2700 g. The patient had been referred to one of 
us (P.C.S.) -in 1976 with a history of 9 years' infertility, tubal 
occlusions, and unsuccessful salpingostomies done in 1970 with 
excision of the ampullre of both oviducts followed by persistent 
tubal blockages. Laparoscopy in February, 1977, revealed 
grossly distorted tubal remnants with occlusion and peritubal 
and ovarian adhesions. Laparotomy in August, 1977, was done 
with excision of the remains of both tubes, adhesolysis, and 
suspension of the ovaries in good position for oocyte recovery. 
Pregnancy was established after laparoscopiC recovery of an 
oocyte on Nov. 10, 1977, in-vitro fertilisation and normal clea-
vage in culture media, and the reimplantation of the 8-cell 
embryo into the uterus 2t days later. Amniocentesis at 16 
weeks' pregnancy revealed normal a-fetoprotein levels, with no 
chromosome abnormalities in a 46 XX fetus. On the day of 
delivery the mother was 38 weeks and 5 days by dates from her 
last menstrual period, and she had pre-eclamptic toxremia. 
Blood-pressure was fluctuating around 140/95, redema in-
volved both legs up to knee . level together with the abdomen, 
back hands and face; the blood-uric-acid was 390 p.mol/l, and , , . 
albumin O· 5 gil of urine. Ultrasonic scanning and radIO-
graphic appearances showed that the fetus had grown slowly 
for several weeks from week 30. Blood-restriols and human 
piacental lactogen levels also dropped below the normal levels 
during this period. However, the fetus grew considerably dur-
ing the last 10 days before delivery while placental function 
improved greatly. On the day of delivery the biparietal dia-
meter had reached 9·6 cm, and 5 ml of amniotic fluid was 
removed safely under sonic control. The lecithin: sphingomye-
lin ratio was 3·9:1, inaicative of maturity and a low risk of the 
respiratory-distress syndrome. 
We hope to publish further medical and scientific details in 
your columns at a later date. 
Department of 
Obstetrics and Gynrecology, 
General Hospital, 
Oldham OLl 2JH 
University Physiology Laboratory, 
Cambridge CB2 3EG 
P. C. STEPTOE 
R. G. EDWARDS 
SPERM BASIC PROTEINS IN CERVICAL 
CARCINOGENESIS 
The classification of r 
General's social classes 
duced in the 1911 Cen: 
instance, it was used to 
sociation between socioi 
health and death. In otb 
lity were associated ~ 
social-class classificatior 
poverty, poor housing, 1 
association of low incil 
high incidence in the un 
tions (e.g., tuberculosis). 
Since 1911 jobs have 
illness experienced by t1 
ing on the system have 
socioeconomic changes 
useful. What were of1 
castes in 1911 (e.g., m: 
so changed that people) 
periods. Mobility; both 
Income gaps have clos 
N.H.S. without a meril 
coalminer, whereas ne 
corne tax and other ded 
ences in education ane 
social classes IV and v 
the ideologies that ac( 
style of the different gro 
Some people have s 
asserts differences whic 
we suspect that this is 
their paper is not clea 
dently held by the mo: 
longer be entertained .. 
class is a classification 
their members in all sc 
For example, there is i: 
vical cancer but it is ll( 
instance, the incidenc( 
and varied experience 
class classification call 
True, medical student 
provided they pass tb 
profession cannot ha 
sperm. This Aristotd 
science centuries ago. 
How a social-class I 
but Reid et al. give in 
stance the U.K. subje( 
the system of the U.: 
were students who, in 
"are coded to the ec' 
from tne classificatiOl 
body, giving absolute credence to the work of Edwards and Steptoe.8 
Furthermore, medical observers were present in order to verify this. 
Interestingly, following Edward's comments in the penultimate 
sentence, in which he indirectly talks about research, the closing 
sentence reads thus: 'Mr. Steptoe decided on a Caesarean operation 
because Mrs. Brown developed blood poisoning, which could have 
resulted in a still birth,' thereby effectively eclipsing the research 
aspect with a clinical rationale. 
The dominant discourse in the article is one of approbation. The use 
of emotive language constructs scientific intervention as benevolently 
and heroically bestowing happiness on the family and simultaneously 
constructing the family as a quintessential good. Consider the 
following: 'Mr. Steptoe and his partner spent 12 years before they got 
their technique right and enabled Mrs. Brown to have the baby she 
craved.' Louise is a 'miracle', but still a 'beautiful normal baby', she's 
'the greatest', 'she might be the most historic child in the universe, but 
to Lesley and I she is just a baby.' 'It's just too fantastic. It's just too 
good ... too good.' Sharon, Louise's stepsister is 'madly in love with 
the baby' and as 'thrilled as her father and step-mother'. The point is 
not to deny that these are true quotations given in a moment of 
genuine joy, but their selection and prominence, set in the stone of a 
front-page, constructs images that filter into the popular 
consciousness. Foucault always reminds us that whatever we read 
could have been otherwise written. 
The oppositional discourse in the article is provided by the Labour 
MP, Leo Abse, whose following emotive quotation appears irrational 
in the context of the whole text: 'He said genetic engineering was 
going on in Russia. Some people had inhibitions about medicine 
moving in to an area which might have overtones of Hitler - who 
thought he could create a master race by experiment.' References to 
Russia, demonised by the Cold War and to Hitler juxtaposed next to 
the happiness of an ordinary family effectively allow these comments 
to be ignored. In addition, they are immediately quashed by Shirley 
Williams in her capacity as Secretary for Science and Education and 
then followed by ecclesiastical approval from the Church of Scotland, 
both representing legal and moral governance. Whilst the Catholic 
Church representative did not give his approval, nevertheless, his 
comments were couched as 'personal misgivings' rather than an 
official line. The oppositional comments are structured into a positive-
negative-positive sandwich, between the medically healed family and 
8 The birth is documented in a letter to the Lancet, where the details of the baby's 
IVF conception are given. P. Steptoe & R. Edwards, 'Birth After the Reimplantation 
of a Human Embryo', in 'Letters to the Editor' of The Lancet, August 12,1978, p.366. 
Reproduced here for historical interest. 
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the establishments of state and church, thereby effectively 
downplaying legitimate concerns. 
The construction of woman 
The privileging of science and man as progenitor continues 
throughout the text by the way in which the male medics and the 
father are given precedence, and more importantly, speech. The 
headline quotes Steptoe, not the parents. In fact, the only person who 
is not quoted is Lesley Brown. She is talked about; the reader learns 
her age, her medical history, her marital status and the events of her 
operation. Her picture is drawn, her current medical condition is 
given and she is praised as a 'supermum', even Louise is twice 
described as making a lot of noise, but her mother remains silent. 
By comparison, Steptoe, Edwards, Mr. Brown, a friend of Sharon's, 
the Brown's neighbours, two MPs, two church leaders and a doctor 
from St Thomas' Hospital are all directly or indirectly quoted in the 
article. Furthermore, whilst the woman undergoing IVF at St Thomas' 
Hospital does not wish to be named, nonetheless, she could still have 
voiced her opinion. The reader is told about how she feels on hearing 
about the birth of Louise Brown in the quotation from her doctor. In 
reality, both these women will have needed considerable 
determination and agency to put themselves through the gruelling 
procedures of IVF knowing that it was an entirely experimental 
technique. Yet by their silence in the discourse they are rendered as 
passive. 
Yet, the construction goes even deeper than simply passivity per se. 
As discussed in chapter one, De Beauvoir revealed woman's alterity 
to man, demonstrating her association with the lesser, fleshly realm of 
childbirth, nurturing and death, but not, ironically, with the agency of 
giving life. Martin's article, in Chapter One, illustrated how biological 
discourses on human reproduction, with which we are all familiar, 
give agency to the sperm, not the egg, reflecting socio-cultural 
attitudes rather than scientific facts.9 Grimwood's analysis of the 
bishops' statement exhibited the technique, first described by 
Foucault, of endlessly talking about the other, whilst simultaneously 
forbidding the other a voice and not permitting themselves, that is, the 
bishops to be similarly interrogated. 
The effect of this practice is to make questioning the speakers as 
unthinkable, whilst giving free rein to study the others as objects. In 
the bishops' statement, the speakers were ecclesiastical leaders who 
sought medical expertise; in this newspaper story, it is the scientists 
9 See Chapter One, p.5. 
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who are predominant, seeking the approbation from the church. In 
both cases, by being linked together in the discourse as those with 
permission to speak, they wield a power over the object, even when 
they speak in opposition. In fact, dissenting voices that speak for the 
object can further this deployment by disguising the way in which 
this removes the agency of the other to speak at all. 
By relating these interconnected insights to the construction of 
woman in the newspaper text, her voicelessness becomes 
synonymous with her reproductive passivity. We are told that Lesley 
Brown' craved' for a baby and when she is successful, she is praised 
as 'supermum'. She is the womb, to be impregnated, or not (from the 
male oppositional discourse), in order to please her husband. The 
article was written by two men, who chose, as text producers, to 
emphasise this particular comment by the use of italics: ' After nine 
years waiting for Lesley to have a baby he (John Brown) was ready to cry for 
joy.' As I have shown earlier in the analysis, the paper chose to quote 
the father's rapture, even though he already had a child. Even Sharon, 
his daughter is not quoted directly. 
Although Shirley Williams is indirectly quoted, this is in her capacity 
as a representative of the state, as the inclusion of her title 
demonstrates. Her comments refute those of Leo Abse; she 'told him 
that the test-tube technique did not involve genetic manipulation', 
reflecting a government response rather than a personal one. When 
women are permitted to speak, as the neighbours do, they all express 
their excitement 'at the news', for 'the happy result', 'pleased it has 
been a success'. These remarks disclose the women's delight for the 
procedure, not for Lesley herself, as might be expected from friends 
after seeing someone go through nine years of experimental infertility 
treatment. 
The construction of the family 
It has been noted by recent social commentators that there has been a 
socio-cultural resurgence in the value of the family, in contrast to the 
consensus circulating in the 60s and 70s about its demise as a social 
uniPo What is interesting about this comment is that the public 
interest surrounding the NRTs has created, by implication, a renewal 
of discourses about the family that may, in part, be responsible for its 
current prominence in the cultural milieu. Furthermore, in terms of 
10 A good example of this is Mary Kenny's article, 'The strange rebirth of the 
family', (Guardian, 27/01/2004, p. 26) in which Kenny, ironically, links her 
commentary to a comment made by Suzi Leather, the current chair of the HFEA, 
without attributing this socio-cultural change to the rise of family discourses 
brought about by the public interest in the NRTs. 
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the discourse, the construction of woman-as-womb inevitably draws 
on that of woman-as-mother, pitting this subject position against that 
of woman as independent, working citizen. 
In his paper, Grimwood discerned how the technique of 
normalisation, which Foucault described in the Ecole Militaire, was 
being deployed in the bishops' statement to privilege heterosexual 
union over homosexual partnerships and marriage as the epitome of 
this hierarchy. In this newspaper text, being a mother is similarly 
upheld as the pinnacle role for woman. There is nothing new in this 
construction, De Beauvoir's insight that woman can only gain 
transcendence through her service to husband, family, church and 
country is now a familiar refrain. What is significant is that this notion 
has been subsumed into the NRT discourses as part of its body of 
knowledge. 
For, as woman is constructed as reproductively passive, so is she 
rewarded with the immensely powerful statement, both in the 
headline and printed in bold font in the opening sentence; 'Here she is 
-the mother with the whole world in her arms ... ' What is odd about 
this first sentence is the juxtaposition of such power with the pronoun 
'she', rather than 'Lesley Brown'. Whilst Lesley is named in the 
second sentence with the epithet 'supermum', nevertheless, the use of 
a pronoun prior to naming someone is noteworthy because it is 
linguistically unusual. The effect it has on the reader is to associate 
generic motherhood, not particularity of personhood, with woman's 
attainment of worthiness. 
The construction of the family in the article is especially interesting 
because the Browns are not a typical infertile couple. Mr. Brown 
already had a daughter from a previous marriage; indeed, his proven 
fertility may even have been a consideration for their selection on to 
the IVF programme. The idea of women having babies for their 
husbands, rather than for themselves is endorsed by the fact that the 
authors chose to phrase the father's joy by saying that, 'After nine 
years waiting for Lesley to have a baby he was ready to cry for joy' 
(my italics here). Thereby, however unintentionally, invoking the 
image that Lesley had been remiss in her wifely duties by keeping her 
husband 'waiting'. 
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The Express Commentary in the Scottish Daily Express, Thursday, 
July 27, 1978, written by George Gale, p.l0. 
Critical Discourse Analysis No.2: The Express Commentary in the 
Scottish Daily Express, Thursday, July 27, 1978, written by George 
Gale, p.10.11 
Mixed Blessings for Britain's Brave New Birth 
Whilst the front-page news article contained only a small section of 
oppositional discourse, the Express featured a dissentient 
commentary by George Gale describing Louise Brown's entry to the 
world as 'Britain's Brave New Birth.' The content of this piece offers 
more considered argument in its critique of IVF than the quotation 
attributed to Abse in the front-page article. The epithet of Brave New 
World, used in the title and again in the body of the text, has become 
synonymous with dissent towards the NRTs by evoking the dystopia 
of Aldous Huxley's novel of the same name published in 1932. 
Huxley's predictions of in vitro fertilisation and surrogate 
motherhood have become concrete realities and genetic engineering 
has become a sophisticated practice in animals.12 The accuracy of 
these prophecies gives the epithet an edge, invoking the concept of a 
post/human existence, which the story so effectively captures. The 
piece reflects this in its attitude and content. However, in conducting 
an analysis of the text, it is the similarities and differences of the 
constructions that I am concerned with, not the content of contrary 
views. 
The privileging of science 
It is no surprise, given the title, that science is privileged again, albeit, 
this time for what Gale perceives as its frightening possibilities rather 
than its benevolent ones. The piece begins; 'THERE WILL be the 
highest praise for the medical, scientific and technical skills displayed 
by Mr. Patrick Steptoe, the Oldham gynaecologist, and Dr. Robert 
Edwards, the Cambridge physiologist.' From this introduction, the 
clinical, benevolent fac;ade of IVF begins to unravel with Gale's 
critique. Underpinning the oppositional content, the myth of 
Frankenstein is again evoked, but, unlike the first article, Gale does 
not concentrate on the 'fatherhood' of Steptoe, but rather focuses on 
the 'difference' of the child. The article appeals to boundaries of 
11 The full transcript is reproduced in Appendix I pp. 230-233. 
12 Whilst commercial surrogacy is illegal in Britain, this is not the case in the USA. 
With the use of the Internet and relatively cheap travel (compared to the costs of the 
NRTs) it has become a viable route to parenthood for wealthy, infertile couples and 
gay partners. Genetic engineering in human beings remains at the level of embryo 
selection, but in animals it has taken place within the genome itself; ANDi, a rhesus 
monkey, which harbours a gene in all his cells that makes jellyfish glow green, is 
just one example. (J. Meek, 'ANDi, first GM primate. Will humans be next?' The 
Guardian, 12/01/2001.) 
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commonplace normality, as demonstrated by the following excerpts, 
in which I have highlighted the words that support this construction. 
Note the use of the word 'product' in the final extract signifying that 
Louise was' made', rather than' came into being' through fertilisation. 
Mr. And Mrs. Brown have so far emerged from the attentions of the world's 
Press apparently unscathed. It is to be hoped rather than expected, that they will 
be able to lead as normal lives as possible. This however, as the parents of what is 
everywhere described as the world's first "test-tube" baby is going to be 
extremely difficult. 
This said the happy birth is very unlikely to prove an unmixed blessing and may 
be the precursor of disaster. The baby, the infant, the little girl, the adolescent 
girl, the young woman: she will be subjected to constant publicity which cannot 
but give her an abnormal upbringing which she will need a tough and stable 
temperament to survive relatively unscathed. She can only hope to grow up as 
normal as possible. Normal she cannot be. 
She is no physical freak; but she is unique, the consequence of being the product of 
a very abnormal conception in a test-tube. 
The construction of woman 
Despite the fact that the subject matter of the whole article requires 
the personal agency of women, and the effects of that agency are 
discussed, nevertheless, woman is again talked about, not listened 
too. Gale refers to wives being' unable to bear their husband's 
children' and 'who want children by their husband', which has the 
double effect of keeping the NRTs within the confines of marriage 
and upholding the construction that women have children, not for 
their own pleasure, but for their husband's. Gale makes a very 
strange claim about Louise. He says; 'As for the baby herself, she is 
likely to be a subject of acute public interest at least until such time as 
she may in tum become a mother herself.' Why would the act of 
becoming a mother make a difference to Louise's interest rating? In 
accord with the composition of woman in the first article, motherhood 
is constructed here as giving societal status at the price of losing 
personal uniqueness. 
In Gale's article, whereas there is recognition and praise for the 
scientists, albeit with the caveat of their desires for fame and the 
consequences of their actions long term, there is none for Lesley 
Brown. In this dissenting article, she has been subsumed into the 
couplet Mr. and Mrs. Brown, who are constructed as blameworthy 
and 'bad' parents, as the above excerpts illustrate, for the 'abnormal 
upbringing' that Gale asserts Louise will receive. He says, referring to 
the Browns' notoriety; 'Few parents, if any, in the position of the 
Browns, with a fortune dangled in front of them, would have done 
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other than take the cash and hope for the best.' Because of the tone of 
the piece, Gale's opening of 'few parents if any in the position of the 
Browns' is insufficient to negate the image conveyed of money 
grabbing fame-seekers. The fact that the Browns may have spent a 
considerable 'fortune' in putting Lesley through an untried, 
experimental procedure is overlooked.13 In both dominant and 
dissenting discourses, whether praised or scapegoated, woman 
remains objectified, passive and silent. 
The construction of the family 
Gale raises the spectre of fear regarding the father's hereditary status 
in the family unit in this following excerpt: 
But the technique opens up many other possibilities, some of which are 
undoubtedly alarming. 
It so happens that in the Brown case, the husband's sperm fertilised the wife's 
egg -and it was this fact which led the medical profession's ethical advisers to 
pronounce that no ethical considerations arose. 
But any man's sperm could have been used. Scientifically, it was irrelevant that 
the husband's was used. 
This means that women will be able to have their eggs fertilised, without 
intercourse from banked sperm. They can already do so now, through artificial 
insemination by donor, a process which disturbs some doctors but not others. 
What is strange about these concerns is that fertilisation outside the 
body does not make the likelihood of using donor sperm more likely 
than it is with artificial insemination, as even Gale himself admits. 
Moreover, women have been able to access' donor' sperm for 
centuries using the procreative method of sexual intercourse. In fact, 
it was not publicly envisioned at this stage that IVF could help sub-
fertile men in the way that Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI) 
now does.14 What becomes apparent here is an ambivalence in the 
male control of reproduction, highlighted by the comment that this 
13 Whilst Steptoe and Edwards did not open their private IVF clinic at Bourne Hall 
Clinic, Cambridgeshire till 1980, nonetheless, the Brown's had to pay for their 
treatment at Oldham hospital. G. Corea recounts Lesley's description of egg 
collection and says: 'Steptoe wanted her to stay in the hospital one more day to 
recuperate but she and her husband could not afford the expense.' G. Corea, The 
Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial 
Wombs, (London: The Women's Press, 1988), p. 176. 
14 ICSI is a process used to bypass infertility, where the problem lies with the 
availability of sufficient active sperm in the man's semen. The woman undertakes 
IVF and an individual sperm is injected into each collected egg. Public concern has 
centred on the possibility of risks to the child from poor quality sperm. However, 
the ethical concerns about subjecting a healthy, fertile patient to potentially risky 
treatment, when the affliction lies with another person, is often overlooked. 
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was the aspect that troubled the ethical committee most. (Whether or 
not this is true does not matter, but the fact that the text producer 
included it, is crucial.) 
Under the subheading, 'Frightening', Gale writes the following: 
But what is far more frightening altogether, is the possibility now opened up of 
genetic engineering on a massive scale, performed by scientists working under 
the direction of the state. Such a brave new world may be on our doorstep not so 
long after 1984. 
Societies based upon the family prevent such breeding taking place. 
What is interesting here is the juxtaposition of the strong family 
discourse on the front-page and the fear of donor gametes, genetically 
engineered babies and motherless clones in the dissenting discourse. 
The paradox lies in Gale's assertion that 'Societies based on the family 
prevent such breeding taking place' -in that it is precisely the 
construction of a perfect family depicted earlier in the paper that 
creates the desire in the cultural consciousness to manipulate 
reproduction. 
The year of legislation -1990 
Moving on 12 years from the birth of Louise Brown, Steptoe's 
predictions in the front-page story were becoming realised. In 
response to societal concern, the government had established the 
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology in 
1982, commonly known as the Warnock Report, which took its title 
from its chairperson, Baroness Warnock. Its findings were submitted 
to ministers in 1984 and subsequently debated in the House of 
Commons later that year. Public consultation was encouraged and 
nearly fifty churches sent their submissions to the Warnock 
Committee and many published their own official responses to the 
Warnock Report. After several delays, and fierce debate, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill finally became law in 1990. 
The next text that I shall scrutinise is an expert secular discourse from 
the Journal, Nature, dated 19 April 1990, in which there is both an 
article concerning the voting of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill, to take place on the 23 April, and an editorial 
commentary on the subject. I have chosen the editorial piece for an 
analysis of the discourse. 
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Critical Discourse Analysis No.3: The Editor's Opinion in Nature, 
VOL 344 19 April 1990, p. 690.15 
Embryo Research 
The British House of Commons should this week settle for the 
government's bill on embryo research 
It can be ascertained from the content of this discourse that the 
emphasis on the proposed bill is focused towards embryo research 
rather than infertility treatments. In fact, the example of the clinical 
application of IVF in the text is for fertile couples; the medical 
expectations of this procedure have long since passed the cautionary 
advice of the Scottish doctor in 1978, who said, 'It applies to women 
whose cause of childlessness is the damage to the fallopian tubes.'16 
Moreover, the word embryo did not appear in the first article, 
whereas it dominates this one. Whilst, it is to be expected that a 
scientific treatise would focus on research, it should be noted that it 
was also this aspect of the bill, which was causing the greatest 
controversy and the most vociferous lobbying to parliament. 
The text producer's interpretive cues leave the reader in no doubt of 
his/her bias for the bill to be passed. The comment that the 
recommendations of the Warnock committee are 'now five years 
stale', implies, in this context, that pro-research legislation is long 
overdue. The use of the word 'stale' as opposed to the more usual 
'old' is a cue of authoritative impatience, which sets the tone of the 
whole article. The second sentence retains this imperious mood, 
opening thus: 'That is why it is to be hoped that all concerned will 
pay more than passing attention to the article on page 768 of this 
issue ... ' Walsh's point is useful here, that interpretive cues not only 
express the text producer's identity, but they also serve to construct 
the reader's. She described the positionality of the reader as 
significant, as readers who feel excluded by the text's tone, mode or 
content may resist cues of linguistic inclusion. (For example, women 
reading a text that specifically speaks to men only, are ambivalently 
both drawn and rejected by the discourse.) The tone of this article 
would engender feelings of righteous indignation to a pro-research 
readership, however, in dissenting readers, it might well inflame their 
antagonism. 
In response to the work being undertaken at Hammersmith Hospital, 
where embryos were being selected for their gender in order to 
prevent certain genetic conditions, the editorial comments; 'It is 
15 The full transcript is reproduced in Appendix I pp. 233-234. 
16 J. Webster, 'Help for Scots', The Scottish Daily Express, 27/07/1978, p. 3. 
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important and relevant to the Embryo Bill that it is entirely predicted 
that the technique would be effective: endless experiments with other 
mammals have given ample assurance that it would be.' The strength 
of feeling here is conveyed by the use of the couplets, as in 
'important/relevant' and the cues of certainty, 'entirely predicted' 
and' ample assurance' that' endless experiments' had proved. In this 
excerpt the authority of the editor has subtly transmuted into the 
supremacy of science, in a similar fashion to the bishops' statement, 
where the dominion of the church leaders became that of God. A 
dissenting reader now challenges science itself. 
The technique of permitting the reader the freedom to hold opposing 
views is deployed in the penultimate paragraph and includes the 
following statement; 'There are many who hold that neither abortion 
nor the manipulation of embryos should be allowed.' As in the 
bishops' statement, the permission to choose belies the way in which 
the discourse has already constructed the reader's subject position, 
ensuring that a sympathetic reader will agree to the content of their 
own volition. By these means, employed throughout the whole piece, 
the reader will be more likely to accept the final, and most 
provocative, sentence;' And properly briefed, the authority [i.e. the 
proposed HFEA] should give the lie to those who also argue that the 
manipulation of embryos before implantation is the beginning of a 
dangerous slippery slope.' 
The construction of woman 
Despite the fact that woman's anatomy (uterus, X-chromosome), and 
reproductive activities (implantation, pregnancy, abortion) are 
mentioned, woman herself is absent from the discourse. In a straight 
reading of the piece, familiar as we all are with accounts of embryo 
research in our daily papers, this does not seem odd. Indeed, it is 
precisely the Foucauldian challenge to everyday, commonplace 
assumptions that requires us to deploy a method of counter-thinking. 
For, as in this discourse, it has become normal to discuss woman's 
bodily parts and functions without acknowledgment to her. In this 
text, woman's reproductive passivity has effectively made her 
invisible, yet without her concrete agency, there would be no embryos 
on which to conduct the research that the piece so vehemently 
endorses. 
Moreover, by the way the text does not make its appeal for research to 
'Women, but to fellow scientists, it thereby effectively constructs 
woman as a compliant, passive, available research object. In addition, 
by not conceding to a woman's potential to refuse permission for 
embryo research, her agency is even further eclipsed. Finally, the 
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already quoted sentence that includes the following phrase, 'endless 
experiments with other mammals' simultaneously equates woman 
with animal research and ensures her invisibility. For, in its insistence 
that embryo manipulation (i.e. removing a cell) could be 'entirely 
predicted' and that the 'technique would be effective' it overlooks and 
negates the fact that this experiment will be conducted for the first 
time inside women's bodies. It is worth noting, that Edwards and 
Steptoe undertook their IVF experimental procedures on women 
based on the Edward's successes with mouse embryology. IVF had 
not been conducted on primates prior to being undertaken in 
women.I7 
The construction of the embryo 
The whole tone of the piece is couched in the impersonal language 
that befits the scientific culture, masking, as I have shown in the first 
section, its emotive stance behind a so-called objectivity. This 
linguistic ambivalence is deployed in the references to the embryo 
and is a significant technique in its construction. The article's 
standpoint towards the embryo is effectively signposted by the 
shortening of the proposed legislation in the text from the 'Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill' to simply the 'Embryo Bill'. In this 
text, the embryo is constructed as a research object. Whilst the 
research at Hammersmith Hospital to help families with hereditary 
sex-linked conditions is described in purely scientific terms, 
disregarding not only the emotionally charged potential of this work, 
but also the parent's agency altogether, the words used in reference to 
the embryo are, conversely, highly emotive. 
Consider the following; the embryo is to be 'manipulated' (this term 
appears three times in the text), have its properties 'exploited', to have 
cells removed, to be 'screened' and 'implanted' and in addition, 
'Defective embryos will, of course, be discarded.' Notably, this last 
sentence could have been written differently to convey the same 
information, thus: 'embryos carrying a defective gene will, of course, 
not be implanted in the uterus.' There are two techniques operating 
here simultaneously to achieve the same effect. Firstly, there is the 
transference from a defective gene to a defective embryo, which 
follows the technique of objectification of others described by 
Foucault in the categorisation of homosexuals as a species, who had, 
hitherto, been men who practised acts of sodomy. Secondly, by using 
highly charged words such as 'manipulate', 'exploit', 'defective' and 
'discard', which would be horrific in the case of a human child but are 
acceptable for research objects, the emotive terms effectively distance 
17 L. Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning, Genetic Engineering and the Future of Humankind? 
(London: Phoenix, 1999), p.79. 
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the embryo from its potential of becoming human. In the context of a 
discourse that uses the Foucauldian tools of I anonymity 
... classification ... objectification' the research potential of the embryo 
is secured. 18 
The year of designer babies - 2000 
It is now twenty-two years since the birth of Louise Brown. In the 
course of my research, I undertook a newspaper search of all the NRT 
related articles in September and October 2000 that appeared in the 
Scottish Daily Mail and the Sun newspaper.19 The choice of these two 
particular months was not entirely random, as I was interested in the 
reporting of the first I designer baby', Adam Nash, who was selected 
as an embryo to be both free of his sister's inherited Fanconi anaemia, 
and also to be a tissue type to provide her with life-saving stem cells 
from his umbilical cord. 
However, in conducting a coding of these stories, I discovered a 
plethora of articles on the NRT, both news and commentary, that 
covered the front-pages, the inside spreads, the editorial and social 
opinion slots, the supplements and the readers' letters page. I have 
tabulated these articles in chronological order, giving the headlines, 
subheadings and photographic captions, where appropriate, to 
provide an overview of the prolific, circulating discourses that were 
in the cultural milieu of that selected period. Whilst it may have been 
a particularly controversial time, the sheer abundance and front-page 
prominence of these stories demonstrates both the popular interest 
and the high level of exposure of NRT discourses to the public 
consciousness. 
A Summary of the newspaper accounts 
Out of a possible 61 days in the two-month period, the Sun ran NRT 
related stories on 12 days and the Scottish Daily Mail featured articles 
on 19 days, covering a total of 24 different days between the two 
papers. The Sun dedicated 23 pages to NRT stories, the Scottish Daily 
Mail, 34 pages.20 The number of front page features for the Sun was 
two, for the Scottish Daily Mail, four. 
18 S. Grimwood, 'Some Foucauldian Perspectives', p. 105. 
19 Occasionally some articles are from the Scottish Sun, and when this occurs, it is 
noted in the reference. 
20 Whilst I included the account of a murder in the USA in my coding, because of 
the discourse concerning a woman so desperate to have a baby that she would 
murder someone for this, nonetheless, this story has not been included in this count. 
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Critical Discourse Analysis No.4: The Headlines of Articles 
featuring the NRT and associated topics in the period between 
September and October 2000 in the Scottish Daily Mail and the Sun 
N ewspapers21 
For my third critical analysis, I propose to interrogate the headlines 
that have been used to give titles to these stories and commentaries. 
In extending Walsh's useful insights regarding the text producer's 
and reader's identity, I would suggest that headlines are particularly 
significant interpretative cues.22 From the text producer's vantage 
point, they are designed specifically to draw the reader's attention to 
encourage the article to be read, and most importantly, when they 
appear on the front-page, for the paper to be bought. The fact that six 
NRT related stories graced the front-pages is significant in itself, as 
the editorial selection would have had sales figures in mind when 
choosing to give them front-page prominence. The headline has to 
sum up the gist of the story with an emotive thrust, usually negative 
and voyeuristic, of shock, horror or fear, or occasionally hope, to 
entice the reader. 
With regard to new procedures of assisted conception, the media 
have immense power over the discourse, because they are often the 
first people to bring the story to public attention. In this way, it is the 
media, who will be responsible for naming the processes, not the 
scientific community. Once the papers have coined an epithet, it 
sticks, even being used in common parlance by the medical profession 
and the broadsheets. Furthermore, the stance that their dominant 
discourse takes is influential over their readership, as they have 
expertise in couching the issues in everyday language and aspire to 
champion the feelings and thoughts of the 'common man' (sic) 
soliciting his sympathy to their views by their defence of his interests. 
Occasionally, the tabloids misread the mood of their readership as in 
the recent case when Frank Bruno was taken ill with depression.23 In 
that particular instance, the Sun's rapid retreat from their original 
standpoint in response to readers' criticism demonstrates the 
21 The complete list has been transcribed in chronological order in Appendix I, pp. 
235-241. All quotations given in this section from the papers' headlines will be 
reproduced in the way in which they appeared in the paper with regard to the use 
of capitals, italics, inverted commas and so forth. Cited articles are also listed in the 
bibliography, but some quotations are from the captions under photographs, which 
are in the Appendix only. 
22 See Chapter Two, p. 54. 
23 The early editions of the Sun newspaper on Tuesday 23/09/2003 ran the headline, 
'Bonkers Bruno locked up', but following a storm of protest from readers, later 
editions changed the headline to 'Sad Bruno in mental home.' Moreover, in 
response to their readership, the Sun not only called Bruno a hero, but also set up a 
fund to support people with mental health difficulties. 
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symbiosis of this relationship, illustrating that the cultural ambiance 
is also a critical factor for the paper in the selection of news items. 
The two newspapers selected for the coding have a wide readership 
directed at different sections of the population. The Sun's NRT stories 
were centred more on the sensational human aspects, whilst the 
Mail's remit included issues of biotechnology and its implications. A 
close inspection of both papers' linguistic structuring of their 
headlines demonstrates that they are not that different from each 
other. Both papers use sensational language, eye-catching epithets 
and emotive terms, however, the Sun is more likely to use vernacular 
language, such as 'tot' as opposed to child, than the Mail. 
Dominating stories 
The Hampshire IVF Clinics story 
Three news stories dominated this two-month period; the first was 
the one, in which frozen embryos had been lost at two Hampshire IVF 
clinics. Whilst the Mail featured this story once on page 17: 'Mothers 
told: You may have had the wrong test-tube baby', 'Embryologist is 
suspended amid fears of a fertility clinic mix-up' (B. Marsh, 23 Sept), 
the Sun chose to give it enormous prominence. The Sun not only gave 
front-page coverage on two separate occasions, (23 & 25 September) 
but also, on the 23 when the story broke, it dedicated four other pages 
and included an editorial comment. In addition, the Sun ran the story 
for a further five days, choosing to interview one of the affected 
couples in a two-page feature. The front-page headline on the 23rd 
opened with '80 COUPLES IN BABY MIX-UP NIGHTMARE' and the 
subsequent, running headline on each of the four following pages 
read 'BRITAIN'S BABY MIX-UP SCANDAL'. 
What is significant in these headlines is the fact that it was embnJos 
that had been misplaced, not babies. Whilst it would be entirely 
legitimate to speculate in the article the possibility that some embryos 
might have been implanted and subsequently developed in the 
wrong mothers, nonetheless, at this stage that was not concretely 
proven. In contrast to the article in Nature, where the embryo had 
been constructed as a research object, in these misleading titles, it is 
being constructed as having almost conclusive human potential. 
Consider the following: 'THEY'VE LOST OUR LAST HOPE OF A 
BABY' and 'MUM: CLINIC LOST SIX OF MY 'BABIES'. This second 
headline is the only one in which babies has been put in inverted 
commas. A further function of this discourse serves to undermine the 
fact that, for most women, IVF remains statistically an unsuccessful 
procedure, currently running at about 20 per cent. 
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Moreover, the Sun's treatment of this news story, promotes a clinical, 
as opposed to a research, standpoint to IVF, paradoxically, by its 
concerted condemnation of medical unprofessionalism. This is borne 
out by the letters page, where the headline reads 'Test-tube baby 
scandal shows we can't trust NHS' and refers to this being the 'latest 
in a line of NHS scandals' (Sun, S. Cook, 2 Oct, p. 28,). Whether this 
misconception was deliberate or not (the paper refers to the clinics in 
its own pages as 'private'), nevertheless, by identifying IVF with the 
NHS, its clinical application is reinforced. In addition, the tone of 
righteous indignation by the Sun, indicated by the repeated word 
'scandal', is specifically directed at the clinics, not at the couples, nor 
at the process. Indeed, the response from readers on the letter's page 
(The Sun, 'Test-tube babies scandal shows we can't trust NHS', 2 
October, p.28) demonstrates how far IVF has been assimilated into 
socio-cultural thinking as a normal, alternative method of 
procreation. 
Furthermore, on page 5 of the Sun newspaper on 23 September, there 
is a photograph of Louise Brown as a teenager with an IVF baby.24 It 
is juxtaposed next to the headline: 'PIONEERS IN LONG, HARD 
FIGHT TO CREATE FAMILIES'. Gale's predictions that Louise 
Brown would retain her notoriety have come to fruition, but not in 
the way he had envisioned. The construction of (good) IVF 
practitioners as heroic has lost its Frankenstein edge with the 
promotion of Louise's normality; in addition, their service in 
providing IVF is constructed as a 'battle for the good' in the creation 
of families, not just babies. In this way dissenting voices align 
themselves as anti-medicine and, more powerfully, anti-family thus 
ensuring the symbiotically secured place of IVF in the mainstream 
culture. Yet, paradoxically, the stories covered in this two-month 
period alone illustrate just how much IVF has created the conditions 
for biotechnological research to flourish. 
The Nash family story 
Whilst the Mail had featured the 'lost embryo' story, its coverage was 
less prominent and less sensational. However, it chose to give front-
page coverage to the second major story in the two-month period 
with the following headline: 'BABY MADE IN A TEST TUBE TO 
SA VE HIS SISTER'. This was the beginning of the Nash family 
controversy, in which Adam Nash was conceived by IVF and his 
embryo was selected to be both free of his sister's inherited condition 
and also to be a tissue match to provide vital stem cells to save her 
life. The Mail's coverage on the 4 October included a referral to Adam 
24 As it is 22 years since her birth, presumably this is an old photograph. 
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on page 11 as a 'spare-part' baby, but elsewhere the epithet' designer' 
baby was used in the text and in the headlines of the following day's 
papers. The epithet' designer baby' has become synonymous with 
children born from embryos selected for their ability to help others, not 
as the misleading phrase suggests, engineered embryos. In some 
respects, the phrase, 'spare-part' baby in the Mail's October 4th 
headline was a more accurate, albeit derogatory, epithet, as Adam was 
chosen for his spare parts (literally), that is, his umbilical stem cells. 
The word' designer' is interesting as it is not a wholly negative word, 
unlike 'spare-parts' in the images it conjures. What is notable about 
'designer' is that whilst it retains vestiges of the Frankenstein myth in 
the notion of 'making a product of human creation', paradoxically, it 
loses the laboratory image of test-tube and IVF in favour of a more 
up-market concept bringing to mind the popular, cultural obsession 
of designer, consumer goods. Whilst' designer labels' have received 
condemnation in oppositional consumer discourses, nevertheless, 
they retain a 'must-have' construction in the discourses of popular 
consumerism. Consequently, whilst dissenting voices may herald the 
possibilities of human genetic engineering in this new development of 
the NRT, they are battling against a construction that has latched on 
to a primary feature of Western capitalism. 
The following headlines demonstrate both papers' approbation of 
Adam's selection, emotively eliciting hope, sacrifice, saving lives and 
family love: 'ETHICAL STORM AS 'DESIGNER BABY' SAVES 
SISTER'S LIFE', 'KISS OF LIFE .,. Molly gives a loving cuddle to tiny 
Adam, whose cells are saving her', 'ONLY GOOD CAN COME OF 
ADAM'S CASE' (The Sun, 5 October) 'Ethics don't matter: As a 
mother, 1'd do anything to save my child's life. An American couple 
defend their right to have a 'designer baby.' (Mail, 5 October) 'We 
want a test-tube lifesaver for our girl too', 'BRITS COUPLE'S BID TO 
COpy FAMILY WITH DESIGNER BABY', 'We are not playing God 
we just want to save our little girl,' and the photograph caption, 
'LIFELINE ... Ellen and Simone, who can be saved by IVF baby'. (Sun 
Woman,6 Oct) 
The headlines used to describe IVF and its biotechnological 
development of embryo examination has, in this instance, promoted a 
heroic construction with the phrases, 'kiss of life,' 'lifeline,' 'lifesaver' 
and the repeated verb, 'save', which is used five times in this selection 
of examples alone. What is significant here is the building of a 
construction of the embryo that has, by implication, a potential for 
saving lives. The biomedical establishment's predictions of stem cell 
technology both tap into this construction, whilst simultaneously, 
strengthening it. The embryo's subject position is becoming 
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increasingly complex with contradictory roles of research object, 
having concrete human potential and heroic lifesaver. 
The Masterton family story 
Whereas the Nash family had received enormous media sympathy, 
by comparison, the story of the Masterton family, which broke on the 
following day, did not. The Mastertons' young daughter had died in a 
bonfire accident and the couple, who had four older boys, wanted to 
use IVF and embryo sex selection to have another daughter. The Sun's 
coverage of the Nash and Masterton cases was less prominent than its 
coverage of the first story had been. However, the stance it took was 
similar to the Mail's in terms of supporting the Nashes, but not the 
Mastertons as coverage of their case included a commentary with the 
following headline: 'WHY PARENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE THIS 
CHOICE' O. Thornton, 19 Oct, p.19). 
In contrast, the Mail chose to give a consecutive day's front-page 
coverage on the 5 October to this story with the following headline: 
'NOW THE 'RIGHT' TO CHOOSE THE BABY'S SEX', '24 hours after 
the u.s. designer baby storm, a British couple demand a test-tube 
daughter' (M. Seamark & J. Mills). They dedicated pages four and five 
to the story with the headlines: ' All we want is a girl like Nicole', 
'Couple who lost their only daughter in bonfire tragedy say they will 
take their fight to the European Court in bid to ensure their IVF child 
is female'. Notably, the paper featured a social commentary across the 
same two pages with the headline: 'Special pleading must not be 
allowed to prevail.' On page 13, the Mail continued its coverage of the 
Nash family with the following headlines: 'Ethics don't matter: As a 
mother, I'd do anything to save my child's life',' An American couple 
defend their right to have a 'designer baby./I 
There are several pertinent issues that these headlines reveal, which 
are fuelled by the close proximity of the two stories occurring at the 
same time. Both papers studied chose to take advantage of this 
phenomenon in their commentaries. Firstly, despite acknowledging 
the Mastertons' tragedy, with regard to the death of their daughter, 
nonetheless, the Mail's condemnation of their wishes is couched in 
unsympathetic language. The front-page headline begins with the 
word 'now' giving the tone of exasperated impatience to what 
follows. The word 'right' is placed in inverted commas, conveying the 
Mail's obvious challenge to this assertion and in direct contrast to the 
article on page 13, where the use of the word 'right' in connection 
with the Nash family has no inverted commas. In addition, by 
choosing the word' demand', as opposed to request, or more 
emotively plead, the paper places the Mastertons in a position of 
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truculence. This is reinforced by the headline on pages four and five, 
which describes them as taking' their fight to the European Court.' (my 
emphasis) 
In keeping with the headlines that the Nash family were given, the 
Mail, if sympathetic to their cause might have written something like, 
'Bereaved couple beg for test-tube daughter to heal their family'. For, 
as we have observed, the concept of embryo selection to save others 
has the paper's approbation and the notion of IVF creating 'families' 
is now circulating in the popular consciousness. There is a certain 
irony that the Mail chose to headline their article about the Nash 
family on page 13, in the same edition, with the opening words: 
'Ethics don't matter'. The headlines of the next few days convey the 
ambivalence that the Mail takes towards embryo selection with the 
following headlines: On the 6 October, 'Adam, first child in new era 
of hope',' As a row over designer babies erupts on both sides of the 
Atlantic, one British couple tells Femail ... How we selected the sex of 
our darling daughter'.25 'Was 'engineering' baby wrong? (Letters 
page). On the 17 October, 'New twist in storm over sex selection of 
babies'. On 20 October, 'Saved, the girl given I designer baby' cells.' 
Perhaps, it is no surprise then, that with the controversy of these two 
cases, the Mail should yet again bring a NRT story to its front-page on 
the 23 October. It must have been the case that these stories were 
giving good sales figures which, again, reflects the symbiotic 
relationship of the media and popular interest, and critically, the 
backdrop of a capitalist system that underpins both newspaper sales 
and biotechnology. What is notable about the story on the front-page 
of the 23 October was that it hooked into the sensationalism of the 
month's coverage of the NRT, rather than having any substantial 
newsworthy value in its own right. 
The emotive headline read: 'IVF TEST TO GIVE PARENTS 'PERFECT 
BABIES', followed by an inside headline on page 6, which said, 'Do 
we want baby quality control?' The crux of the story was a technique 
of screening in IVF clinics to ensure the best embryos were selected 
for implantation in order to improve success rates. In one sense, it 
was merely an extension of good practice that had been undertaken 
since the beginning of IVF, that is, to place the healthiest looking 
embryos in the womb, if there were several to offer a choice, in order 
to increase the chances of implantation. However, the thrust of the 
headline has two subtle functions working in parallel to each other. It 
invokes both the myth of Brave New World, and more powerfully, 
the horrors of the Holocaust, whilst simultaneously, promoting the 
25 This was done by sperm differentiation and artificial insemination of the 
husband's sperm, not through IVF. 
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technology of IVF in a competitive, capitalist system, in which the 
elite are valued and their prowess is sought after. 
The construction of woman as mother 
What is significant in these three stories is that woman, whom I have 
previously demonstrated has had a construction of reproductive 
passivity that obscures her personhood, is speaking in these 
discourses. It might seem at this juncture that either my analyses in 
the earlier section need to be revised, or alternatively the climate has 
changed dramatically, constructing woman differently. It is my 
contention that the previous analyses remain valid and that the 
statements, being fluid in their power to construct, have 'transformed' 
and' correlated' with the passage of time adapting to the socio-
cultural changes that have occurred over twenty-two years.26 
For example, one of the correlative techniques that has been 
assimilated into the cultural milieu is the 'media confessional', 
whereby both celebrities and non-famous people pour out their 
personal stories to the media that, hitherto, would have only been 
divulged to a close confidante. When woman speaks in these NRT 
discourses, she is doing so in the manner of this discursive practice. 
Furthermore, I will reveal in my examples, that the construction of 
reproductive passivity has 'transformed' from silence into woman's 
speaking, thereby, paradoxically, eliciting woman as agent in her own 
passivity, which accords this construction even greater power. For, a 
close reading of that voice demonstrates that woman is only being 
permitted to speak as 'mother' and through her speech a construction 
is being formed of woman, who will' do anything' to be a mother, and 
as a mother, will' do anything' for her child. What is missing from her 
speech is any critique of IVF, the clinics, the cost, her treatment, 
requests for spare embryos, and very little description, if any, of her 
work or wider interests. 
The Sun's extensive coverage of the lost embryos included a two-page 
interview with one of the couples concerned on the 3 October, 
followed by a further two-page feature on the following day. In the 
text of both articles respectively entitled: 'We'll never know if our 
'babies' were thrown out as trash .. or is someone else having our 
children?' and 'I see mums playing in the park and I know I will 
never do that', it is Lisa Butlin, the woman, who is accorded the most 
speech. Other mothers who speak are as follows: 
26 This is discussed in Chapter One, p. 35. 
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Jane Parfitt, 'As a surrogate mother I just wanted to give to others, but 
I ended up destroying my own marriage.' (Mail, L. Gibson, 29 Sept, 
pp.32-33) 
Lisa Nash, 'Why I gave birth to a 'spare-part' baby.'(Mail, J. 
Chapman,4 Oct, p. 11) Lisa Nash is quoted at length in the text, not 
her husband, although the headline is not taken from any of her 
words; I would suggest the text producer compiled this. 'Ethics don't 
matter: As a mother, I'd do anything to save my child's life.'(Mail, S. 
Chalmers,5 Oct, p. 13) 
Louise Masterton, whose husband is also quoted, ' All we want is a 
girl like Nicole' (Mail, L. Collins, 5 Oct, p. 4-5) 
Ellen Phillipson, whose daughter also has Fanconi anaemia, 'We want 
a test-tube lifesaver for our girl too' (Sun Woman, R. Perrie, 6 Oct, pp. 
1-2) 
Gill Clark and her husband both talk about having a daughter using 
artificial insemination of his sperm, following a process of screening 
to separate X and Y chromosome bearing sperm, 'How we selected 
the sex of our darling daughter'. (Mail, 6 Oct, pp. 30-31) 
Pat Anthony and her daughter Karen discuss Pat's surrogacy of her 
daughter's three embryos (fertilised by Karen's husband) and the 
subsequent birth of triplets, now 13 years old, 'The triplets who 
discovered granny gave birth to them'. (Mail Supplement, Weekend, 
28 Oct, pp. 26-27.) 
In the course of this analysis, as previously stated, I am not in any way 
decrying the genuine distress of these people (or the joy in the case of 
the Clarks and Pat Anthony's family) nor am I criticising the desire to 
become a mother or the terrible panic one feels when one's child is 
very sick. What I am endeavouring to illustrate is that in the selection, 
prominence and structuring of the discourses that tell these stories, 
techniques of objectification, normalisation and construction are being 
consciously and unconsciously deployed by the text producer and 
similarly received by the reader. For example, the adjective most 
commonly applied to these couples, and the women in particular, is 
'desperate'. Whilst for each individual this may be the case, 
nonetheless, by its repetitive use and persistent exposure, it becomes 
a mantra, constructing woman as incomplete if childless. Ironically, 
this only serves to make acceptance of infertility even harder to bear. 
Furthermore, this construction of motherhood is particularly 
significant in a time of demographic change when both men and 
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women are marrying later and having fewer children at an older age 
than ever beforeP I have phrased this last sentence carefully as it 
takes a couple to marry (or cohabit) and start a family. However, this 
obvious fact goes against the grain of the dominant everyday 
discourses, which antagonistically places the responsibility for late 
motherhood on woman's shoulders alone. A typical example of this 
can be found in the headlines of my selected two-month period: 'How 
older mothers put baby at risk' (Scottish Daily Mail, J. Chapman, 28 
Sept 2000, p. 19) 
The article discusses the dangers, and a few benefits, of older 
motherhood solely in terms of woman, such as; 'Researchers already 
know that women who wait until their mid-thirties to start a family 
double their chances of miscarriage'. (my emphasis)28 Conversely, 
older single women, who are not in a relationship and yet wish to 
have a child, are maligned in the NRT discourses for seeking single 
parenthood. Ironically, it is the agency of men that is missing from 
these accounts. Furthermore, by aligning male procreation with 
virility, the treatment of late fatherhood is usually constructed with 
admiration, even envy, in celebrity accounts, with some discourses 
suggesting that older men make better fathers.29 
I would contend that these discourses, which give sympathetic 
encouragement to IVF participants and accord blame to older mothers 
and single mothers are working to construct woman as 'mother in the 
nuclear family' by the technique observed by Foucault in the Ecole 
27 In 2000, the average age for first marriages was 30 for men and 28 for women. In 
1961, it was 26 and 23 respectively. In 2002, there were just under 9 births per 1000 
women aged 40, but this has nearly doubled since the 1980s. The average age for 
women to have a child is 29.3 compared with 25 ten years ago (when one takes into 
account the number of young single mums who will be included in this statistic, 
bringing the mean down, for many career women the average age is likely to be 
higher than this). The fastest growing age group for births is women aged 35-39 and 
40 and over. 
28 Although the article states that older mothers are more likely to breast feed and 
have more intelligent children, nonetheless, the overwhelming content suggests that 
older mothers are endangering their baby's health. 
29 A good example of this is the article written by Dennis Barker (who became a 
father at 61) in his advice to Sir Ralph Halpern, who had also just become a father at 
61. The piece is an unabashed polemic in defence of older fathers being better 
parents with such comments as the following: 'It leaves more energy for when it is 
really needed - such as when matters of health and education are to the fore or 
when the child is in any sort of real predicament. You may miss the fact that your 
child is unhappy or otherwise in a mess if you are too concerned that his or her 
scuffed shoes let your own reputation down, which you are more like to do at 25 
than 55.' (D. Barker, 'How's your old man?' The Guardian, 17/10/2000). In addition, 
the aspect of dying before the child reaches adulthood is treated as a sadness, rather 
than an irresponsibility, although this is often the accusation aimed at women who 
become mothers after the menopause with IVF. 
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Militaire. Bucking against the demographic trend, young, married 
motherhood is exemplified as ideal, but it is woman alone, who is 
targeted by privileges and punishments towards this conformity. In 
addition, by consistently revealing the ages of the couples involved in 
IVF, which are usually mid to late 30s or early 40s, the technique of 
blaming' older women who wait' subtly apportions responsibility 
onto infertile women for their own predicament. As I have said, there 
is nothing new in this societal subject positioning of woman, but what 
is innovative, is the way in which the discourses of the NRT have 
embraced this orthodoxy within the biotechnological post/human 
vision. 
The media treatment of the Masterton couple requires exploration, as 
this was a dominant story, which stood out from the others due to the 
lack of public sympathy it received.3D Currently, sex selection of 
embryos is permitted for medical reasons, that is, to prevent the 
conception of children with genetically inherited, sex-linked 
conditions, such as haemophilia, but prohibited for social ones. 
Possibly in light of the Masterton case, the HFEA were recently 
commissioned by the Department of Health to conduct a public 
consultation on the matter with regard to changing the rules 
concerning this. The results of the survey were that the public did not 
want sex selection for social reasons, despite the potential caveat that 
this should be only used for family balancing following the birth of 
two children of the same sex.31 
Whether it is the case that the media had judged the public mood 
correctly or whether popular feeling had been influenced by the 
media condemnation, it is impossible to surmise. It seems to have 
been the case that a distinction was made between having IVF to save 
an existing child and having IVF to replace a dead one, which the 
media championed despite the couple's protestations that this was 
not the reason for their request. In considering what this discourse 
means in terms of the construction of woman as mother, there is a 
30 I discussed this case, briefly, in my interview with the Rev Dr R. Holloway, who 
was personally sympathetic to their plight. See Appendix II, p. 248. 
31 The Rev Dr R. Holloway was involved in the first public consultation on sex 
selection, when he was serving on the HFEA, which took place in 1993 -see 
Appendix II, pp. 244-5. More recently, the minutes of the HFEA's May 2002 meeting 
demonstrated that there was a Steering Group on Sex Selection 
(http://www.hfea.gov.uk/AboutHFEA/AuthorityMinutes/2002I May200;?, p. 3). 
At the request of the Secretary of State for Health a second consultation was 
launched on 23 October 2002, which considered the issue of sex selection for 'family 
balancing.'(http://www.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/Archive/563-l5735, p.l) On 12 
November 2003, the HFEA announced their recommendations that sex selection 
with regard to sperm sorting should be regulated and that the current policy of 
using sex selection of embryos to prevent sex-linked diseases only should continue. 
(hLlp:/Iwww.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/Archive,p. 3). 
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definite punishment being applied to the woman seeking motherhood 
outside the boundaries of what constitutes the 'normal' family. I have 
said 'woman' because, as I have demonstrated, it is to woman that the 
techniques of persuasive conformity are directed. Woman's desires to 
selflessly have a child for her husband or to save a sibling are 
sanctioned, but her desires to have a child to satisfy her own needs 
are not. 
The construction of woman as animal 
I wish now to interrogate a different aspect of the construction of 
woman that is becoming increasingly prevalent with the rise of 
popular biotechnology discourses. As I shall demonstrate, it is not a 
new subject position, nor a fixed one; indeed, my analysis in this case, 
centres on how the fluidity of a construction per se can be part of its 
functioning capability. It is my contention that the discourses of 
animal and human biotechnology have commonalities that pass 
through an increasingly permeable boundary. Furthermore, the route 
of linguistic osmosis, through which knowledge and functioning 
statements pass, is centred in both discourses on female bodies. In this 
way, animal discourses correspond predominantly with constructions 
of woman, as opposed to generic humanity. It is my premise that as 
these discourses deploy reproductive language interchangeably, a 
technique is being established whereby animal biotechnology, by 
transformation, can find an entry into the discourses of woman 
without seeming unusual. 
Moreover this opening is strengthened by constructions and 
entrenched ideological concepts of woman passing through the 
boundary into the animal discourses. I referred in Chapter One to 
Foucault's understanding that statements were primarily functioning 
units that can cut across structures and that' an appreciation of 
fluidity and difference' was essential to the conceptualisation of how 
power flows. Moreover, this cognisance is critical in aligning the 
discourses to their political influences and ramifications. The use of 
this particular technique operates by the assimilation of the atypical 
into the everyday, creating a newly established 'commonplace' where 
challenge becomes unthinkable. 
As I have previously argued the case that the article in Nature 
constructed woman as a compliant research object, I propose now to 
conduct an analysis on an animal discourse in order to demonstrate 
my premise that constructions of woman have transformed into the 
textual statements contained within it. 
In the selected two-month period of coded newspaper stories, there is 
an article on animal research that I have chosen to analyse. I propose 
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to split the analysis into two sections, the headline and then the text of 
the article. I will begin by focusing on the headline itself, which is a 
highly significant interpretive cue that draws and prepares the reader 
for what follows. I would assert that headlines have the potential to 
be immensely powerful because they can evoke discursive fields that 
unconsciously positions a reader into a multiplicity of interlocking 
discourses and ideologies before they begin to read the text. The 
following is a particularly good example. 
Critical Discourse Analysis No.5: The Scottish Daily Mail, 9 
October 2000, p.25, written by B. Marsh32 
The cow that brings hope of resurrection for extinct species 
The headline 
The headline begins with' the cow', which is also a well used and 
highly familiar, derisory epithet for woman. Whilst some of the 
content was about using cows as surrogates for an endangered 
species, nonetheless, the title could have been written otherwise, after 
all it was hardly the domestic cow that devised the biotechnology that 
made this possible. This is the first word that is read, and in a similar 
way to the working of metaphors, all the images and meanings of this 
word will be consciously and unconsciously conveyed to the reader. 
There is a photograph that accompanies the article of a gaur and her 
calf. The caption underneath states, 'Breakthrough: Gaurs like these 
could flourish again if cloning proves a success.' What is interesting 
about this with regard to the headline is that a picture of a farmyard 
cow is not featured. The photograph correctly points the reader to the 
fact that this is an animal discourse, whilst simultaneously leaving a 
discursive space for the images of' cow'. This permits all the 
unconsciously conveyed meanings of 'cow' to remain in the mind 
without securing them to a picture of bovine familiarity. 
The words 'hope' and 'resurrection/ in juxtaposition, are reminiscent 
of the gospel story conveying multiple images of the divine, of self-
sacrifice, of new life and the miraculous. This correlation between the 
discourses of biotechnology and religious symbolism has become part 
of everyday parlance, especially since the advent of the Human 
Genome Project, which has claimed so much media attention, since it 
was announced on 26 June 2000.33 What is pertinent in this case is 
32 The full transcript is reproduced in Appendix I pp. 241-2. 
33 Press announcements included such headlines as: 'The book of life' (TIze Times, 
The Finnncial Times, TIle Observer), 'the story of life' (TIle Guardian), 'life's secret 
manual' (Evening Standard) and 'The miraculous map of mankind' (Daily Mail). 
Taken from the Wellcome News Supplement, Commemorative Issue, Unveiling the 
human genome: TIle first draft 2001, (London: The Wellcome Trust, 2001), p. 9. Also in 
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that the rise of the new construction of the embryo as 'lifesaver', 
which, as I have already mentioned, is being established in the 
context of the designer baby discourses, is being transformed to the 
ultimate pinnacle of 'life-giver' by its correlation with the discourses of 
religious symbolism. 
However, the crucial word in the title is the one, which joins together 
'cow' with 'hope of resurrection', that is the word 'brings'. It is only in 
a close reading of a text that the inconsistencies or incongruity of a 
phrase can be discerned and I have already pointed out that it is not 
the cow that brings 'hope' but the new technologies. It is my 
contention that the use of the word 'brings' demonstrates how 
discourses correlate, in the Foucauldian sense, and that a further 
ideological discourse is being recalled in this statement. In a similar 
way that I have demonstrated how the NRT discourses have been 
able to encompass and transform the traditional notions of woman's 
place and responsibility for the nuclear family, so now I wish to 
illustrate how these discourses are transforming another centuries old 
orthodoxy. 
For, as I discussed in chapter one, Simone de Beaviour's penetrating 
insights established that woman could only attain transcendence in 
her capacity to serve husband, family, church and country, as 
opposed to man who could do so in his own right. Man transcends 
through his own agency, whilst woman does so through her 
obedience. Yet, obedience is, in effect, actively choosing to be 
subservient to the rule of another, in other words, to choose passivity. 
De Beaviour demonstrated that woman was ideologically positioned 
to achieve spiritual and ontological equality by her servitude and in 
this headline the cow is given parallel 'rights' in its capacity as 
'willing flesh' to do the same. As the word 'cow' conjures up the 
derogatory icon of stupid woman, the title serves as both a 
justification of using woman as a surrogate, whilst simultaneously 
elevating her if she makes this her choice. 
For, in this headline, it is the cow in its utterly, passive, reproductive 
role, which 'brings hope of resurrection'. The following three words 
'for extinct species' leaves the reader in no doubt that, in this context, 
resurrection is meant (almost) literally. In this way the headline 
functions to accord an action of sublime passivity with one that is 
simultaneously divine, for could there be any higher spiritual power 
than bringing the dead to life? Furthermore, does this not also 
selection of coded headlines, Found, the secret of eternal life (well, at least if you're 
a worm)' (Scottish Daily Mail), 1/09/2000, J. Chapman, p. 29. 
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resonate with the first article twenty-two years ago, when Lesley 
Brown, constructed as passive, generic mother, 'held the whole world 
in her hands.' 
The article 
The significance of the cow 
The article opens with the announcement that: 'Scientists using 
cloning techniques believe they may have found a way to eradicate 
the threat of extinction for endangered species.' Despite the elevation 
of the cow in the headline, this first sentence firmly re-establishes 
science as progenitor. The text continues: 'In a unique experiment 
conducted in the U.s., a rare ox-like jungle animal known as a gaur 
has been cloned and its embryo implanted in the womb of an 
ordinary domestic cow.' There are three significant antithetical 
phrases operating in this sentence, two of which are featured at one 
end of the spectrum and one at the opposite end. The continuum in 
question is one of extra/ ordinariness. 
The first two phrases are disparate in content but are aligned by their 
locus in the spectrum; the text informs the reader that' a unique 
experiment' is conducted on 'a rare ox-like jungle animal' conveying 
images of exclusivity in both cases and exotica in the second. The 
corresponding other, 'an ordinary domestic cow' relates antithetically to 
the rarity of the gaur in content and to the uniqueness of the 
experiment in the construction of the spectrum. Thus the statement 
functions in a similar fashion to the headline by elevating the 
ordinariness of the cow into something special by its reproductive 
passivity. Yet, the statement functions at an even deeper level. For, in 
a Foucauldian interrogation of the everyday, why is the farmyard 
cow so described? Why has the text superimposed the Western 
human constructs of ontological hierarchy onto these animals in this 
way? For conversely, is it not the cow that is unique in its bountiful 
service to humankind, providing the nation with seemingly endless 
supplies of food and clothing? After all, whilst environmentally 
tragic, the extinction of gaurs could pass without notice but the loss of 
our cattle herds would be a catastrophe. 
Moreover, not all cultures view the cow in this way as the Hindu 
construct of sacred status illustrates. By the use of the word 
'domestic', as opposed to 'familiar' or 'plentiful', enhanced by the 
preceding word 'ordinary', the text producer has transformed the 
statement (in the Foucauldian sense) to correlate with the culturally 
assimilated and everyday construction of woman as 'ordinary, 
domestic supplier of bodily needs,' that is, mother. This connection is 
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further enhanced by the information that it has been possible to 
'clone' the extraneous 'embryo' and 'implant' it in the 'womb'. These 
terms are now so familiar to the non-scientific reader from the NRT 
discourses that they can be written without the need for an 
explanatory comment. It is, therefore, noteworthy that the use of the 
word 'womb' is retained as opposed to the biological term of 
reference 'uterus', which might afford some distance between animal 
and woman. For, 'womb' is a far more emotive term, which touches a 
multiplicity of maternal images from non-scientific discourses that 
uterus does not. The effect of these opening statements is to place 
animal and woman in a discursive close proximity, whilst elevating 
science to god-like omnipotence. 
The text continues: 'The breakthrough could have huge implications 
for the 5,435 animal species classed as 'threatened' by the World 
Conservation Union which include a quarter of all mammals and one 
in eight species of birds.' The simplicity of the text belies the 
enormous jump that has been made from a tentative beginning using 
a surrogate cow into the heroic potential for saving the world. Nearly 
every word in the sentence emotively taps into the (genuine) popular 
anxiety for planetary environmental health. My critique is not of that 
valid concern, but to the way a solution is being constructed. Words 
and epithets such as, 'breakthrough', 'huge implications', '5,435 
species', 'threatened', 'World Conservation', 'quarter of all mammals' 
conjure up a picture of global calamity that can only be solved by 
cloning! In terms of the content this misses the critique of the 
problem, but in terms of the way the discourse is functioning, cloning 
and surrogacy are being constructed as saviours. In the permeability 
of an animal/woman boundary, the concepts of 'saving others' can 
move across the discourses gathering strength from their correlations 
and interconnections. 
The significance of naming 
The article then states: 'The gaur is a humpbacked, cow-like animal 
native to India and Burma. The latest member of its species is due to 
be born to a cow called Bessie in Iowa next month.' In an incredible 
turn-about-face the discourse quashes the elevated status of its 
alluring creature by the adjective 'humpbacked' and raises the 
surrogate cow to unprecedented heights of human equivalency by the 
act of naming her. It is my contention that the act of conferring a 
name to an animal is highly significant, for in human society, the 
importance of giving or withholding a name is perceived respectively 
as an affirming or disempowering act. What is significant, in this 
instance, as it is with the keeping of pets, is that this is a human 
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construct, which situates specially favoured animals into a higher 
ontological place than they would otherwise be located. 
Peter Singer elucidates clearly in his article I All Animals are Equal' 
that human beings are speciesist with regard to animals in the same 
way that they can be racist and sexist to others of their own species 
and that this stems from the ideological roots of human dignity in the 
'Great Chain of Being', where man's pivotal place above the animals 
was established.34 However, I would contend that not only did the 
chain legitimise man's focal position, it also established the 
problematic concept of hierarchy-of-being, which has been used within 
the spectrum of humanity, as his reference to sexism and racism 
validates. 
Moreover, because this chain was primarily conceived to address 
problems of theodicy, it enmeshed a divine justification for its own 
existence within the very concept of hierarchy itself. Kathleen Sands 
describes how ontology and worthiness became inextricably linked in 
this chain; she says, 'The notions of superior and inferior forms of 
beings, however, did refer to something: the supposed natural 
inequality of created goods, expressed in the Neoplatonic metaphor 
of an organic chain in which degrees of goodness were at the same time 
degrees of being (my italics).'35 Consequently, naming an animal 
functions to send a powerful message about transcendence with 
regard to reproductive passivity. Whilst the import of the message 
will patently mean nothing to animals, its significance will permeate 
to woman, as a way of circumventing her ontological position. 
Other examples in the text of interchangeable language and 
anthropomorphism are as follows: 
This created an embryo with the gaur's characteristics which is now growing 
inside Bessie. 
The panda's closest relatives -racoons and rabbits- are not ideal surrogate mothers, 
so a female black bear is being lined up to carry a bam). 
A clear choice is being made by the text producer (albeit 
unconsciously) to use popular vernacular phrases rather than 
scientific terminology to describe reproductive events. The phrase 
'now growing inside Bessie' as opposed to 'developing in the 
surrogate cow' is more intimate and personal than scientific language, 
tapping into the ways women often speak about their pregnancies. It 
34 P. Singer, I All Animals are Equal,' pp. 461-470, in Bioethics: An Anthology, Ed by 
H. Kuhse & P. Singer, (Oxford & Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) p. 468. 
35 K. Sands, Escape from Paradise: Evil and Tragedy in Feminist TIwology, (Minneapolis: 
Augsberg Fortress, 1994) p. 2. 
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is my assertion that this is not simply a point of pedantry, for, in other 
contexts, language differentials are critical in making clear 
distinctions between human beings and the animal kingdom. 
Paradoxically, this is most obvious when an animal label is used as an 
insult as in cow, cat, bitch, dog, beached whale, ass, vixen and so 
forth. That these epithets should be most often directed at woman 
further illustrates the previous assertion regarding the Chain of Being. 
In the second excerpt, the description of animal surrogates as mothers 
is disconcerting, precisely because there is no distinction being made 
between animal and woman. By contrast, bulls are described as 
impregnating cows, not fathering calves and male animal progenitors 
are known as studs, not fathers.36 Moreover, whilst it may be 
acceptable in an animal discourse to discuss surrogates in terms of 
how 'ideal' they are, the transference of this concept onto human 
beings is both offensive and ethically dubious. The concluding phrase 
'carry a baby' effectively demonstrates the fluidity of transformation 
that has been active in this text, for the language is so emotively 
human it would be considered anthropomorphic in any article, let 
alone one that is discussing biotechnological developments in 
animals. 
The significance of science fiction 
The text continues: 
Researchers hope to use the same technology to clone giant pandas. They believe 
they may even be able to recreate a species of Spanish mountain goat which died 
out nine months ago, using some of the animals preserved cells. 
If successful, scientists will have accomplished the world's first resurrection of 
an extinct species, bringing the dinosaur theme park fantasy in Spielberg's 
Jurassic Park a step nearer to theoretical reality. 
Animals whose wombs are deemed suitable to carry a different species could be 
implanted with an unlimited succession of species on the endangered list. 
Pertinently, sandwiched in between these paragraphs the paper had 
highlighted in bold and larger font, 'We have a duty to do this', which 
was not directly taken from the text of the article. Blended into the 
sense of the miraculous is the imposition of duty with all its 
connotations of stoic, moral forbearance and religiosity. It is a word 
that is used to send people into situations against their will for a 
higher moral good. Its use in this context acts as an interpretive cue, 
not only revealing the text producer's identity but also functioning as 
36 With regard to conferring animal epithets onto humans, stud is considered 
complimentary not offensive. 
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a justification devise in the punishment! privilege normalising 
technique. 
In these excerpts the text is drawing on two powerful, circulating, 
interconnected discourses, which are predominant in the cultural 
climate. The first is the one I have previously discussed, that of 
biotechnology as miraculous saviour, imbibing cloning and surrogacy 
as its vehicles of realisation. The second one is the discourse of the 
superhuman, which Graham interrogated in her genealogical 
approach to the perimeters of post/human ontological hygiene. 
Graham notes that, 'Transhumanism celebrates technology as the 
manifestation of human liberation from bondage to nature, finitude, 
and the vagaries of disease, decay and death.'37 It is powerfully 
evoked here by reference to Jurassic Park, a work of science fiction 
that is 'a step nearer to theoretical reality: 
Notably, the backdrop to this discourse is a capitalist system that has 
invested heavily in biotechnology and expects returns on that 
investment, offering a solution to the world's problems by a route of 
further sophisticated consumerism as opposed to one of genuine 
conservation. For, would it not be more effective to seek ways of 
arresting resource exploitation, thereby preserving environments for 
species to flourish, than to offer expensive ways to treat the 
symptoms leaving the underlying disease untouched? The text 
continues with the following comments: 
Robert Lanza, vice president of medical and scientific development at Advanced 
Cell Technology, said: 'It's not science fiction, it's real. 
, A hundred species are lost every day and these mass extinctions are mostly our 
own doing. Now we have the technology to reverse that, I think we have the 
responsibility to try.' 
Having informed the reader that Jurassic Park is a 'step nearer to 
theoretical reality', the text producer includes the quotation from the 
scientists that this is 'not science fiction, it's real'. (my italics) This 
functions to challenge the borders of what constitutes human norms 
by adding a frisson of fear and excitement to those deep-seated 
human fantasies of overcoming human mortality. Immediately, the 
quotation continues by expressing the loss of species in a couplet for 
emphasis, 'a hundred species are lost every day' and 'mass 
extinctions' then follows this with an admission of it being' our own 
doing'. The subtle use of the pronoun 'our' and 'we' in the next 
sentence engages the reader as complicit in both the problem and the 
37 E. Graham, Representations of the post/human Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular 
Culture, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 9. 
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solution. 'Now coe have the technology to reverse that, I think we have 
the responsibility to try.' 
The discourse taps into the well-established construction of science as 
'progression' and 'miraculous saviour' and that of 'experts knowing 
what is best' and offers the individual reader, who feels powerless in 
the face of global calamity, a way of atonement. In terms of the 
content the piece is comically illogical, for unless the conditions for 
survival are changed, then cloned species will continue to become 
extinct. This aspect is not addressed in the article; the dissent 
expressed is directed at the difficulties of using different species as 
surrogates and the ethics of creating duplicate creatures. Whilst it 
may seem that I am labouring a point that is irrelevant to my main 
premise, I would argue that in terms of how the discourse is 
functioning, it is critical to my central contentions. For these statements 
are engaging readers, in a Foucauldian sense, in constructions and 
subject positions that, as I have demonstrated, can transform through 
the permeable barrier into the discourses of woman and thereby into 
post! human norms. 
Critical Discourse Analysis No.6: The BBC Documentary, Creation, 
from the series 'How to Build a Human' screened in 2001.38 
In this next section, I propose to conduct a critical discourse analysis 
on a BBC television documentary, Creation, the first in a series entitled 
How to Build a Human, which was shown in 2001. The subject of the 
documentary is therapeutic cloning and its potential to cure a wide 
range of conditions, for which current treatment can only offer 
palliative remedies. Through this analysis, I intend to demonstrate 
how differing and sometimes contradictory constructions of woman 
have been incorporated teleologically in the discourse to support stem 
cell research. Some of the constructions and the subject positions, 
which they engender, have already been discussed and I will refer to 
these without repeating what has already been established. 
Creation 
The film centres on a commercial company, Advanced Cell 
Technology (ACT), in Worcester, Massachusetts, which is co-
incidentally the same corporation that featured in the previous 
newspaper account. The film follows the actions of its main 
protagonist, Dr. Jose Cibelli, who aims to be the first person to clone a 
human embryo by nuclear transfer. The programme is delivered in 
38 For this critical discourse analysis, I have chosen to place the coded excerpts in to 
the body of the text, as they are relatively short and this allows the reader easy 
access to the discourse being analysed. 
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the style of a drama-documentary, hyped up with exciting music, 
science-fiction images and projections, interspersed with interviews 
from experts and 'ordinary' people. In recalling Walsh's insights that 
interpersonal framing devises are the I driving force' of language, then 
it follows that these intertextual devices of the film genre can be 
powerful collaborators in the deployment of functioning statements. 
Consequently, I have included a few pictures taken from the 
programme to give a flavour of the visual aspect. 
For, if the evocation of discursive fields engendered by metaphors in 
the thrust of a headline can be an effective technique, how much more 
influential will these interpretive cues be as they encompass the 
sensory receptors of sight, sound and imagination? In the context of 
this particular programme, I would assert that these are primarily 
interpersonal rather than ideational framing devises due to their 
capacity to affect a powerful emotional response in the viewer. As 
Grimwood demonstrated in his analysis, this technique is most 
servicable when it seduces, rather than overtly coerces the 
reader/viewer, by means of the punishment/privilege technique, as 
opposed to one of open command or condemnation. 
It will be helpful at this point to give a brief explanation of my 
methodology, with special regard to the process of coding that I chose 
to employ. After several viewings, I selected the most relevant clips 
which involved the central theme, and transcribed these as closely as 
possible from the sound track. The numbers in brackets indicate the 
length of time in counted seconds between each phrase. In the film 
these gaps were filled by music and images, the effect of which is 
difficult to convey by a written transcription, but should be 
acknowledged as a significant framing devise. I have included 
repeated words and speech hesitations from the interviews with 
Cibelli as they occurred on the sound track. 
A brief explanation of the science involved 
I interviewed Professor Ian Wilmut from the Roslin Institute and was 
able to put questions to him that related, not only to stem cell therapy, 
but also to specific points raised by this programme. The full 
transcription of the interview can be found in Appendix III. The 
biotechnology of cloning is evolving rapidly; consequently the 
contemporary scientific knowledge at the time that this programme 
was screened may well be out of date when this thesis is completed. 
For the purposes of discourse analysis and the demonstration of 
power operating through textual constructions, as established by 
Foucault, this does not matter. What is crucial, however, is to argue 
the central premise through an analysis of the film set in the era in 
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which it was screened, thereby establishing contentions, which if 
accepted, can be adapted to the changing biotechnological arena. 
With these criteria, I shall give a brief explanation of the scientific 
background to the film that was current at the time it was televised. 
The term cloning means making an exact genetic copy of an 
organism, but it refers to two distinctly different processes. Natural 
cloning occurs when a cell divides and replicates its genetic 
constitution, as occurs in the development of identical twins. The 
scientifically induced method of cloning is more accurately termed 
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or cell nucleus replacement 
(CNT). This process involves removing the nucleus from an ovum 
(which contains half the chromosomes) and replacing it with a 
nucleus taken from any cell of another individual of the same species 
containing the full number. The egg is then activated, usually with an 
electric impulse, to begin developing as it would if fertilised 
naturally. 
Reproductive cloning would entail the embryo being inserted into a 
surrogate uterus in order for it to develop, as was the case with Dolly, 
a Finn-Dorset ewe, which was the first mammal ever to be cloned 
from an adult body cell.39 Therapeutic cloning, whilst identical in the 
creation of the clone, only allows embryonic development up to about 
50 cells, when the undifferentiated stem cells can be used to replace 
damaged cells in living individuals of the same species with chronic 
disease states. (An embryo of 50 cells would only be a few days old 
and well within the 14-day limit set out in the HFE Act.) Critically, 
undifferentiated stem cells have not yet been internally programmed 
to become specialised in any way, consequently they are described as 
totipotent and can take on the characteristics of any cell type. 
Fully developed creatures do have some stem cells, but these are 
pluripotent, that is, they can specialise into a variety of cells but only 
within a narrow margin.40 For example, blood stem cells can become 
red or white blood cells, but not muscle or nerve cells. IVF has 
provided the means to collect embryonic stem cells from spare 
embryos and routinely freezing umbilical stem cells would be another 
source, but these stem cells, whilst sufficiently totipotent, may cause 
391. Wilmut, K. Campbell & c. Tudge, The Second Creation: The Age of Biological 
Control btJ the scientists who cloned Dolly, (London: Headline, 2000), p. 15. 
40 Even at this time, work was being carried out in the U.s. by Catherine Verfaille 
from the University of Minnesota who has discovered adult stem cells in bone 
marrow. These cells, called multipotent adult progenitor cells (MAPC), have been 
isolated from 70% of human volunteers. In addition, another biotech company, 
MorphoGen Pharmaceuticals in San Diego has found them in skin and muscle. 
NewScientist.com, 'Ultimate stem cell discovered' 23/01/02. 
http://www.n{'wsdcntisLcom/news/npws.jsp?id=ns99991826 
113 
problems of rejection similar to organ transplantation if used in 
patients with a different tissue type. 
However, according to Professor Wilmut, tissues have varying 
immunological responses, for example, nerve cells have almost no 
problems with rejection, (they are said to have 'immune privilege') 
whilst bone marrow cells require very specific tissue typing.41 So for 
some tissues, cell lines of 20 or maybe even 200 different types could 
be established from an IVF embryo, which would cover most of the 
population. It would only be necessary to clone embryos to prevent 
immunological rejection in cases where the tissue typing was for a 
much larger variation. A further point, whilst it may be possible in 
the future to turn an adult differentiated cell into a totipotent stem 
cell, it may always be preferable to use an embryonic cell due to aging 
factors in the adult celL42 To summarise, the future scenario 
envisioned could be thus; a patient who needs stem cells to repair 
damaged tissue, say following a heart attack, could provide a cell 
from scraping the inside of their mouth, from which the nucleus 
would be removed and inserted into a prepared donor egg. The 
cloned egg would then be activated and at approximately 50 cells of 
development it would be used to treat the patient from whom the 
original nucleus was taken. This would guarantee the exact tissue 
match. 
The scientific narrative 
The consideration of the scientific narrative will consist of a detailed 
analysis of three extracts from the film. Whilst there will be scientific 
aspects in later clips, these will be selected primarily for their greater 
contribution to their constructions of woman. 
41 See Appendix III, p. 254. I shall refer to this point again later on as it makes it 
completely unnecessary to use therapeutic cloning for repairing nerve cells. A cell 
line taken from a 'spare' IVF embryo would be sufficient, if nerve cells have 
immune privilege. 
42 NewScientist.com, 'Stem cells linked to life expectancy', 22/07/02 
htlr:// www.newstientisLrom/news/news.jsp?id=ns99992556 This article does not 
discuss adult stem cells with regard to their therapeutic use, but says of them, 'The 
finding supports the theory that we age because our stem cells essentially run out of 
juice and can no longer cope with the degree of cell turnover needed to keep our 
organs young.' Whilst Professor Wilmut agreed with my assertions, he did suggest 
that the problem could be fairly easily overcome by increasing the length of the 
telomeres. See Appendix III, p. 257. 
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Transcript No.1 from the Film's Introduction 
CREATION 
We are setting out on a fantastic voyage [5] a journey into inner 
space [5] into the world of ourselves [3] because this is where our 
future lies [1] inside each one of us [1] never before could we 
navigate this microscopic universe or view it so clearly [3] 
At the heart of each cell is DNA the substance that builds every 
living creature on this planet [5] and now for the first time in 
history not only can we read our own DNA we can manipulate it [3] 
The future is here now [3] it promises to rebuild broken lives [5] 
cells will be engineered to grow new organs [5] it heralds a brave 
new world of prediction [5] superhumans with unhuman abilities 
[5] the hope of extended lives a true elixir of youth [7] This is the 8th 
day of creation as we explore how to build a human 
Critical discourse analysis 
The introduction sets both the scene and the tone of the programme 
by the use of exciting music and images of outer space that change to 
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similar constellations of inner space. It cleverly evokes the Star Trek 
science fiction narrative by the maintenance of exotic, planetary 
imagery and in the mimicry of the first line of the discourse, 'We are 
setting out on a fantastic journey, a journey into inner space, into the 
world of ourselves.'43 In the same way that the previous account 
stressed that science fiction was becoming reality, so too does this clip 
with greater force by insisting that its science fiction tropes are already 
an actuality. This sense of inevitability is secured by several devises; 
firstly, by the use of the following phrases: 'this is where our future 
lies' and 'the future is here now', which is an interesting manipulation 
of concepts as the future, by its very essence, can never be 'now'. 
Secondly, by using the inclusive, interpersonal framing technique of 
deploying the pronouns, 'we' and 'our' throughout the film, the 
viewer is unconsciously enticed into a collaborative position. These 
two techniques work together to invoke a situation where 'we' have 
no choice. There is no room in the discourse for dissent, it does not 
ask 'is this what you want?' nor even does it state 'this is the way it 
will be', rather it infers by the use of phrases such as, 'never before', 
'for the first time in history' and 'here now' that 'this is the way it is'. 
In addition, the unforeseeable nature of scientific predictions is 
contraindicated by the use of the indicative verbs 'will', and 'can' as 
opposed to the subjunctive 'may,' when the text proclaims that 'we 
can read our own DNA', 'we can manipulate it', 'cells will be 
engineered', 'it promises to rebuild broken lives.'44 
At the heart of this inexorable depiction of biotechnological reality, 
lies a challenge to the concept of divine responsibility for human 
transcendence. The opening imagery of creation, both interstellar and 
cellular, corresponds with the closing line 'this is the 8th day of 
creation as we explore how to build a human ... Creation' (my italics). 
The text producer taps into the seductive power of transhumanism by 
offering transcendence of mortal fallibility by the claims to overcome 
decay' grow new organs,' uncertainty, 'brave new world of 
prediction', human limitation, 'superhumans with unhuman abilities' 
and death, 'extended lives a true elixir of youth.' The accompanying 
imagery to this excerpt was pure science fiction and could be 
considered comic in another context, but this was a serious 
documentary about a real issue. The Foucauldian challenge would 
not be to the accuracy of the claims, nor to the irresponsibility of 
43 In the Star Trek series, each story line evolved around the crew of the star ship 
Enterprise as they travelled into previously unchartered regions of outer space. 
44 This attitude is very different from the line taken by Professor Wilmut in my 
interview, where he stresses throughout that there is so much we do not yet know 
and the uncertainty of how new discoveries may change the landscape from what is 
now envisioned. See Appendix III. 
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them, but rather would ask, 'why is science being constructed in this 
way?' and 'whose interests does it serve?' 
Transcript No.2, which immediately followed the previous clip 
DEPICTION OF PRIMEVAL CLONING 
In the beginning was the cell and all life was single-celled [3] and 
the cells multiplied [2] by cloning [3] by creating identical copies 
[10] 
For billions of years this was the way life reproduced [10] clones 
ruled the world mindless and immortal [12] 
Then under water sex evolved [] sperm met egg the mingling of 
genes sparked an explosion of life millions of new species [12] and 
this potent mix of sex and chance ultimately led to us [10] 
It's taken millions of years for blind chance to turn us from 
primitive humans to modern man [6] but now we are taking charge 
[10] 
Biologists are learning how to clone and they are mixing genes to 
create new species but above all they are becoming masters of the 
molecules they study. We are at a turning point in history and the 
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potential impact of this work excites leaders in the field like 
Princeton's Lee Silver. 
Critical discourse analysis 
There is a misconception being played out in this excerpt, which was 
clarified in the brief scientific explanation that I provided, but is not 
attempted here. Natural cloning is a dissimilar process from SCNT, 
but the distinction is not made explicit in the text. Cloning is 
presented as ancient, natural and integral to life itself. The differential 
set out in the discourse between cell division and therapeutic cloning 
is one of human dominion, not biology, consider the following 
phrases; 'we are at a turning point in history,' 'now we are taking 
charge, 'biologists are learning how to clone,' and consequently 
becoming the 'masters of the molecules' (my emphasis). Professor Ian 
Wilmut, the creator of Dolly, puts it succinctly when he says, 'Note, 
now - a crucial point - that clones produced by nuclear transfer are 
not directly comparable to clones produced by embryo splitting, 
whether these are produced artificially or naturally, in the form of 
identical twins' (his italics).45 
Critically, what is at stake in terms of a Foucauldian analysis is not 
the misconception itself, but rather how this functions as a statement 
in the discourse. Cloning is being portrayed as an ancient and natural 
norm to justify the process of therapeutic cloning with the incitement, 
and privilege, of human control. The programme validates this 
premise later on when the viewer is introduced to Sarah, a woman 
who is pregnant with identical triplets, which the film describes as 
'natures clones'. The voice-over proclaims that 'nature is practised at 
making human clones so the odds are high of a successful outcome' 
(my emphasis). This claim is patently phrased to support the 
programme's technique of justification, for natural identical triplets 
are extremely rare, and as a woman's body is best suited to carrying 
and delivering one baby, the odds of producing three healthy babies 
without medical intervention are quite low.46 
The implicit challenge to divine responsibility continues in this clip, 
which in the screening of the programme flowed from the previous 
excerpt that ended with the word' creation'. This extract is delivered 
with a backdrop of volcanic imagery resembling the formulation of 
life on earth. The transcript begins by echoing the words of John's 
451. Wilmut, K. Campbell & c. Tudge, The Second Creation; The Age of Biological 
Control by the Scientists who cloned Dolly, (London: Headline Book Publishing, 
2000), p. 71. 
46 Mortality rates for triplets are significantly higher (up to 44 %) tllan for singletons 
at all three stages of statistical measurement, stillbirth, infant and perinatal counts. 
hltp://www .hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice /Backgroundpapers/MulitipleBirths, p. 2. 
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Gospel, 'In the beginning was the cell', rather than the Word. The 
sentence continues to privilege cloning as the most basic foundational 
principle of life itself, [and all life was single-celled and the cells 
multiplied by cloning.' Yet whilst the resonance of Scripture evokes 
discursive religious concepts, the text is staunchly atheist. 
For, it states that [clones ruled the world mindless and immortal', 
which specifically rejects a divine plan by giving dominion to eternal 
life forms with no agency. This is underscored by the repetition of 
[chance', first in the [potent mix with sex', and then followed by the 
more definitive statement; 'It's taken millions of years for blind chance 
to turn us from primitive humans to modern man'. By evoking 
religious symbolism and simultaneously denying its divine origin, the 
discourse invites the collaborative viewer to justifiably step into the 
discursive space of evolutionary responsibility, which is, in reality, 
not the province of the common man (sic), but rather the empire of 
biotech capitalism. 
CIBELLI WORKING AT NIGHT IN HIS LABORATORY 
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Some of the most exciting and controversial work in modern 
biology is going on inside this building [3] in here they are about to 
attempt something that has never been done before [2] to done a 
human embryo [10] 
Dr. Jose Cibelli is working late because tomorrow morning he will 
start an extraordinary experiment [3] Jose's dream is to develop new 
ways to repair damaged humans and he plans to do it by cloning. 
Critical discourse analysis 
This is the clip in which the viewer is first introduced to the principal 
character of the film, Dr. Jose Cibelli. In keeping with the dramatic 
style of the programme the scene is set at night to the accompaniment 
of eerie music. The camera pans the laboratory in darkness till it rests 
upon the figure of Cibelli working alone under a single light, which 
casts shadows around him, conveying unmistakably the culturally, 
familiar icon of Frankenstein. The construction of Cibelli as lone hero-
scientist, who is 'working late' in order to fulfil his' dream' 'to repair 
damaged humans' stands antagonistically alongside the science 
fiction trope arousing notions of secrecy, illicitness, dedication and, 
most of all, excitement. This is underlined by both the first line of the 
transcript, 'Some of the most exciting and controversial work. .. ' and also 
the description of his assignment as an 'extraordinary experiment' . 
Whilst evoking the images of Frankenstein might seem to work 
against the validation for therapeutic cloning, nonetheless, it also 
serves to reinforce the central theme of imagined science fiction being 
currently realised in contemporary biotechnology. Throughout the 
programme Cibelli is consistently referred to as Jose, rather than Dr. 
Cibelli, inviting the already complicit viewer into an intimate 
relationship with him and his project. The film portrays, inaccurately, 
a Frankenstein image of a loner, which ignores the authenticity of 
teamwork and scientific networking and never explores the 
commercial aspect of cloning, with its concomitant capitalist interests 
that might make Cibelli a man of fortune. 
How the programme continues 
Following this excerpt, the film introduces us to Dr. Judson 
Somerville. His tragic story is reconstructed for the viewer's benefit. 
He is a white, heterosexual, married man with a young family, who 
became a paraplegic through a cycling accident. The programme 
involves the viewer in this deserving person's case by interviewing 
him at home with his family and by filming his daily struggles with 
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his condition; thus securing the viewer's sympathy to a particular 
individualP 
DR JUDSON SOMMERVILLE 
The film then focuses on the work of biologists who have 
demonstrated that rats can regenerate their spinal nerves with stem 
cell technology, which was, hitherto, impossible. The viewer is left 
with the inference that damaged spinal nerves could likewise be 
cured in human beings. 
Following this, the programme devotes substantial dramatic footage 
in following Cibelli's efforts to find suitable human eggs, which are 
essential for his attempt to clone a human embryo. I have selected 
three extracts, in which contradictory constructions of woman are 
used to promote the donation of ova for this purpose. The existence of 
totally disparate constructions of woman is so commonplace that they 
can be used in tandem in a single discourse without arousing any 
conscious notion of incongruity. Familiar examples in the cultural 
47 When I refer to this man as 'deserving', I am not personally suggesting that this 
patient is more deserving than any other, but rather that he fits every criteria that 
would satisfy public scrutiny ensuring their support of his case. 
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milieu are virgin/ whore, tigress/ doormat, angel-in-the-house/ evil 
temptress, and career woman/ mother. What is significant from a 
Foucauldian stance is the way in which transformation and 
correlation of statements function to engender specific subject 
positions by ignoring glaring inconsistencies, which might disrupt the 
central purpose of a discourse. 
Extract 1 
DR JOSE CIBELLI PUTTING HIS CASE FOR NEEDING HUMAN 
OVA 
Dr. Jose Cibelli however is going into unknown territory with his 
experiments [5] 
To clone a human embryo Jose first needs human eggs [10] 
A human egg like this barely visible to the naked eye [2] it could 
easily fit on to the tip of a pin [1] unlike the cow or bovine eggs Jose 
practises with human eggs are in extremely short supply [2] 
tomorrow he'll work with some for the first time [2] 
Jose speaking "I have access to hundreds and hundreds of bovine 
eggs every day human eggs is completely different you have only 
perhaps [2] tomorrow we're gonna get only [1] we can get anywhere 
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from zero to twenty [2] and [1] each one of them has to survive [1] I 
can not afford to kill one of them." 
Critical discourse analysis 
In this first extract the shortage of human eggs is raised. Having 
presented a sympathetic case for therapeutic cloning, the transcript 
makes it explicit that; 'To clone a human embryo Jose first needs 
human eggs'. Immediately following this the viewer is informed with 
superlative emphasis that human eggs are 'in extremely short supply'. 
Cibelli, already constructed as heroic, contrasts this shortage with a 
hyperbole of bovine accessibility. Recalling my assertions regarding 
the discursive space where woman and cow are already in close 
proximity, woman is elevated in this instance by her exclusivity. 
Note, for example, that Cibelli only 'practises' on bovine eggs. 
Furthermore the urgency of Cibelli's tone regarding woman's ova is 
compelling, consider the phrases regarding her ova; 'has to survive' 
and 'I cannot afford to kill one of them'. The use of 'kill' as opposed to 
'lose' is an important interpretive cue because of its inaccuracy. 
Biologically, eggs cannot be killed because they are not organisms, 
but the verb conveys both their human potential and also Cibelli's 
sovereignty over them. 
Extract 2 
Extract 2 follows an explanation of why cloning one's own embryo 
would prevent organ rejection and involves the potential recipient, 
Judson Somerville, whom we have already met. One of the 
incongruities of this programme, is that Cibelli does not need to use 
therapeutic cloning to provide a stem cell for this patient, as I 
mentioned earlier, nerves cells have immune privilege, and therefore, 
Sommerville would not experience the rejection from an IVF stem cell 
that the programme insists would occur.48 
And this is why Jose is preparing to done cells from Judson [7] he 
passionately believes that this process called therapeutic cloning 
could transform the lives of many people [5] 
Jose speaking II A recent survey is saying that about [1] a hundred 
and twenty million people can potentially benefit from this therapy 
so this is a revolution in medicine." 
The significance of this extract is in its powerful justification for 
Cibelli's work. The survey is dropped like a bombshell into the 
48 Mentioned on p. 114, footnote 41; see Appendix III, p. 254 for interview reference. 
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discourse without any reference as to who undertook it and without 
any further collaborative evidence from either Cibelli or the 
programme makers as to the authenticity of its claims.49 Rosalind Gill 
discusses how a speaker's citation of 'surveys' adds persuasive 
authority and a sense of objectivity to their claims and helps to 
distance 'pertinent facts' from a standpoint of self-interest.5o Critically, 
with regard to this specific documentary, this citation has even 
greater significance. For, neither Cibelli, nor the documentary 
producers make any attempt to explain, explore or challenge the 
inconsistency of juxtaposing the specified tiny number of eggs 
available against the (again) specified vast numbers of people who 
could potentially use them. Simply put, according to the programme's 
scientific commentary, one would need a minimum of 120 million 
eggs to provide this 'revolution in medicine'. 
Extract 3 
The third transcript, Extract 3, far from addressing this anomaly, 
actually reinforces it to the point of melodrama, by inviting the 
viewer to witness Cibelli as he collects human eggs from a local clinic. 
The filming enhances the language by focusing on Cibelli nervously 
tapping his fingers and feet (in close up) and by the presence of the 
security guard, whose services are not employed by IVF clinics. It is a 
demonstration of blatant propaganda, and isolated in this way, 
appears ludicrously comic. Yet, seen in the context of the film at 
home, its power would have been highly seductive. 
Using cloned stem cells doctors will grow spare parts that are exact 
doubles of the originals [23] but this vision of the future depends 
on creating cloned human embryos [2] something no-one has ever 
done before [6] Jose Cibelli however is going to try [7] (my italics) 
The BBC have been given exclusive access to follow the whole 
procedure [6] 
First of all Jose needs human eggs [7] he waits outside while they 
are collected from an anonymous donor at a nearby clinic [6] human 
eggs are so hard to obtain that initially Jose's wife volunteered to 
donate hers [2] 
49 Professor Wilmut considered this number to be a gross exaggeration and 
expressed surprise at the figure throughout the interview. See Appendix ill. 
50 R. Gill, 'Justifying Injustice: Broadcasters' accounts of inequality in radio' in 
Discourse Analytic Research; Repertoires and Readings of Texts in Action, ed by E. 
Burman & I. Parker, (London & New York: Routledge, 1993) pp. 80-81. 
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Jose speaking JJThis is a difficult procedure my my wife wanted to 
do it and urn she partially started to to to be stimulated and then 
has to be stop she's not the right age so I [1] am very very thankful 
for this woman whose gonna help us uh get the research plan." 
A security guard is with Jose to ensure the eggs don't go astray [8] 
Human eggs are precious because a woman's ovaries normally 
produce just one egg every month [10] 
But under the influence of hormone injections a woman's body can 
produce up to twenty eggs at a time [10] as with infertility 
treatments the eggs are collected under local anaesthetic [2] 
afterwards the eggs are carefully counted and inspected [12] each 
egg is less than a tenth of a millimetre wide [8] 
Female reporter speaking (as Jose emerges from the clinic with the 
eggs) HJ ose do you know how many?" 
Jose speaking J~r we got er seven [1] seven so that's good they 
predicted last night I didn't get that message but they predicted 
eight so they got seven that's pretty good" [10] 
These eggs could mark the start of a new era in medicine [2] the 
quest to repair people by cloning [3] 
THE SECURITY GUARD EMPLOYED TO PROTECT THE EGGS 
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Critical discourse analysis 
For this analysis, I will comment on pertinent phrases in the extract 
and then discuss the differing constructions of woman that the 
discourse formulates, transforms and correlates with. Note, firstly, 
that the interpersonal framing devise (first line second paragraph), 
'the BBC have been given exclusive access,' also privileges the viewer, 
who has already been linguistically enticed into intimate abetment. 
The first paragraph masks the anomalies within its content by 
deploying a tone of simplistic authority. Consider the opening 
phrases: 'will grow spare parts', rather than the more honest 'may be 
able to' and' exact doubles of the originals,' which is scientifically 
inaccurate. It follows with the comment 'this vision of the future 
depends on creating cloned human embryos', placing the 
responsibility for human flourishing on to a process that 'no-one has 
ever done before' . 
The second sentence of the second paragraph repeats the familiar 
refrain, 'First of all Jose needs human eggs', with the persistent 
accompanying claim that they' are so hard to obtain'. This is 
underscored in the film by the deployment of a security guard, whom 
the viewer is informed, will 'ensure the eggs don't go astray'. In this 
way, the discourse continues its parallel mantra of the miraculous 
cure of cloning juxtaposed next to the egg shortage that would make 
it impossible, without addressing the inconsistency of this. 
The following phrase explains why the eggs are 'precious' linking 
their value as a resource with the need for special protection. An 
unseen female reporter asks with quivering emotion, 'Jose do you 
know how many?' thereby projecting womanly concern into the 
charade. The clip ends with the now familiar, but unsubstantiated, 
claim that 'these eggs could mark the start of a new era in medicine ... 
the quest to repair people by cloning' . 
Woman as Animal 
The paragraph describing egg collection is highly reminiscent of farm 
animal discourse. It opens with the provocative sentence; 'Human 
eggs are precious because a woman's ovaries normally produce just one 
egg every month' (my emphasis). The text has transformed the subject 
position of woman's reproductive capability from her potential to be 
a mother into her capacity to be an egg donor. Her ova should be 
'precious' because they can develop into her children, not because of 
their scarcity for donation purposes; moreover, one egg is the perfect 
number for procreation, yet the inclusion of the adverb 'just' changes 
this ideal into a deficiency. In addition, the word 'produce' is a 
significant interpretive cue because a more accurate, biological term 
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would be 'release,' yet 'produce' has connotations with commercial 
farming. 
Whilst egg collection is being described, the camera pans across an 
operating theatre, where the unknown woman is hidden from view 
behind green sheets. The voice-over proclaims, 'under the influence of 
hormone injections a woman's body can produce up to twenty eggs', 
which not only repeats the loaded word 'produce', but also further 
extinguishes the woman's personhood by the specification that it is 
her body, which is performing this task. Following the retrieval of 
eggs, the viewer is informed that they are' carefully counted and 
inspected,' which is linguistically synonymous with the discourses of 
the farming fraternity. Gena Corea demonstrates that this associative 
language is not innovative to the IVF discourses as doctors were 
using it in bygone times to describe the supervision of wetnurses. She 
says, 'Under medical control, as physician's reports reveal, wetnurses 
were screened, inspected, controlled, devalued and viewed as cOWS.'SI 
AN OUT OF FOCUS SHOT OF THE OPERATING THEATRE 
The discourse demonstrates the fluidity of constructions that can be 
appropriated for a specific purpose. The animal-as-produce discourse 
correlates with the discourses of exonerated biotech manipulation 
51 G. Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination 
to Artificial Wombs, (London: The Women's Press, 1988) p. 240. 
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over creatures unable to resist. The fact that foxhunting can cause 
such public outrage compared to the relative public silence on using 
animals for genetic experimentation, demonstrates just how 
entrenched the rhetorical justification for animal exploitation in 
medical research truly is.52 The long established ideology of 
ontological inequality, discussed earlier, not only provides a 
discursive,liminal space where animals and woman (and other 
people considered of lesser worth) are in propinquity, but also creates 
a locus where this utilitarian validation of medical practices for the 
overall human good can appropriate human bodies if required.53 
Woman as Invisible 
My foremost contention from the introduction of this thesis, was that 
woman was missing from the discourses of the NRT, despite the fact 
that she is essential to the process. This incongruity is ably 
demonstrated throughout the programme, with its emphasis on 
woman's bodily resources and its simultaneous obscuration of her 
personhood. What is perplexing in terms of the content of this film is 
that it desperately requires the agency of woman, but it maintains a 
male gaze, directing its message to her covertly.54 However, with 
regard to how the film functions, the incongruity can be understood as 
a powerful technique playing to the De Beaviourian insight of 
constructing woman's passivity so she can acquire ontological parity. 
The principal agents of the film are all men. Sir Ian Holm, an 
acclaimed man of social status provides the authoritative voice-over, 
disabling any challenge to the certainty and inconsistencies of the 
programme's stated claims. Cibelli, Somerville, the renowned experts, 
and the scientists and medics featured in incidental clips, are all male. 
52 RSPCA,20/08/2001, 
hltp://www.rspca.org/nmtent/twws/Biotechlncn'dsp.html The RSPCA have 
called for the I staggering increase' of animals used in biotechnology to be critically 
reviewed. Home Office statistics reveal that between 1999 and 2000 there has been a 
rise of 14 % in the numbers of animals used for genetic manipulation. Moreover, 
there has been an alarming rise in the last decade from 48,000 in 1990 to 582,000 in 
the year 2000, which is threatening the overall UK decline in animal 
experimentation that had been taking place over the last 20 years. 
53 Whilst the now infamous human experiments of the Nazi concentration camps 
are an extreme example of this, the use of African peoples in developing the vaccine 
for polio and, more recently, as already stated, the ways in which women were used 
in early IVF research, lies within the mainstream of public acceptability. Indeed, the 
research focus for IVF has been on the embryo (both by the scientists themselves 
and uppermost in public concern) rather than on the long-term effects of the various 
hormones used on women's bodies. (D. Steinberg, Bodies in Glass; Genetics, Eugenics, 
Embryo Ethics, [Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997], pp. 
65 & 34-5. 
54 Discussed in Chapter Two, pp. 53-54. 
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Even the scene depicting human evolution places a chimpanzee next 
to a boy rather than a girl. Woman is not only absent in any active 
roles, she also remains invisible in her passive role, except when she is 
interviewed in her capacity as mother, where she is given both 
visibility and speech. 
The viewer is introduced to Sarah, pregnant with triplets and later on 
to a mother of a severely disabled child, whom her husband would 
like to clone, although she does not want this. In contrast, the woman 
donor and Cibelli's wife are neither seen nor heard and the female 
interviewer, who only poses one question in the whole programme, is 
heard off camera. The transcript is not able to convey her physical 
absence, nor her emotional tone, but the film makes use of both. For, 
whilst it may seem an insignificant detail, nonetheless, it functions to 
secure feminine collusion with the patriarchal project. 
Woman as Selfless-giver 
The incongruity of egg shortage versus the desperate need for ova 
finally comes together in this construction. For, simply put, if 
sufficient numbers of women donate their eggs, the problem is 
solved. In direct contrast to the effacement of woman as animal and 
woman as invisible, this construction praises woman to the highest 
moral pinnacle of self-sacrifice. Cibelli describes his wife's devotion to 
his project, she' 'volunteered to donate hers' and' she 'wanted to do it', 
indicating by double emphasis her cooperation, rather than any 
coercion, in her service to her husband and humankind. She had to 
'stop' because of her 'age', not because of the difficulties involved, 
which Cibelli admits to, nor because of the dangers to her health, 
which he does not. 
However, Cibelli has found an 'anonymous donor;' the repetition of 
the word donor confers altruism and divorces the project from its 
commercial reality. The viewer is not told whether or not the woman 
was paid for her eggs, or even if she was paid expenses for her time. 
The inference in the text is to suggest not, especially as Cibelli says, 'I 
am very, very thankful for this woman whose gonna help us get the 
research plan.' This construction of woman as selfless-giver is 
culturally familiar in the discursive notions of both motherhood and 
the religious symbolism of the Virgin Mary. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the programme should reinforce the value of mothers 
by the conferred status of visibility and speech that it gave to two of 
them. The donation of eggs could elevate both the childless, as well as 
the fertile, woman by her singular capacity to provide for the 
chronically sick. 
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Gena Corea has written extensively on how woman's emotional 
composition is exploited by the commercial surrogate industry in the 
U.s.55 She draws on the work of Margaret Adams, who has coined 
woman's role of nurturing others to their own detriment as the 
'Compassion Trap'. In a comparative analogy to this situation, Corea 
states: 
Pharmacrats searching for surrogate mothers or egg donors exploit woman's 
emotional structure. They appeal on the media for compassionate women to 
come forward and" give the gift of life" to a sorrowing couple. They call these 
women" special" and praise them as selfless, loving, sensitive and big-hearted.56 
Significantly, the psychological aspect of the selfless-giver is further 
enhanced in this discourse, where the giving is itself already gendered 
by its need for solely, female anatomy, as opposed to a text on 
nursing or parenting, where it could be argued that both men and 
women are equally competent to provide nurturing skills. Crucially, 
from a Foucauldian point of view, woman's' emotional structure' is 
not a static' given' to be exploited per se, rather she is constantly 
negotiating subject positions, one of which is powerfully influenced 
by this ideologically founded construction. Consequently, discourses 
that appeal to her 'compassionate' nature must continually deploy 
techniques of power to construct a locus for her to actualise her 
fostering capacity, and in so doing, the flowing mechanisms of control 
are exercised. 
Woman as Commodity 
Carrette, in his critique of Graham's Representations of the postjhuman, 
identifies the critical role of capitalism in the power dynamic of 
technological progress when he states: 
I think the key underlying question is the relation between capitalism and 
technology. If we follow the basis of capitalism, according to Marx's analysis at 
least, such a relation is to maximise capital. It then follows that greater efficiency 
and endless new markets are required, both generated by technological 
invention. Technology creates new worlds of consumption and increases its 
production with the development of ever-new technology, which creates yet 
more consumption and more technology for yet more capital.57 
55 G. Corea, The Mother Machine, Chapter 11, 'Surrogate Motherhood: Happy Breeder 
Woman', pp. 213-249. 
56 G. Corea, The Mother Machine, p. 231. 
57 J. Carrette, 'Cyborg Politics and Economic Realities: Reflections on Elaine 
Graham's Representations of the post/human' (pp. 45-55) in Theology and Sexuality: 
TheJournal of the Centre for the Study of Christianity and Sexuality, Vol.10.2, March 
2004, p. 52. 
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A GLIMPSE INTO A BIOTECHNOLOGICAL FUTURE 
The construction of woman as commodity is hidden in the discourse 
by the emphasis on her voluntary contrib~tion, but the implications 
of what is being proposed reveal its lucrative promise. The capitalist 
machinery of biotech markets, health insurance and pharmaceutical 
companies is poised to take advantage of this new technology and its 
medical progeny. That the film should effectively ignore these 
commercial aspects of therapeutic cloning, couching their delivery in 
altruistic rhetoric, exposes non-innocence at best and deliberate 
manipulation at worst. 
The increasing longevity that is being forecast in Western 
demographics will provide a market of wealthy elders beset with 
chronic conditions suitable for stem cell therapy. By choosing a 
young, healthy, albeit disabled, recipient for the programme, the issue 
of using young women's bodies to prolong older people's lives is 
deflected from both open discussion and belated reflection. 
Furthermore, the tone of inevitability that was present from the 
beginning of the programme and the lack of dissenting critique sways 
the viewer from asking if equivalent funding would not benefit more 
people's health globally by providing a good diet, vaccines, 
antibiotics and retroviral drugs. Unfortunately, these people's 
incapacity to pay makes them a poor investment option. 
131 
Conversely, however, impoverished persons may find their own body 
parts a potential source of income in this biotech marketplace and in 
terms of therapeutic cloning, women will be more at risk from 
exploitation than men. Women in the developing world may 'choose' 
to donate their ova as a means of feeding their families, whilst 
simultaneously controlling their fertility, in an analogous situation to 
lower income women in the U.s., who choose to become surrogate 
mothers for the minimum wage. Even as long ago as 1984, the 
surrogate industry was planning to use women from the Orient, 
because they would only need to have their living and travelling 
expenses paid. 'Though such women receive no pay, Stehura said, 
they benefit from the arrangement because they get to live. /I Often 
they're looking for a survival situation- something to do to pay for the 
food and rent. If '58 
Despite the fact that selling ova is illegal in the U.K., a pharmaceutical 
firm were able to circumvent this in a recent case where research was 
being conducted on egg maturation in the laboratory. A licence is 
required from the HFEA only if eggs are to be fertilised and, as this 
was not to be the case, financial recompense could be offered.59 
Initially, the drugs company wanted to pay the women £4000 but the 
hospital ethical committee at Leeds General Infirmary, where the 
trials were being undertaken, felt this would be an inducement. With 
regard to egg shortage, it was reported that 96 women took part in the 
trials. It could be argued, that in a free market society, woman should 
be given the choice to partake in ova donation if she needs the money, 
or alternatively, she should be permitted to help an elderly, beloved 
grandparent create stem cells on an entirely voluntary basis. 
However, Andrea Dworkin in conversation with Corea, points out 
that freedom of choice for women is singularly absent when it refers 
to other aspects of a woman's life, such as becoming a surgeon, for 
example. She continues: 
Feminists make that argument and it is, in the common parlance, not a 'sexy' 
argument. Nobody pays any attention to it. And the only time you hear 
institutional people-people who represent and are part of the establishment-
58 G. Corea, The Mother Machine; John Stehura is the president of the Bionetics 
Foundation. P.245. 
59 S. Templeton, 'Scientists pay women £1500 for their eggs; Outcry as 
pharmaceutical firm exploits loophole', Sunday Herald, Front-page, 30/11/2003. 
There is an irony in this case that if the ethics committee had been truly concerned 
about the principle of inducement, they should have kept to the HFEA rules of 
expenses only. For, £1,500 would still be a financial inducement for many women. I 
would argue that the 'ethics' committee permitted the principle to be flouted, whilst 
saving the pharmaceutical company considerable funds. Why pay women £4000 for 
their eggs when you can get away with £1500? 
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discuss woman's equality or woman's freedom is in the context of equal rights 
to prostitution, equal right to some form of selling of the body, selling of the self, 
something that is unconscionable in any circumstance, something for which 
there usually is no analogy with men but a specious analogy is being made. (her 
emphasis)6O 
The subject of therapeutic cloning was the vehicle of content for these 
very real concerns, but the point of the analysis was to illustrate these 
fluid constructions in working practice. Whether or not they 
materialise into commercial stem cell therapy as possibly envisioned 
only time will tell, nonetheless, they are actively flowing in the 
cultural milieu, engendering a host of contraindicatory subject 
positions for woman to negotiate. 
Summary 
In drawing together the various analyses of this chapter, I have 
demonstrated how statements (in the Foucauldian sense) function 
through discourse, transforming constructions, in this instance of 
woman and the embryo, for the purposes of biopower, and in 
addition, that this is inextricably entwined with biotech capitalism. 
The discourses that flow from the newspapers illustrate the way in 
which these constructions are able to transform centuries old 
ideologies into contemporary, everyday commonalties that have been 
unconsciously assimilated into popular acceptance. 
From the very initiation of the NRT public discourses, science was 
privileged as the primary progenitor signalled by the now mundane 
epithet,'test-tube baby,' which transformed into the more commonly 
used term 'IVF', thereby, securing the laboratory connotations of its 
vernacular predecessor. Louise Brown has retained her notoriety, but 
far from being cast into the horrors of a Frankenstein nightmare, as 
Gale predicted, she has become the epitome of normality, which has, 
in part, been responsible for transforming the Frankenstein myth into 
a frisson of permissible human dominion. The embryo has emerged 
as a political entity, constructed into contradictory subject positions of 
research object, of having definitive human potential and of sacrificial 
saviour. It has also transformed conceptually in the popular 
consciousness from a metaphorically, separated being to a literally, 
separated one. 
Long established constructions of woman have transmuted into the 
NRT discourses, and in so doing, her subject position of reproductive 
passivity has been strengthened, whilst paradoxically, the textual 
content has accorded her greater procreative choice. Moreover, further 
anomalies with regard to woman have emerged; as the hidden shame 
60 Quoted in, G. Corea, TIze Motlzer Machine, p. 227-8. 
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of infertility has gained public sympathy and openness, it has 
solidified the construction of woman-as-mother, thereby, securing 
childlessness as a lack in woman. The techniques used to create 
norms, as illustrated by Foucault in the Ecole Militaire, have 
apportioned the demographic responsibility for a falling birth rate to 
woman, yet the functioning statements inherent in the analyses accord 
procreative agency to man -and science. In addition, whilst 
motherhood is increasingly held in high esteem, conversely, it is 
simultaneously constructed as generic and splintered, divorcing it 
from the personhood of the individual woman. 
Similarly, as woman becomes increasingly crucial to the 
biotechnological market place, her invisibility as a person is procured. 
Ironically, her obscuration is itself covert, because like homosexuality 
in the bishops' statement, reproductive woman is the object to be 
studied ad nauseam, but not heard, except in the capacity of 
'desperate mother'. Finally, the article on cow surrogates and the 
documentary established that the permeable boundary between 
animal and woman creates a constructed pathway for 
biotechnological capitalism to utilise human females without causing 
popular disquiet, or even public attention. 
It is much clearer to see, from this analytical standpoint, a technique 
of power operating, which would not be so apparent from an analysis 
of content alone. Recalling Dunlap's insights, the personal, inner 
turmoil of infertility, whilst no less felt, can be better understood 
amidst the conflicting subject positions that beset the infertile woman 
and a raised awareness of this can be helpful in pastoral support and 
prophetic critique. Crucially then, the question I must now ask is, 
'what are the churches saying about IVF?' In the next chapter, I 
propose to address this by undertaking a similar analysis of the way 
in which the Church approaches the NRTs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AN EXPLORATION INTO WHAT THE CHURCHES ARE SAYING 
ABOUT THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
We must not expect the discourses on sex to tell us, above all, what strategy they 
derive from, or what moral divisions they accompany, or what ideology - dominant 
or dominated - they represent; rather we must question them on the two levels of 
their tactical productivity (what reciprocal effects of power and knowledge they 
ensure) and their strategical integration (what conjunction and what force 
relationship make their utilization necessary in a given episode of the various 
confrontations that occur).1 
M. Foucault, 1976. 
The family was the crystal in the deployment of sexuality: it seemed to be the source 
of a sexuality which it actually only reflected and diffracted. By virtue of its 
permeability, and through that process of reflections to the outside, it became one of 
the most valuable tactical components of the deployment.2 
M. Foucault, 1976. 
In this chapter, I shall begin by assessing the content of what the 
churches are saying about the NRTs in order to offer a broad overview of 
their views and a brief historical trajectory of how these have been 
shaped by procreative linked debates in the past. This is necessary to 
provide a foundation for the following section, which will examine the 
discourses of two church reports using the Foucauldian approach that I 
have applied to the media texts. By interrogating ecclesiastic documents, 
I am aware that this is not entirely representative of the range of 
theological thinking within a given denomination to which a report 
belongs. Nevertheless, church statements are indicative of a 
denomination's leadership and expert opinion, which holds immense 
power as Grimwood demonstrated on page 73. Moreover, as previously 
attested by Foucault and illustrated by Grimwood, the authority of 
expert ecclesiastical discourses is substantially increased by their 
permission for members to be free to follow their own conscience in the 
matters under discussion. 
In addition to the church reports, in order to provide a broader 
perspective, I shall examine three theological publications concerning the 
NRTs (see Chapter Five). In all cases my exploration of religious opinion 
1 M. Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1, translated by R. 
Hurley, [1st pub Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1976], (London; New York; Victoria; Ontario; 
Auckland: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 102. 
2 M. Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, p. 111. 
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constrained to interrogating the constructions of woman and the embryo 
within Christianity, so that I can maintain consistency and depth in the 
analyses that are to follow. 
An overview of the content of the churches' methodologies and 
outcomes in their reports on human fertilisation and embryology 
In considering what the churches have said about assisted reproduction, 
it is significant to note that they responded to government initiative, firstly 
to the Committee and secondly to the Warnock Report, in the same way, 
that with regard to stem cell technology, they are responding to the 
Donaldson Report} Despite their differing outcomes, all the 
denominations have converged in their choice of foundational themes 
and have followed similar methodologies in their consultative approach. 
Each one has taken into account, to varying degrees, similar, specifically 
selected aspects of Scripture and Church tradition. For example, the 
scriptural presupposition that human beings are made in the image of 
God (Gen. 1:26) is a unifying, authoritative precedent. The incarnation of 
God in Christ, the redemptive action of the cross and the relational 
aspect of God through Christ with humanity also inaugurate the 
theological assertions in many of the reports. For the Roman Catholic 
Church patristic teaching and previous Magisterial Statements are also 
crucial. 
In addition, scientific evidence and the advice of professionals involved 
in clinical practice have been taken into account, providing the working 
parties with data about conception and embryonic development. In 
common with each other, the churches assert that the embryo is human 
and genetically complete from conception and that, given the right 
environment, it will develop into a human being. Some church 
commentators also believe that the evidence of twinning prior to the 
primitive streak and embryo wastage are also significant.4 Norman Ford 
succinctly sums up the ecclesiastic consensus when he states: 
Being viable inside or outside the mother's womb makes a difference to the kind of 
dependence required for survival, not a difference to being a human individual or 
3 In Britain the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology was 
established in 1982, its findings, known as the Warnock Report, were submitted to 
ministers in 1984 and subsequently debated in the House of Commons later that year. 
Public consultation was encouraged and nearly fifty churches sent their submissions to 
the Warnock Committee and many published their own official responses to the 
Warnock Report 
4 K. Kelly, Life and Love: Towards a Christian dialogue on bioethical questions, (London: 
Collins Liturgical Publications, 1987), p. 72. 
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not Viability outside the womb cannot be advanced as a genuine intrinsic criterion 
for being a human individual. The fetus that is only viable within the womb is 
already a distinct human individual, even if it depends on the mother to continue 
living.5 
However, the churches are also in agreement that scientific knowledge, 
in itself, cannot determine when personhood begins and that this aspect 
of moral judgement lies in the domain of theolOgians and philosophers, 
although none of the reports make explicit at what point ensoulment 
occurs in their church official statements. 
In addition, the committees have all upheld the institution of marriage in 
their documents and discussed the NRTs only in relation to a married 
couple. The contemporary experience of individual believers and the 
practice of exercising reason are cited as being essential components of 
structuring moral guidelines, although, in a similar way to the formation 
of the bishops' statement with regard to listening to the views of 
practicing homosexuals, women's account of their own experiences of 
infertility and undergoing treatment have been consistently overlooked.6 
Whilst some denominations have independently raised other relevant 
concerns, nonetheless, the primary objections of all the churches to IVF 
stem from its clinical procedures and what this entails for the embryo, 
the marital relational goods and the ensuing child. 
Essentially, these constitute the following specific points: the breaking of 
the unitive and procreative aspects of sexual intercourse, the IVF baby 
being a product of human technology, the experimentation on, or 
destruction of, unwanted embryos and the prospect of donor 
involvement and surrogacy. Whilst the churches were similar in their 
approaches, their outcomes differed according to the measure of 
provisionality that was permitted by their theological standpoint. 
Moreover, the outcomes reveal that the emphasis on doctrine and the 
absence of the IVF participant's voice in the methodologies is reflected in 
these accounts, which provide either limited, ambivalent pastoral 
guidance or none at all. 
The Roman Catholic Church proscribes IVF on all the above counts. The 
definitive document, Donum Vitae, states that IVF breaks the unitive and 
procreative aspect of marriage, which it contends is held in the act of 
sexual intercourse itself, and asserts that any destruction of embryos is 
5 N. Ford, When did I begin? Conception of the human individual in history, philosophy and 
science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 80. 
6 K. Kelly, Life and Love: p. 85. Kelly points out that women are not properly represented 
at the level of church debate at which official statements are discussed and produced. 
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an act of murder. In addition, donor involvement and surrogacy are 
forbidden. I will interrogate these issues in the second section, when I 
undertake a critical discourse analysis of Donum Vitae. The Protestant 
churches, for the most part, having reached different conclusions on both 
contraception and abortion, in their interpretation of the same moral 
dilemmas, all give approval to IVF with various caveats of concern. 
The Church of England, in its report Personal Origins, which I shall later 
analyse in depth, outlines a position regarding the unitive and 
procreative aspects of a marriage that the other Protestant churches 
assent to, which is that they are held together more by a loving 
relationship than by the act of sexual intercourse per se. This 
understanding makes both contraception and IVF something that, far 
from being destructive to marital goods, can substantially enrich them? 
All the Protestant churches are wary and equivocal of donor 
involvement, except the Church of Scotland, which rejects it entirely. 
They are all in accord in explicitly condemning surrogacy.s 
On the question of the moral status of the embryo there is equivocation 
around the issues of spare embryos left over from the clinical practice of 
superovulation, and on the embryo experimentation that has been 
intrinsic to the actual development of IVF itself. This ambivalence from 
the official line can leave individual congregations and believers in an 
unconfirmed position with regard to undertaking IVF and the pastoral 
issues surrounding it. For example, the Church of Scotland states: 
As a technique to relieve infertility within the husband/wife relationship, NF raises 
no moral questions. However, when superovulation is used to produce more 
embryos than will be transferred to the mother's uterus, questions arise concerning 
the deliberate creation of new life without hope of its potential being realized.9 
Superovulation is used in the routine clinical practice of IVF in order to 
prepare as many eggs as possible for ovulation, up to about twenty. A 
large clutch of ova is by no means guaranteed, nor do they all 
automatically fertilise, so this is undertaken to maximise the possibility 
of producing sufficient viable embryos for transfer back to the uterus. If 
7 The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the Church of England, 
Personal Origins: The Report of a Working Party on Human Fertilisation and Embryology of 
the Board for Social Responsibility, (London: Church House Publishing, 2nd ed 1996[lst 
pub 1985]) p. 50. 
S This is despite the fact, ironically, that there is scriptural precedence for surrogacy in 
the families of both Abraham and Jacob. 
9 Church of Scotland Board of Social Responsibility: Study Group on Abortion and 
Report on Warnock Report in Reports to the General Assembly, 1985, p. 290. 
138 
more embryos are produced than are required, they may be frozen, 
which can save the woman from repeating egg collection a second, and 
sometimes third, time with all its inherent difficulties.1o Consequently, 
for sound clinical reasons, superovulation remains an integral part of the 
IVF package. In light of this, the report's statement is both inconsistent 
and confusing. For, having stated that IVF 'raises no moral objections', it 
then cites a principal remonstrance against its routine practice in the very 
next sentence. 
The Baptist Union of Great Britain have included as contrary factors to 
the affirmation of IVF the two following comments; '(a) the danger as 
with any genetic manipulation of treating human life as mere genetic 
material; (b) the question of the cost of the process in the light of just 
distribution of resources.' However, having raised these two important 
issues, the report continues, 'But in many situations these factors could 
be outweighed by the benefit of relieving the pain of childlessness, and 
the responsibility of man to co-operate with God in the enrichment of 
life.'ll Thus an opportunity to explore the issues further was lost. 
Similarly, both the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England 
have voiced concerns about making the IVF baby into a 'product'. The 
possibilities of where this might lead society is taken up in Personal 
Origins with the following comment; 'What is feared is the impact on our 
culture of a technological way of thinking about sexual intercourse and 
procreation.'12 In both cases the issue remained embedded in the context 
of the nuclear, married family foregoing the opportunity to explore in 
depth such issues as back-door eugenics, the medicalisation of women's 
reproduction, or the effect of technology on simultaneously increasing 
and limiting choices. The separation of intercourse from procreation was 
predominant again in the discussions surrounding donor involvement, 
which might have opened up an examination of the cultural meaning of 
the family in current western society. The Church of England did take 
this opportunity to discuss whether or not genetic relationality in 
families was crucial and admitted in Personal Origins to a difference of 
opinion on the matter in the following statement: 
We differ on this depending on whether we see the genetic as the most basic 
manifestation of the personal and find the alienation of genetic parenthood from 
marriage a development which undermines the Christian understanding; or 
10 See Appendix IV, p.272. 
11 Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland Submission to the Warnock Committee 
prepared by a working party under the auspices of the Baptist Union Department of 
Mission (unpublished, March 1983) p. 8. 
12 Personal Origins, p. 49. 
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whether we judge that, although everyone is fundamentally influenced and limited 
by his or her genetic endowment, nevertheless the overriding factor is the social 
context which can assure proper love, respect and care. To this extent the question 
of genetic origin is not of fundamental importance, when compared with the 
question of how the child will be loved and cared for.'13 
But here, as elsewhere in the church statements, there was limited 
discussion followed by an ambivalent decision on donor involvement 
that does make explicit whether the Church of England accepts it or 
not.I4 
The British Council of Churches and Free Church Council Report Choices 
in Childlessness (1982) has commendable contrasts from the other church 
reports, which are worth highlighting. The title of the report itself is 
significant, in that the emphasis is dissimilar and indicates a more 
contextual perspective by centring on people's agency and the concept of 
a childfree existence, rather than on fertilisation and embryology. As in 
Personal Origins, the report openly acknowledged a divergence of 
opinion when this arose, as it did with donor involvement, and stated 
both positions, rather than trying to arrive at a fudged compromise. 
Moreover, the report considered the issue of marriages that were 
deliberately childless and debated whether this was unchristian, or even, 
inhuman.IS 
Following a theolOgically insightful statement the report suggests that 
some fertile couples may have a vocational calling to be childless in the 
same way that other Christians feel called to celibacy. By including the 
procreative choices of the fertile in this report, the issue of in/ fertility is 
considered from a communal perspective preventing a polarisation 
where the fertile make pronouncements that the infertile are expected to 
obey. Kevin Kelly observes that this report incorporated more of the 
female voice than the other church reports and that, unlike the other 
churches, an equal number of women and men were on the joint 
working party that produced it.16 
Although IVF is a new phenomenon, the two primary, ecclesiastic 
censures against it have been considered previously; firstly, separating 
the unitive and procreative aspects of marriage has been discussed with 
--~-------
13Personal Origins, p. 52. 
14K. Kelly, Life and Love, p. 30. Kelly points out that the positive affirmation given to AID 
in the Church of England's Response to the Warnock Report was not included in its 
later publication Personal Origins. 
15K. Kelly, Life and Love, p. 43. 
16 K. Kelly, Life and Love, p. 103. 
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regard to contraception, and secondly, the destruction of fetal life has 
been debated for centuries with regard to abortion. As this brief 
overview of the reports' content has demonstrated these former 
deliberations and the moral trajectory that each church has formulated 
from them, dominate the church statements, despite the fact that, 
ironically, the purpose of IVF is to engender pregnancy rather than to 
prevent or terminate it. However, Deborah Steinberg points to the 
inherent psychological connection between the two procedures when she 
states that IVF 'has made material the ideological separation between 
woman and embryo that underpins anti-abortion ideology.'17 For this 
reason, it will be helpful to briefly examine the moral framework in 
which the churches have considered the dilemma of abortion before 
conducting the critical discourse analysis on the two church reports. 
The moral framework in which the churches deliberate abortion 
Somebody has written a note to Giant, 
it is not signed. 
It only says, 
'I've known you since the beginning.' 
Giant doesn't know what it means, 
but it makes him feel 
almost contenl18 
S. Henderson, 1989. 
Recalling Foucault's insights, if historically contingent discourses 
delineate the limits and forms of a particular subject-knowledge, then 
scrutinising abortion rhetoric will demonstrate the way it has been 
traditionally framed.19 All the church debates on abortion have been 
deliberated within a justice ethics perspective, wherein universal rules 
predominate over relationships and the language of rights takes 
precedence over responsibilities. Whilst context and particularity are 
often considerations, these are always discussed in the light of, and 
secondary to, abstract principles, creating a dichotomy of good and bad 
reasons. This, in tum, as Janet Hadley succinctly points out' ... is a 
treacherous moral enterprise.'20 Whilst this position is commonly held by 
the secular world, and therefore familiar to us all, nevertheless, an 
alternative viewpoint is possible. In contrast to Ford's standpoint, cited 
above, Adrienne Rich speaks from outside his way of seeing when she 
17 D. Steinberg, Bodies in Glass: genetics, eugenics, and embryo ethics, ( Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997) p 64. 
18 S. Henderson, A Giant's Scrapbook, (London: Spire, 1989), p. 11. 
19 See Chapter One, pp. 33-4. 
20 J. Hadley, Abortion: Between Freedom and Necessity, (London: Virago, 1996), p. 80. 
141 
says, 'The child that I carry for nine months can be defined neither as me 
nor as not-me.'2l 
However, despite the fact that the ethics of care has provided feminist 
scholarship with an alternative moral framework, many feminist ethicists 
are uncomfortable with eschewing the androcentric model entirely, 
since, as Held puts it, ' ... women so clearly need and deserve more justice 
and fairness than we have received in political life, on the job, at school, 
and especially at home in the division of labor in the household.'22 
Furthermore, in appraising moral approaches, Hadley also 
acknowledges that rights language is ' ... the borrowed language of 
feminism' and that, 'Tactically, rights have proved a most successful way 
of obtaining access to legal abortion.'23 Yet, the difficulties with a rights 
approach, is that it constructs the mother and her fetus into adversarial 
positions, because, by the very nature of the situation, opposing rights 
have to be taken into consideration. These male ethics are so deeply 
culturally embedded that De Beauvouir describes a woman 
contemplating abortion as being' divided against herself.'24 
Richard Hare, who purports that using the Golden Rule in the abortion 
debate would be more suitable has made this point.25 He claims that the 
conflicting rights argument of mother and fetus and its supplementary 
debate over embryonic personhood, is extremely unhelpful because no 
one has come up with a plausible method of evaluating rights. He 
continues; 'Rights are the stamping ground of intuitionists and it would 
be difficult to find any claim confidently asserted to a right which could 
not be confidently countered by a claim to another right, such that both 
rights cannot simultaneously be complied with.'26 The difficulty is 
specifically acknowledged in the following excerpt from the Church of 
England's publication, Abortion: An Ethical Discussion, which was the 
Board of Social Responsibility's contribution to the debate preceding the 
1967 Abortion Act. It states: 
The foetus, as potentially a human life, has a significance which must not be 
overlooked, minimised or denied. Indeed the problem of abortion is precisely the 
problem of weighing the claims of the mother against the claims of the foetus and vice versa, 
21 A. Rich O/Woman Born, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976) 
22 v. Held (ed) Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, (Colorado; Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1995), p. 1. 
23 J. Hadley, Abortion: Between Freedom and Necessity, p. 76. 
24 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, p 508. 
25 R. E. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', in Bioethics An Anthology, edited by H. 
Kuhse and P. Singer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) pp. 58-68. 
26 R. E. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', pp. 58-9. 
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when they conflict; though it is important that neither be thought of in isolation from 
the family group of which they are a part.27(my italics) 
The Church of Scotland's struggle with the conflicting rights dilemma 
was publicly played out in its Reports to the General Assembly of 1985 
and 1986. The historical precursor to this was influenced by the events 
surrounding the debate in 1966 leading up to the legislation of the 
Abortion Act, when the General Assembly issued a statement that 
contained two rights perspectives. Firstly, it claimed that, 'the 
inviolability of the foetus is one of the fundamentals and must be 
defended', and secondly, that 'we recognise that this general right is, in 
certain circumstances, in conflict with other rights. In the Reformed 
Church, the paramount concern has been for the mother.'28 
However, following this declaration, the Church of Scotland became 
increasingly anxious with the way in which the first right was being 
ignored by the practical implementation of the Abortion Act and in 1985, 
persuaded by the strong views of Professor Thomas Torrance, it chose to 
revoke its earlier recommendation in the 1966 statement that abortion 
could be permitted if continuation of the pregnancy 'would involve 
serious risk to the life or grave injury to the health whether physical or 
mental of the pregnant woman whether before or after birth of the 
child.'29 After much debate, and with a narrow majority, this condition 
was changed to: 
From our belief in the sanctity of all human life we are convinced that the 
inviolability of the foetus can be brought into question only in the case of risk to 
maternal life and when all alternatives have been exhausted. 30 
Almost immediately, grave disquiet was expressed by many of 
Scotland's theologians, who worried about the pastoral implications for 
rape victims, and publicly dissociated themselves from this decision. The 
return to the former 1966 broader ruling was made in 1986 in Professor 
Torrance's absence. 
The Methodist Church produced a document, Abortion Reconsidered: The 
Methodist Statement and its Background (1977) in response to the formal 
statement made at its Conference the previous year. It mentions three 
27 CIO, Abortion, An Ethical Discussion, (London: Church Information Office, 1965) p. 6l. 
28 Church of Scotland, Reports to the General Assembly, Social and Moral Welfare, 
(Edinburgh: Church of Scotland, 1966) p. 475. 
29 Church of Scotland, Reports to the General Assembly, p. 473-6. Discussed in K. Kelly, 
Life and Love, pp. 52-3. 
30 Church of Scotland, Reports to the General Assembly, Board of Social Responsibility 
(Edinburgh: Church of Scotland, 1985) p. 287. 
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rights to be considered, which stand side by side together in point 6 of 
the publication quoted here and highlighted in italics: 
On one side of the abortion debate is the view which seeks to uphold the value and 
importance of all forms of human life by asserting that the foetus has an inviolable 
right to life and that there must be no external interference with the process which 
will lead to the birth of a living human being. The other side of the debate 
emphasises the interests of the mother. The foetus is totally dependent on her for at 
least the first twenty weeks of the pregnancy and, it is therefore argued, she has a 
total right to decide whether or not to continue the pregnancy. It is further argued that a 
child has the right to be born healthy and wanted.31 (my italics) 
In weighing up how to resolve the conflict between those rights, the 
Methodist perspective concentrated on the relational aspects of 
personhood and stated that whilst the fetus possesses individual 
identity, 'it lacks independence and the ability to respond to 
relationships.'32 For the Methodist Church, the fetus' human dignity is 
something that increases with its development and it does not view any 
boundary as definitive before that of viability to survive independently. 
Whilst the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland is a voluntary 
association of approximately 2,400 churches, their collective thinking on 
this issue can be discerned from their submission to the Warnock 
Committee. The Baptist perception on conflicting' claims' is to consider 
the maxim of the 'lesser of two evils' and suggests that not to do so is 'to 
blunt moral sensitivity .'33 Again, conflicting rights must return to the 
status of the embryo and the distinction that the Baptists make is 
between having life and having 'human personality' in the sense of 
acquiring full humanity. If a fetus cannot survive independently, then it 
remains a potential human personality, but similarly to the Methodist 
view, one that gains increasing significance as it develops. 
Critically, as Hare has stated, and as the various churches have 
demonstrated, the moral status of the embryo is pivotal to the outcome 
of conflicting rights, despite the fact that the definitions given to 
determine personhood become specious if used outside the abortion 
debate. For example, the ability to make relationships cannot, surely, be a 
prerequisite for determining full human status, or people with profound 
mental disability, mental illness, or unconscious patients, whose 
31 Division of Social Responsibility of the Methodist Church edited by J. Atkinson, 
Abortion reconsidered: The Methodist Statement and its Background, (Methodist Publishing 
House, 1966) point 6. 
32 Division of Social Responsibility for the Methodist Church, Abortion reconsidered, 
point 3. 
33 K. Kelly, Life and Love, quoting from the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland 
Submission to the Warnock Committee, p. 62. 
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condition causes dysfunction in relating, would be excluded. Similar 
arguments can be invoked against the Baptist requirement of having a 
personality. For both the Methodists and the Baptists, the notion of 
increasing human worth being aligned to growth and development 
might suggest, by implication, that the elderly and dying should be 
accorded less worth as they degenerate further and lose their faculties. 
Ironically, the drive to create human rights legislation has been precisely 
to protect such vulnerable people. 
These ethical anomalies in the content and the moral framework create 
considerable confusion. Yet, no denomination seems to have queried the 
framework in which the way of seeing is already set. For example, why 
should personhood per se be the definitive axis of conflicting rights; why 
not consider sentience- the capacity to suffer - as a critical factor? Early 
abortion would be preferable to a later one, not because the fetus was 
more intrinsically human, but because, due to its increased neurone 
development, it would be more likely to experience pain and fear. 
Gilligan'S research demonstrated that women who contemplate abortion 
often think in terms of conflicting responsibilities rather than conflicting 
rights.34 The following excerpt is from a study by Baban and David on 
Romanian women who sought illegal abortions during the rule of 
Ceaucescu: 
Almost every woman considered abortion as a way to protect and secure her 
existing family. As they perceived their sacrifice as a form of devotion, the women 
took upon themselves all possible risks to their health, freedom and well-being ... 'I 
did what I did for my family, to bring up children. I was confident God would 
understand.'35 
By undertaking discourse analysis, I propose to offer, not a clearer 
solution - these will always remain morally complex issues - but a 
different way of conceptualising the problems. By interrogating key 
subject positions, and by determining how these positions have been 
constructed, I hope to prepare the way for a different agenda. 
Understanding the web of interlocking discourses can illuminate how 
knowledge perception can be holistically different, and possess equal, or 
possibly greater, validity. And what of woman? Her construction is not 
only pivotal to the conflicting rights discourse, but, more critically, to the 
34 Gilligan interviewed 29 women, who were contemplating abortion in one of the 
studies she undertook, described in her book A Different Voice. 
35 A. Baban and H. David, Voices of Romanian Women: Perceptions of Sexuality, 
Reproductive Behavior and Partner Relations during the Ceaucescu Era, (Bethesda, Md.: 
Transnational Family Research Institute, 1994). Quoted in J. Hadley, Abortion: Between 
Freedom and Necessity, p. 78. 
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whole ecclesiastic response to biopower. Clearly, even this brief 
exploration has shown that she often perceives reproductive issues 
differently to the churches. Having raised awareness of the historical 
importance of the abortion debate and an appreciation that these 
discourses have transformed and correlated into the NRT deliberations, I 
shall now conduct an analysis of how the Roman Catholic Church and 
the Church of England have formulated their human fertilisation and 
embryology reports. 
The critical discourse analysis of two church reports concerning the 
NRTs 
I have chosen to apply an analogous structured layout for both 
documents for ease of comparison between them. In addition, I have 
conducted a word count on key words in each analysis to determine any 
corresponding and contrasting emphases in the documents. This is a 
helpful aid to coding, in that it can provide ideational evidence across a 
substantive text. 
Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and the Dignity of 
Procreation, Donum Vitae 
Replies to certain questions of the day36 
The structure of the document 
The statement is published as a small booklet of 45 pages and is 
comprised of a foreword, an introduction that recalls I fundamental 
principles' and three main sections. The first sentence of the foreword 
sets the scene and reads thus: 
The congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has been approached by various 
Episcopal Conferences or individual Bishops, by theologians, doctors and scientists, 
concerning biomedical techniques which make it possible to intervene in the initial 
phase of the life of a human being and in the very process of procreation and their 
conformity with the principles of Catholic morality.37 
I do not know whether or not Catholic women have sought advice from 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith as to where they stand vis-
a-vis Catholic teaching on the NRTs, but as this opening sentence 
36 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its 
Origin and the Dignity of Procreation, Donum Vitae, (Boston: Pauline Books/Media, 1987). 
37Donum Vitae, p.4 
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explicitly demonstrates, the report's directive does not seek to engage 
with them in any way. In addition, building on Dunlap's insights 
regarding the politicisation of discourses, this declaration overtly signals 
the document to be an expert treatise. 
The foreword continues to describe in the following extract the content of 
its three parts, illustrating that infertility per se is not a concern, rather 
the technologies that endeavour to alleviate it are the main focus . 
. .. ; the first part will have as its subject respect for the human being from the first 
moment of his or her existence; the second part will deal with the moral questions 
raised by technical interventions on human procreation; the third part will offer 
some orientations on the relationships between moral law and civil law in terms of 
the respect due to human embryos and fetuses and as regards the legitimacy of 
techniques of artificial procreation. [their italics]38 
The document is broken down into the following headings, which 
demonstrate effectively the issues that were judged to be significant:39 
INTRODUCTION 
1. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND THE TEACHING OF THE 
CHURCH 
2. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AT THE SERVICE OF THE HUMAN 
PERSON 
3. ANTHROPLOGY AND PROCEDURES IN THE BIOMEDICAL FIELD 
4. FUNDAMENTAL CRITERIA FOR A MORAL JUDGEMENT 
5. TEACHINGS OF THE MAGISTERIUM 
PART I 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN EMBRYOS 
1.What Respect is Due to the Human Embryo, Taking into Account his 
Nature and Identity? 
2. Is Prenatal Diagnosis Morally Licit? 
3. Are Therapeutic Procedures Carried Out on the Human Embryo Licit? 
4. How is One to Evaluate Morally Research and Experimentation on 
Human Embryos and Fetuses? 
5. How is One to Evaluate Morally the Use for Research Purposes of 
Embryos Obtained by Fertilization 'in Vitro'? 
6. What Judgement Should Be Made on Other Procedures of 
Manipulating Embryos Connected with the "Techniques of Human 
Reproduction" ? 
38 Donum Vitae, p.4. 
39 Capitals and lower case letters are used as written in the document. 
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PART II 
INTERVENTIONS UPON HUMAN PROCREATION 
A. HETEROLOGOUS ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZATION 
1. Why Must human Procreation Take Place in Marriage? 
2. Does Heterologous Artificial Fertilization Conform to the Dignity of 
the Couple and to the Truth of Marriage? 
3. Is "Surrogate" Motherhood Morally Licit? 
B. HOMOLOGOUS ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZATION 
4. What Connection is Required from the Moral Point of View between 
Procreation and the Conjugal Act? 
5. Is Homologous 'In Vitro' Fertilization Morally Licit? 
6. How Is Homologous Artificial Insemination to be Evaluated From the 
Moral Point of View? 
7. What Moral Criterion Can Be Proposed With Regard to Medical 
Intervention in Human Procreation? 
8. The Suffering caused by Infertility in Marriage 
PART III 
MORAL AND CIVIL LAW 
THE VALUES AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS THAT CIVIL 
LEGISLATION MUST RESPECT AND SANCTION IN THIS MATTER 
It should be noted that the only aspect of the report to address infertility 
is point 8, page 33, where just over a page is devoted to 'The Suffering 
Caused by Infertility in Marriage', otherwise the entire document focuses 
on the embryo and the marital goods and how these are effected by the 
clinical practice of IVF, encompassing pre-natal diagnosis, donor 
involvement and surrogacy. 
The language used in the document 
The extracts and headlines that I have so far included are illustrative of 
the linguistic style of the report. It is couched in formal and seemingly 
'impartial' language, although this impartiality is thinly disguised by 
highly emotive terms that betray a definite bias. The text contains words 
and phrases expressed in the superlative, such as; 'gravely illicit act', 
'embryos are sacrificed', 'corpses of human embryos and fetuses', 'kills 
defenceless human beings' and' dynamic of violence and domination'. 
However, the authoritative tone of the document, which is enhanced by 
the use of the imperative verb rather than the subjunctive declaring that 
things must be so, obscures its proclivity, especially when it makes 
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frequent claims to 'rational reflection' and states that it 'puts forward the 
divine law in order to accomplish the work of truth and liberation.' 40 
The discourse is developed within an androcentric, justice ethics 
framework, which deploys the rhetoric of rights, universal abstract 
principles and legalism. The generic, universal man and its 
accompanying male pronouns are used to refer to humankind, almost 
exclusively, throughout the whole document and I shall return to this 
aspect later in my analysis of woman's construction. Whilst emotive 
terms are invoked, as previously described, these are reserved to 
preserve the sanctity of the rules, not to shed light on relational contexts 
or to deliberate points of equivocation, neither of which are permitted. In 
undertaking a count of key words to reveal the document's standpoint, 
the word' rights' was used 39 times and' abortion' was cited 12 times, 
despite this being a report on assisted conception. Furthermore, the 
words to import legality; 'law', 'legislation', 'legislator', 'licit' and 'illicit' 
occur 47 times, notwithstanding the fact that apart from the small, final 
section, this refers to moral law as defined by Catholic teaching, not civil 
law. 
The construction of woman 
I have already demonstrated in the report's overview that, despite the 
fact that the NRTs predominantly affect not only women's bodies but 
also their life choices, this report on assisted conception does not focus 
on woman, or even on infertility, in its content. This, in itself, is a 
powerful interpretive cue by the text producer(s), promoting their 
stand point of woman's insignificance in procreation. It is highly 
reminiscent of the secular scientific text in Nature, that was similarly 
directed to fellow experts and in which woman was also absent, in spite 
of repeated referrals to her body parts. Both documents reflect Foucault's 
insights that' the body has become the battlefield', which was cited by 
Grimwood in his analysis.41 Moreover, I shall demonstrate that the 
weapons of 'anonymity, classification and objectification' continue to be 
powerful operatives in this ecclesiastic treatise.42 
In addition, with regard to infertility, the report consistently refers to 
those unable to conceive as 'sterile'. In fact, the only time 'infertility' is 
used is in point 8 of Part II, as shown in the overview of the document's 
structure. Again, with reference to Walsh's methodology and the 
40 Donum Vitae, p. 10 & p. 6, respectively. 
41 See Chapter Two, p. 68. 
42 Originally cited in Chapter Two, p.68. 
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examples that I have provided in Chapter Three, the discursive fields 
opened up by this word are harsher and more finite than those 
associated with 'infertility'. Moreover, the word 'sterile' invokes 
belonging to a discrete group or type, rather than denoting a condition 
with which we might all be afflicted. It serves to polarise the issue in 
direct contrast to the way in which Choices in Childlessness did not. 
I propose to utilise two linguistic tools to interrogate the report's 
techniques of securing woman's invisibility in the discourse. Firstly, I 
shall examine the way non-inclusive language is deployed throughout 
the text, and secondly, I shall conduct a keyword count on the times 
'woman' is cited. With regard to the first consideration, whilst the 
inclusive word 'person' or 'people' is used intermittently throughout the 
report, the pronoun that refers back to these terms in a sentence is almost 
always masculine. The pronoun 'she' is used three times to refer to the 
church and only once on its own to refer specifically to woman, which 
will be discussed later with regard to motherhood. 
Incongruously, the term 'his or her' is cited six times in reference to 
'person', 'child' or 'embryo' , and' it' is used twice with reference to a 
child and an embryo. Yet, the infrequent citing of the double pronouns 
interchanging with the male only term creates, not only an inconsistency, 
but also, paradoxically, a sense of inferiority to the feminine aspect that is 
greater than having no citation at all. For, whilst using non-inclusive 
language reveals the text producer's identity, nonetheless, it could 
simply be seen to reinforce the 'objective', formal rhetoric that has 
already been highlighted. However, the occasional, intermittent use of the 
feminine pronouns is a technique of power functioning in the discourse. 
This can be discerned in point 3. of the Introduction, entitled 
, Anthropology and Procedures in the Biomedical Field'. There are seven 
paragraphs in this section. The first four discuss the moral imperative to 
perceive the human body as both 'corporeal and spiritual'. The final 
three seek to apply these principles of anthropology to the biomedical 
domain. Initially, it is not clear in the first two paragraphs whether this 
directive is aimed at the moral status of the embryo or the ethics of adult 
decision-making. The third paragraph, however, clarifies the text 
producer's position when it states: 
The natural moral law expresses and lays down the purposes, rights and duties 
which are based upon the bodily and spiritual nature of the human person. 
Therefore this law cannot be thought of as simply a set of norms on the biological 
level; rather it must be defined as the rational order whereby man is called by the 
150 
Creator to direct and regulate his life and actions and in particular to make use of his awn 
body.43 (my italics) 
Clearly, this section has moved from the integrity of the embryo to the 
integrity of human agency. The fourth paragraph continues to uphold 
moral agency in masculinist language, saying: 
A first consequence can be deduced from these principles: An intervention on the 
human body affects not only the tissues, the organs and their functions but also 
involves the person himself on different levels. It involves therefore, perhaps in an 
implicit but nonetheless real way, a moral significance and responsibility. Pope john 
Paul II forcefully reaffirmed this to the World Medical Association when he said: " 
each human person, in his absolutely unique singularity, is constituted not only by 
his spirit, but by his body as well Thus, in the body and through the body, one 
touches the person himself in his concrete reality. To respect the dignity of man 
consequently amounts to safeguarding this identity of the man' corpore et anima 
unus', as the Second Vatican Council says (Gaudium et Ses, 14, par. 1). 44 (my 
emphasis) 
Whilst this paragraph pertains to the moral responsibility that all people 
have to their spiritual and fleshly cohesiveness, in the context of this 
document, it specifically relates to the procedures that primarily women 
undertake in assisted conception, as theirs is the greater part. In addition, 
it is directed at those who, either theologically or medically, will be the 
overseers not the recipients. Consequently, as the text consistently refers 
to 'his body' when it really means 'her body' it creates an ambivalence, 
whereby bodies, dominion and moral accountability become 
disconnected. 
The following paragraph compounds, rather than clarifies, this 
inconclusiveness by its abstract referral to 'decision-making' with regard 
to 'procedures which are not strictly therapeutic', which is a statement 
that in itself begs the question, 'what is meant by' strictly' and 
'therapeutic'?' 
It is on the basis of this anthropological vision that one is to find the fundamental 
criteria for decision-making in the case of procedures which are not strictly 
therapeutic, as, for example, those aimed at the improvement of the human 
biological condition.45 
Finally, it is in the following paragraph that both couplets of 
'man/woman' and 'his/her' appear, with the pronouns coming first 
43 Donum Vitae, p. 8. 
44 Donum Vitae, pp. 8-9. 
45 Donum Vitae, p. 9. 
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Applied biology and medicine work together for the integral good of human life 
when they come to the aid of a person stricken by illness and infirmity and when 
they respect his or her dignity as a creature of God. No biologist or doctor can reasonably 
claim, by virtue a/his scientific competence, to be able to decide on people's origin or destiny. 
This norm must be applied in a particular way in the field of sexuality and 
procreation, in which man and woman actualise the fundamental values of love and 
life.46 (my emphasis) 
Whilst, the previous paragraphs were implicitly directed at the 
biomedical community, now their directive is made explicit. The report 
appeals to practitioners of' applied biology and medicine' by saying that 
they work for the 'good of human life' when they' respect his or her 
dignity'. The inclusion of this one small pronoun at this contextual 
moment (which has, until now, been missing) is deeply significant. For, it 
resolves the discursive equivocacy by appealing to the practitioners to 
apply this' anthropological vision' to women's bodies as their moral 
duty. Having secured their dominion, the sentence that immediately 
follows relates this assigned duty, not to woman, but to the embryo. 
Woman is sidelined and remains an incidental procreative component, as 
De Beauvoir originally claimed, the 'inessential'.47 
With regard to the word count, the words signifying woman appear 39 
times and include 'woman','female', wife','mother/hood'. On 16 of 
these occasions the words are preceded by the male counterpart 'man', 
'male', 'husband' and 'father/hood', representing a pair and are 
interchangeable in meaning with couple, spouse or parent/hood. Out of 
the 20 occasions that the word 'woman' or 'mother/hood' is used 
without a preceding correlative, 8 refer directly to her body or body 
parts, 6 to surrogacy, 2 to donor involvement, 2 to pre-natal testing, 1 to 
abortion and 1 to consent for post-mortem on an embryo or fetus.48 There 
is only one instance in the whole document where the feminine word 
takes precedence over the male complement and that is on page 34 in the 
small section on 'The Suffering caused by Infertility in Marriage', where 
motherhood comes before fatherhood. 
This method of coding demonstrates that woman is subsumed into a 
couple or into her body parts. The reproductive passivity and absence of 
personhood are reminiscent of the secular constructions analysed in 
Chapter Three. Similarly, woman is only accorded subjectivity in the role 
of mother, reflecting De Beauvoir's cultural observations of how woman 
46Donum Vitae, p. 9. 
47J)iscussed in Chapter One, p. 24. 
48 The Significance of this will be discussed in the construction of the embryo in the next 
section. 
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gains her subjectivity through service, discussed in Chapter One.49 
However, in contrast to the frequently sentimentalised media accounts, 
in this report, her subjectivity as mother is accentuated when she acts 
against her designated role. For example, on the one hand, the document 
consistently refers to the male-female pair who seek help together for 
their 'sterility' (despite the fact tha t it is the woman who is clinically the 
patient, even when the problem lies with the man); yet, in undertaking 
pre-natal diagnosis with a view to termination, the document states: 
Thus a woman would be committing a gravely illicit act if she were to request such a 
diagnosis with the deliberate intention of having an abortion should the results 
confirm the existence of a malformation or abnormality.50 (my italics) 
The absence of the preceding male complement makes her alone 
responsible for both the abortion and simultaneously rebelling against 
her allotted role of 'sacrificial motherhood', for in the case of pre-natal 
diagnosis, she would be aborting a fetus, who would need an inordinate 
amount of care. Whilst the text continues to cite that others would be 
colluding with her, nevertheless, the language is softer to them and she is 
given precedence in the text. Her action is described as a 'gravely illicit 
act', whereas her spouse and relatives 'would be acting in a manner 
contrary to the moral law' . The specialist 'would be guilty of illicit 
collaboration' (my italics), placing the moral onus on woman. This is also 
the only occasion in the report that the pronoun' she' is used alone, 
except when it refers to the church. 
Kathleen Sands illuminates this stance in her exposition on rationalism 
and dualism in Western Christianity, whereby woman has been 
'symbolically associated with evil both as the demonic Other and as the 
rebellious inferior.'51 She says; 'However, under any serious threat to 
patriarchal hegemony - for example, female reproductive freedom-
rationalistic egalitarianism readily gives way to the demonization of 
women'.52 (my italics) Yet, when that motherhood is denied her, the 
document still calls upon her to be sacrificial, for the only time in the 
whole document that the feminine complement precedes the male, is 
when motherhood comes before fatherhood, cited earlier in point 8, 'The 
Suffering caused by Infertility in Marriage: Note that this pertinent 
sentence immediately follows: 'Spouses who find themselves in this sad 
49 Discussed in Chapter One, p. 25. 
50 Donum Vitae, p. 15. 
51 K. Sands, Escape from Paradise: Evil and Tragedy in Feminist Theology, (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1994) p. 5. Her reference to the Neoplatonic Chain of Being was 
discussed in Chapter Three, p. 108. 
52 K. Sands, Escape from Paradise, p. 5. 
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situation are called to find in it an opportunity for sharing in a particular 
way in the Lord's Cross, the source of spiritual fruitfulness.'53 
The construction of the embryo 
It is clear from the structure of the document that disquietude for the 
embryo dominates the report. The examples of emotionally charged 
words already cited are, but a few of the many, which are used to protect 
its moral status. In the counting of keywords, those that denote the 
unborn child (including 'embryo', 'pre-embryo', 'zygote', 'fetus' and the 
'unborn child') occur 85 times throughout the text. Even this count does 
not include all the references to the embryo, where a phrase such as'in 
relation to human life and its beginnings' is used, nor does it include the 
times ET (embryo transfer) is cited, as this is a procedure.54 Moreover, 
often the words' embryo and fetus' are used in tandem, giving emphasis 
to the unborn child by a double reference. As can be seen, this is in stark 
contrast to the number of times words denoting woman are used, as 
discussed previously. 
However, illustrating concern for the embryo does not delve into its 
construction or its subject position. In recalling the analysis of the secular 
scientific discourse from Nature in Chapter Three, the embryo was also 
similarly privileged. Furthermore, the linguistic style was formal and, 
again, affecting terms towards the embryo were deployed, but its 
construction could not be more different to the one created here.55 
Ironically, whilst emotive terms were used in the scientific treatise to 
distance the embryo from its humanity, they are used here to construct it 
as, not just potentially human, but fully human from the moment of 
conception. This is achieved in several ways. 
Firstly, it is repeatedly stated as an absolute, unequivocal fact, and such 
is the strength of this conviction, it creates ambivalence in certain 
passages as to whether the text is referring to embryos or adults as 
pointed out in the first two paragraphs of point 3 of the Introduction on 
the anthropological vision. Secondly, the text not only states the 
embryo's fully human status, it accords it equal, or greater status, to fully 
developed natals. For example, I have already discussed the report's 
emphasis on legalism and that this is mostly pertaining to moral law, 
without any caveat that others might justifiably hold different views. ln 
Part I, 'Respect for Human Embryos' , the Second Vatican Council's 
53 Donum Vitae, p. 34. 
54 Donum Vitae, p. 6. 
55 Chapter Three, pp. 91-92. 
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document is quoted thus: 'Life once conceived, must be protected with 
the utmost care; abortion and infanticide are abominable crimes.' (my 
italics )56 Whilst infanticide is recognised by the State as a crime, abortion 
is, in fact, legal. It is more usual to refer to an opposing moral stance as 
'unethical' , rather than 'criminal', but in so doing, not only does the 
report create emphasis in its content, crucially, it serves to construct the 
embryo as a birthed individual. 
It is testament to the power of construction through discourse that an 
ideological subject position can gain such momentum through a given 
text that the reader absorbs the construction without finding paragraphs 
such as the following incongruous. The penultimate paragraph of Part I, 
point 4. reads: 
In the case of experimentation that is clearly therapeutic, namely, when it is a matter 
of experimental forms of therapy used for the benefit of the embryo itself in a final 
attempt to save its life, and in the absence of other reliable forms of therapy, recourse 
to drugs or procedures not yet fully tested can be licit57 (my italics) 
One has to be reminded that the early embryo is barely visible to the 
naked eye, that the cell or cells are undifferentiated and that its 'life', 
whether within the mother's body or not, is extremely tenuous, and even 
after implantation has occurred, it remains at a precarious stage of 
development. Lee Silver emphasises this point when he says, 'The 
normal reproductive biology of human beings is such that 75 percent of 
all naturally fertilized eggs will succumb to death naturally before the 
nine-month period of gestation is completed.'5s (his italics) Yet, by using 
the phrase 'in a final attempt to save its life' and referring to 'reliable 
forms of therapy' an embodied individual is created in the imagination 
of the reader. 
This effect is taken to extreme in the following paragraph, which opens 
thus: 
The corpses a/human embryos and fetuses, whether they have been deliberately aborted or 
not, must be respected just as the remains of other human beings. In particular, they 
cannot be subjected to mutilation or to autopsies if their death has not been verified 
56 Donum Vitae, p. 13. The use of the word 'crime' in relation to embryo experimentation 
is used again on p. 17. 
57 Donum Vitae, pp. 17-18. 
58 L. Silver, Remaking Eden, p. 50-51. Sir Robert Winston also claims that 40% of human 
embryos do not fertilise and many that do are lost after implantation R. Winston, 
Infertility: A Sympathetic Approach, (London: Martin Dunitz, 1986), pp.23-4. 
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and without the consent of the parents or of the mother.59 (their italics, my 
underlining) 
It cannot be said that, biologically, dead embryos could either be 
described as 'corpses', or that an 'autopsy' could be performed on them. 
The conferring of full moral status is an ethical stance, it does not endow 
a body when one has not yet developed, but the statement functions to 
make visible that which is not yet so. 
These are examples that demonstrate the embryo's equal status with 
natals, but earlier I had alluded to occasions when it was accorded 
primacy over birthed individuals. I would assert that this ontological 
superiority has correlated into this treatise from Roman Catholic 
abortion discourses; in other words, this functioning construction pre-
existed the NRTs. In the final part of the Introduction, the penultimate 
paragraph ends with: 
God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can, in any 
circumstances, claim the rightto destroy directly an innocent human being.6O (my 
emphasis) 
The key word here is 'innocent'. The function of describing a fertilised cell 
as an 'innocent' human being, not only infers' guilt' to a mother who 
does not wish to be pregnant, it also projects sentience onto an entity that 
clearly has none. This aspect has not gone unnoticed by other 
denominations, which ignore it, or as in the case of the Church of 
England, specifically cite it as being unhelpful due to the implication of 
maternal guilt.61 
However, the inference goes further, for, within the perimeters of Roman 
Catholic teaching on abortion, if the embryo is constructed as fully 
human, then given the circumstances of a potential termination where 
equal rights conflict, the innocent embryo is given absolute protection, 
even if the life of the mother is threatened. It is only morally permissible 
to take the life of the fetus if it is taken 'indirectly' in the principle of 
double effect, which is also invoked in the killing of the innocent in 
wartime.62 Such an absolutist stance has its own moral predicaments and 
59Donum Vitae, p. 18. 
60 Donum Vitae, p. 11. 
61 K. Boyd, B. Callaghan, E. Shotter, Life Before Birth: Consensus in Medical Ethics (London: 
SPCK, 1986), p. 25. 
62 D. Smith, Life and Morality, p30. 
Consequently, the removal of the fallopian tube in an ectopic pregnancy is considered 
an indirect killing of the foetus because the primary intention is to save the mother's life 
and the death of the foetus is caused as a by-product of this. For, in the case of an 
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David Smith describes how the term 'invincible ignorance' can be 
invoked when a woman is so traumatised by her situation that she has 
an 'overall inability to cope with a certain moral imperative'.63 The 
implication being that she is ethically unable to attain 'the highest 
regards of the Gospel', which is hauntingly reminiscent of Lawrence 
Kohlberg's conclusions described in Chapter One.64 However, with 
regard to the embryo, its construction of 'innocent' from abortion 
rhetoric has justified its ontological position above woman. 
My use of the word 'justified' implies that I consider there to be a more 
fundamental reason for the embryo's higher status. The following two 
extracts, which also illustrate the embryo's primacy, deploy a textual 
device that simultaneously demonstrates the embryo to be ideologically 
male. Moreover, these examples overtly confirm that which is covertly 
implied throughout. The first instance is in Part I, point 2, third 
paragraph, which refers to prenatal diagnosis: 
Such diagnosis is permissible, with the consent of the parents after they have been 
adequately informed, if the methods employed safeguard the life and integrity of the 
embryo and the mother, without subjecting them to disproportionate risks. (my 
italics)65 
The second instance pertains to embryo research in point 4. of Part I and 
the opening paragraph reads thus: 
Medical research must refrain from operations on live embryos, unless there is a moral 
certainty of not causing harm to the lite and integrity of the unborn child and the mother, 
and on the condition that the parents have given their free and informed consent to the 
procedure. It follows that all research, even when limited to the simple observation of 
the embryo, would become illicit were it to involve risk to the embryo's physical 
integrity or life by reason of the methods used or the effects induced.66 (their italics, 
my underlining) 
I have already shown throughout the report, except in one significant 
phrase regarding self-sacrifice in childlessness, that when female and 
male terms are used in tandem, the male counterpart always precedes its 
female complement. In both extracts above, when mother is cited in a 
ectopic pregnancy, it is not possible to wait until the child is born or to save the mother 
other than by surgical intervention. However, undertaking a fetal craniotomy to save 
the life of the mother is not permissible because in this instance, whilst the intention to 
save the life of the mother is good, I directly taking the life of an innocent fetus' is evil. 
63 D. Smith, Life and Morality, p. 37. 
64 D. Smith, Life and Morality, p. 37. For reference to Kohlberg, see Chapter One, p. 19. 
65 Donum Vitae, p.1S. 
66 Donum Vitae, p.16. 
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couplet with the embryo/unborn child, it is the embryo which takes 
antecedence, thereby according it both predominance and masculinity. 
Furthermore, the context of these two citations is deeply significant, for 
they both relate to the 'life and integrity' of the pair. This functions to 
situate the ideologically male fertilised cell on a higher ontological plane 
than woman, even when she is performing her one and only truly 
merited duty of servitude, that of mother.67 This is underscored in the 
second extract by the following sentence that relates solely to concern for 
the embryo's life. Nowhere in the entire document is there any concern 
for woman, either regarding the experimental procedures undertaken on 
her body, or in the pastoral care that she might require throughout the 
process of infertility treatments or in the acceptance of unwanted 
childlessness.68 It is the ideational conferring of masculinity on to the 
embryo, which is the real reason that it has been accorded special 
protection in abortion discourses. 
It may be helpful to perceive this conceptualisation of the embryo 
through De Beaviour's insights of woman's subjective otherness. For, in 
the ideological separation of mother and embryo that abortion and IVF 
have progressively accentuated and made more adversarial, the embryo 
is male and subject to the mother who is other. Imogen Tyler succinctly 
points out: 
As philosophy has provided the template for foetal personhood it is not surprising 
that the foetus is almost exclusively signified as white and male or that 
commentators have noted how the foetus appears to have been formed within and 
by the most traditional narratives of individualized Western selfhood.69 
From this interpretation, the almost hysterical response to embryo 
research and loss through IVF can be better understood, not as an attack 
on a small number of differentiated cells, but as a perceived destruction 
of the male subject, infused with the same androcentric privileges as the 
autonomous elite men who have produced this report and for whom it is 
intended. 
67 I discussed in the construction of woman that the only time woman becomes visible, 
and is subject in her own right, is when she is mother. 
68 I mentioned in Chapter Three, p. 91 that IVF was undertaken on women following 
success with mice, without first conducting experimental research on primates. 
69 I. Tyler, 'Reframing pregnant embodiment' in Transformations: Thinking Through 
Feminism ed by M. McNeil, L. Pearce, and B. Skeggs, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000) p. 299. 
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Summary of the discourse analysis 
This report is explicitly an expert discourse that seeks to expound its 
standpoint not only to the ecclesiastic community, but also to 
practitioners in the biomedical field. It is supremely didactic and brooks 
no dissention, yet despite the utilisation of a formal, abstract, 
authoritative rhetoric, it is an emotively charged treatise. Its purpose is to 
protect the embryo from any interference, and to this end, it deploys 
textual techniques to secure an embryonic construction in the discursive 
fields of ontological worthiness equivalent to the elite, adult male.70 
Woman, by contrast, is obliterated ontologically and is constructed as a 
potentially rebellious womb to be controlled by those more capable of 
exercising moral agency. For, not only is the embryo is accorded greater 
human worth than woman, it is also endowed with actual sentience that 
woman is denied by the obscuration of her personhood. 
Whilst, it could be argued that an appraisal of the content alone would 
reveal the text's deeply misogynist standpOint, nevertheless, undertaking 
a discourse analysis offers greater scope for interrogation. For, by 
engaging with the politicisation of the treatise, as Dunlap and Grimwood 
have also elicited, the techniques of power operating throughout the 
discourse are exposed as colluding with, and constructing further, the 
systems of socio-cultural control rather than being claims to an essential 
'truth'. Consequently, it becomes possible to unravel the correlating and 
transforming statements of historical ideologies and interrogate the 
source of their claims with an oppositional rationale, which forces those 
systems to be examined rather than remaining hidden. In this way, not 
only can other outcomes be considered as authentic alternatives, but also 
more crucially, differing frameworks of thinking can be theologically 
validated. 
Personal Origins 
The Report of a Working Party on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology of the Board for Social Responsibility 
70 This is underscored by the fact that The Roman Catholic Church has given 
approval to biotechnology in agriculture according to a press release from Crop 
Biotch Update http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTnews/CBTrecent.htm. Bishop Elio 
Sgreccia, vice president of the Pontifical Academy for Life stated, 'God has given 
man the task and responsibility to govern creation, which implies a grave 
responsibility: He continued 'The use of plants and animals is legitimate, but it does 
not represent an absolute right. The Church has an open but conditioned position: 
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The structure of the document 
The document is published as a booklet, with a colourful abstract cover, 
comprising 75 pages with a foreword from both the first and second 
edition and 2 appendices consisting of the resources and bibliography 
used. Following an introduction of 15 points, the book is divided into 6 
sections with the following headings:71 
1. Developments in assisted conception 
Artificial insemination by husband or donor 
In vitro fertilisation 
Cryopreservation 
Spare embryos 
Related Techniques 
Wider applications of IVF 
Ovum donation 
Embryo donation 
Surrogate motherhood 
Male infertility 
Other possibilities arising from these new techniques 
Genetic screening 
Gene therapy 
Sex selection 
Research 
Other ethical dilemmas 
Concluding comment 
The fear of genetics 
The way forward 
2. Human dominion 
The impact of modern science 
Christian responses 
Creation and 'Natural law' 
Order in Nature 
Human responsibility 
Eschatology 
The Kingdom of God 
Jesus Christ and the Divine purpose 
3. The status of the human embryo 
The Christian tradition 
71 These are set out as featured in the Contents page. 
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The formed and unformed foetus 
The development of the early embryo 
Different interpretations of the status of the early embryo 
4. Marriage and the family 
5. Conclusions for practice 
Technologies for resolving infertility 
Enabling natural fertilisation 
Artificial insemination by husband 
In vitro fertilisation 
Enabling fertilisation through the use of donor gametes 
Donor insemination 
Egg donation 
Embryo donation 
Permissible intervention 
Surrogacy and womb-leasing 
Secondary effects of these practices 
Spare embryos 
Research 
In conclusion 
6. Questions concerning pastoral care 
Infertility and childlessness 
Marriage 
Family 
Identity 
Human life 
Other people 
The main concerns set out in the Introduction are demonstrably similar 
to those espoused in Donum Vitae and are as follows: 
We have identified three major areas of debate: 
(a) The status of the fertilized egg or early embryo, and the protection it should 
be given (Chapter 3); 
(b) The nature of the marriage bond, and the effect on it of the introduction of a 
third (or even fourth) party in artificial insemination by donor (Dr), ovum 
donation etc. (Chapter 4); 
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(c) The nature and extent of divine providence and human responsibility 
(Chapter 2).72 
The prioritising of the embryo can be seen from the order of main points 
and although it is dealt with in Chapter 3, the second chapter on human 
dominion directly concerns procreative control and limitations and 
therefore is a relevant preamble to it. The first chapter, as shown in the 
headings, deals comprehensively with the developments in assisted 
conception techniques, the fifth chapter provides conclusions for clinical 
practice and the final chapter of 6 pages is devoted to 'Questions 
concerning pastoral care'. Whilst the terminology is quite different, it can 
be seen by the sequencing of issues and the textual space given to them, 
that this report has a comparable framework to Donum Vitae. 
The language used in the document 
However, as can be seen from the above quotation and the list of 
contents, the language used in this report is very different from the way 
in which the Roman Catholic text is written. It is couched in a user-
friendly style, less formal, less authoritative and openly equivocal. The 
use of the inclusive pronoun 'we' to signify, not only the working party, 
but also the Christian community is indicative of a much more 'softly-
softly' approach to the subject. There is little, if any, use of the generic 
'man' to mean humankind and the paired terms of couple and parents 
are frequently used rather than the linguistically cumbersome duo of 
'husband and wife' or 'father and mother'. The tone is conveyed by the 
subjunctive mood, rather than the imperative and often admits to a 
difference of opinion within the working party that permits 
indeterminacy in the reader. The following sentences in point 59 are 
typical: 'We ought not to be surprised by the fact that Christians react in 
different ways to these changes. In considering modem developments in 
the field of human embryology we ourselves have reacted in two 
contrasting ways.'73 
Consequently, it may seem that this document encompasses more of a 
contextual approach than the formal, abstract, principle-led perspective 
of Donum Vitae. However, whilst the tone and language are less 
absolutist, nevertheless, the emphasis of the document remains fixed on 
a similar androcentric standpoint demonstrated by the fact that the same 
issues are considered to be of paramount importance. Furthermore, the 
softer language disguises the fact that woman is still covertly subsumed 
72 Personal Origins, p. 2. 
73 Personal Origins, p. 25. 
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into the agency of the man by the use of the term' couple', which will be 
discussed in greater depth in the next section. In addition, it can be 
recalled from earlier analyses, that the use of the pronoun 'we' is a 
powerful interpretive device that seductively, and unconsciously, draws 
the reader into compliance with the text producer(s)' standpoint. 
Moreover, as Grimwood demonstrated, permitting 'freedom of 
conscience' can be an immensely powerful technique to regulate 
behaviour. The treatise is an expert discourse, which appointed 'two 
moral theologians, a social theologian, an experimental biologist and a 
geneticist' on to the working party, but did not feel the need to listen to 
women undergoing treatment.74 In addition, the bibliography reveals an 
emphasis towards other expert discourses predominantly surrounding 
concern for the embryo, only one book out of 40 was written from the 
perspective of personal experience and even this was a Christian 
publication. There are no feminist publications that would have 
provided alternative standpoints, priorities and concern for woman's 
part in the NRTs. Clearly, these anomalies require further scrutiny. 
The discourse deploys a variety of techniques analogous to the 'hidden 
curriculum.' Simply put, the text does not do what it says it is doing. For 
example, I have demonstrated that the historical trajectory of the 
abortion debate has correlated into the NRT discourses, transforming 
both the rhetoric and the moral framework, with its inherent rights 
language, into the church statements on assisted conception. This point 
has not gone unnoticed by the working party and the report 
acknowledges the problematic of conflicting rights in the following 
extract. Consequently, the word 'rights' is not cited in the document after 
the declaration in paragraph 9, which states: 
Other language used to describe the status of the foetus is that of 'rights', often 
contrasting the 'right' of the mother with the 'right' to life. We have not found this 
helpful. Scripture does not use such concepts, but speaks instead of responsibilities 
or duties and their associated privileges.75 
However, despite this declaration, nevertheless, a similar argument 
ensues regarding the humanness of the early embryo that takes place 
when conflicting rights are discussed. Ironically, what the report 
demonstrates is that simply using different words is neither sufficient to 
provide, nor indicative of, a changed perspective; the framework remains 
unchanged, but this is obscured by the absence of typical language. 
74 Personal Origins, p. 1. 
75 Personal Origins, p. 4. 
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Similarly, the report does not utilise overtly legalistic vocabulary, such as 
the formal terms iI/licit as the statement from Donum Vitae did, although 
legal phraseology does occur 17 times. 
A further, pertinent example can be found in the final paragraph of the 
Introduction. For, in this extract, the report explicitly recognises that the 
abortion issue has influenced their discussions and reads thus: 
The arguments about assisted conception matters have inevitably but sadly 
inherited the dissensions and traditions of the abortion debate. On the one hand, 
English law has accepted that there are circumstances which allow the therapeutic 
termination of pregnancy; on the other, there are many Christians who regard the 
legalisation of abortion as a symptom of and spur to moral decadence. It is not easy 
to reconcile the extreme views expressed in the abortion controversy, and it has to 
be accepted that a similar polarisation is manifest in the debate about new 
reprod uctive technologies?6 
True to its assertions, the report makes reference to abortion 23 times and 
contextualises its standpoint from the very perspective that it purports to 
be disinclined to take. Note the inclusion of the adverb (sadly', when 
referring to the 'inevitability' of including the traditions of the abortion 
debate. This small interpretive cue functions interpersonally to promote 
a sense of reluctance on the part of the working party to tread this path 
again, but later on their ideational desire to do so is reiterated by the 
phrase, 'and it has to be accepted that similar polarisation is manifest in 
the debate about new reproductive technologies'. However, recalling the 
Foucauldian understanding of' otherwise', this need not have been the 
case; the text producer(s) could have chosen to focus on other issues, 
such as, the relational aspects of infertility and the role of the church in 
providing constructive avenues of pastoral support. 
Further examination of this extract reveals another interpretive cue; the 
reader is informed that 'English law has accepted' conditions for 
abortion, but that 'many Christians' regard it as culminating in {moral 
decadence'. By aligning the State with a pro-abortion stance and large 
numbers of anonymous Christians with an anti-abortion perspective, a 
similar effect is created in the discourse to the referral of the 
unreferenced survey in the documentary analysis?7 The analogy lies in 
the fact that it functions to add weight to an argument, or in this case, to 
76 Personal Origins, p. 6. 
77 See Chapter Three, p. 124, footnote 50. Rosalind Gill points out that a text producer's 
citation of' surveys' is highly persuasive and adds both a sense of authority and 
objectivity to their claims, distancing 'pertinent facts' from a standpoint of personal 
advantage. 
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adopting a perspective, that is removed from a standpoint of self-interest 
and, crucially, personal accountability. 
Furthermore, this is reminiscent of the techniques used in the bishop's 
statement that Grimwood discerned, where the freedom to have 
homosexual relationships was permitted, whilst at the same time it was 
made clear that this would be outside the borders of what constituted 
normal Christian morality. Other Christian ethics, such as celebrating 
reciprocal, mutually enriching and monogamous sexual relationships 
were not encompassed into a same-sex union. Correspondingly here, the 
Christian requirement to place the embryo at the centre of procreative 
morality is being formulated at the expense of promoting alternative 
ethical considerations. 
The construction of woman 
The techniques of disguising intent behind a softer approach are also 
deployed in determining the subject position of woman. As previously 
stated, more inclusive terminology is used in this report, in addition to 
the words 'couple' and 'parent', woman is often referred to as the 'female 
partner' signifying an equal status and reflecting current socio-linguistic 
trends used now to describe one's spouse, cohabitee or boy/girl friend of 
either sex. The comparative word count reveals that words used to 
import 'woman' occur 71 times and are rarely, if ever, used in tandem 
with the male counterpart, however, 44 of these instances arise in the 
first chapter and refer mostly to the body in describing assisted 
conception procedures. These citations are far less than those referring to 
the embryo, which is not surprising as the contents page demonstrates 
just how much of the document focuses on the embryo, not woman. 
The report's even-handedness in the aspect of gender terminology may 
seduce the reader into thinking that the report is according woman more 
visibility and ontological equality than either Donum Vitae or Nature. 
However, in common with those texts as well as the media accounts and 
the documentary, woman only features in the report in the context of her 
body parts and in relation to her role as wife and mother. By the role of 
wife, with regard to assisted conception, I refer to the constructed duty of 
providing a child for her husband. I propose in the following extracts to 
demonstrate how techniques operating in the discourse achieve this. 
The techniques that construct woman's subject position are deployed by 
an attitude of balance that belies a reality of unequal participation. In 
addition to the use of gender inclusive words, the document achieves its 
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equitable stance by comments such as, 'Infertility affects both sexes and it 
has many causes.'78 Yet, whilst this creates an impression of equal 
respect, nowhere in the document is it made explicit that it is woman, who 
shoulders almost all the investigations and treatment and consequently 
bears the total risk of experimental and established procedures as well as 
the considerable discomfort of these. In addition these burdens, together 
with those of embarrassment and work related difficulties, fall mostly on 
her, even, when the problem lies with the man. 
In the first chapter, it states that, 'In vitro fertilisation (IVF) can overcome 
female infertility, and may be regarded very broadly as the female 
equivalent of AIH.' (my italics for female)79 In light of this, consider 
paragraph 35, headed by the title 'Male infertility', just 5 pages later than 
theaboveconunent 
In around 40% of infertile couples the problem lies with the male rather than with 
the female. Again, the causes are many and AIH and DI are two techniques which 
can be used in such cases. More recent techniques may also involve in vitro fertilisation 
and are increasingly used to help couples where the males produce few active spenll. An 
example is ICSI (Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection) where an individual sperm is 
injected into an egg. Some concerns have been expressed about its risks connected 
with this technique; as with all new techniques, the HFEA is monitoring this 
closely.so (my emphasis) 
The paragraph opens with the statistic that in 40% of cases of infertility, 
'the problem lies with the male.' By listing AIH, DI and IVF as possible 
treatments for him, especially as it was previously stated that IVF is used 
to 'overcome female infertility,' the woman's part in undergoing 
treatment for her partner's medical condition is effectively hidden. Note 
too, that the use of the word' couple' in this extract, far from including 
woman, actually distances her from the reality of her participation. 
Ironically, this ethical dilemma does not feature in the lengthy 
theological considerations of bodily integrity, discussed in Chapter 2 of 
the document, which I shall examine in the next section on the embryo's 
construction. 
The final chapter on pastoral care continues in this vein. Whilst couched 
in the now familiar cosy language, paragraph 153 functions not only to 
subsume woman's greater involvement into the ubiquitous couple, but 
also it accords the man visibility in the sole physical activity that might 
cause him some distress. It reads as follows: 
78 Personal Origins, p. 8. 
79Personal Origins, p. 10 
so Personal Origins, p. 15. 
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In counselling couples who are unable to have children of their own it is important 
to bear in mind particular points in their experience. For example, where couples are 
unable to have children it is predominantly the woman who seeks professional help. 
Yet in around 40 per cent of cases it is the man who is infertile. This suggests that 
men have difficulty in coming to terms with infertility, and pastoral care may need 
to take account of this. It is also worth bearing in mind how daunting and 
discouraging it can be to couples when seeking help to be faced with the routines of 
infertility clinics involving the giving of endless personal histories to doctors, and 
the requirement to masturbate to order. Some clinics are more sensitive than others. 
It can be very humiliating for a couple. (my italics)81 
In this extract, following the claim that it is the woman who is more 
likely to seek professional help, the reader's attention is drawn again to 
the fact that in 40% of infertility cases, the difficulties lie with the man. 
This acts as a textual device giving man visibility in the discourse. It 
allows the next sentence to flow naturally without causing any 
incongruity. Yet, the fact that more women seek professional help than 
men does not' suggest that men have more difficulty in coming to terms 
with infertility' at all. It is a completely arbitrary conclusion to make that 
does not take into account a multiplicity of socio-cultural factors, and 
furthermore, it ignores a patently obvious fact. For, the prospect that a 
couple might be infertile begins with the lack of conception taking place 
within the woman's body, consequently, it has to be woman who first 
seeks help, whatever the reason might be. 
As she will be the partner upon whom the greater weight is placed in 
terms of deciding how far to go with medical procedures on her body, it 
is little wonder that she may be predominant in seeking guidance and 
support. Woman's invisibility is so entrenched that even when her need 
for emotional support becomes statistically evident, the text producers 
have turned this around calling for pastoral care to take more account of 
the male partner. Having highlighted man, the paragraph continues to 
describe the rigours of treatment in terms of the 'couple', obscuring, yet 
again, woman's part. By singling out for sympathetic comment the man's 
requirement to masturbate, the text continues to privilege male bodily 
integrity over woman's. 
I am fully aware that masturbating to order is difficult; my point is not to 
disparage the man's part, but to demonstrate that the weight of concern, 
and more crucially, textual visibility, is utterly disproportionate to the 
reality of the situation. Furthermore, the empathy given to the infertile 
man that is not commensurately given to the infertile woman, 
demonstrates an ideological position. For despite references to the 
81 Personal Origins, p. 67. 
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contrary as this sentence alludes, I A couple may need reassuring that 
their sexual relationship in their marriage is valid, God-given, loving and 
responsible even though children are not conceived,'82 the hidden 
message of the text is that the infertile wife has failed her husband in her 
only valued role. 
The one place in the whole document, where this emphasis is different, is 
in the quotation taken from the HFE Act, which appears in paragraph 
147. I have reproduced the entire paragraph to demonstrate the contrast 
of style and prioritisation: 
The needs of people seeking pastoral support will vary not only according to their 
own personal reactions and experience but also according to the quality of service 
offered to them by any agencies with which they may be in touch or considering 
approaching. The HFE Act recognises the importance of this aspect for it states that 
I A woman shall not be provided with any treatment services ... unless the woman 
being treated, and where she is being treated together with a man, the man have been 
given a suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling about the implications of 
taking the proposed steps and have been provided with such relevant information 
as is proper: The HFEA Code of Practice gives detailed instructions as to how this 
should be carried out83 (my italics) 
The HFE Act's quotation deals with the reality of the NRTs in that it 
recognises woman to be the person who undergoes treatment and, 
furthermore, that she may, or may not, be doing so with a male partner. 
The construction of the embryo 
The historical trajectory of the abortion debate is especially pertinent to 
this report. The Church of England's publication, Abortion: An Ethical 
Discussion, which preceded the 1967 Abortion Act, had permitted 
abortion in certain circumstances. However, after the implementation of 
the Act, as had been the case in the Church of Scotland, some members 
expressed disquiet concerning the numbers of abortions being 
performed.84 The advent of IVF provided the Board of Social 
Responsibility with an opportunity to reconsider the moral status of the 
embryo, as the excerpt cited on page 163 demonstrated. The working 
party found that they were divided on the issue, and whilst the report 
illuminates their equivocation by overtly stating, and respecting, two 
opposing stances on the moral status of the embryo, nonetheless, the 
82 Personal Origins, p. 67. 
83Personal Origins, p. 65. 
84 K. Boyd et aI, Life Before Birth, p. 31. 
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consequence of this is an ambivalent outcome.85 One opinion stresses the 
inviolability of the embryo from fertilisation; the other considers 
consciousness (occurring at approximately 40 days after conception) to 
be the arbitrating factor in deciding moral status and concludes that 
prior to differentiation the embryo has fewer claims to equal statuS.86 
What is striking about this report, in terms of correlating discourses, is 
that abortion was still an issue for the Church of England, whereas, 
unlike the Roman Catholic Church, contraception was not. Significantly, 
contraception has been traditionally discussed within the contextual 
framework of disrupting the unitive and procreative bonds rather than 
within the abortion debate. In the chapter entitled 'Marriage and the 
family', the document states, 'Anglicans usually hold that love may be 
expressed through sexual intercourse even when the use of 
contraceptives prevents the possibility of procreation, and that it is quite 
proper to plan both the number and timing of children within a 
marriage.'87 There is no caveat to say that only certain forms of 
contraception should be used. Yet, it is well known that the intrauterine 
device and certain types of pill work by preventing embryo 
implantation, and therefore, will involve the destruction of the early 
embryo. It is precisely because this line of thinking ensues from a 
different archaeological directive that the issue of the embryo's moral 
status does not become a stumbling block to the use of contraceptives. 
Moreover, I would contend that the disparity over the moral status of the 
embryo contained in this report arises from the construction of the 
embryo as fully human, which has transformed into the NRT discourses 
from traditional abortion rhetoric. The moral status of the embryo 
dominates the report's content, which, as with Donum Vitae, emphasises 
the text producers' ideational emphasis to the reader about what is 
deemed to be important. The comparative word count further illustrates 
this preoccupation in that the words to denote the unborn child occur 
165 times, and this does not include the adjective embryonic, which is 
frequently used. In addition, the following example demonstrates this 
construction functioning in the text. 
85 The Church of England's acceptance of IVF'in principle' has the following caveat 
'Some of us, however, are not able to support IVF in practice.' This is due to the 
destruction or experimentation of the early embryo that practical application of IVF 
incurs. Personal Origins p. 56. 
86 Personal Origins, pp. 38-40. 
87 Personal Origins, p. 47. 
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Chapter 2, entitled 'Human dominion' is Personal Origin's theological 
interpretation of human behaviour, which is equivalent to Donum Vitae's 
anthropological vision, particularly the section headed 'Jesus Christ and 
the Divine purpose'.88 Certain ambiguities arise here that are similar to 
those elicited in Donum Vitae', whereby the discussion regarding the 
importance of the harmony between body and spirit (para. 66) 
conceptualises an embodied entity in the mind of the reader. As the 
subject matter of the report is generated from procedures undertaken on 
women's actual bodies, the following paragraph could easily have been 
talking about the role of woman in assisted conception, as the embryo 
does not yet have a body. Paragraph 67 reads thus: 
We tum from this to consider the subject of the often quoted warning that personal 
dominion over ourselves threatens to become the dominion of some people over 
other people. The covenant we make one with another, our equality before God and within 
the community offtllowship, may be threatened ifwe view one another only as a body which 
may be used for whatever good purpose we choose. The existence of codes of ethics (such 
as the Hippocratic Oath and the Helsinki Declaration) governing scientific 
experiments on human subjects is clear acknowledgement of this. Indeed we can 
learn from the limits imposed by these codes. (my emphasis) 
The highlighted sentence could have referred to the use of woman's 
body in treating another's medical condition, or it might have alluded to 
the experimental nature of the NRTs, whereby woman's consent to risky 
procedures is complicated by issues of trust in the medical profession 
and desperation on her part to become pregnant at any cost. These are 
valid ethical concerns about consent, power and the psychological 
pressure that is placed on woman to achieve subjectivity through 
motherhood. However, in later paragraphs, it becomes clear that this is a 
preamble to considering the ethics of embryo experimentation. 
Paragraph 71 includes the following comment: 'It is clear that 
experiments on embryos would be difficult to justify under these general 
principles on consent, because of the qualification concerning actual 
harm, and on either the maximum or minimal (proxy) notions of the 
meaning of consent' 
I am not suggesting that embryo experimentation is not an important 
issue. My point is that by couching this discussion in such terms as 'the 
value placed on the body' and 'bodily life' (para. 66), a construction of 
embodied existence in the embryo is being established in the mind of the 
reader before the ontological status of the embryo is debated in the 
following chapter. A tally of words denoting 'body' in the section, 'Jesus 
Christ and the divine purpose' (pp.28-31) reveals the citation of 
88Personal Origins, p. 28-31. 
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'body / ies' 17 times and' embodied' twice. In this light, it is ironic that the 
Warnock Report's recommendations of protection to the embryo from 
the appearance of the primitive streak, when individual development is 
established, is closer to the report's requirement of bodily integrity than 
its own divided working party's stipulation of consciousness at 40 days. 
What is happening in this document is comparable to the constructions 
of 'nature' discussed by Macnaghten in his analysis of a public inquiry 
into planning application for a landfill site, which I have previously 
referred to in Chapter One.89 In his analysis, Macnaghten demonstrated 
that three different constructions of nature were being deployed 
interchangeably creating ambiguities of meaning. In his summing up he 
says: 
And finally, it illustrates how these processes of argumentation were constrained 
by, and determinant of, external sources of power in a framework of social 
relationships. In other words, arguments over nature could not be seen as free 
floating but constrained and limited by existing power structures of what was 
permitted to count.90 (my emphasis) 
Similarly, here the archaeological trajectories of different lines of 
thinking permit the embryo to count in the NRT discourses, but not in 
those discussing contraception, because arguments over the embryo are 
not 'free floating', but are constrained by, as 'nature' was above, power 
structures that continue to operate through the transmutation and 
correlation of discourses. 
Summary of the discourse analysis 
Personal Origins, like Donum Vitae, is an expert treatise. However, its 
direction and tone are different; it deploys inclusive interpretive cues, 
such as using personal pronouns to seduce the reader to its ideational 
position and by encouraging the freedom to hold a range of views. Its 
open, easily readable, linguistic style invites non-clerical Christians to 
read it, thereby encompassing and involving a wider readership beyond 
the theological community and interested clinicians. Whilst this may 
seem at first to be a far more concerted approach than Donum Vitae to 
dealing with the issues of the NRTs, its framework and constructed 
subject positions of woman and the embryo demonstrate that a similar 
agenda is still operating. Ironically, as Foucault first illustrated and 
Grimwood discerned in the bishops' statement, such an approach is 
89See Chapter One, p. 10. 
90 P. Macnaghten, 'Discourses of Nature:' p. 69. 
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more powerful than the didactic, proscriptive stance taken by the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
In addition, I have demonstrated that woman remains hidden and the 
report does not address the monumental issues that affect her and her 
bodily integrity regarding the harmony of spirit and flesh that is so 
crucial to the divine anthropological vision. The disregard of her 
personhood is more insidious in this statement, than in Donum Vitae, 
because it is less obvious and becomes, therefore, more likely to be 
accepted. Without undertaking discourse analysis, it is difficult to 
challenge just how this text is functioning to undermine her well-being 
and to demonstrate that, despite its protestations to the contrary, the text 
producers have further entrenched the adversarial conflict of woman and 
her embryo. For, whilst the report does not forbid IVF outright, 
nevertheless, its total lack of recognition of woman's part leaves her 
without a valid claim to, or an understanding of, the critical pastoral 
advocacy that she is due in dealing with the feelings of hopelessness 
engendered by infertility and the biomedical minefield of the NRTs. 
Conclusion 
These analyses of two ecclesiastic reports demonstrate that the church 
has imbibed constructions of woman that are deleterious to her and in so 
doing, they have foreclosed both pastoral and prophetic opportunities of 
advocacy. Moreover, there is no reflection in either document about how 
much emphasis the institutional church itself places on the status of 
motherhood, leaving woman psychically bereft when that option is 
denied her. How ironic is the case that these male ethics should continue 
to playa part in preventing woman from achieving the motherhood that 
they so persistently urge upon her. In Chapter Five, I propose to 
interrogate the wider theological community to ascertain whether 
woman's subject position of invisibility has been noted and challenged 
by those who have engaged with the NRTs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
APPRAISING MAINSTREAM TEXTS FROM THE WIDER 
THEOLOGICAL COMMUNITY 
But if these fears are acknowledged, do they form a proper basis for moral 
judgement? Is the 'unnatural' wrong because we designate it so out of fear? I do not 
think so. I believe that we ought to face our fears and recognize them for what they 
are: the fear of losing our certainty about natural laws by allowing everything that is 
possible to be tried; and the fear of losing touch with nature as it is, of alienating 
ourselves from that of which as human beings we form a part We should not deny 
or ridicule, or otherwise attempt to dismiss, such fears.1 
Mary Warnock, 2002. 
Truth-seeking requires a necessary asceticism; it calls upon us to give up what we 
are tempted to cling to for the wrong reasons.2 
Richard Holloway, 1997. 
In summarising the findings of Chapter Four, it would appear that the 
discourses of the church reports reflect a similarly constructed subject 
position of woman to that, which is found in the secular press and 
scientific treatises. If anything, the De Beaviourian analysis of woman as 
'incidental' unless, or until, she gains transcendence through service as 
wife and mother, is demonstrated even more sharply by the church 
statements on human fertilisation. For, in these documents, woman only 
becomes visible when her lack or rebellion to this end is evident, that is, 
when she deviates from her role by aborting a fetus or refuses repeated 
pregnancy in the case of the Roman Catholic Church. In the case of the 
more muted style of Personal Origins, woman's failure to produce a child 
for her husband is signified by the disproportionate sympathy given to 
him in the IVF process, when it is she who must undergo the rigours of 
treatment. What remains hidden, in both cases, is her particular pain of 
infertility with the inherent social and family shame and isolation 
together with the uncertainty of varying investigations and 
experimental, often unsuccessful, procedures. 
Mirroring Harding's premise regarding traditional notions of objectivity, 
my contentions are that the church has taken a view that is both too 
narrow and too broad and has thereby missed vital issues in need of 
1 M. Warnock, Making babies: Is There a Right to have Children? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 83. 
2 R. Holloway, Dancing on the Edge, (London: Fount Paperbacks, 1997), p. 194. 
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theological critique, prophetic opportunity and pastoral support.3 Its 
view is too narrow, not because it draws on Scripture, but more 
importantly, because it turns to the traditionally selected texts and 
accompanying discourses that have formed ecclesiastical opinion 
throughout the centuries without taking into account any contemporary, 
deconstructive, hermeneutical insights from the plethora of liberation, 
feminist, queer, body and post-modem theologies available. 
Furthermore, it has chosen to ignore the texts on infertility and 
surrogacy, which feature in the Hebrew Bible, and which might be a 
source of contemplation, preferring instead to focus on references to the 
embryo.4 
It is too broad because it uses a framework that is constructed on ethical 
convictions of universality, which purports that the impartial, objective, 
abstract, principle-led rationality is the definitive method for moral 
deliberation, consequently, ignoring context and particularity as valid 
considerations. An imperative question to ask is; 'Is this ethical structure 
deployed or critiqued by other Christian commentators?' In Chapter 2, 
Grimwood's analysis of the bishops' statement demonstrated how 
influential expert, church reports are to the theological community, but 
nevertheless, in mounting a substantial critique against the framework 
deployed by the church, it would be prudent to explore Christian 
opinion beyond the confines of the ecclesiastical elite. 
In order to do this effectively, I propose to undertake an archaeological 
critique of three mainstream theological texts on the NRTs, which will be 
comparable to Graham's interrogation of popular science fiction 
narratives. The three publications that I have selected are Fertility and 
Faith by Brendan McCarthy, Reproductive Technology by Brent Waters and 
The Ethics of IVF by Anthony Dyson. My rationale for choosing these 
three particular texts is that, in each case, the author has expressed 
dissatisfaction with the perimeters of the current debate and seeks to 
take a different standpoint from the status quo. The fact that these 
authors hold this view is indicative of both the sheer complexity of the 
issues and also the inadequate ecclesiastical response to them. As I 
discussed in Chapter One, the success of discourses analysis is not 
dependent upon sample size, consequently an interrogation of three 
3 See Chapter One, p. 8. 
4 The stories of Abraham, Sarah and Hagar (Gen. Chapters, 15-21); Isaac and Rebekah 
(Gen.25:21); Jacob, Rachel and Leah (Gen. Chapters, 29 & 31); Hannah at the temple (1 
Sam., Chapter 1) and Elizabeth and Zachariah (Luke 1:5-2) all illustrate the anguish of 
infertility . 
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texts, in which each are seeking to find an alternative vantage point, 
merits a credible source for critique.s 
My interrogation of these works will be primarily an archaeological 
examination of their systems of thinking, in the Foucauldian sense, 
rather than reviewing their arguments per se. I will outline the text 
producer's perception of the specific shortcomings that he wishes to 
overcome, thereby eliciting his identity, and compare these with my own 
contentions. Thereafter, I will be more concerned with how the discourse 
constructs woman and the embryo, and the ethical framework that has 
been deployed to do so, in line with the premises of this thesis, rather 
than discerning whether the text fulfils its own objectives. 
B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith: The ethics of human fertilisation, 
(Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1997) 
The aims and objectives of the book 
The first question to ask of these three publications is 'what was the 
author's critical premise for seeking a different approach?' In McCarthy's 
case, his primary objection was that he considered the Warnock Report, 
which was, in his opinion, pivotal in establishing the agenda for assisted 
conception, to be lacking in its failure to produce a coherent relationship 
between law and morality and also in its ambivalent deliberations with 
regard to reason and sentiment in moral decision-making. Consequently, 
he felt the need to revisit Warnock in order to clarify his objections and 
states: 
We can be sure, then, that the correct starting-place for our investigation of human 
fertilization and embryology is to examine the agenda set by the Warnock Report 
The Warnock debate was not concluded by the publishing of the committee's report; 
it still continues today.6 
He does, however, acknowledge and share Mary Warnock's prioritising 
of the moral status of the embryo as the 'greatest single concern' and 
reflects that in his study.? 
A further issue for McCarthy was the churches' response to Warnock, 
particularly in their varied approaches and disparate outcomes 
5 See Chapter One, p. 43. 
6 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith: The ethics afhuman fertilisation, (Leicester: Inter-Varsity 
Press, 1997), p. 13. 
7 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 8. 
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(conversely, I have argued in Chapter Four, that their perspectives were 
remarkably convergent, despite the differing results), which he believes 
led to a confusing Christian message to the world. For McCarthy, 
Christian morality is established by doing God's will and he puts his case 
thus: 
To act in a morally correct manner is to act in accordance with God's will. Certainly, 
it is difficult to see how a Christian could argue that to obey God's will would be to 
act in an immoral manner or that to disobey it would be to act in a moral manner.8 
He draws on the work of Brunner, Barth and Bonhoeffer to defend his 
case, but unfortunately does not address the most quintessential problem 
for believers, which is the discernment of what God's will is in any given 
context. Such difficulties occupied Kathleen Sands in her theological 
deliberations on evil when she said: 
When I fight injustices - for example, those suffered by lesbians and gay men - I am 
uneasily aware that there is no higher ground from which to adjudicate the 
differences between me and my opponents over what is "natural" or "jusf'; what I 
judge to be culpable evil, they assess as natural good.9 
In his quest to promote a unifying theological premise upon which all 
Christians can agree, McCarthy misses the irony of his position in two 
aspects. Firstly, the anomalies of combining philosophical principles and 
sentiment in the Warnock Report, which he asserts are problematic, are 
comparative to the difficulties inherent in determining ethics based on 
reason and revelation, which he promotes. For, in both cases, the 
problem of dealing with emotional, intuitive or spiritual responses in a 
paradigm of thinking that cannot contain, and often devalues, non-
rational aspects of human understanding, will always cause 
discrepancies unless the system itself is scrutinised.1° Secondly, his 
disparagement of utilitarianism illustrates precisely the very dilemmas 
that exist in using God's will as a means of working out what action is 
morally sound. He states: 
Since, in utilitarianism, we must make moral decisions on the basis of our own 
interpretation of any given situation, utilitarianism proves to be a very uncertain 
foundation for ethics.ll 
8 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 24. 
9 K. Sands, Escape from Paradise, p. ix. 
10 I have used the term 'non-rational' to mean understanding that is not reached by 
reason alone, that is, which includes spiritual or emotional thinking. I do not believe 
this is 'irrational', but it is outside the perimeters of uncontextualised reason, which is a 
model of epistemology that I have already discussed as being problematic in Chapter 
One,p.n. 
11 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 30. 
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The identity of the text producer 
The first point to make about McCarthy's identity as the text producer is 
his adherence, already demonstrated in part, to a principle-led 
framework that seeks universality. This is further illustrated by the fact 
that on the book's back cover, the following information is given: 
Brendan McCarthy is a pastor of a community church 
In Northern Ireland. 
After their first two children died at birth 
due to a rare medical condition, 
He and his wife began to investigate infertilihj treatments 
and faced the question of which, if any, 
were compatible with their faith. 
This book grew out of that initial research. 
Presumably, this tragic history is mentioned to inform prospective 
buyers that McCarthy has had personal experience of the issues 
discussed in his book. However, this is the only time that his story is 
disclosed, it is never discussed in the text itself, which suggests his 
investment in an objective, value-free epistemological model that would 
not brook any subjective input. Indeed, he is critical of feelings having 
any part in moral decision-making, from his analysis of Warnock, 
despite the fact, ironically, that the book itself was initiated by them. Yet, 
the detailed critique of this epistemological model undertaken in Chapter 
One of this thesis, demonstrated that eschewing one's partial and 
particular context leaves one's subjective view undeclared, and far from 
strengthening a study, it becomes hidden in the 'view from nowhere' 
insightfully described by Haraway. 
McCarthy provides evidence of this by his use the personal pronouns 
'we' and 'our' that he deploys in his linguistic style and which act as 
interpersonal, interpretive cues, invoking complicity in the reader, to 
support his ideational directives. For example, he says, 'Once again, we 
may be tempted to go for a simple, clear-cut statement of principle: the 
Bible is God's Word and must be obeyed.' (my italics)12 The 
epistemological difficulties of an unacknowledged standpoint are made 
apparent in this extract, as the technique of assuming that 'we' might all 
be in agreement in interpreting 'God's Word' permits a subjective 
viewpoint to lose its accountability. I will give a second example of this 
in the next section; for, as this technique is indicative of McCarthy's 
identity, it can be used to determine his stake in the traditional 
constructions of woman. 
12 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 36. 
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The construction of woman in the text 
The book's contents page, which includes chapters on Warnock, the 
embryo, sexual ethics and theological responses to NRT procedures, 
together with McCarthy's stated priorities, suggest that woman is absent 
from this text, except in the context of her body with regard to assisted 
conception technologies and what is expected of her regarding sexual 
ethics in marriage as defined by ecclesiastic tradition. What is 
noteworthy from the author's Preface, is that, on two occasions, he 
acknowledges the potential of feminist commentary to his research, but 
then discards the opportunity of drawing on this resource. These two 
instances are cited here: 
While it would be interesting to examine the Warnock debate from the perspective 
of humanist or feminist or medical contributors, the objective of this book is to 
concentrate on ethical and theological implications of the debate, viewed from a 
Christian perspective.13 
Yet, over the next page, Christian feminist commentary is also omitted: 
Other topics, such as the wider implications of scientific intrusion into the processes 
of reproduction or the distinctive insights of feminist theology, are not dealt with here; 
interesting as these topics are, they were not to the fore in establishing current 
United Kingdom legislation. (my italics)14 
In the first excerpt, McCarthy chooses to eschew feminist, oppositional 
discourses because they are not relevant to a Christian viewpoint and in 
the second quotation feminist theologies are not used as a critical 
resource because they were not consulted in the original debate. Yet, as 
already discussed, McCarthy's principal objection to the Warnock Report 
was that it did not fully explore the issues involved at the time and his 
primary aim in writing the book is to address that failing. He claims his 
study will encompass the following remit 
The debate and its underlying principles are explored from legal, medical, 
philosophical, ethical, theological and practical purposes. One of the disappointing 
features of the debate which took place was that contributars tended to approach the 
subject from too narrow a perspective; this is also true of many books written since the 
publication of the Warnock Report. (my emphasis)15 
In the light of his intended propositions, his rationales for excluding 
feminist commentary on a topic that primarily affects the bodies and 
13 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 7. 
14 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 8. 
15 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 9. 
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lives of women require critical analysis. I would attribute this omission 
to the process of objectification, illuminated by the Foucauldian insights 
discussed in Chapter One and revealed in Grimwood's analysis of the 
bishops' statement. In this particular case the technique has rendered 
woman's reproductive passivity and personal invisibility to become so 
entrenched in the ecclesiastical discourses surrounding procreation that 
it has become 'unthinkable' to consider her involvement as having 
anything relevant to contribute. I would also contend that McCarthy has 
imbibed the hostility towards the 'rebellious' woman that is inherent in 
the constructions of the church reports. This can be deduced from his 
discussions on abortion. 
In the first chapter, 'The agenda set by Warnock', he traces the trajectory 
of abortion legislation and misses the irony of his following justification 
for doing so: 
The Warnock Committee did not meet in a vacuum. Existing laws provided a basis 
for the committee's deliberations, and those laws carried with them the ethical 
principles on which they were founded. It would have been asking too much, perhaps, to 
have hoped that the Warnock Committee would have returned to first principles in 
examining crucial issues such as the status of the human embryo. Almost inevitably, 
the committee chose to build on existing laws and attitudes without any detailed questioning 
of their underlying principles. (my italics) 16 
I have drawn attention in the excerpt to both McCarthy's interpretive 
subjectivity, in the first emphasis, and to his lack of appreciation that his 
critique of the committee describes precisely his position of building on 
existing (ecclesiastical) laws and attitudes without any detailed 
questioning of their underlying systems of thinking, in the second. 
In his appraisal of the Bourne case, McCarthy uses the interpersonal cue 
of the pronoun 'us' to promote his standpoint regarding the effect this 
pivotal case had on abortion law. Briefly, the obstetrician, Mr. Bourne 
undertook an abortion on a 15-year-old girl, who had been raped, and 
was acquitted on the grounds, previously established in the 1929 Act, 
that to continue the pregnancy would endanger the girl's life. 
McCarthy's comment is illuminating: 
The most significant point, for us, is the fact that at no time did Bourne believe the 
girl was in danger of dying as a result of the pregnancy. He carried out the abortion 
because he believed that the health of the girl was at risk due to psychological 
pressures placed upon her by the rape and pregnancy. The judge, in his summing 
up, stated that if the continuance of a pregnancy was likely to result in the woman 
becoming a physical or mental wreck, then a doctor who performed an abortion in 
16 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 13. 
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that honest belief can be said to have acted in order to preserve the woman's life. 
(my italics) 17 
Firstly, it is important to point out just how effective the two small 
words, 'for us' are as an interpersonal technique and a marker of the text 
producer's identity. In a reading for content, these will be unconsciously 
seducing the reader into a complicit position with the author's 
undeclared standpoint, and thereby be constructing the discursive fields 
of what constitutes the 'right' viewpoint; it is a technique of 
normalisation. Secondly, McCarthy's description of the judge's summing 
up is not given in quotation marks and therefore the characterisation of a 
woman 'becoming a physical or mental wreck' is presumably his 
polemical interpretation. His use of derogatory terms to comment upon 
such a human tragedy serves to underscore his covert subject position, 
his eschewing of a relational context and his acceptance of the 
unfavourable, ecclesiastic construction of woman as described in the 
analysis of the church reports. 
This assertion can be further discerned in Chapter 4, 'The status of the 
human embryo: a theological approach.' Under the heading, 'Christian 
Tradition', quotations are cited from eminent church fathers such as, 
Arthenagoras, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Minicus Felix, Gregory, 
Jerome and Augustine of Hippo to elicit their thoughts on the status of 
the unborn child. What is notable, but not surprising, about these ancient 
citations is that, in nearly every case, woman alone is condemned for, not 
only abortion, but also for the 'sin' of an unwanted pregnancy. Consider 
the examples in these extracts: 
What sense does it make to think of us as murderers when we see women who 
practise abortion are murderers and will render account to God for abortion? [my 
emphasis] (Arthenagoras in his apology to pagan charges that Christians were 
murderers)18 
Women who, in order to conceal fornication, make use of deadly medicines which lead 
directly to ruin, destroy all humanity along with the fetus. [my emphasis] (Clement 
of Alexandria)19 
Others, when they find they are with child as a result of their sin, practice abortion 
with drugs, and so frequently bring about their own death, taking with them to the 
lower world the guilt of three crimes: suicide, adultery against Christ and child-
murder. [my emphasis](Jerome, on the fate of consecrated Christian virgins found 
with child)2° 
17 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 16. 
18 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 90. 
19 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, pp. 90-1. 
20 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 94. 
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McCarthy has critiqued Warnock for using existing laws and attitudes in 
formulating policy, but here he is actively pursuing the same course. For, 
whilst there is a clear directive from the tradition on the perils of 
abortion, it is imbibed with an attitude that constructs woman as totally 
blameworthy. In his quest to seek guidance on the moral status of the 
embryo from theological treatises, he makes no attempt to deconstruct 
their polemic against woman. Recalling the Foucauldian mantra of 
'otherwise', it should be noted that the text producer felt there was not 
space in his study for feminist insights, yet he chose to include a plethora 
of quotations from ancient texts that now form part of his discourse with 
their constructions of woman remaining intact. 
For, far from disassembling this ideological stance, McCarthy follows 
these quotations with the following claim: 
These comments are unambiguous in their condemnation of abortion and those who 
practise it Other less orthodox second-century writings, such as the Apocalypse of 
Peter and the Christian Sibyllines, delight in describing in lurid detail the horrors and 
torments awaiting those who procure abortions and are consigned to hell for their 
sinS.21 (my emphasis) 
Critically, in his first sentence, he aligns himself with the traditional 
discourses and their condemnation of woman, by the use of the word 
'unambiguous' , and by choosing not to acknowledge contextual 
considerations, either towards the dual responsibility for an unwanted 
conception (if consensual, otherwise the responsibility would be man's 
alone), or towards the extremely vulnerable position that this eventuality 
would place woman in. In his second sentence, the use of the word 
'delight' is significant. In the first place, the word is his choice, and 
without critique, it becomes a stance that he does not disassociate himself 
from. Secondly, it might seem to those readers who hold a more 
uncertain position on the 'will of God' that drawing on a Christian 
tradition, which' delights' in the suffering of others is an unsuitable 
foundation for moral arbitration. 
In Chapter 8, entitled, 'Egg and embryo donation', McCarthy provides 
an illuminating example of woman's construction within his theological 
treatise. The paragraph reads thus: 
As we have seen, in 01, the sperm of a third party is used to inseminate a woman in 
order to fulfil a function which her husband is not able to fulfil. In accepting such a 
treatment, a woman or a couple must accept a degree of intrusion into their 
21 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 91. 
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relationship, even if this cannot be equated with adultery. In the case of egg 
donation, a third party must also be used, but in this case the woman accepts from 
another woman something which she is unable to provide for herself: a healthy 
ovum. In this instance there is, at most, minimal intrusion into the marital 
relationship, for what is happening is not something which can ever be mirrored 
naturally within marriage. The woman is not accepting something which in a 
natural way she could have received from her husband as part of their sexual life 
together, while, of course, the husband is not receiving anything. In some ways it 
may be suggested that egg donation resembles organ donation more than it does DI, 
for there are no sexual overtones in receiving an egg from another woman as there 
are in receiving sperm from a man.22 
It is worth reiterating that my aim here is not to argue for or against 
gamete donation, rather to discern from this passage how woman is 
being constructed. 
In this extract, the transmuted discourses of church tradition, 
anachronistic and socio-biological notions of procreation and woman's 
constructed absence can all be discerned. These transmutations correlate 
with the ecclesiastical doctrine concerning the marital bond and to what 
extent it is broken by gamete donation. In the first sentence the 
discursive scene is initiated by describing the infertile man, as having a 
'function' he is unable to fulfil, whereas later on in the passage, woman is 
depicted as being unable to 'provide' from her body. The mirroring of 
male agency in giving life and female passivity in providing her body are 
reconstructed in different ways throughout the text. It should also be 
noted that the text producer uses the words 'husband' and 'woman', not 
wife, in this extract, reflecting his ideational privileging of not only 
specified male over unspecified female, but also as a projected 
transference onto the gametes, giving sperm greater precedence than 
ova. 
McCarthy claims that in undergoing DI, 'a couple must accept a degree 
of intrusion into their relationship, even if this cannot be equated with 
adultery', but later on states that in egg donation, 'there is, at most, 
minimal intrusion into the marital relationship'. He maintains that sperm 
donation is the greater intrusive act, because this can be achieved by 
natural means, whereas ovum donation cannot. I would contend that 
this fact has no relevance; if it has been established that DI is not 
commensurate with adultery because it is consensual and marital 
betrayal has not taken place, then to say it is more intrusive because it 
could be undertaken by an adulterous act, is an absurdity. Furthermore, 
he does not take into account that sperm donation is far less intrusive as a 
procedure than the invasive, painful, complex, drug induced, potentially 
22 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 194. 
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dangerous process that is required to extract eggs. The fact that such 
aspects of practice are excluded from the text is itself indicative of 
woman's subjective absence. 
The ideological objections that the churches have to masturbation in AIH 
and DI, derived from anachronistic notions of 'wasting seed' that were 
based upon ancient, and incorrect, understandings of reproductive 
biology are present in the discursive fields of this passage. For, 
Aristotle's assertion that woman provided the nurturing' soil' for the 
seed to grow, but did not have a 'seed' of her own to contribute, retains 
an ideological strand in this discourse. 23 It can be discerned by the idea 
that there is a 'minimal intrusion' in receiving donated eggs compared to 
DI and by the fact that greater weight is given to ecclesiastical objections 
to masturbation than to the realities of producing male gametes. 
In the third sentence, McCarthy refers directly to egg donation and his 
choice of verbs is significant, 'In the case of egg donation, a third party 
must also be used, but in this case the woman accepts from another 
woman something which she is unable to provide for herself: a healthy 
ovum.' Imagine how unthinkable it would be to switch this around and 
write that a man accepts something from another man that he is unable 
to provide for himself (which really means, if roles are reversed, for his 
wife): healthy sperm. The next sentence continues, 'The woman is not 
accepting something which in a natural way she could have received from 
her husband as part of their sexual life together, while, of course, the 
husband is not receiving anything'. Critically, in this sentence, the author 
has drawn upon the discursive notion that what is ideologically vital, is 
that the woman is the passive recipient, not the husband. 
In addition, the sperm is privileged as the gamete of agency and sole 
importance, promoting the womb as a critical location for its nurturing, 
ra ther than the egg as being of any consequence. Not only is woman's 
hidden personhood transposed on to her ova, but also what is revealed 
here, is that serving her husband's desire for his gamete to be given life is 
being constructed as having greater importance to her, than her desire for 
her own gamete's potential to be realised. I am well aware that it is 
obvious that such a choice would only be considered if a woman could 
not produce her own eggs for any reason, however, in terms of discourse 
analysis, this is irrelevant. What is crucial is how the text producer 
constructs woman's subject position in the text as he argues his case. 
23 Norman Ford provides an illuminating account of Aristotle's biological and 
philosophical understanding of human reproduction in his book, When did I begin?, p. 
25-36. 
183 
The construction of the embryo 
McCarthy admits that the moral status of the embryo is his primary 
ethical consideration and he devotes almost a third of the book 
specifically to defending the embryo's status as commensurate with an 
adult's. He says, 'We ought to emphasize that the human embryo is to be 
treated, in principle, with the same respect as a human child or adult.'24 
The caveat, 'in principle', is due to the acceptance that 'a right to life is 
not absolute'.25 He splits his defence into a biblical and a theological 
approach to the issues. In Chapter 3, 'The status of the human embryo: a 
biblical approach,' he cites texts that provide evidence of God's intention 
for individuals, not only whilst they are in still in the womb, but even 
before conception. Jeremiah 1:5 perfectly illustrates this: 
Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, 
and before you were born I consecrated you; 
I appointed you a prophet to the nations.26 
McCarthy continues to put his case for all embryos based on these 
readings when he says: 
What may be said of these men because of their distinctive calling can, it must be 
presumed, also be said of every individual who may have a more general or less 
spectacular role to fulfil God's purposeS.27 
However, God's call to individuals could equally be used to justify all 
methods of assisted conception. Simply put, if every individual is called 
by God to come into being before they are conceived, and if fertility is a 
gift from God, as is later argued, then, following this line of reasoning, 
no child could come into being through the NRTs, if God had not willed 
it so. Furthermore, with regard to theodicy, such an interpretation could 
be problematic for those whose conception was wrought with suffering, 
such as through rape, or resulting in a debilitating congenital condition 
or being born addicted to heroin or infected with HIV. Even McCarthy 
experiences difficulties with this line of thinking as this later excerpt 
illustrates: 
This does not necessarily suggest, however, that every embryo is a person, since 
there is no way of proving that every embryo is 'called', only that every 'called' 
person must at some time be an embryo.28 
24 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 137. 
25 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 207. 
26 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, quoted on p. 71. 
27 B. McCarthy, FertilihJ and Faith, p. 71. 
28 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 87. 
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I would contend that McCarthy is unaware of the inherent difficulties in 
trying to establish 'first principles' using scripture and tradition, without 
first deconstructing the textual framework, or establishing a theological 
standpoint regarding God's will. For, in his text, God has become the 
view from nowhere. In addition, there is no recognition that the 
churches' working parties may also have had similar difficulties, 
resulting in the disparate response that McCarthy claimed was confusing 
to the world. 
In the latter half of the book, McCarthy considers specific procedures of 
the NRTs in separate chapters and includes a clear and concise 
description of the various official denominational responses to each one. 
However, in his appraisal of the various NRTs, McCarthy deliberates on 
the moral validity of the techniques from the standpoint of the embryo, 
constructed as a vulnerable, fully human being. However, as the text 
producer is McCarthy, not the embryo, it is McCarthy's undeclared, 
subjective view, which has imbibed the ecclesiastic constructions, that 
transmutes through the discourse. Whilst this perspective offers some 
important safeguards regarding the commodification of potential 
children as products, nevertheless, it is not always argued from this 
viewpoint, rather the interests of the embryo are paramount. An example 
of this can be deduced from the discussion on spare embryos in the 
chapter on IVF. One option discussed would be to offer an unwanted 
embryo to another woman. McCarthy comments thus: 
This situation would, of course, be highly unsatisfactory, but we are placed in this 
position because we have to try and balance the importance of the life of the embryo 
with the importance of maintaining the link between genetic and legal parenthood. 
This is a difficult decision to make, but the most loving and just solution must be to 
attempt to safeguard the life of the embryo. (my emphasis) 29 
In this extract the 'life of the embryo' takes precedent over the lives of 
birthed individuals in the subject position it holds in the discourse. By 
placing the 'life of the embryo' as the main consideration, whilst 
simultaneously harbouring a construction of woman that is passive and 
hidden, the pastoral needs of women undergoing treatment remain 
persistently invisible. Moreover, the concern with the personhood of the 
embryo signals its conceptualised gender as male, for if adult, sentient 
woman is constructed without subjectivity, there could be little 
consideration for her in her embryonic stage. 
29 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 206. 
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In her book, Becoming Divine, Grace Jantzen traces how traditional 
Christianity has been fixated on death and preparing for the after-life at 
the expense of facing the reality of this world. She claims that this 
fascination extends to other realms beyond earthly existence and quotes 
Luce Irigaray thus: 
The patriarchal order is based upon worlds of the beyond: worlds of before birth and 
especially of the after-life, other planets to be discovered and exploited for survival, 
etc. It doesn't appreciate the real value of the world we have and draws up its often 
bankrupt blueprints on the basis of hypothetical worlds.30 (my emphasis) 
McCarthy's choice to draw upon biblical texts that feature accounts of 
pre-natal life rather than upon those, which deal with the pain of 
infertility, demonstrate Irigaray's point, particularly as this emphasis 
obscures the concrete, actual, lived experience of human suffering. His 
accentuation towards the abstract, unknown realm of God's province is 
illustrated here: 
It is entirely reasonable to argue that all embryos should be treated, not in the light 
of what they can actually do as embryos, but in the light of God's eternal 'call' of 
individuals to enter into fellowship with him. This 'call' extends throughout their 
entire history, including their period as embryos and fetuses. 31 
Summary 
In conclusion, I would assert that McCarthy's book is not providing 
anything substantially different from that, which has gone before, 
although the churches' responses to the NRTs are clarified in a helpful 
way. Whilst his aim was to examine the Warnock Report further, he 
chose not to appropriate contemporary, oppositional discourses that 
might have given him the tools to see differently. By not attempting to 
deconstruct the epistemological models or ethical systems that constitute 
the traditional, ecclesiastical discourses, he was unaware of the 
inconsistencies in his arguments and did not provide the unifying 
Christian response that he sought to do. His lack of recognition that an 
uncontextualised account of 'God's will' is deeply problematic as a basis 
for an ethical foundation undermined his search for the 'first principles' 
that he was seeking to provide. The difficulty is succinctly put by 
Richard Holloway, when he says: 
30 Quoted in G. Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion, 
(Manchester: Manchester University press, 1998), p.130. 
31 B. McCarthy, Fertility and Faith, p. 82. 
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We either admit that God is, to some extent at least, a human construct that is 
subject to criticism and evolution, or we weld religion to unsustainable prejudices 
that guarantee its rejection for the best, not the worst of reasons, so that to abandon 
it becomes a virtuous act of revolt against an oppressive force that imprisons rather 
than liberates humanity.32 
In addition, his failure to separate the rational from the non-rational 
epistemologically led to further anomalies in his argument. He was 
unable to discern that what he found to be so problematic in the 
Warnock Report, that is, Mary Warnock's' confusion' between reason 
and sentiment' was masquerading in his own undeclared standpoint, 
whereby his intuitive feelings were hidden within the abstract, objective 
framework of universal principles. I would contend that both McCarthy 
and Warnock were exhibiting similar emotional responses to those 
described by Ju.rgen Habermas, who claims that people's attitudes to 
prepersonallife are characterised differently from those directed to other 
ethical issues and describes them thus: 
They do not touch on this or that difference in the great variety of cultural forms of 
life, but on those intuitive self-descriptions that guide our own identification as 
human beings - that is, our self-understanding as members of the species. If I'm not 
mistaken in my assessment of the debate over the "use" of embryos for research, or 
over the conditional creation of embryos, it is disgust at something obscene rather 
than moral indignation proper that comes to be expressed in our emotional 
reactions. (his italics)33 
With regard to McCarthy's construction of woman, she remains as 
hidden in his text as she is in the church reports. The ethical 
considerations of the NRTs are never viewed from her standpoint and 
her subject position as defined by ecclesiastical and traditional discourses 
not only lies unchallenged, but also is continually reconstructed by the 
text producer. The procreative discourses, both ancient and 
contemporary, have colluded in the discourse with other ideational 
strands from the churches' tradition to secure woman as passive, generic, 
objectified, provider of bodily needs and nurturer of her husband's 
progeny. 
Unlike the embryo, she is constructed as a non-person, silenced, without 
feelings, fears or desires of her own. The choice not to consult those who 
could have spoken theologically on her behalf was taken by active 
omission, rather than by careless oversight. Bernadette Waterman Ward 
in exploring Rene Girard's theories in relation to abortion discusses how 
32 R. Holloway, Godless Morality: Keeping Religion out of Ethics, (Canongate: Edinburgh, 
1999), p. 4. 
33 J. Habermas, The FuhlTe of Human Nature, (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2003), p. 39. 
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woman's self-definition is dependant on being in relationship with a 
man. She cites the results of a survey undertaken at Emory University to 
discover what sexual information most young, sexually active girls 
wanted to know, and says: 
And so ingrained was their habit of defining their own needs as the needs of a male 
person that 85% wanted to know "How to say no without hurting the other's 
feelings."34 
I would contend that McCarthy's discourse, with its invitation to reader 
complicity in the deployment of personal pronouns and interpretive 
asides, is also actively constructing woman into this position of self-
definition in her reproductive role. 
The construction of the embryo is constituted as fully human, and 
despite certain caveats in the content that this does not mean a 'right to 
life', nevertheless, as the embryo's subject position takes precedence over 
other human beings, its construction becomes all encompassing, 
endowing it with greater humanity than birthed individuals. The space 
that the text producer devotes to God's realm of the eternal 'beyond' 
before birth, compared to the consideration given to the practicalities of 
living through infertility and its consequences, demonstrates his 
(unconscious) commitment to patriarchal ideologies and his preference 
for the abstract, rather than the actual. By producing a text in which these 
constructions of woman and embryo are intertwined, the relational 
connection is further severed. Ideologically, the male embryo is aligned 
with the patriarchal progenitor, which, spiritually, is God and the 
keepers of ecclesiastic tradition, and biologically, is the sperm, the active 
agent that gives life. 
B. Waters, Reproductive Technology: Towards a Theology of Procreative 
Stewardship, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd, 2001) 
The aims and objectives of the book 
Waters' overriding concern, which he addresses and critiques 
throughout his text, is with the ' dominant moral framework' of 
procreative liberty in which, he asserts, the ethics of the NRT are 
deliberated.35 He claims the central tenet of this framework is that people 
34 B. Waterman Ward, 'Abortion as Sacrament Mimetic Desire and Sacrifice in Sexual 
Politics' (pp. 18-35) in Contagion, ed by A. McKenna, Vo!.7, Spring 2000, p. 21. 
35 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology: Towards a Theology of Procreative Stewardship, 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd, 2001), p. 2. 
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have a fundamental interest to avoid or pursue their reproductive 
desires, and thereby, they have the right to deploy medical intervention 
and techniques to these ends. He presents his objection to this 
proposition thus: 
The principal complaint against this moral framework is its excessive individualism. 
In fixating on the reproductive interests and rights of individuals, a larger network 
of biological and social relationships impinging upon the moral ordering of 
procreation and child-rearing are virtually ignored. Consequently, procreative 
liberty fails to address a number of significant moral considerations. Given these 
limitations, an alternative framework is needed.36 
He proffers an alternative theological framework of procreative 
stewardship with four main themes that closely follow the selected 
ecclesiastic doctrines outlined in Chapter 4, which were common to all 
the churches' responses to the Warnock Report. Theme one reflects the 
Genesis reading of humans bearing God's likeness and that life is a gift 
and a loan from God. Waters' expounds this to encompass 'dominion', 
through Christ's resurrection, of a 'vindicated order' in fellowship with 
one another.37 Theme two features the anthropological vision, in which, 
Waters eschews a dualist understanding of humankind, emphasising 
that body and soul are inherently interconnected. Theme three centres on 
the marital bond, which he underscores as bearing a threefold' sign, 
covenant and vocation' of mutual belonging into which children may be 
received as a gift from God. The fourth theme is in regard to 'procreative 
stewardship', which places the covenantal perspective as formative in 
how procreation is 'ordered'. Waters' own standpoint is not always clear, 
but it is confirmed towards the latter end of the book when he says, 'The 
account of procreative stewardship being developed in this book argues 
in favour of placing extensive restrictions on ART.'38 
From my understanding of Waters' text, his use of the term 'moral 
framework' is different to mine, and to avoid confusion, I will clarify my 
position. I would assert that his definition of 'procreative liberty' does 
not constitute a moral framework, but rather, it is a particular standpoint 
held within the universalising, androcentric meta-framework of justice 
ethics. The primary language of 'procreative liberty's' foundational 
premise is 'rights', which is indicative of this overarching, 
uncontexualised framework, demonstrating it to be a view, not a 
36 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology: p.3. 
37 I have put inverted commas around the words and phrases that are Water's own 
chosen words, which I shall discuss in the section describing the identity of the text 
producer. 
38 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 100. 
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separate structure. Furthermore, I would contend that the theological 
alternative that Waters' proposes, is, in point of fact, contained within 
this same meta-framework and whilst it does constitute a different 
perspective, nevertheless, it transmutes and retains similar constructions. 
Given that Waters pays attention in his critique to issues of relationship 
that are foundational to an ethics of care, my assertions require further 
explanation. I will address this in the next section, as the analysis of 
Waters' identity as text producer is crucial to my argument. 
The identity of the text producer 
To reiterate, the emphasis of the content and the discourse used in this 
book are different from the normative theological treatises concerning 
human reproduction. The contents page cites the following chapter 
headings: Reproductive Options, Theological Themes, Childlessness and 
Parenthood, Preventing and Assisting Reproduction and Quality Control 
and Experimentation. In addition, in the discourse Waters expresses 
concepts of mutuality in the marriage bond and underscores this by 
preferring to give woman precedence in the couplet/woman and man', 
which sends powerful messages to the reader by the atypical ordering of 
these two words. In reference to a child, he will often cite a daughter, 
rather than a son as an example, as this excerpt shows in the discussion 
on familial relationships: 
A daughter, for instance, may command her father to fulfil responsibilities 
incumbent on him as her father not only for her own well-being, but also for the 
good of their family.39 
As demonstrated here, relational connections are given prominence over 
abstract principles and although Waters draws on tradition and 
scripture, this is not undertaken in the manner of proof-texting to 
validate God's will. Furthermore, he ends each chapter with a short case 
study, depicting a complex, human, procreative dilemma for the reader 
to ponder. His alternative approach does bear fruit as different issues of 
the NRTs are highlighted and explored theologically in greater depth, 
than has otherwise been the case. For example, his polemic against the 
commodification of children includes this crucial insight: 
Those who presume that technology emancipates people from natural constraints 
fail to recognise that they become equally constrained by the imposed destiny of 
technical skill and planning in which they are already enveloped. Moderns deceive 
39 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, pp. 46-7. 
190 
themselves into believing that the quality of their freedom is proportional to the 
quality of options at their disposal.40 
It would seem from this analysis so far that my premises are unjustified; 
in order to put my case for claiming that this text correlates with 
traditional constructions, I will begin by citing several points, which 
were raised in my methodology. In Chapter One, I discussed how 
normative ethics was problematic to woman, because it was based on a 
gendered, masculinist perspective that falsely claimed universality. 
Parsons' analysis revealed two important dynamics of response that I 
would claim are techniques of this text. Firstly, she critiqued an ethics of 
equality, which eschews difference, by asserting,' Thus women are to 
appear only to disappear.'41 Secondly, she pointed out that a positive 
aspect of recognising that the 'mediating self' of ethics has traditionally 
been expressing male, embodied experience could enable man to 
redefine his gendered standpoint. However, she also cautioned that this 
insight might enable man to 'return humbled back into the system that 
gave him power, reinforCing his dominant position within it.'42 
I would contend that woman's disappearance via the route of equality 
and man's humbled, reinforced position of dominance are closely 
intertwined in this book and this will underpin my interrogation of 
woman's construction in the next section. However, firstly, Waters 
provides a good illustration of my premise in Chapter 3, where he 
expounds on his four themes of procreative stewardship. He outlines his 
first theme by saying, , ... life is a gift given by God. Since humans belong 
to God, they should not treat themselves or others as possessions or 
property.' 43 Yet, what comes across in the text is an exposition on power 
and control that is underpinned by the account of creation in Genesis, 
although specific scriptural references are not directly cited. 
The section includes reference to Christ's resurrection, but this is not 
interpreted as signifying empowerment of the vulnerable, but as 
'vindication of a created order'. To illustrate my assertions, I have listed 
the words denoting power that have been used, and I have indicated, by 
a word count in brackets, how many times they appear in this small 
section of four and a half pages, they are: stewardship (13), obedience (2), 
conformity (3), command (10), dominion (11), govern (5), order (15), 
40 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 93. 
41 See Chapter One, p. 22. 
42 See Chapter One, p. 24. 
43B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 33. 
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entrust (6), vindicate (11), authority (9), subdue (3), lordship (1), submit 
(1), subjecting (2), mandate (3), and empower (1).44 
Moreover, the phrase, 'vindicated order', which is reminiscent of 
traditional notions reflecting the Neoplatonic Chain of Being, is 
frequently asserted in differing ways throughout the text as the word 
count demonstrates. This ideational emphasis is a cause for concern 
because, as I discussed in Chapter Three, the traditional application of 
the Chain of Being has been particularly harmful to woman.45 
Furthermore, as Waters establishes his foundation for procreative 
authority from the Genesis discourse, without constituting what is 
actually meant by a 'created ordering', he, consequently, leaves this open 
to interpretation. His 'humbled' re-entry into the system, which softens 
his polemic, is demonstrated by his insistence that stewardship must be 
undertaken in fellowship, not expressed so much in community, but in 
the woman/ man partnership. He says: 
There is, for instance, the task of co-operation. Humans cannot faithfully assert their 
dominion, or be faithful stewards in isolation from each other. Thus the blessing of 
dominion is given equally to woman and man; they are commissioned together by 
God as female and male. (his italics) 46 
What is significant in this section, exemplified in this excerpt, is that the 
particularity of woman's unique position in human reproduction 
disappears into the ephemeral notion of equality. The account is 
disingenuous on two fronts. Firstly, stewardship over the earth, in 
recorded history, has never been shared equally between woman and 
man, and this being the case, the promotion of such a balance of power 
requires an acknowledgement that this is a revisioning of the status quo, 
not a given precept. Secondly, there is no recognition that human 
procreation, in actuality, is not an equal enterprise (except in relation to 
the part played by gametes) with regard to the biological emphasis on 
woman's body, the social impact on woman's life style and the 
ideological notions constructing motherhood as woman's transcendent 
fulfilment It is this failure to take account of difference, particularity and 
context that locates Waters' framework in the broad spectrum of 
normative ethics, and which becomes problematic in his relational 
perspective. 
44 I have listed the root words, but in my count I have included different grammatical 
forms of the words. Two examples will illustrate my coding; steward and stewardship 
come under the same count, and govern and governance are not differentiated. 
45 The Neoplatonic Chain of Being has been discussed previously in Chapter Three, see 
p.l08. 
46 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 35. 
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The construction of woman in the text 
Whilst, as I have already stated, woman is accorded 'equality' 
throughout the text, nevertheless, her specific subject position is silenced 
in the discourse. I have selected three areas for examination based on the 
criteria of particularity, or more accurately, its notable absence. The first 
account lies with Waters' critique of procreative liberty, when he 
(rightly) asserts that, ' ... as humans exert greater control over the 
reproductive process, a sense of mystery is being displaced by one of 
mastery.'47 What is missing from his assessment is the acknowledgement 
that feminist commentators have been saying this for several decades, 
especially in regard to the medicalisation of natural childbirth, pointing 
to the statistics illustrating an increasing number of caesarean sections to 
validate their claims. By leaving aside this aspect of the evidence, the text 
producer does not interrogate the historical and gendered implications of 
this mastery, which did not begin with the NRT. Furthermore, by 
ignoring the particularity of woman's bodily significance to biopower, 
which is the root of this mastery, he misses an opportunity to interrogate 
the systems of biocapitalism that underpin the socio-cultural norms of 
commodification that he is seeking to prevent. 
The second area for exploration is Waters' discussion on contraception. 
Despite saying in his fourth theological theme, 'Natural or artificial 
methods of preventing conception may be employed if the purpose is to 
enable the unfolding of familial love', Waters later invokes Humanae 
Vitae (1968) as a foundational document on the subject. 48 In Chapter 4, 
he devotes a section to 'Preventing Reproduction' focusing solely on this 
report, for as he later states: 
As the preceding discussions suggest, Humanae Vitae and Donum Vitae may serve as 
landmarks for plotting points within the field of Christian moral deliberation on the 
ordering of human fertility and infertility. (my emphasis) 49 
This seeming contradiction in Waters' text is indicative of a repeated 
ambivalence that creates confusion in the content in other areas that will 
be addressed as my analysis continues. From a Foucauldian point of 
47 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 2. 
48 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 50. Whilst some Roman Catholic commentators 
assert that this document is not as proscriptive to contraception as it might appear, 
nevertheless, other commentators, such as Dyson, find it unequivocal. He says, 'This 
happened to contraception in Pope Paul VI's encyclical Humanae Vitae where, ostensibly 
on the basis of natural law, artificial contraception was found to be unethical without 
exceptions.' T. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, (London: Mowbray, 1995), p. 52. 
49 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 90. 
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view, these anomalies allow constructions to permeate the text from 
discourses that the text producer refutes in his theological premises. For 
example, the word 'ordering' in the above extract aligns with his 
constructions of a I vindicated order', yet he distances himself in the 
content from the Roman Catholic dictums. Furthermore, my analysis of 
Donum Vitae, in Chapter 4 of this thesis demonstrated that woman is not 
held in equal regard to man in that document and by appropriating the 
Roman Catholic reports as 'landmarks', her construction of non-
personhood can be successfully secreted into this discourse under the 
banner of I equality.' 
From this vantage point, it will not be surprising to note that this section 
conducts its appraisal of contraception without any regard for woman's 
particular situation, despite the citing of theological opposition to 
Humanae Vitae. For, dissenting arguments are presented to the tenets of 
the treatise, they do not challenge the structure of the document itself or 
question the theological premises on which these tenets are based. This is 
analgous to Jantzen's point when she says that even in a secular society 
the concept of God as divine, omnipotent, eternal disembodied Father is 
held by theists and atheists alike. Consequently, they I ••• tacitly agree on 
the masculinized nature of the God whose existence they dispute' .50 
It is becoming evident from my critique, why I have concerns with the 
text producer's ideational premise that procreative stewardship should 
be based on a relational approach. For, it is not possible to have a 
relational structure for ethical deliberation if one of the participants is 
constructed as a non-person. In order to interrogate this further, I will 
tum to Waters' exposition of his third theme, that of 'Marriage and 
Family.' His justification of a relational approach is stated thus: 
The emerging pattern does not so much reflect a revision of traditional mores 
governing sexual conduct, procreation and child-rearing as it does a competing 
account of what gives these activities their meaning and significance. Displacing a 
normative framework of marital and familial relationships in favour of one 
emphasising individual interests and rights entails a collision of contending principles 
shaping subsequent moral deliberation. (his italics) 51 
The first point to make is to challenge Waters' foundational claim of a 
'normative framework of marital and familial relationships'. For, analogous 
to Okin's critique of Rawls' treatise, A Theory of Justice in Chapter One, 
Waters, like Rawls, makes assumptions about the family that are not 
sufficiently deconstructed before building a moral perspective based on 
50 G. Jantzen, Becoming Divine, p. 10. 
51 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 19. 
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their norms.52 In the case of Rawls, his predication of a just society did 
not take into account, firstly, woman's role in formulating a sense of 
justice as the primary nurturer, from whom foundational values are 
learnt, and secondly, he did not give due consideration to the fact that 
his preferred model of the family was itself in need of a justice analysis. 
In the case of Waters, his description of 'normative' marital relations 
constituting 'a life of mutual belonging and self-sacrifice' have a different 
interpretation from a contemporary understanding, if they are to be 
viewed as a covenant (as he asserts they should be), which is 
'accountable to the church.'53 
For, it is the case that the traditional household codes, expressed in 
Ephesians 5:22-6:9 do not constitute equal reciprocity as Waters 
acknowledges, again ambivalently, in the following chapter. Drawing on 
James Dunn he accepts that, ' ... 'the patriarchal character' of the times is 
evident in the man asserting his authority over the members of his 
household.'54 Whilst he maintains that the household codes were not 
accommodating the prevalent norms of the era by 'reconceiving a 
fundamental mutuality and equality in Christ,' nevertheless, he does not 
appreciate how repeated reference to these codes reconstitutes their 
constructed (patriarchal) subject positions.55 As Daphne Hampson 
succinctly summarises: 
Even if rationally they acknowledge that times have changed, at a subconscious 
level, when from childhood this literature is repeatedly heard in a scared setting, 
people gain a sense that it is 'natural' that men should, for example, be head of 
households. The fact that these things are not voiced makes them all the more 
potent.56 
To illustrate my point further, it is helpful to consider how Waters 
describes the third aspect of his threefold, theological perspective of the 
marriage bond, that of vocation: 
In faithfully, fulfilling the roles as wife and husband in covenant, we may also speak 
about marriage as a vocation. A vocation marks an obedient response to a particular 
command of God in which one way of life is followed to the exclusion of other possible 
ways. A vocation orders one's life within those circumstances where one is called to 
follow Christ. The particularity of a vocation, however, is not synonymous with 
receiving private instructions from God. Although how one follows a vocation may 
52 Discussed in Chapter One, p. 21. 
53 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, pp. 41-2. 
54 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 61. 
55 B. Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 61. 
56 D. Hampson,' On Autonomy and Heteronomy,' pp.1-16, in Swallowing a Fishbone? 
Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity, ed by D. Hampson, (London: SPCK, 1996), p. 7. 
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contain unique qualities, there is nonetheless continuity over time on how a vocation 
should be followed. Otherwise we could not discern the difference between an obedient 
and disobedient response to God's command. (his italics, my underlining)57 
In keeping with Waters' polemiC on stewardship, discussed in the 
previous section, it is worth highlighting how words denoting power are 
used in this excerpt on vocation. 'Dis/ obedience' is cited three times and 
'command' is used twice and both terms are deployed in reference to 
'following' (used four times), stemming from the Christian call to 'follow 
Christ.' But Waters is at pains to emphasise that such a calling 'is not 
synonymous with receiving private instructions from God,' but that one 
must look to tradition, which he phrases as 'continuity over time', in 
order to discern 'how a vocation should be followed.' As Hampson points 
out, 'Christians can never simply say that it is unethical to discriminate 
against persons and that is the end of it. They must always make 
reference to a particular past history.'ss 
The anomalies in the content create confusion, but if Waters claims to 
hold a position of 'mutual belonging' this should be evident from his 
constructions of woman in the discourse. Mutuality in relation does not 
mean treating the other in the same way as oneself, it means respecting 
and caring for the other's individual situation as different to one's own, 
and by means of listening and empathetic understanding endeavouring 
to stand in their shoes. Yet, in a book that underscores the importance of 
relationality, there is no mention of woman's central role in procreation. 
In her personhood, woman is absent. For example, in his critique of 
technology, cited earlier, he does not interrogate how the choices of 
prenatal testing and IVF have both ' emancipated woman from natural 
constraints' as well as 'equally constraining her'. It is woman, not' a 
couple', who must undergo an abortion, should a couple decide not to go 
ahead with a pregnancy after prenatal testing. Again, it is woman, who 
must undertake the rigours of repeated IVF cycles and cope with the 
psychological consequences of her body's failure, should a couple decide 
to keep trying. Waters does not address this aspect, which is succinctly 
described by Sarah Franklin, when she says: 
Deciding to abandon hope for success may have become much more difficult after 
'living for the dream' from cycle to cycle, often over several years. Against the urge 
to terminate unsuccessful treatment may be the fear that success is only one step 
away. Hence, the certainty of resolution - one way or the other - which often 
characterises the decision to undertake IVF can be seen to dissipate over the course 
5713. Waters, Reproductive Technologtj, p. 42. 
58 D. Hampson, 'On Autonomy and Heteronomy', p. 6. 
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of serial failure (which, even for the minority of couples who eventually succeed, 
most often comprises the better part of their treatment).59 
The construction of the embryo 
It can be discerned by the chapter headings cited earlier, that Waters' 
approach does not place the embryo at the centre of his study. In fact, 
unlike other theological treatises on procreation, the moral status of the 
embryo is not discussed at all in typical terminology and it is difficult to 
elicit from Waters' discussions what his standpoint is on this issue. 
Furthermore, his relational position is better contexualised in relation to 
the embryo than it is to woman. This is especially illustrated in Chapter 
5, 'Quality Control and Experimentation', where he undertakes an 
exploration of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). His central 
tenet throughout this chapter is towards the 'parent-child relationship', 
not the life of the embryo per se. Ironically, having argued that 
procreative liberty encompasses increasing medicalisation and mastery 
of reproduction, which he asserts is detrimentally changing moral 
perceptions, he is sympathetic to the medical intervention of PGD, which 
would not have been possible without the technical advances made 
through IVF. 
Consequently, determining the embryo's construction through a variety 
of fragmented discourses, it is not possible to provide a conclusive 
picture, as it was, for example, in the secular treatise from Nature in 
Chapter Three.60 This is not an uncommon feature of discourse as has 
been highlighted by the scholars' discourse analyses in Chapter Two. 
However, there is evidence from Water's exposition that a construction 
of the embryo as fully human constitutes a strong, ideational thread, 
despite its atypical absence from the text's central focus and the author's 
affirmation of PGD. Consider the following two excerpts: 
Instead of bypassing potentially defective genes by using donated gametes, medical 
attention is focused on expediting what may be considered the death of a dying 
embryo.' (my italics) 61 
The objection fails to acknowledge that within a restricted diagnostic context the 
purpose of embryo selection is not to exclude offspring, but to prevent the further 
development of an already mortally ill embryo whose birth would virtually preclude 
any parent-child relationship.62 (my italics) 
59 S. Franklin, Embodied Progress: A cultural account of assisted conception, (London; New 
York: Routledge, 1997), p. 12. 
60 See Chapter Three, pp. 91-2. 
61 Waters, Reproductive Technology, p. 119. 
62 Waters, Reproductive Technology, pp. 119-120. 
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In both of these extracts, the embryo is constructed as a birthed 
individual. Synonymous with Donum Vitae's conceptualisation of an 
embryo that fails to evolve as constituting a corpse requiring an autopsy, 
Waters confers a body that can become' mortally ill' and 'die' on to a 
cluster of undifferentiated cells that have yet to develop one.63 In 
addition, Waters places the following words and phrases in inverted 
commas suggesting his ideational ambivalence towards them, (I have 
used italics in each case to highlight the specific words): 
The HFEA also regulates research conducted on human embryos 'outside the body'. 
To secure a research licence it must be demonstrated that the use of human embryos 
is 'necessanJ or desirable' ... 
Embryos used for research must be 'obtained with appropriate consent' ... 
It is forbidden to use or keep an embryo past the fourteenth day of development or 
appearance of the 'primitive streak' ... 
... the use of quality-control techniques in a manner that 'respects' human embryos. 
64 
Ironically, it appears that within the text producer's discourse, lies an 
ideational struggle between a desire for reproductive dominion in PGD, 
expressed through his notion of procreative stewardship and a 
construction of the embryo that, if fully realised, would prohibit any 
agency in its destruction. Water moves between competing discourses to 
attempt a way to alleviate the suffering of parents, who carry hereditary 
conditions, without (seemingly) perceiving this anomaly. 
Summary 
Whilst this text acknowledges that existing ecclesiastic responses to the 
NRTs are inadequate, it does not offer a clear alternative. In the first 
place, it does not give sufficient analysis to deconstructing the current 
situation and demonstrates a misunderstanding of moral frameworks as 
defined by feminist ethics. Whilst the differing moral frameworks of 
justice and care have been fiercely contested since Gilligan's pioneering 
work, In a Different Voice, nevertheless, their distinctive variations stem 
from fundamental perceptions that cannot be simply 'mixed in' without 
foundational changes in concepts of thinking. Sara Ruddick illuminates 
my point succinctly when she explains her vision of how these two 
perspectives can work together: 
63 See Chapter Four, p. 155. 
64 Waters, Reproductive Technology, pp. 108-9. 
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I believe that "justice" and" care", when more appropriately elaborated, usefully 
mark alternate moral visions, conflicts, virtues and ways of reasoning. I also believe 
that the capacity to welcome irreducible differences of perspective, as much as the 
insight each affords, illuminates moral conflict in both personal and public contexts. 
If there are two irreducible orientations, individuals can learn to shift between them 
while discussants can acknowledge that they" see" the same situation yet see so 
differently that they cannot at once understand each other's moral reasoning. 
Because there are contrasting perspectives rather than a multiperspectival array, a 
disruptive and illuminating shift of moral perspective in regard to the same 
phenomena becomes possible.65 
In this text, the producer draws on an unacknowledged feminist critique 
to deploy interpretive cues of equality, mutuality and relationality 
without applying these concepts in the structures of his discourse. His 
failure to recognise that procreation, and involvement in the NRTs, is a 
vastly different experience for woman than it is for man, demonstrates 
this lack of understanding. Whilst his critique of individualism and an 
appreciation of the relational context has created fresh perspectives from 
traditional ecclesiastic treatises, nevertheless, this has been clouded by a 
false mutuality in his vision of family relations that presents an ideal 
belied by reliance on a tradition, which has consistently failed to promote 
it in praxis. 
The competing discourses have been blurred in this text with glaring 
anomalies of content, whereby the producer makes opposing claims in 
different sections of the book. For example, his promotion of PGD stands 
in direct contrast to his stated preference for' extensive restrictions on 
ART' and his equivocal stance on contraception is equally confusing. 
However, the most telling issue of all is his account of procreative 
stewardship, which is not a vision of prophetic, oppositional 
empowerment for NRT participants against the structures of biopower, 
but rather an androcentric mirroring of Genesis that moves the NRTs 
into a privatised domain 'vindicating the traditional ecclesiastical order' 
of male procreative agency. 
A. Dyson, The Ethics of IVF (London: Mowbray, 1995) 
The aims and objectives of the book 
The third publication to be considered was inspired, in common with the 
other two texts, by the notion that the ethical issues involving IVF had 
65 s. Ruddick, 'Injustice in Families: Assault and Domination [1995], (203-223) in Justice 
and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, ed by V. Held, (Colorado; Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1995), p. 205. 
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not been sufficiently addressed in the Christian response to them. 
However, in contrast to the previous authors, it is not the lack of a 
definitive Christian response that Dyson objects to, but rather the 
persistent drive by some theologians to find an all encompassing one. It 
is worth quoting in full Dyson's principal objections: 
I shall register in this book a measure of dismay about some of the biblical, 
theological and ethical treatments of IVF which have appeared from Christian 
sources. It seems that the lessons, coming from over one hundred years of 
development of the critical method employed on the study of the Bible and 
tradition, have not been widely heeded. Moreover, some Christians judge that, with 
biblical and! or theological principles, we can arrive at definitive ethical conclusions 
without assistance from secular sources of knowledge and judgement But I am clear 
in my own mind that neither Christian biblical study, nor Christian theology, nor for 
that matter Christian ethics, can by themselves settle the urgent and difficult 
questions thrown up by the NRTs, and not least IVF. We need to listen to many 
different voices. (his italics)66 
In addition, Dyson also identifies two areas that have proved to be 
problematic with regard to effective communication: that of mediation 
between the disciplines of ethics and science, and the epistemological 
dichotomy between theory and experience. This latter division mirrors 
the justice and care perspectives that have been referred to as 
androcentric and feminine systems of thinking, and whilst Dyson does 
not gender them in this extract, nevertheless, their locus and praxis 
positions them in the gendered camps that were explored in Chapter 
One:67 
It seems as if theoretical and abstract reasoning belong to the public realm and are 
fully approved, whilst the different tiers of human, especially emotional, experience 
are not regarded as ethically respectable, and are thus relegated to the private 
realm.68 
In a further contrast to typical theological approaches to the NRTs, the 
book sets out to consider the complex ethical issues of IVF holistically, 
not just in terms of the moral status of the embryo. The contents page 
marks a radical departure from conventional Christian texts on this 
subject, which might be missed by secular critics, in that it places IVF as 
its central focus. Consider the chapter headings as follows: 
Editor's foreword, Acknowledgements, Definitions, Introduction, Infertility, 
Historical moments, The IVF process and its ethical problems, Risks and successes, 
66 A. Dyson, The Ethics oflVF, pp. 7-8. 
67 See Chapter One, pp.18-20. 
68 A. Dyson, The Ethics oflVF, p. 7. 
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Feminist critiques of the NRTs and ofIVF, NF and natural law, IVF and the Bible, 
IVF: towards responsibility, Some IVF participants, IVF and embryo research, 
Human fertilisation and embryology: Act and Authority, The wider society, 
Conclusion.69 
This is in stark contrast to the two church reports and McCarthy's 
publication, where infertility, IVF per se and woman were relegated in 
varying degrees by concerns relating to the embryo. Whilst Water's 
contents page was also seeking a different route, Dyson places the 
problem and the participants at the heart of his text in contrast to Waters 
who speaks at great length around the issues but leaves out the 
emotional pain of infertility and woman's part therein. In so doing, 
Dyson provides space for considering relevant topics that have hitherto 
been ignored, such as, the female partner of the male donor. However, 
the book's most radical departure from the normative Christian treatise 
is in its proactive choice to listen to the voice of woman, both as IVF 
participant and as feminist commentator, as can be seen by his 
dedication of the whole of Chapter 5 to feminist critiques. 
Dyson's primary response to the ethical dilemmas of IVF, and therefore 
his overriding aim, is to promote an ethic of responsibility, which is 
similar to Water's call to procreative stewardship, but the way in which 
these two theologians pursue their understanding of this concept could 
not be more different. Dyson's approach is characterised by a search for 
understanding and a refusal to make definitive ethical pronouncements, 
rather than by a will to power and control. 
The identity of the text producer 
The ideational concepts set out in the aims of the book are backed up by 
the interpretive cues that the text producer uses to investigate his 
premises. In keeping with his eschewing of a conclusive approach, his 
linguistic style is open, questioning and thought provoking, which 
provides a forum for the reader to listen rather than be told. Inherently, 
Dyson respects his reader to think for her or himself, preferring to 
illuminate the complexities of the issues, by conversely, writing in a 
clear, easily readable style that clarifies medical terminology and 
presents useful data succinctly. 
Perhaps, the best example of acting differently is the inclusion of IVF 
participants speaking about their experiences interspersed throughout 
the chapter on infertility. In terms of the content, this creative device is 
69 The full page of contents: A. Dyson, The Ethics of IVF, p. v. 
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immensely successful in bridging the dichotomy of factual information 
and personal experience that Dyson had found to be problematic in his 
critique of ethical responses to IVF. Furthermore, by placing these 
extracts directly into the first chapter alongside the physical data, rather 
than in a discrete final chapter or an appendix, a powerful interpersonal 
message is sent to the reader. Building again on Walsh's helpful 
methodology that the ideational is driven by the interpersonal, this 
message has a twofold effecUo 
Firstly, it signals in the content that feelings are important 
considerations, but secondly, and more importantly, it constructs the 
male text producer as sympathetic to woman's position. This latter 
aspect is far more penetrating to the discursive fields of infertility and 
IVF situated in the unconscious realm of the reader, and as this occurs in 
the first chapter, it sets the scene for what is to follow. I will return to this 
point in my discussion on the construction of woman, for, despite its 
innovative difference to the content, I would contend that it has not been 
so productive in constructing woman's subject position. Finally, these 
components constitute the text producer's overall style locating the 
ethical complexities of IVF in the lived reality of human existence rather 
than the mysterious, eternal world of beyond. It is a work of Practical 
Theology, written in the context of praxis, not in the abstract of doctrine. 
The construction of woman in the text 
I have already alluded to the fact that this book is very different to 
normative Christian discourses on the NRT by its inclusion of woman 
that is not only overtly undertaken, but also referred to by the author 
himself as being unusual, as these extracts demonstrate. 
It is astonishing that most of the contemporary literature on IVF virtually or wholly 
ignores the feminist arguments.71 
Surprisingly, very few of the books and articles aboutIVF make any reference at all 
to the feminist challenge. As far as my reading goes, feminists are correct in 
observing that none of the male-centred criticisms of the NRTs, be they conservative 
or radical, has opposed the technologies because of what they do to women.72 
In terms of the content, this book comprises one of the most enlightened 
texts on IVF that I've encountered. However, not withstanding that fact, 
from the vantage point of critical discourse analysis, one must ask; but 
70 See Chapter Two, p. 54. 
71 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 6. 
72 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 43. 
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'how is woman constructed in this text?' Has the conscious effort to 
make her visible accorded her a different construction from normative 
treatises? I would answer in the negative, for, I would allege that she is 
still constructed as reproductively passive. Dyson makes similar claims 
in his critique of IVF to those that I have already stated in this thesis, 
such as the high failure rate of IVF and the lack of research on primates 
before attempting IVF on women?3 These are not normally mentioned in 
Christian accounts of the NRTs, so why do I assert that his accounts 
construct woman as passive, whereas my critique does not? 
In the first place, Dyson inadvertently creates a false dichotomy between 
IVF participants and feminist scholars analogous with the divide 
between the Presbyterian women and feminist theologians that 
McClintock-Fulkerson sought to unravel in her analyses discussed in 
Chapter TWO.74 In the Introduction, he characterises the feminist 
response to IVF by saying that whilst there are varying stances of 
feminist dissent; , ... ~ including Firestone, would agree that the NRTs, 
in our kind of society, represent in differing degrees a serious threat to 
woman's self-consciousness - and to her body as well.' (my underlining; 
his italicsF5 He continues to immediately expound this in the following 
extract constructing IVF participants as unthinking woman, 'caught up' 
'will-nilly' in events that her more intellectual sisters would not be 
associated with: 
At the first level, the threatening character of the NRTs can be a cause of damage to 
the individual woman. But that is not the end of the ethical argument At the second 
level, a systemic threat is encountered. The woman, whatever the outcome for her as 
an individual, is caught up in, and willy-nilly contributes to, patterns of injustice 
which affect entire sectors of the world society' (his italics, my underliningY6 
In a text such as this one, which appreciates the infinite complexities of 
human dilemmas, it is surprising to find so many absolutist statements 
contained in the above excerpts that are left unexplained. For example, 
there is no elucidation as to how specifically IVF participants contribute to 
'patterns of injustice which affect entire sectors of the world society'. For, 
whilst IVF is ethically equivocal, it cannot be denied that it has brought 
immense fulfilment to thousands of infertile couples and may have 
provided considerable benefit to some women's self-consciousness. Later 
on in the book, Dyson underscores this construction of haplessness, 
when he generalises: 
73 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 46. 
74 See Chapter Two, pp. 57-63. 
75A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 6. 
76 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 6. 
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All this relates closely to the theme of exploitation of women by the NRTs and, in 
particular, by IVF.77 
Woman has a multiplicity of subject positions, and even as 'infertile 
woman' these are fractured by class, race, wealth and education. By 
condemning IVF as exploitative to all women, Dyson blurs the 
distinction between those women who are vulnerable due to economic or 
emotional reasons, and therefore more likely to be exploited by 
biopower, and those who are in stronger positions. In practice, this 
vulnerability might constitute some groups of poorer women selling 
their ova and wombs, whilst others might have less access to IVF for 
their own procreative desires. 
Moreover, by separating IVF participants' emotional comments in 
Chapter 1 of his book from the intellectual critique of feminists in 
Chapter 5 he has effectively reintroduced in construction the very 
dichotomy of theory and experience that he was attempting to bridge in 
the content. Ironically, his (genuine) sympathy as text producer only 
serves to reinforce this construction, which comes across as patronising, 
as similarly was the case with the Presbyterian women. McClintock-
Fulkerson demonstrated that the Presbyterian women, whilst 
constructed and constrained by normative, sexist perimeters were, 
nevertheless, able to exercise considerable creative agency in 
circumventing them. The fact that they chose to do this in such a way 
that did not involve confronting specific sexist proscriptions, did not 
mean that they behaved in a passive way, although this is how some 
feminist commentary would have labelled their behaviour. McClintock-
Fulkerson was able to show, by critical discourse analysis, that this was 
not the whole picture. 
She claimed that, whilst feminist theology highlighted the socio-cultural 
structures that create and maintain patriarchal oppression, nevertheless, 
this critique did not connect with the discursive practices that cause these 
systems to be perpetuated. So, as McClintock-Fulkerson put it, 'The gap 
between the hegemony of capitalist patriarchy, for example, and the 
discursive practices of the poor woman is not filled in.'78 In a 
comparative analogy, I would argue that in this account, the anti-IVF 
feminist critiques and the IVF participants' voices create a gap whereby, 
the hegemony of biopower and the discursive practices of the infertile 
woman are not filled in. Crucially, it is important to distinguish between 
77 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 48. 
78 See Chapter Two, p. 59. M. McClintock- Fulkerson, Changing the Subject, p. 110. 
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how the systems of biopower operate with regard to capitalist and 
eugenic undertones that construct woman as reproductively passive in 
order to accomplish their procreative agency, and woman's ability to 
determine her own ethics of self within this socio-cultural milieu. By 
falsely dividing woman into two discrete groups, the emotional 
participants and the intellectual dissenters, Dyson has effectively 
perpetuated the very construction that feeds the biocapitalist machine. 
This construction of passive, coerced IVF participant continues in the 
following comment 
It would hardly be denied that women often experience intense pressure to 
undertake IVF. That pressure can come from the partner, would-be grandparents, 
from female friends, from a commercial market with a huge turnover relating to all 
sorts of goods to attract the would-be or actual mother, and from a general natalist 
climate which is difficult to characterise, but which is nonetheless experienced as 
very reaF9 
With regard to women's desire to become mothers, I would disagree 
with Dyson that the most intense pressure comes from partner, family 
and friends, I would assert that it comes from the woman herself. 
However, I do converge with Dyson that the 'natalist climate' has 
considerable influence. Dyson's analysis is unable to interrogate the 
minutiae of this discursive field, which I interrogated in Chapter Three, 
whereby woman has to negotiate a range of competing discourses that 
call on her simultaneously to have a career, watch her biological clock 
and take responsibility for childcare. These are fractured by discourses of 
societal approbation (the perfect mother) and discipline (the desperate 
childless woman who left it too late), which transmute throughout the 
NRT newspaper stories as a technique of normalisation. 
Ironically, whilst woman is constructed as reproductively passive, the 
responsibility for demographic catastrophe is given solely to her. 
Furthermore, when a woman actively pursues procreative intervention, 
for what is perceived as her own desires rather than her husband's or her 
children's, she is publicly castigated as the treatment of the Masterton 
case demonstrated. Crucially, the difference that discourse analysis 
makes, is that the technique of self-mastery for woman, as she 
contemplates an ethics of self in determining her procreative choices, is 
illuminated as being immensely complex. In contrast to the subject 
position afforded her by Dyson of exploited, emotional and unthinking, 
she is shown to be actively engaged in a constant struggle of self-
definition. However, perhaps, Dyson's construction of woman as 
79 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 75. 
205 
procreatively passive is epitomised by his failure to address her part in 
his ethic of responsibility. If, as he asserts, she contributes to patterns of 
injustice by her participation in IVF programmes, how then should she 
act more responsibly? By giving woman visibility in the process and 
critique of IVF, but absenting her specific contribution from the agency of 
responsibility, Dyson constructs her, by his omission, as unable to take 
part in this vital role. 
The construction of the embryo 
As has already been made clear, the moral status of the embryo does not 
dominate this text, which Dyson obliquely refers to as being unusual, 
when he states: 
So dominant has the embryo-foetus become in many ethical presentations of IVF 
that other important dramatis persanae often fade into relative invisibility.so 
Furthermore, the contents page reproduced in the aims and objectives 
section demonstrates this, as the subject is not discussed until the tenth of 
thirteen chapters. Even more significantly, embryo concerns are not 
primarily addressed in the two chapters, 'IVF and natural law' and 'IVF 
and the Bible'. Yet, it is Dyson's ideational emphasis on the lived reality, 
ra ther than the eternal world of beyond, which becomes most evident in 
his treatment of the embryo. Whilst he recognises that conceptualisations 
regarding personhood and embryo rights are far more than simply 
subjective viewpoints, nonetheless, he is at pains to present the following 
standpoint: 
Bu t a different kind of argument suggests, and the commentary which I have 
presented reinforces, that these different views on human personhood are in fact 
acts of cultural canstructian drawing upon scientific, sociological, anthropological, 
historical, moral, religious and other sources. These constructs are not rigid and 
fixed, but they have their own history, as they negotiate different ethical problems 
and they respond to new or revised data.(his italics)81 
Consequently, his discourse resists the constructions of' fully human' , 
'research object' or 'saviour' that have been prevalent in the spectrum of 
Christian and secular discourses that have been scrutinised so far. 
Dyson's open style of reflective conversation partner structures his 
ethical commitment to continuing dialogue and of acting responsibly, 
thereby refusing to make any definitive statements. In this instance, his 
so A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 73. 
81 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 91. 
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content and construction of the embryo are much more aligned than was 
the case in his treatment of woman. 
Summary 
It has been fitting to end my exploration of Christian responses to the 
NRTs with this text that, in so many ways, refutes the normative, 
traditional approaches and produces a treatise, which opens the 
boundaries of the subject rather than maintains them within pre-set, 
narrow perimeters. Moreover, it demonstrates that Christian tradition 
has within its wide ranging characteristics, qualities of contemplative 
engagement, compassion and questioning critique as well as fervent calls 
to doctrinal absolutes. Its style of a holistic approach to ethical 
complexities, which seeks first to understand, is willing to listen and is 
grounded by the context of socio-cultural reality brings fresh 
perspectives to the ongoing Christian debate. 
The text producer has made a conscious effort to overcome the barriers 
of communication that he had ascertained were problematic in the 
plethora of other Christian responses. Most notably, with regard to the 
premises of this thesis, he sought the feminist critique and participants' 
voices to provide a more balanced and informed perspective. In turning 
to Scripture, he kept the question of IVF and infertility uppermost in his 
exploration thus rendering the status of the embryo to one aspect of this 
enquiry rather than privileging it above, and to the exclusion of, other 
vital concerns. My challenge to his construction of woman does not 
detract from his active choice to include her. 
The visibility of woman in the discourse is a marked departure from 
which to build. That she has been divided and constructed as 
reproductively passive is easier to challenge now that she can, at least, be 
seen. For, Dyson has broken through the technique, demonstrated by 
Grimwood in the Bishops' statement, whereby the other is endlessly 
talked about, but not spoken to. However, by giving the feminist 
commentators their due recognition in a separate chapter, another 
difficulty is created. Firstly, this chapter can Simply be omitted by those 
who are not interested in their critiques, whereas this would have been 
far more onerous a task had their insights been dispersed throughout the 
text. Secondly, it sends a powerful signal in construction that is not 
intended in the content. It suggests to the reader that only 'feminists' - a 
marginalized, disparate group hold these views. This is not helped by 
the fact that Dyson does not challenge the medico-scientific community 
with the same fervour as the feminists do. 
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In his chapter 'Historical moments', he rightly points to the fact that IVF 
has a history, which well preceded the advent of Louise Brown's birth. 
He says: 
Butl do want to convey, at this early stage, a sense of the human ingenuity, 
persistence and achievement in responding, from different angles, to the challenge 
of infertility.( my italics )82 
Contrast this statement with the way Dyson refers to the corpus of 
feminist opinion: 
The principal conclusions of this corpus are that women's contribution to the 
practice of medicine has, on the initiative of male society in general, and male 
medicine in particular, been progressively devalued and marginalized; that the 
control of women's reproductive medicine has been wrested from women by men; 
that masculinist philosophical-scientific presentations of women's reproductive 
biology have distorted fundamentally the image of womankind with the 
consequence that greater control has been gained over women's social future.83 
It is as if Dyson has not listened to the feminist critique, because if he 
had, he might have accorded more hermeneutics of suspicion to the way 
scientists doggedly pursued a 'cure' for infertility, which was a low 
medical priority before the impact of IVF. Not only has it been the work 
of embryologists, not medics, which have been foremost in developing 
IVF, but moreover, overcoming female infertility by an external route 
provides access to the embryo, which is an invaluable commodity to the 
biomedical community. My challenge goes further. Having elicited these 
concerns from the feminist critiques, why are they absent from the ethic 
of responsibility? How are we to act? There is insufficient challenge to 
the pervasive operation of biopower and biocapitalism and no directive 
to connect its modus operandi with the discursive practices of the NRTs. 
I would contend that the first act of responsibility would be to start 
making these connections. 
Conclusion 
In forming a conclusion to the findings of these three texts, I would assert 
that using critical discourse analysis has been illuminating in the way it 
has demonstrated how functioning statements transmute and correlate 
through content connecting with discursive fields in the unconscious 
mind of the reader. It has enabled anomalies to be interrogated and 
techniques of normalisation to be explored. In the first text, Fertility and 
82 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 21. 
83 A. Dyson, The Ethics ofIVF, p. 45. 
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Faith, despite the author's claims that he was setting out to provide a 
definitive Christian response, he followed the traditional perimeters of 
the church reports, imbibing their constructions of woman and the 
embryo, eschewing the opportunities to find a fresh perspective that a 
variety of liberation, feminist, body and queer theologies could have 
provided. His failure to understand the critical differences in 
epistemological models was evident both in his critique of Warnock and 
in his own theological premises. His refusal to declare a standpoint in the 
interests of objectivity, ironically, suffused his text with subjective 
interpersonal cues. 
The second text, Reproductive Technology, succeeded in taking a different 
route from the traditional line, but discourse analysis was able to discern 
that the constructions, which transmuted through his content, were as 
traditional as those contained in the church reports. By not attending to 
sufficient deconstruction before setting out to undertake a different 
perspective, these competing strands created confusing ambivalences. In 
addition, with regard to woman's subject position, his text was more 
alarming than an absolutist treatise. For, his content of mutuality and 
relationality was better able to hide damaging constructions of woman 
that lay in the functioning statements of vindicated order and procreative 
power. 
The third text, The Ethics of IVF, was different in its approach and 
provided a powerful challenge to the church reports by its adherence to 
alternative, valid aspects of Christian tradition that have not been 
appropriated by the ecclesiastic elite. Whilst the constructions of woman 
were problematic, nevertheless, her visibility broke through the 
technique of examining the other whilst maintaining them as the secret, 
which had been predominant in the bishops' statement as elicited by 
Grimwood's analysis. For this, Dyson is to be applauded. All three texts 
are expert discourses. Water's text has aspects of a priva tisa tion 
discourse and Dyson's has aspects of an oppositional discourse. 
However, none of these publications explicitly explore the relationship 
between biopower and the participants of IVF, which might provide the 
pastoral tools that Dunlap considered vital for supporting another to 
determine an ethics of self. If the construction of woman is consistently 
determined as reproductively passive, by secular and Christian accounts, 
how then should the church proceed? I propose to address this question 
in the conclusion of my thesis, setting an agenda for change. 
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OIAPTERSIX 
CONCEP1UALISING AN AlGENDER FOR OIANGE 
Christianity has never been at its best when it has turned its back on uncomfortable 
truths and new knowledge. It has nothing to fear from the truth, no matter how 
challenging, and in its most creative periods it has adapted its central message to the 
ideas of the day and has sought to express itself through the best intellectual or 
scientific models for understanding reality. This confident openness to new truth has 
always been in tension, not only with a valid desire to be true to its own tradition, but 
- -
with static and authoritarian versions of Christianity. Today this kind of Christian 
openness is threatened by a number of pressures.1 
- --
R. Holloway 
1 R. Holloway. Dancinf! on the Edf!e. !l. xm 
')10 
IN CONCLUSION 
However, as a poshnodern, gender-sensitive and performative discipline, pastoral 
theology is less concerned to legislate about the application of eternal moral norms or 
rules articulated outside the situation, as it is concerned to act as interpreter of the 
resources by which the faith-community may cultivate its sensibility for disclosure. 
Pastoral theology does not neglect the imperatives of hope and obligation, but refuses 
to absolutize the epistemological foundations of pastoral response and transformative 
praxis in the interests of a larger vision yet to come.! 
Elaine Graham 1996. 
What is my understanding of Practical Theology? 
Despite its detailed exploration of socio-cultural issues, my thesis is a 
work of Practical Theology not an undertaking in cultural studies. I 
propose in my concluding comments to begin by outlining my 
understanding of what constitutes Practical or Pastoral Theology as a 
discipline in order to place my findings into the theological context.2 
Whilst originally the role of Practical Theology was, for much of its 
history, concerned solely with the task of educating ministers, it has 
developed significantly in more recent times to encompass a much 
broader vision and audience. Stephen Pattison's evocative description is 
particularly helpful when he says: 
Pastoral Theology is more like living water than a tablet of stone. It is something 
that moves and changes shape, content and appearance, like a lake, over time.3 
In accordance with this fluid conceptualisation of the discipline, many 
practical theologians find their inspirational source for re-interpreting 
theological doctrines, not only from reflecting on responsive Christian 
praxis, but moreover, from the contemporary, complex, messy, lived 
situation of the human struggle itself. In their work of engaging with 
Scripture, Christian tradition, belief, praxis and secular wisdom, practical 
theologians have often found that the tenacity of spirit by those who are 
already grappling with any given problem may form the foundation of 
their theological illumination. 
IE. Graham, Transfonning Practice: Pastoral Theology in an Age of Uncertainty, (London: 
Mowbray, 1996), pp. 209-210. 
2Traditionally Pastoral Theology was concerned with individual pastoral care and 
counselling, whilst Practical Theology was the domain of teaching ministerial 
functions, such as preaching, liturgy and church organisation; both titles are now 
used interchangeably. 
35. Pattison, A Vision of Pastoral Theology, Edinburgh: Contact Pastoral Monograph 
No 4,1994), pp. 9-10. 
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Such was the case with the emergence of Liberation Theology, rising 
from the purposeful activities of the poor in Latin America to be agents 
of their own social change. If Practical Theology seeks to ask the 
question, 'How are we walking alongside the other in this situation?' and 
follows this with, 'Can we learn from our inquiry to walk better?' Then, 
it may be the situation that becomes the source of both transforming 
practice and theological understanding. 
It is a mark of respect to, and Christian love for, the other that any 
dialogue should be marked by mutuality and reciprocity in the exchange 
of values and world views. However, this is in tension with the fact that, 
as practical theologians we are inclined, either implicitly or explicitly, to 
place our Christian beliefs in a position of moral superiority due to our 
faith perspective. As Graham says of Tillich's model of 'ultimate concern' 
in the pastoral encounter, it ' ... assumes that the values of theology and 
psychology point to one single convergent, and ultimately Christian, 
Truth'.4 
Yet, the notion of a single convergent Christian Truth has been fractured 
by the plethora of varying interpretations that Christians hold regarding 
their theology. Just to take one example, the scholarship of feminist 
theologians, such as Fiorenza, Reuther, Hampson, Daly and many others 
has demonstrated unequivocally that Scripture and Christian tradition 
have been formed through patriarchal cultures, which have consistently 
denied woman her full humanity, both in the faith-community and 
beyond. Yet such moral ambiguity is often overlooked in the reference to 
tradition and in the privileging of the congregation as the locus of moral 
discourse. In his research of church communities, the well renowned 
theologian Don Browning neglected to scrutinise the mechanisms of 
justice within the congregation itself. Graham, in reference to his studies, 
says: 
There is little attention to the internal power relations of the congregations, nor any 
commibnent towards looking at exclusions of gender, race or class within them.5 
Such anomalies pose a dilemma for critical correlation, in that, the 
conversation could be reduced to a form of theological relativism, 
whereby divine revelation per se is abandoned and the dialogue 
continues between varying social constructs. Such is Richard Holloway's 
point in his publication Godless Morality, and indeed, this might be less 
4E. Graham, Transforming Practice, p.70 
5E. Graham, Transforming Practice, p.91. 
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harmful to human flourishing than the way in which some Christians 
have, and still do, use theological power as a means of social control. 
However, as a person of faith, believing that God is All, I take the 
position that divine revelation continues in the active process of seeking 
God's direction through dialogue, worship, reflection, prayer and praxis. 
As I explored in Chapter One, human beings are constrained by their 
finitude and cultural locus, but the Spirit is not, as Jesus said, it is like the 
wind and blows where it will Oohn 3: 8). Consequently, I would assert 
that the commitment to dialogue and reflection includes an obligation to 
listen with humility to the Word as it is spoken through the varying 
forms of theological reflection in order to discern how Christian praxis 
can best be transformed in each social context that presents itself. 
The ultimate Truth is not to be found as a set of rules, but is more 
analogous to a horizon that, whilst it is always elusive and untouchable, 
can occasionally seem very close. The journey towards that horizon may 
require the reformulation of boundaries and even the revisioning of 
metanarratives as Paul discovered on the road to Damascus and later in 
his ensuing struggles with the cultural mores of circumcision and the 
food laws. I have confined my investigation of the NRTs to exploring the 
discourses relating to them, leaving out other aspects of enquiry that 
would be included in a holistic approach to critical correlation. The 
reason for this is that a broader sweep would have reduced the depth of 
my research and so I have chosen to concentrate on one area in detail. 
How then does my interrogation of secular and theological discourses 
relating to the NRTs make a contribution to Practical Theology? 
The discourses surrounding the NRTs are a critical component of the 
contemporary situation that affects those who discover they are infertile 
and who subsequently decide upon a medical option to overcome their 
problem. I have frequently drawn on Foucault's understanding of power 
relations to demonstrate how discourse is intrinsically connected to 
practice, and this is the case whether it occurs in the IVF clinic or the 
faith-community. Whilst it is true that it is the practice itself, which 
embeds a functioning technique into the culture, yet without a detailed 
questioning of the discourses underpinning that practice, effective 
resistance to it becomes much more difficult, or even I unthinkable', to 
challenge. I would assert that transformation of any given practice can be 
much better supported if there is an awareness of how the techniques of 
power are operating to sustain it. Consequently, it is from this vantage 
point that my findings provide illumination to an ongoing theological 
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discussion. In the following section I shall briefly summarise my findings 
and then offer suggestions as to how such understanding might 
transform praxis both pastorally and prophetically. 
The summary of my findings 
The interrogation of secular discourses undertaken in Chapter Three was 
necessary to establish a baseline for the everyday, taken for granted 
constructions of woman and the embryo that the popular narratives of 
the NRTs have made familiar to us all. Woman was constructed serially, 
and sometimes simultaneously, as: reproductively passive, 
childless/ older and desperate, selfless-giver, research object, animal, and 
supermum. The embryo's construction was similarly equivocal: research 
object, saviour and fully human. The findings demonstrated that a 
variety of functioning statements were constructing both entities into 
subject positions that were ambivalent, often adversarial, and which 
were rarely challenged, or even noticed, by both dominant and 
oppositional texts. 
In differing ways, these constructions were a cause for grave disquiet, 
particularly against a backdrop of biopower and biocapitalism, in which 
Carrette's crucial question of 'how do I exchange?' is especially pertinent. 
As it is the role of the church to speak out against the world's popular 
values, particularly when those values encompass wealth and power, 
which undermine human worth, my next logical step was to interrogate 
theological discourses to explore whether or not the church was fulfilling 
this critical role. 
In deconstructing the ecclesiastical responses to the NRTs, my findings 
have demonstrated that the ethical framework, in which these issues 
have been deliberated, is the normative, androcentric, justice structure, 
which is also dominant in secular accounts. An interrogation of the 
historical trajectory of traditional treatises illustrated how these have 
correlated into the theological community's NRT discourses, and 
thereby, secured this particular form of moral reasoning to such an 
extent that it has become unthinkable to approach the subject differently. 
But what of the churches' pastoral and prophetic role in the field of 
infertility and biopower; has the church been able to speak out from 
within this familiar framework? I would contend that, whilst it has 
indeed spoken, it has not fulfilled its prophetic and pastoral role, 
because, crucially, it is not speaking differently from the secular 
discourses in the most fundamental aspect. For, not only have the 
churches failed to take account of the subject position of assigned to 
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woman in the secular discourses of the NRTs, their construction of her is 
often more damaging than that which is found in secular tracts. 
The theological construction of woman 
This thesis has repeatedly demonstrated that it is woman's body, upon 
which biopower is founded and it is her ethics of self, which is crucial to 
determining how that power weaves through the discursive practices of 
the NRTs. Yet the textual techniques in the church reports and 
mainstream texts not only render her invisible, but they also separate her 
body from her personhood. (It is ironic that they conversely construct the 
embryo as having both these aspects utterly connected.) Woman is 
hidden more effectively in the theological discourses because she does 
not even have the voice that the media accounts give her. Whilst the 
popular stories also divide her into unrealistic and opposing positions, 
nevertheless, her visibility, as in Dyson's text, at least gives her a 
potential platform from which to challenge these constructions. 
Furthermore, in the secular accounts, woman is more likely to be heard 
in her own right, because they reflect the socio-cultural realities of 
procreative woman existing outside marriage. On the other hand, the 
theological community are resolute in constraining their deliberations to 
the context of a married couple. Whilst, it could be legitimately argued 
that the church could not do otherwise as this would undermine their 
commitment to marriage, nonetheless, as Foucault has shown, not to do 
'otherwise' is to operate within the perimeter of what is permitted with 
in a discipline or institution. 
Significantly, the ecclesiastical sanctification of marriage and the family, 
that is evident not only in the texts analysed in this thesis, but also in 
church liturgies and services, serves to prolong the subjugation of single 
and childless women within the church.6 Furthermore, because woman's 
personhood is suppressed, the church fails to reflect on the double bind 
it places woman in by only according her acknowledgement as mother 
and then ignoring her plight when she cannot achieve this prized subject 
position. It is therefore, not best placed to offer pastoral support for the 
anguish of infertility, when it has been complicit in denying woman 
fulfilment through other worthwhile avenues. Whilst woman still does 
6 In their book, Silence in Heaven: A Book of Women's Preaching, the editors H. Walton 
and S. Durber discuss how church services (and preaching in particular) have 
excluded the insights and experiences of women from the faith story. (London: SCM 
Press Ltd, 1994), pp. xi-xix. 
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not enjoy full parity in secular society, at least there is some recognition 
of this injustice in the oppositional discourses circulating in the media. 
For example, Dame Ruth Deech, the former Chair of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), related her concerns in 
a recent public lecture that women were being pressurised to 'do 
everything' to have a baby and that this resulted in couples 
remortgaging their homes due to the cost in the private clinics of 
repeated cycles? (For whilst, scientifically, IVF is quite successful for a 
new venture, its failure rate remains high, with a current 'take-home-
baby' rate of about 17-20%. Many women undertake several cycles and 
still end up with nothing, which can be far more psychologically 
destructive than accepting infertility as a given, which occurred prior to 
the advent of IVF.) Deech felt that the media gave a false impression of 
IVF as a cure-all and that society was not sufficiently compassionate to 
women who cannot have children. Why was the church not saying these 
things, when in its role as a pastoral organisation it should have been 
closest to the sort of problems that Deech was identifying? 
The Foucauldian concept that everyday knowledge becomes the most 
difficult to challenge is borne out by the fact that woman's disappearance 
from the NRT discourses is so taken for granted that it elicits no surprise 
or comment, not even from women themselves who ingest the same 
cultural constructions.8 For, in the anthropological vision contained in 
both church reports and the published texts, the opportunity to promote 
the dignity of woman and address a multiplicity of issues concerning her 
welfare has been consistently forgone, with the notable exception of 
Dyson. However, even his critique did not focus on connecting the 
discursive practices of the IVF clinic with current lucrative opportunities 
in the biotechnology field. 
Pastoral implications of woman's textual invisibility 
Why has no church asked the most fundamental pastoral question, 'How 
best can we support a woman through her unwanted childlessness and 
her decision whether or not to try the NRTs?' Ironically, the similarities 
with abortion are again evident here, for whilst it takes a couple to make 
a baby and a couple to discover their infertility; the resolution to both 
these dilemmas must take place within a woman's body and must, 
7 Ruth Deech was speaking at The Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow in 
November 2002. 
8 I am referring here to popuIar conceptualisations, feminist scholars have drawn 
attention to the way in which woman's interests in the NRT have not been considered. 
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therefore, be subject to her agency. Why then is the scriptural guidance 
of the anthropological vision not supporting woman as she determines 
her ethics of self through these deliberations? For even in Dyson's 
enlightened text, such moral responsibility is not accorded her. 
Moreover, as I said in the introductory paragraphs to this thesis, the 
theological discourses construct the boundaries not only of what counts 
as knowledge for the church, but also what is considered to be important 
or relevant to the debate. As woman's invisibility is perpetually 
reinforced, the issues that she must face with the ever-increasing 
biotechnological advances are never addressed from her vantage point. 
Whilst they may be debated from the standpoint of the embryo, it is 
woman, not the embryo, who must take responsible action. 
Consequently, the practices of the IVF clinic that affect her are not 
scrutinised, leaving any pastoral support that may be given to infertile 
couples open to the dangers of being uninformed and counterproductive. 
None of the practical issues which woman faces are presented in ways 
that can offer her critical support, such as the following: choosing 
whether or not to opt for IVF, another treatment, or adoption, making 
decisions about frozen embryos, egg sharing or using donor gametes, 
choosing ICSI, undergoing repeated superovulation, finding sufficient 
funding, choosing whether to pay for PGD or opt for early termination of 
an affected fetus, and deciding whether to donate spare embryos for 
research or to help another childless couple. An awareness of the 
emotional devastation that these pressures cause caught up as they are in 
the cycle of hope and failure is woefully missing from the church reports. 
As a pastoral organisation, with its listening ear open to the difficulties of 
lived realities, the church should have been more attuned, paradoxically, 
to the problems of IVF success. Yet, it has been the secular world, which 
has raised concerns on issues such as the number of embryos returned to 
the uterus that has resulted in a huge increase in multiple births. A more 
careful appraisal would have demonstrated that the real costs of IVF to 
the NBS are the increased demands on the Special Care Baby Units that 
have had to provide for premature babies resulting from multiple birth 
deliveries. Moreover, the sufferings of both children born prematurely 
and of parents watching their newborn babies struggle for life are greater 
concerns than the fate of an embryo of less than 14 days. 
When, tragically, a death or disability results, the disappointment and 
grief after years of yeaming for a baby can be devastating. If all goes well 
and the babies go home, raising twins and triplets is immensely stressful 
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and expensive, which, again, can be particularly hard after years of 
infertility and a draining of personal wealth in paying for treatments. 
The practice of returning three embryos has now been prohibited by the 
HFEA; new guidelines stipulate that only two embryos can be returned.9 
It would be possible to freeze a clutch of embryos and put one back each 
month, both relieving woman from the prospect of repeated 
superovulation and mirroring closely the circumstances of natural 
conception. Not only would this be best practice for the well-being of 
both mother and baby, it would incur savings to the Special Care Baby 
Units.10 Yet, the church was unanimously silent on this issue. 
Prophetic implications of woman's textual invisibility 
As woman's invisibility in the church reports has resulted in a lack of 
concern for her pastoral care, so similarly, issues of prophetic importance 
that her presence would have signalled have also been missed. For 
example, whilst the churches have discussed consent and 
experimentation in all their reports in relation to the embryo, none of 
them has applied their concerns to woman's part in the NRTs. There has 
been no discussion regarding the origins of IVF, when as I have stated 
previously, there was no research undertaken on primates before IVF 
was offered as a treatment for infertile women. In addition, there has 
been no follow up research undertaken on the effects of repeated 
superovulation on women's bodies, despite the fact that recent surveys 
on the contraceptive pill and hormone replacement therapy suggest that 
hormonal interference might have long-term harmful effects. 
In addition, the commodification of reproduction and the competitive 
practices of private clinics to achieve good success ratings, contribute to 
further medicalisation of women's reproduction and a limiting of some 
choices, whilst paradoxically extending others. The use of donor gametes 
and embryos generates an ethical minefield, for in order to maintain a 
good statistical success rating, clinics may put pressure on younger 
women to donate eggs and on older women to accept them. 
Moreover, the theological community has not discussed the macro-
cultural issues that relate to these critical micro-practices from woman's 
particular locus. By maintaining the embryo's interests as predominant, 
whilst simultaneously absenting woman as person from the text, 
insufficient data is explored from which to understand how biopower is 
9 See the Prologue, p. xi; footnote 2. 
10'J'he NHS might be persuaded to offer a more equitable IVF service if this became 
common practice. 
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operating in the discursive practices of the IVF clinic. For, even when 
issues are raised, such as the increasing medicalisation of human 
reproduction, they are not viewed in the light of the historical practices 
that are the means through patriarchy authority. Such reflection was 
woefully missing from Waters' text, despite the fact that this was 
fundamental to his critique of the status quo. How then can the church 
speak out in truth, when it ignores so many interconnected complexities? 
Whilst further issues of prophetic concern have emerged since the 
publication of the church reports, nonetheless, in their deliberations over 
stem cell technology, the churches remain entrenched in the same 
perspective and continue to privilege the embryo over woman. The need 
for donor eggs mayor may not escalate depending upon the scientific 
discoveries and techniques that emerge in the future, but IVF has made 
commonplace the method of egg recovery needed for this. The analysis 
of the television programme in Chapter Three demonstrated that the 
circulating and ambivalent constructions of woman as self-less giver and 
woman as animal could be deployed by biocapitalism for its own 
lucrative ends. Moreover, the advent of procreative tourism, which 
needs to be challenged in its own right as an integral part of biopower's 
dynamic web, could incorporate poor women in the developing world in 
commercial ova donation. In its commitment to human worth and 
dignity, the church should be speaking out about these concerns. 
The media treatment of 'designer babies' also discussed in Chapter 
Three, incorporated oppositional, secular prophetic elements, in the 
envisioning of genetically engineered superhumans. Whilst much of this 
could be discounted as hysterical fabulations, nonetheless, more realistic 
social justice concerns are certainly an issue that should cause disquiet. 
For, IVF could be used by young, elite, fertile couples to eliminate genetic 
propensity to common diseases such as diabetes, cancer and heart 
conditions from, not only their embryo, but from their descendents also. 
Operating within the accepted values of doing' the best for one's 
children' and' taking personal responsibility for health', these practices 
are far more likely to be assimilated into popular cultural practice. 
This would have implications for increasing the 'nature' gap between the 
haves and have-nots that is already sustained through the 'nurture' gap 
of poverty, unequal access to resources and inequality of opportunity. A 
form of eugenics via individual agency could be created that is resonant 
of the way in which the discourses of the protestant work ethic, capitalist 
practices and the hysterisation of woman combined to undermine sexual 
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pleasure in the marital bed as discussed in Chapter One.ll By using 
historical analyses based on Foucauldian principles, it is possible to 
ground a prophetic call for caution based on the knowledge of how 
social constructions can work alongside socio-cultural opportunities in 
the relational web of biopower. Again, woman is strategic to this 
dynamic, and by omitting her from theological concerns, the church 
denies itself a position from which to effectively, and compassionately, 
make challenges on these issues. 
The theological construction of the embryo 
From the constructions that abound in the secular and theological 
discourses, the embryo has emerged as an unembodied, free-floating, 
political entity, which has taken on the projections of man's fantasies, 
desires and fears. H woman's body is the battlefield, then the embryo 
severed from its roots, has become the contested territory. The 
theological community's defence of it could be viewed as heroic in this 
metaphor by protecting its moral status from the clutches of 
biocapitalism, however, discourse analysis has demonstrated that other, 
less honourable, dynamics are operating in this contest of power. For the 
theological analyses have revealed that it is not biocapitalism that has 
been their ideological adversary, but woman. In saying this, however, I 
do not deny that the Church's defence of the embryo has been effective 
in providing a religious brake to some of the potential excesses of the 
NRTs, and that this has, inadvertently, also protected woman. 
However, when that protection is based on flawed and damaging 
constructions, it becomes problematic as this thesis has demonstrated. As 
I have shown, the theological construction of the embryo must be 
correlated with previously established discourses on abortion. In 
traditional accounts, through a dynamic of psychic empathy, ecclesiastic 
text producers have reflected themselves in the threatened embryo and 
constructed it accordingly, that is, as an embodied, elite, male adult, who 
is vulnerable to woman. The irony that, in reality, it is the unintentionally 
pregnant woman who has been placed in a position of powerlessness 
and vulnerability is utterly irrelevant to the functioning of this 
construction in theological tracts. 
This understanding illuminates why the debates over consent and 
research move so easily from generic man, as envisaged in the 
anthropological vision, to the embryo without incorporating woman's 
11 See Chapter One, p. 32. 
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different position. It also provides insight into why woman is perceived 
in the discursive fields of the cultural unconscious as the enemy, and 
why she is accorded such high ontological regard, and gratitude, as 
mother. This construction has been so entrenched that it has confused 
moral reasoning in the status of the embryo, which is discerned by 
Jurgen Habermas when he says: 
It does not solely belong to human dignity to qualify as "not to be disposed over" 
["unverfiigbar"]. Something may, for good moral reasons, be not for us to dispose 
over and still not be "inviolable" [" unantastbar"] in the sense of the unrestricted or 
absolute validity of fundamental rights (which is constituted for "human dignity" as 
defined in Article 1 of the Basic Law).12 
How can the faith-community meaningfully respond to these issues? 
Clearly, the first step towards any oppositional praxis relating to the 
NRTs would be to make woman visible, thereby enabling the process of 
her taking responsibility for her ethics of self in ways that could be seen 
and heard in the theological community. Yet, given that so many of the 
NRT discourses hide woman, how can this be overturned? One of the 
difficulties for the woman in the pew, who finds herself faced with the 
dilemmas of infertility and its technological choices, is that her local 
congregation may be ill-equipped to support her for many reasons. As 
Western church communities are shrinking and constitute higher 
numbers of older people in the local congregation, she may find herself 
isolated both in terms of her predicament per se, and also by the low 
priority that the NRTs may be given by those who have left their 
childbearing years behind them. This is not to say that older people 
would be unsympathetic, rather that other issues may be of greater 
concern to them. 
Paradoxically, in thriving congregations where the emphasis towards 
family centred services, Sunday school teaching and child orientated 
initiatives may be much more prominent, personal disclosure from those 
suffering from unwanted childlessness may be even more difficult. 
Moreover, in such congregations, where an almost weekly baptism takes 
place, the heartache of those who find this celebratory service extremely 
painful will often be hidden away from public scrutiny. Infertility is a 
condition that, despite its recent media popularity, still remains a deeply 
private and shameful issue for many women and is something that they 
might shrink from discussing with a male minister. In addition, the 
churches' public statements that are quoted in press reports suggest an 
12 J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2(03), p.31. 
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ambivalent line at best, and a hostile one in many instances, which serves 
to keep the dilemma in the domestic, private and secular domain. 
Critically then, for woman's visibility in relation to the NRTs to actualise 
and for her voice to be heard in oppositional theological discourses, there 
needs to be a corporate locus that exists beyond the local situation. There 
are already established networks of Christian women, who are the 
bearers of resistant discourses and practices for other aspects of woman's 
particular difficulties. These networks have gained expertise in 
providing alternative liturgies, prayer networks, support groups and 
spiritual direction that could offer a starting place, and thereafter, many 
avenues of theological support for infertile women on their personal 
journey. In tum, by opening their doors to the predicament of unwanted 
childlessness and its incumbent technological minefield, these networks 
could be enriched and informed by the experiences of women who could 
be invited to share their feelings without fear of judgement. 
This agenda for change is not without hope or precedent for other issues 
of concern to woman have flourished due to the empowering of women-
church connections organised alongside the mainstream congregational 
church. The plight of domestic violence, also a private and shameful 
issue that remained hidden due to its theological embarrassment factor 
('it doesn't happen in our backyard') has been exposed by these 
mechanisms. Whilst such uncovering does not dissipate the problem, its 
visibility initiates the opportunity for change. These networks have 
provided a platform upon which alternative ways of living, speaking 
and acting are first imagined and then begin to take shape. 
Critically, as these are theological networks, the richness of the Christian 
tradition has been revisited for different narratives, liturgies and 
inspirational prayers to ground the revisioning and reformulation of 
orthodoxy. I would even suggest that this process is, in fact, at the very 
heart of Christian orthopraxis. Not only could these networks offer 
succour for the childless woman, but they could also effect real change in 
the theological understanding of infertility and the NRTs. For when the 
only challenge to the church comes from secular sources, the theological 
position becomes entrenched across a faith divide, which serves to 
reinforce the traditional discourses surrounding human reproduction 
particularly those, as I have demonstrated, that stem from abortion and 
their misogynist perception of woman. 
Moreover, a response from the wider faith-community could begin to 
question the moral framework in which the NRTs are couched. I have 
222 
already stated that women need justice and do not suggest that it should 
be abandoned for an ethics of care, but the traditional framework of the 
public sphere might be turned around so that the overarching moral 
framework is one of care mitigated by justice. Ironically, this is not as 
radically different as it first appears, for as Held asserts, women have 
been familiar with this domestic model of practice for centuries: 
Though justice is surely a most important moral value, much life has gone on 
without it, and much of that life has been moderately good. There has, for instance, 
been little justice within the family, but much care; so we can have care without 
justice.13 
This concept has scriptural validity in the calls to act justly and show 
mercy (Mic 6:8, Zec 7:9, Mt 23:23, Jas 2:13) and furthermore, in James' 
letter, compassion is given precedent: 
Speak and act as those who are going to be judged by the law that gives freedoms, 
because judgement without mercy will be shown to anyone who has not been 
merciful. Mercy triumphs over judgement! Games 2:12-13.) 
I believe that a foundational place to start such a changed perspective lies 
in the concept of relationality that is integral to an ethics of care. Whilst 
the embryo lies separated from woman in the petri dish, ironically, I 
would contend that it is in this most vulnerable place that the relational 
connection with woman might prevent the worst excesses of 
biotechnology becoming reality. For, in this regard, relationality is not 
predominantly an ideological position; it is a concrete one. This is not at 
variance with Steinberg's assertions, as one can be separated and still in 
relationship. Crucially and incongruously, it has become forgotten that 
without woman's desire for children, whether this is socially constructed 
or not, there would be no need of assisted conception, no opportunity to 
gain access to the embryo and no bodies made available for the forces of 
biopower and biocapitalism to operate through. 
The ecclesiastical placing of the anthropological vision as a pivotal 
prophetic and pastoral priority, reflecting the scriptural presupposition 
that human beings are made in the image of God (Gen. 1:26) could 
remain an authoritative foundation in this changed structure. But rather 
than situating generic man at the centre of this vision, it could be turned 
to encompass spiritually embodied woman as befits her role in the NRTs. 
As Janet Martin Soskice argued in her debate with Daphne Hampson, 
turning symbols is possible: 
13 V. Held, 'The Meshing of Care and Justice', pp.537-541, in Feminist Ethics, ed by M. 
Gatens, p. 540. 
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They vary from culture to culture, they shift over time, they turn and they can be 
turned. Symbols, like languages themselves, are social products and not natural 
kinds like porcupines or zinC.14 
The embryo would remain a vital consideration, but in this framework, it 
would not be constructed as adversarial to woman, nor as threatened by 
her, nor even as separated from her, but as potential life in waiting to be 
returned to her. The relational framework would place family 
responsibility at the heart of this vision, addressing issues such as the 
splitting of parenthood and promoting the welfare of children. Within an 
overarching framework of care, aspects of justice regarding woman's role 
as worker and mother could be addressed as socio-cultural imperatives 
that require prophetic critique of capitalist practices that also impede 
man's role in this relational structure. 
Furthermore, by deliberating issues from within a meta-structure of care 
as opposed to justice, the pastoral needs would gain precedence. Not 
only would this offer greater compassionate support to couples working 
through their infertility, it would also serve to highlight the discursive 
practices of the IVF clinic, revealing the macro-cultural systems that 
underpin these practices. Finally, whilst a corporate challenge from a 
theological source would not wave a magic wand, it could, nonetheless, 
offer new ways of seeing and new possibilities for being church that 
affirm woman's place as co-creator, rather than as rebellious other. 
14J. Martin Soskice, 'Turning the Symbols', pp. 17- 32, in Swallowing a Fishbone? 
Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity ed by D. Hampson, (London: SPCK, 1996), p. 
27. 
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EPILOGUE 
I began this thesis with a Prologue that recounted my story of secondary 
infertility, which began twenty-five years ago with the birth of my first-
born son and became a journey, which may not have even ended here. I 
discussed in the first chapter why I felt it was important to declare a 
personal standpoint and, moreover, I established that such a standpoint 
is predominantly an alternative position, from which it is possible to see 
differently. This is not analogous to an opinion, as feminist theologies 
demonstrate, for there can be a plethora of opinions that can emanate 
from a particular locus. As the feminist theorists were careful to 
emphasise, personal experience must be open to critique and validation 
to counter the dangers of relativism, and whilst to do so places one in a 
position of vulnerability, nonetheless, the knowledge of how something 
feels, is too precious not to be used in theological reflection. 
I hope that I have contributed something worthwhile to the ethical 
debate surrounding the NRTs, which has been enhanced by my lived 
experience of IVF - bringing together in this study woman as body and 
woman as person from my position as participant ethnographer. I owe a 
debt of gratitude to the work of Foucault, and to those scholars who have 
incorporated his insights before me, as his understanding of social 
construction through knowledge and discourse has been invaluable. I 
have found discourse analysis to be a highly effective tool for 
deconstruction, which is critical when the material to be interrogated has 
an emotive and subjective element. I believe Practical Theology can only 
benefit from its assimilation into the discipline's toolbox as a primary aid 
for theological enquiry. 
My research has had to have perimeters in order to achieve sufficient 
depth and so, inevitably, there will be important issues that I have not 
had the scope to explore. In addition, my perspective will have had its 
own blind spots that other IVF participants could illuminate. Even 
putting aside the extensive NRT dilemmas that I did not experience, such 
as eventual IVF failure, using donor gametes or embryos and being a 
carrier of an inherited disease, one of the major limitations to this study 
was the omission of man's part in the NRTs. This was forgone due to the 
enormous undertaking of demonstrating woman's invisibility in both 
secular and theological discourses and to establishing her particular 
importance to the functioning of biopower. It was not possible to also 
consider the particularity of man's situation, but this does not mean that 
I consider it to be unworthy of reflected study. On the contrary, it would 
be immensely useful to have a man's personal account that did not speak 
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generically in terms of abstract principles, but which reflected on his own 
personal feelings. 
Whilst the boundaries of this thesis have not been able to connect all the 
discursive practices of the IVF clinic with meta-arching systems of 
power, nevertheless, I hope that I have established that these connections 
exist. In addition, I have shown that due to the unprecedented interest of 
the media in issues relating to the NRTs, newspaper discourses impact 
on socio-cultural norms that encompass both the fertile and infertile 
alike. Finally, I have demonstrated that the ethical framework, which the 
church uses, has fallible aspects that prevent it from fulfilling its critical 
role of applying the teaching of Christ to woman's dilemmas in the 
world. What began in the reflections on the NRTs could be applied to a 
far wider socio-cultural context, particularly the vision of founding care 
ethics as the overarching moral framework, informed and constrained by 
the praxis of justice. 
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APPENDIX I 
TRANSCRIPTS OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES USED FOR 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN CHAPTER THREE 
The articles used for discourse analysis in Chapter Three have been 
reproduced here for reference. The first piece is the announcement of 
Louise Brown's birth taken from the Scottish Daily Express; the 
second is the Express commentary, written by George Gale in the 
same newspaper edition. The editor's opinion from the journal Nature 
is the third article. The final section contains the headlines of all the 
articles from the Scottish Daily Mail and the Sun newspapers, which 
featured the NRTs and related topics within the time period of 
September and October 2000. 
Article No.1: The front-page of the Scottish Daily Express, No. 
24,282, Thursday, July 27,1978. 1 
THE WHOLE WORLD IN HER HANDS 
Test-tube baby 'just beautiful' -Steptoe 
Here she is -the mother with the whole world in her arms ... 
An Express artist creates the scene in an Oldam hospital yesterday as 
supermum Lesley Brown, 32, cuddled the world's first test-tube baby. 
Mrs. Brown, who lost a lot of blood during the caesarean operation, 
was resting last night. 
She needs peace and plenty of relaxation to make a full recovery. The 
51b. 12oz. girl who made history when she bawled into the world on 
Tuesday night, is doing well, too. 
And yesterday the man, who made it all possible, gynaecologist Mr. 
Patrick Steptoe, described her as "beautiful." 
He said the little miracle was 1/ a beautiful, normal baby which was 
crying its head off at birth." 
And he added: "In a reasonable number of years there will be more 
babies of this kind. 
1 I have reproduced the front-page text with its continuation on page 3. I have put 
spaces to indicate where the newspaper has indented new paragraphs and kept the 
punctuation as the original. The article included a large portrait sketch on the right 
side of the front-page of Lesley Brown and Louise. 
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"Instead of it being a seven day wonder, it will be a fairly 
commonplace affair." 
Mr. Steptoe, 65, was showing the strain of the last two days as he 
answered questions from the world's Press in Manchester, with his 
colleague Dr. Robert Edwards, 52. 
He said he was" absolutely whacked out." But he still managed to 
look as delighted as the baby's father, 38-year-old Mr. John Brown. 
Mr. Brown was over the moon. "She's my little girl-she's the 
greatest," he declared. 
After nine years of waiting for Lesley to have a baby he was ready to cry for 
joy. 
He told a relative: "She is just so beautiful. She hasn't got much hair-
but she certainly did a lot of bawling and crying after she was born. 
"She might be the most historic child in the universe, but to Lesley 
and I she is just a baby. 
"I never thought anything could make me so happy. It's just too 
fantastic. It's just too good ... too good." 
Among the first visitors allowed in to see the baby was Mr. Brown's 
daughter from an earlier marriage, 17 -year-old Sharon. 
According to one of her friends, Sharon was "madly in love with the 
baby. She is just as thrilled ... 
(End of front-page, the article continues on page 3, which also 
contains a piece with delighted comments from the Brown's 
neighbours [which includes a photograph of them toasting the birth 
with champagne] and a further section entitled, 'Help for Scots', 
which promises hope for childless couples in Scotland. On page 3, the 
continuation of the article from page one has the subheading 'Wonder 
baby', and above this there is a photograph of Dr. Edwards and Mr. 
Steptoe, both smiling. ) 
... as her father and step-mother." 
A TEST-TUBE baby operation was performed yesterday morning at a 
London teaching hospital, just under twelve hours after the birth of 
baby Brown. 
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The woman - the 13th to have the operation at St Thomas's Hospital -
heard about the news from Oldham as she was on her way to the 
hospital. 
Said Professor Ronald Taylor, head of the Department of Obstetrics 
and gynaecology at St. Thomas's: "She was very pleased and very 
cheered at the idea that the operation can be a success." 
The woman, who asked not to be named, is in her 30s. She already 
has two children and has been trying for a third for more than three 
years. 
Marvel 
AN M.P. demanded yesterday that the Government should monitor 
the effects of a test-tube baby boom. 
Labour M.P. Mr. Leo Abse bid a Commons committee that the new 
"marvel of medical manipulation" could have malignant 
consequences. 
He said genetic engineering was going on in Russia. Some people had 
inhibitions about medicine moving into an area which might have 
overtones of Hitler - who thought he could create a master race by 
experiment." 
Mrs. Shirley Williams, Education and Science Secretary, had told him 
that the test-tube techniques did not involve genetic manipulation. 
THE CHURCH of Scotland welcomes the test-tube baby technique, 
provided it was used with care and responsibility. 
The Rev. James Simpson, of Dornoch, joint convener of a Kirk 
committee which looks after such matters, said it was in many ways 
merely an extension of methods used in artificial insemination by 
donor. 
But Roman Catholic Cardinal Gordon Gray expressed personal 
misgivings about the methods used and the possible consequences. 
Mr. Steptoe and his partner spent 12 years before they got their 
technique right and enabled Mrs. Brown to have the baby she craved. 
They are convinced they can repeat it and that little Miss Brown is not 
a one-off fluke. 
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Mr. Steptoe, who carried out the 10-minute caesarean operation was 
able to prove the breakthrough to medical observers. 
They were able to see that Mrs. Brown had no fallopian tubes and 
couldn't have a baby normally. 
Of the 20,000 women in Britain who go to their doctors every year 
unable to have babies, 40 per cent have damaged or diseased fallopian 
tubes. 
Mr. Steptoe and Dr. Edwards believe they can help a vast proportion 
of these women. 
Said Dr. Edwards: "We are changing, testing, adapting all the time. I 
believe we can achieve a success rate of 50 per cent." 
Mr. Steptoe decided on a Caesarean operation because Mrs. Brown 
developed blood poisoning, which could have caused a still birth. 
Of the 20,000 women in Britain who go to their doctors every year 
unable to have babies, 40 per cent have damaged or diseased fallopian 
tubes. 
Mr. Steptoe and Dr. Edwards believe they can help a vast proportion 
of these women. 
Said Dr. Edwards: "We are changing, testing, adapting all the time. I 
believe we can achieve a success rate of 50 per cent." 
Mr. Steptoe decided on a Caesarean operation because Mrs. Brown 
developed blood poisoning, which could have caused a still birth. 
Article No.2: Mixed Blessings for Britain's Brave New Birth' by George 
Gale in the Scottish Daily Express, No. 24,282, Thursday, July 27, 
1978, p.10. 
Mixed Blessings for Britain's Brave New Birth 
There will be the highest praise for the medical, scientific and 
technical skills displayed by Mr. Patrick Steptoe, the Oldham 
gynaecologist, and Mr. Robert Edwards, the Cambridge physiologist. 
The birth of a daughter to Mr. and Mrs. John Brown was due to their 
work. Without it Mrs. Brown would not have conceived. 
Mr. And Mrs. Brown have so far emerged from the attentions of the 
world's Press apparently unscathed. It is to be hoped rather than 
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expected, that they will be able to lead as normal lives as possible. 
This however, as the parents of what is everywhere described as the 
world's first /I test-tube" baby is going to be extremely difficult. 
As for the baby herself, she is likely to be a subject of acute public 
interest at least until such time as she may in turn become a mother 
herself. 
The case for protecting the anonymity of parents and child in this 
unique occasion was very strong: but the pressures, financial, 
professional and others were far too powerful for there ever to be any 
real chance of keeping the names concerned out of it. 
Few parents, if any, in the position of the Browns, with a fortune 
dangled in front of them, would have done other than take the cash 
and hope for the best. 
As for the gynaecologist and the physiologist, we need to recognise 
that fame is the spur of a great deal of pioneering medical and 
scientific research. 
Acclaim 
Their satisfaction, far more than any material rewards, will remain 
having been the first men to have fertilised a human egg in vitro, 
which is to say, in glass, in a test-tube outside the womb. Their work 
together has been painstaking and long, and they deserve their 
acclaim. 
Moreover, as their techniques are improved and their knowledge 
disseminated through the medical and scientific world, we may 
expect many wives who hitherto because of gynaecological effects 
have been unable to bear their husbands' children will now be 
enabled to do so. 
This said, the happy birth is very unlikely to prove an unmixed 
blessing and may be the precursor of disaster. The baby, the infant, 
the little girl, the adolescent girl, the young woman: she will be 
subjected to constant publicity which cannot but give her an abnormal 
upbringing which she will need a tough and stable temperament to 
survive relatively unscathed. She can only hope to grow up as normal 
as possible. Normal she cannot be. 
She is no physical freak: but she is unique, the consequence of being 
the product of a very abnormal conception in a test-tube. 
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Whether the world at large will become a better place as a result of 
this new technique of conception is to be doubted. It is safe to assume 
that the technique, at present expensive, difficult and in part secret, 
will in due course become cheap and easy and public property. 
This will help wives who want children by their husbands, and who 
cannot at present have them. 
But the technique opens up many other possibilities, some of which 
are undoubtedly alarming. 
It so happens that in the Brown case, the husband's sperm fertilised 
the wife's egg - and it was this fact which led the medical profession's 
ethical advisers to pronounce that no ethical considerations arose. 
But any man's sperm could have been used. Scientifically, it was 
irrelevant that the husband's was used. 
This means that women will be able to have their eggs fertilised, 
without intercourse from banked sperm. They can already do so now, 
through artificial insemination by donor, a process which disturbs 
some doctors but not others. 
The new process, however, suggests that soon one woman's egg 
could be fertilised in a test-tube then planted in another woman's 
womb. 
Parents will be able to decide the sex of their children. Children will 
be born with unknown fathers and unknown mothers. 
This may all sound far-fetched: but it is already beginning to happen: 
the techniques are already beginning to be understood. 
And if conception can take place in a test-tube and life be sustained 
therein for days, as the cells divide and multiply towards the 
formation of the foetus how long will it be before a foetus itself is 
grown to maturity within the laboratory? 
Frightening 
All this is alarming and disturbing enough. But what is far more 
frightening altogether, is the possibility now opened up of genetic 
engineering on a massive scale, performed by scientists working 
under the direction of the state. Such a brave new world may be on 
our doorstep not so long after 1984. 
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Societies based upon the family prevent such breeding taking place. 
It could very easily happen again. We already have sperm banks and 
may soon have egg banks. Under the guise of eliminating hereditary 
diseases and defects, governments could easily insist upon the "right" 
or "best" kind of genetic material to be used. 
The next stage could then be the banning of the natural-born children, 
in order, to eliminate all risk of hereditary defects. Far-fetched? Of 
course it is far-fetched. 
But the birth of the brown baby in Oldham has already fetched us far 
along that road. Is it a road we want to travel along? It is a road 
irresistibly attractive to genetic engineers. 
I have no desire to travel along that road. But if I peer into the future 
as far as I can see, I begin to see in the far distance a society of people 
bred to measure: and I don't like the sight at all. 
Article No.3: The Editor's Opinion in Nature, VOL 34419 April 
1990, p. 690. 
Embryo Research 
The British House of Commons should this week settle for the 
government's bill on embryo research. 
The bill to give effect to the recommendations of the Warnock 
committee, now five years stale, reaches the House of Commons this 
week, perhaps even today (see opposite). That is why it is to be hoped 
that all concerned will pay more than passing attention to the article 
on page 768 of this issue, which carries one of the first formal reports 
to have appeared in print of the potential benefits of the manipulation 
of human embryos before they have been implanted in the uterus. 
What Professor Robert Winston and Dr Alan Handyside have done is 
to exploit the property (well-known in, for example, the mouse) that 
not all the cells in an early embryo are necessary for its successful 
development. It is possible to take one cell from, say, the four-cell 
stage of the embryo's development, use that cell for making a 
diagnosis of the genetic condition of the embryo as a whole, and still 
look to the remaining cells to yield a viable fetus. What the work at 
the Hammersmith Hospital has shown is that it is possible to use this 
technique for screening embryos for their gender, using for 
implantation only female embryos, almost certain to be free from 
genetic defects linked with the X-chromosone, of which females carry 
two, one from each parent. 
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It is important and relevant to the Embryo Bill that it is entirely 
predicted that the technique would be effective: endless experiments 
with other mammals have given ample assurance that it would be. 
But this implies that the technique is an operational technique - a 
means of avoiding genetic defects that might otherwise be detectable 
only much later in pregnancy, perhaps resulting legitimately in 
abortion. It has been used, with approval of the voluntary committee 
set up to span the long wait for the Embryo Bill, and will no doubt be 
more generally applied when there is a legal framework in which 
other groups can operate. Defective embryos will, of course, be 
discarded. The ethical question for most people is whether the 
discarding of some out of several embryos at this stage is preferable to 
an abortion later. The House of Commons cannot be in much doubt 
where its decision should lie. In logic, those who support the present 
abortion law cannot easily oppose the Embryo Bill. 
But that, of course, does not dispose of all the arguments. There are 
many who hold that neither abortion nor the manipulation of 
embryos should be allowed. The opinion, which has as a corollary the 
view that the birth of children with avoidable genetic defects is 
virtuous in some sense, deserves respect as a matter of civil comity. It 
is also relevant that, at least for recessive genes, there may be genetic 
arguments for caution: the disadvantages of the homozygote may be 
more easily recognized than the advantages of the heterozygote. 
But that, fortunately, is but yet another argument for caution, which is 
one of the considerations that should weigh with the Licensing 
Authority which, the British Government proposes, will replace the 
voluntary committee that has stood in for it. And, properly briefed, 
the authority should give the lie to those who also argue that 
manipulation of embryos before implantation is the beginning of a 
dangerous slippery slope. 
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Article No.4: Headlines of Articles from the Scottish Daily Mail 
and the Sun Newspapers Featuring the NRT and Related Topics in 
September and October 20002 
SEPTEMBER 2000 
THE SUN NEWPAPER 
5th Lottery Twinner; Sam's test-tube babies are paid for by the 
Lotto, (no author cited) p.l5. 
23rd World Exclusive 
80 COUPLES IN BABY MIX-UP NIGHTMARE 
Scandal of hospitals' frozen embryos blunder 
FULL STORY-SEE PAGES 2,3,4 AND 5 
Includes a photograph of a small fetus with the caption 
'New life .. but tots may have grown in wrong womb', J. 
Askill, Front-page. 
BRITAIN'S BABY MIX-UP SCANDAL (Covers pp. 2-3) 
BABIES COULD BE SITTING ON THE KNEES OF WRONG 
MUMS Implant 'bungle' shock for parents, J. Askill, p. 2. 
SECURITY VITAL WITH IVF 
Includes a half-page explanation of the IVF process with 
photographs, J. Thornton, p. 3. 
BRITAIN'S BABY MIX-UP SCANDAL 
How will they cope? Hell facing IVF parents 
PIONEERS IN LONG, HARD FIGHT TO CREATE 
FAMILIES 
Includes a photograph with the caption, 'Miracles ... test-tube 
tot Louise Brown as a teenager with IVF baby', V. Grimshaw, 
pp.4-5. 
THE SUN SAYS 
Parents need the truth, now 
The first paragraph of the Sun's editorial reads: 
'THE first thing to say about the test-tube baby scandal in 
today's Sun is this: 
2 The papers' headlines have been reproduced in the way in which they appeared in 
the paper with regard to the use of capitals, italics, inverted commas and so forth. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to convey the size of the print used, but in a page 
layout, I have called the largest sized print the headline and the smaller printed title, 
if one accompanies it, the subheading. I have maintained this rule of coding, even if, 
as often happens, the smaller printed title is placed above the main headline. 
235 
There is nothing WRONG with the practice of in vitro 
fertilisation', Sun Editorial, p. 8. 
25th THE GREAT IVF SCANDAL 
THEY'VE LOST OUR LAST HOPE OF A BABY (The Scottish 
Sun), J. Askill, Front-page. 
THE GREAT IVF SCANDAL 
AGONISING WAIT FOR 10 MOTHERS 
DNA tests to see if their babies are theirs 
Includes a photograph of the Hampshire IVF clinic and an 
enlarged fertilised egg with the caption: 
'Birth treatment ... childless couples' hopes were pinned on 
fertilised eggs like this, left', (The Scottish Sun), J. Askill, pp. 4-
5. 
26th EMBRYO BOSS IN PROBE ON CLINIC'S CASH, J. 
Askill & T. Kandohla, p. 2. 
27th THE GREAT IVF SCANDAL 
MUM: CLINIC LOST SIX OF MY 'BABIES' 
'Embryos alive somewhere', J. Askill, p.2. 
30th FRAUD COPS SWOOP ON BABY CLINIC 
Includes a photograph of the Hampshire clinic with the 
subheading: 'Pair fear 'theft' of embryos', S. Evison, p.9. 
THE SCOTTISH DAILY MAIL 
1 st Found, the secret of eternal life (well, at least if you're a 
worm), J. Chapman, p. 29. 
8th The heart repair kit; Cardiac cells could be made to fix 
themselves, R. Gray, p. 37. 
22nd Disabled parents in fight for gene rights; Let deaf couples 
select deaf children, say charities, B. Marsh, p.IS. 
23rd Mothers told: You may have had the wrong test-tube baby 
Embryologist is suspended amid fears of a fertility clinic mix-
up, B. Marsh, p.17. 
25th Anguish of mother in frozen embryo mix-up, M. Bayley, p.18. 
26th How Dolly genetics will help gay men conceive 
Technique means 'no need for a mother' 
Includes diagram of donor egg and surrogacy plus a 
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photograph of Dolly with the caption: World first: Dolly has 
led to controversial advances in genetics', J. Chapman, p.22. 
28th WARNING OVER GM ANIMALS IMMUNE TO PAIN, S. 
Poulter, Front-page. 
Continues on p. 2 under the heading: 
Warning on Frankenstein Farmyards 
How older mothers put baby at risk 
The opening sentence reads: 'Older mothers are more likely to 
have smaller weaker babies who risk growing up 
with serious health problems, according to a study.' 
pregnancy with the caption: 
'High risk strategy: Madonna was 41 when she gave birth to 
her son', J. Chapman, p. 19. 
29th FRANKENSTEIN'S FARMYARD 
If we let scientists defy nature, it is we who should be called 
animals, C. Tudge, p. 12. 
As a surrogate mother I just wanted to give to others, but I 
ended up destroying my own marriage 
Includes photographs with the caption: 'Surrogate mother Jane 
Parfitt (left) brought family joy to David and Debbie Howells 
(top with baby Grace). But it was at the cost of her own 
marriage to Tony (above)', L. Gibson, pp. 32-33. 
Man's IVF victory 
Ex-boyfriend wins right to be father to a child conceived after 
break-up, M. Bayley, p. 41. 
OCTOBER 2000 
THE SUN NEWSPAPER 
2nd Test-tube babies scandal shows we can't trust NHS 
This is the Sue Cook readers' letters page. There were 13 letters 
printed. The introductory paragraph from S. Cook stated: 
'THE BIG ISSUE The Sun exclusively revealed that a 
shocking mix-up at Hampshire fertility clinics means mums 
may have given birth to test-tube babies who are not theirs. 
You were shocked by the embryos outrage - the latest in a 
line of NHS scandals across the country.', S. Cook, p. 28. 
3rd EXCLUSIVE: COUPLE AT THE HEART OF EMBRYOS 
SCANDAL TALK TO THE SUN 
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We'll never know if our 'babies were thrown out as trash .. or 
is someone else having our children? 
Includes a photograph of the IVF clinic with the caption: 
'Riddle .. the private Hampshire Clinic where the embryos 
frozen for Lisa and Peter went missing' 
Also, page 5 includes a full-size photograph and laboratory 
type photographs of the IVF procedure. The caption under the 
couple reads: 
, Agony .. Lisa and Peter told the Sun of their torment', S. 
Evison, p. 4-5. 
4th DAY 2: COUPLE AT THE CENTRE OF LOST-EMBRYO 
SCANDAL OPEN THEIR HEARTS 
I see mums playing with their children in the park and know 
I will never do that 
Includes photograph of the couple on p. 2 (Sun Woman), S. 
Evison, pp. 2-3. 
TOT SURVIVES HORROR ATTACK 
KILLER SLICES UNBORN BABY OUT OF MUM 
Although this report of a murder in the USA is not about the 
NRTs, I have included it for the paragraph written in italics that 
the story includes: I Cops believe 39-year-old Bica -who had 
pretended to her husband she was pregnant - killed Theresa to steal 
her baby after answering an ad for a Jeep she had for sale.', V. 
Newton, p. 23. 
5th ETHICAL STORM AS 'DESIGNER BABY' SAVES SISTER'S 
LIFE 
Was it right to breed this test-tube tot just for his blood cells? 
Includes a picture of Molly kissing Adam, the caption reads: 
'KISS OF LIFE ... Molly gives a loving cuddle to tiny Adam, 
whose cells are saving her' 
Dr Peter Bromwich and Dr Vivienne Nathanson give 
affirmative and negative responses to the question respectively. 
The page also includes two other articles: Couple's struggle for 
right to have little girl, K. McAlpine and ONLY GOOD CAN 
COME OF ADAM'S CASE, D. Sanders, p. 6. 
6th We want a test-tube lifesaver for our girl too 
BRIT COUPLE'S BID TO COpy FAMILY WITH DESIGNER 
BABY 
We are not playing God we just want to save our little girl 
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Includes two photographs of the mother and daughter, the 
second carries the caption: 'LIFELINE ... Ellen and Simone, 
who can be saved by IVF baby' (Sun Woman), R. Perrie, pp.1-2. 
Gene genius 
LIFE'S BLUEPRINT IS THE KEY TO BEATING DISEASE 
(Sun Woman), Dr R. Viner, p. 6. 
19th WE'LL USE EURO LAW TO CHOOSE OUR BABY'S SEX 
Couple' s I designer' tot bid 
Includes a photograph of the couple, the caption reads: 
'Desperate .. Alan and Louise, who long for a girl', C. Hartley 
Also includes a commentary: WHY PARENTS SHOULD NOT 
HAVE THIS CHOICE, J. Thornton, p. 19. 
THE SCOTTISH DAILY MAIL 
2nd Infertility failure 
Couples still suffering in the IVF postcode lottery despite 
Minister's order,l. Smith, p.21. 
4th BABY MADE IN A TEST TUBE TO SAVE HIS SISTER 
Includes a half-page size photograph of Molly Nash cuddling 
her baby brother Adam, Front -page, continues on pp. 10-11 .. 
Moral and medical dilemma as a couple conceive a child 
whose blood will save their dying daughter (subheading 
covers pp. 10-11) 
Human life is sacred no more COMMENTARY, A. Q'Hear 
(Professor of Philosophy at Bradford University), p.l0. 
Why I gave birth to a Ispare-part' baby 
Includes a photograph of the Nash family with the caption: 
'Jack and Lisa Nash with Molly and Adam: Iyou cannot judge 
us unless you've been in our shoes", J. Chapman, p.ll. 
5th NOW THE IRIGHT I TO CHOOSE THE BABY'S SEX 
24 hours after the U.S. designer baby storm, a British couple 
demand a test tube daughter, M. Seamark & J. Mills, Front-
page. 
All we want is a girl like Nicole 
Couple who lost their only daughter in bonfire tragedy say 
they will take their fight to the European Court in bid to 
ensure their IVF child is female, L. Collins, pp. 4-5. 
Also across pp. 4-5 there is a commentary by K. Grant: 
Special pleading must not be allowed to prevail 
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Ethics don't matter: As a mother, I'd do anything to save my 
child's life: An American couple defend their right to have a 
'designer baby' 
Includes the photograph of the Nash family, which was used in 
yesterday's feature with the caption: 'Jack and Linda Nash 
with Molly and Adam: They must wait to see if the transplant 
works', S. Chalmers, p.13. 
6th Adam, first child in new era of hope, C. Douglas Home, p.13. 
As a row over designer babies erupts on both sides of the 
Atlantic, one British couple tells Femail ... 
How we selected the sex of our darling daughter 
Includes a photograph of the couple with their daughter with 
the caption: 'Happy family: Gill and Neil Clark with their 
daughter Sophie May, born through controversial fertility 
treatment', A. Mollard, pp. 30-31. 
Was 'engineering' baby wrong?, Readers'letters, p.61. 
9th The cow that brings hope of resurrection for extinct species 
Includes a photograph of cow and calf, the caption beneath 
reads: 'Breakthrough: Gaurs like these could flourish again if 
cloning proves a success', B. Marsh, p.25. 
10th Embryo scientists take a step towards cloning spare parts, J. 
Chapman, p.37. 
17th New twist in storm over sex selection of babies, J. Chapman, 
p.l0. 
20th Saved, the girl given 'designer baby' cells, (no author cited), 
p21. 
23rd IVF TEST TO GIVE PARENTS 'PERFECT BABIES', B. Marsh, 
Front-page. 
Do we want baby quality control? (continued from page 1, p. 
6) 
Also Winston warns Viagra mother, C. Kitchen, p. 6. 
28th The triplets who discovered that granny gave birth to them 
Triplets David, Jose and Paula knew they grew inside their 
grandmother's tummy. But it is only now, 13 years on, they 
realise just how much they owe to Pat Anthony, who at 48 
became the first woman to act as a host surrogate for her own 
daughter. SUE REID finds what effect making medical 
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history has had on the family, S. Reid, (SDM Supplement, 
Weekend), pp. 26-27. 
30th Dolly the sheep to face early retirement, (no author cited) p.17. 
Article No.5: Critical Discourse Analysis No.5: The Scottish Daily 
Mail, 9 October 2000, p.25, written by B. Marsh 
The cow that brings hope of resurrection for extinct species 
SCIENTISTS using cloning techniques believe they may have found a 
way to eradicate the threat of extinction for endangered species. 
In a unique experiment conducted in the U.s., a rare ox-like jungle 
animal known as a gaur has been cloned and its embryo implanted in 
the womb of an ordinary domestic cow. 
The breakthrough could have huge implications for the 5,435 animal 
species classed as 'threatened' by the World conservation Union 
which include a quarter of all mammals and one in eight species of 
birds. 
The gaur is a hump-backed cow-like animal native to India and 
Burma. The latest member of its species is due to be born to a cow 
called Bessie in Iowa next month. 
Researchers hope to use the same technology to clone giant pandas. 
They believe they may even be able to recreate a species of Spanish 
We have a duty to do this' 
mountain goat which died out nine months ago, using some of the 
animal's preserved cells. 
If successful, scientists will have accomplished the world's first 
resurrection of an extinct species, bringing the dinosaur theme park 
fantasy in Spielberg's Jurassic Park a step nearer to theoretical reality. 
Animals whose wombs are deemed suitable to carry a different 
species could be implanted with an unlimited succession of species on 
the endangered list. 
This could see threatened creatures such as the Ethiopian wolf, sea 
otter, Iberian lynx and mongoose flourishing again. The cloning 
technique is described in the latest issue of the specialist journal 
Cloning. 
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A single skin cell was taken from a dead gaur and fused to a cow's 
egg from which the genes had been removed. 
This created an embryo with the gaur's characteristics which is now 
growing inside Bessie. 
Scientists in Massachusetts, from biotechnology firm, Advanced Cell 
Technology, are also looking to clone giant pandas using preserved 
cells from animals that died in Washington's National Zoo during the 
1990s. 
The panda's closest relatives - racoons and rabbits - are not ideal 
surrogate mothers, so a female black bear is being lined up to carry a 
baby. 
Robert Lanza, vice president of medical and scientific development at 
advanced Cell Technology, said: 'It's not science fiction, it's real. 
, A hundred species are lost every day and these mass extinctions are 
mostly our own doing. Now we have the technology to reverse that, I 
think we have the responsibility to try.' 
However, the ethical implications of cloning remain unresolved. 
Some conservationists argue that the technology flies in the face of 
nature and creates homogenous populations of duplicate creatures. 
Kent Radford, of the Wildlife Conservation Society in New York, said: 
'There is a very hollow echo of a gaur in the birth of that animal to a 
cow in Iowa.' 
David Wildt, chief of reproductive sciences at the national Zoo's 
Conservation and Research Centre, added: 'It's one thing to be a gaur 
in a domestic cow, which is very closely related. 
'It is much more difficult to put a giant panda in a black bear. There 
has been very little work with embryo transfer in bears.' 
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APPENDIX II 
INTERVIEW WITH REV DR RICHARD HOLLOWAY: THE 
EPISCOPAL BISHOP OF SCOTLAND 
This interview took place on 14 March 2001 at the Episcopal Bishop's 
official residence in Edinburgh. In addition to being a renowned and 
well-published theologian, Rev Dr R. Holloway was a serving member of 
the HFEA for seven years. The interview was taped and I have edited it 
after transcription, but I have endeavoured to retain the conversational 
feel of the interview. For ease of reading, I have put my questions in bold 
font. 
JS: I understand that you were a member of the HFEA for seven years; 
how did that appointment take place, were you invited to go on the 
Committee or did you apply? Could you tell me a little about your 
role? 
RH: I got a call from a civil servant saying that they were putting this 
authority together, around 1989 or the beginning of 1990, and would I be 
interested in serving? I knew nothing about the subject at that time; I was 
out of the country when the Warnock report came out. I was intrigued 
and said yes, and then the Secretary of State for Health formally invited 
me. I became a member of the authority before the Act was finally put 
through in the summer of 1990. There were twenty of us, a mixture of lay 
and professionals, clinicians and embryologists. Most of us were lay 
members in some sense, with an interest in ethics. I'm not a good 
scientist so it did take me a while to get my head around that side of it, 
enough to engage intelligently, but I eventually did and I ended up 
chairing the ethics sub-committee. That was an awkward development, 
because one of the things that the authority did was, not only to license 
and invigilate the process that was going on at the centres, (and I did 
what they all do which was to go on visits), they also kept abreast of 
developments and monitored public opinion. For example, there was for 
instance a big debate about whether it would ever be right to use fetal 
ovarian tissue. 
JS: How was that done? 
RH: We did that by a process of internal discussions. First of all, we 
would develop, not necessarily a view, but we would develop the topic 
and then we would issue a discussion document. We issued such a 
document on sex selection and tens of thousands of copies were sent 
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around the country. As part of our remit, we invited responses and, in 
fact, I chaired a number of debates up and down the country. One of the 
best was here in Edinburgh on the fetal ovarian tissue issue, which was 
never really a runner. Most people out there had no ideas about this 
stuff. I didn't want to be too far ahead of public opinion because 
obviously social change in this kind of area has to be managed very 
carefully. I don't think that many people, except infertile couples and 
clinicians, had heard of using ovarian tissue till a number of stories hit 
the press. An embryologist had been talking about using fetal ovarian 
tissue, at the same time as the guy in Italy was offering treatment to 
menopausal women. It was during the silly season when a number of 
stories hit the press, with headlines such as 'babies from dead babies' 
and 'daughters to grandmothers.' The phone started ringing and the 
authority became a hot ticket. This became one of those media stories 
that has run ever since and it's hot news. You normally serve five years 
on the HFEA, but they kept me on for a couple of extra years. 
JS: I was going to ask how you would describe the process of ethical 
debate but you've probably covered that, did you feel that it was 
evenly balanced? 
RH: Opinion wise? 
JS: Yes 
RH: There was probably a fairly good spread, but if you come in as Mr 
or Mrs Citizen you become, to some extent, an expert by virtue of being 
on the authority. Certainly, you are more of an expert than someone you 
do a box pop with off the street, and knowledge always complicates 
opinion. Well I hope it does. The people who have the strongest views on 
things are not infrequently the ones who are most ignorant of the issues. 
So inevitably as your knowledge bank increases, things that were 
shocking or off putting to you (what Stephen Hillier, an embryologist 
here in Edinburgh, calls the yuck factor) gradually diminish. It is very 
hard to decide whether you're being corrupted or whether you're being 
educated. I think I prefer the second one. 
With regard to how ethical change takes place, I think a deep underlying 
theoretical issue is really 'what is ethics?' Are there absolute values out 
there that we discover, put there by God or some other power, or is it 
really up to us to organise society in ways that are comfortable to us? I've 
become in my approach to ethics a kind of humanist, in the sense that I 
believe that ethics is what we choose, that I don't think there are any, or 
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many, obvious and absolute principles that should govern us. We have 
to make a distinction between a preference and an ethic. What I mean by 
this is that I may not want to go down the IVF route, I may not want to 
have a face lift, I may not want to practise sodomy, for all sorts of 
reasons, including aesthetics, prejudice, whatever. The point is, I can 
state that preference, but where do you get the authority to say I and it is 
wrong'? What do you mean by wrong? All of that is very much in flux at 
the moment, which is what makes ethical debate so interesting in our 
culture - partly because there are so many different value systems. For 
myself, if I were a woman of 61, I'm certain I wouldn't want a child, but 
do I have the right to forbid another woman of 61 to go ahead, who may 
be a millionaire with a house full of servants? I don't know. 
JS: Yes, what is interesting is that if a man of 90 fathers a child people 
say things like Iwhat stamina l and' good on yer mate' yet he is never 
going to live to see the child into adolescence. However, if an older 
woman, who may well live to see her child into adolescence, does the 
same, the typical reaction is Ishock, horror, probe.' So what is 
informing this reaction? 
RH: Yes, there's a lot of kind of gender discourse in there. 
JS: We're much more aware of that these days. 1 read your book 
Godless Morality and 1 am fascinated by it because 1 feel its less 
godless than it first appears, I'm not fooled. 
RH: Yes, but I think that inevitably we're on the human side of this and I 
think we should content ourselves with that and debate with it on that 
level. Let's not get on to God. 
JS: No, right, we won't! Although, 1 was going to ask you how you feel 
your theology has helped you in making ethical decisions? What 1 
mean is, as you have had a life immersed in theology and thinking 
through biblical issues (I read your book Dancing on the Edge, where 
there is a lot of references to the parables and the teaching of Jesus), 
surely, these things have informed your prejudices, or your values, 
even if the construct of authority is taken away. How has this helped 
you? 
RH: I don't know whether helped is the right word, it has certainly 
informed me and kept me moving, because like most Christians, or most 
people with a system, I started with an a priori set of approaches to 
things. However, increasingly I have thought my way out of a prioriism 
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into a kind of state of deep provisionality. I think, for me increasingly, 
the trouble with theology and the church is that it is a closed system and 
that it simply goes on repeating itself. Obviously, if you belong to an a 
priori system, a closed system that operates from fixed principles and 
values, then you can more or less figure out your answer to anything if 
you've got the programme. It's like a piece of theological software; you 
shove it in, you ask the question, and outcomes the answer. I have 
moved right away from that because I no longer understand theology in 
that sense. 
I think the classic example of that kind of a prioriism is the Roman 
Catholic moral tradition, which can be very flexible and evolutionary, 
but on the whole it operates from fixed principles, for example, the moral 
status of the embryo as fully human and the moral status of sexual 
intercourse as a purely procreative act. If you begin with those principles 
then you can answer certain questions. If all acts of sexual intercourse 
have to be open to procreation, and if you cannot interfere with that, 
therefore contraception is wrong. If the embryo, at whatever moment 
you fix it, has full moral status then to interfere, to experiment, is torture 
or murder; you draw those conclusions from your basic a priori 
principles. But if you don't operate on that then you have to think issues 
through. You can come up with maybe a general approach, and my own 
general approach to that, and I know you don't want to get into the 
status of the embryo, my own general approach to that is, it doesn't have 
full human status. 
IS: It's okay; it was a later question and you've answered it! 
RH: I'm not sure what the doctrine of the soul is. The notion that at the 
point of implantation an immortal soul is zapped into that little creature 
... and so you're dealing with some kind of eternity, well, I no longer 
think in those terms. So that means for me, that ethics consists of the 
human community painstakingly working out an ethic, an ethic that we 
can live with, one which I hope does good, rather than does harm. There 
are inevitably tragic choices that you have to make, for instance, the 
freedom to have an abortion. Although I would be anti-abortion in terms 
of my own instincts, I'd rather abortion didn't happen, but I would 
prefer that it were legally possible than have it outlawed. 
And so to return to the question of the embryo; I think that clearly the 
issue becomes incrementally more problematic the further into the life of 
the potential creature you go. I would see no problems with the morning 
after pill, but a Roman Catholic would have problems with it as it brings 
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about an abortion, because even though it's only 12 hours old, it's got the 
moral status of a full human being. I hope the morning after pill will 
become so efficient that it will put the abortion industry out of business. I 
think there is something instinctive in us that doesn't like to see babies 
damaged, I mean, abortion is the killing of a baby. I hope that captures 
some of the perplexity of my own position. 
JS: Do you have any absolute no-go areas in the field of new 
reproductive technologies? 
RH: Well I could anticipate a number of, I would have thought, very 
unlikely scenarios, such as the one described in the novel The 
Handmaiden's Tale. They maintain young women who are fertile and they 
simply use them as kind of embryo slaves, obviously anything that 
invades human freedom without consent is wrong. To me consent is a 
pretty absolute principle, I don't have many, but I do not think that you 
can colonise human beings in that way. So consent would be important. I 
think, say women took over the world, and decided they wanted to keep 
men simply as sperm banks - there's something to be said for that as men 
are a bloody nuisance - and they put them all on a desert island and 
milked their sperml Well, clearly anything like that would not be right. 
Also, I have reservations, like most people, about the way the cloning 
thing could go, although I'm not as squeamish about that as some people 
are. It may be that some of my objections are aesthetic, and I would not 
rule out on a priori grounds the possibility of using the cloning technique 
in cases where the other infertility approaches are absolutely not 
working. So I could see cases being made, and I think that my overall 
principle would be that it's quite good to have a general rule, but it has 
to be open to exceptions. That's one reason why I'm not an absolute 
rejectionist with sex selection. I would have at least listened to the 
Mastertons' case, and tried to understand the psychological oddness and 
pressure there. At the moment, it's permitted for medical reasons but 
only that, I don't think there's a great moral leap between that and for 
certain kinds of non-medical selection reasons. 
JS: The irony in that case, I know people get terribly worked up about 
it, but there are millions of girls aborted because of their sex in the 
developing world, and I mean millions, and then here is one couple 
who actually want a girl and I've often thought, oh why can't they just 
do it. 
RH: Yes, I know. Well they did try but they failed. 
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JS: Yes, they went to Italy didn't they? 
RH: Yes, I'm not quite sure what the deal was but apparently a male 
embryo was donated and they've given up. 
JS: I had sympathy for them. 
RH: Yes, I had a lot of sympathy and I thought that at least the HFEA 
should have considered their case. They said they would consider an 
application if they found a centre that would treat them, but no centre 
was probably going to go through that. It would probably be ruled out 
on a priori grounds, because the rule is in this country that you can only 
have it for medical reasons. 
JS: I think there is a clinic in London that does sperm selection and 
that's sex selection by natural methods. 
RH: The role of fashion in these things is extraordinary. I mean, I'm not 
in favour of hunting but the cruelty that we inflict on the animals that we 
eat is on a far higher plane than the cruelty we inflict on the animals that 
wehunt. 
JS: I agree. I don't know if we've touched on this question, but how do 
you believe society makes it's ethical decisions? I'm interested in the 
role of the media in the symbiotic dynamic of reflecting and 
constructing public opinion. 
RH: Oh sure, I agree with that. I think the interesting thing about our 
society is that it is not complete, but it is increasingly postmodem. We 
are aware of many value systems, and we are also aware that value 
systems can disagree with each other but still be value systems, and so 
choice becomes very important. You also have on the other side an 
antithetic to that, which is an increasingly interventionist society. For 
instance, it's not inconceivable to me that in a new politics, say in 20 
years time, they might outlaw cigarettes. I happen to be a libertarian 
about stuff like that, I mean, I know that cigarettes are damaging to 
health, in fact, it's the single biggest killer. Cannabis doesn't kill anyone, 
it may make you dopey, but it doesn't kill you. Yet, that's the one that's 
outlawed. 
I also think that another aspect in culture shift and ethical change is the 
prophetic role; this is where I still have a residual theological element 
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because I think that prophetic individuals and groups challenge the 
norm. Nietzsche made the same point that the thing that keeps 
communities evolving is the awkward customer, the heretic, the 
degenerate, the person who challenges, you can come up with any 
number of examples. They usually get biffed about by the system for 
challenging it, but they're the ones who keep society healthy. It can work 
both ways of course because you can get people whose vision into the 
future is a profit one. For example, the tie between the big drug 
companies and the embryology industry (when I went to the conferences 
that they had, I was outraged) but I was also intrigued by the connection 
between the big drug companies and the gynaecology industry. 
JS: I'm glad you said that because one of the things that worries me is 
the pharmaceutical companies who are producing more and more for 
the 10% of the global population who can afford it and not the 90% 
who can't. I think the genetics phenomenon with its individualised 
therapies will increase this trend. 
RH: Genetic aristocracy, yes. It will happen because that's the way the 
powerful always arrange reality to suit themselves. That's where the role 
of government might come in because you might recognise that and 
develop policies that would moderate that. 
JS: One of my prepared questions was have you any fears for the 
future in this area? 
RH: Fear is too strong a word, obviously concern; I mean 1'm not a 
frightenable person. I think there could be terribly bad things out there 
including meteorites that might smash the whole globe, but we are better 
to cope bit by bit, to think our way through and challenge. We might get 
ambushed, but if we do, we do. If you know anything about human 
nature, you will know that corruption is as mathematically certain a 
possibility as goodness. Both are with us. But I don't myself, emphasise 
the evil that we do over the good that we do. I would rather that we 
emphasise using these things, emphasise the possibility of doing good 
things with them and then you can balance the evil. But you won't rule 
the evil out. Simply to dismiss things because they're capable of an evil 
intention invariably fails. I think policies that try to rule evil out end up 
by becoming themselves monstrously dictatorial. But again there's a 
balance. 
JS: How would you advise the church to proceed? 
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RH: I do not like churches pronouncing as churches. I don't mind them 
in generic terms saying we should do more for the poor, that we should 
care for the sick, but when they actually as churches start pronouncing 
on a whole range of issues, I don't think they're speaking for most of 
their members, even the Roman Catholic Church, which is the most 
authoritarian and works from a priori principles. When I hear the 
Archbishop of Canterbury denouncing the Internet for instance, I think, 
'Oh for God's sake George, just belt up'. Okay, we know people abuse 
the Internet but they abuse the telephone, they abuse anything. Why 
churches get into the scolding side of those things is partly a throwback 
to the church seeing itself as a modem, as opposed to a postmodern 
institution, as an authority which tells people how they should be 
thinking and leading their lives. This is one reason why the church feels 
uncomfortable; they are finding it very difficult to respond to our kind of 
culture. 
It's interesting that the press like it when the church makes 
pronouncements. They will phone up Cardinal Winning and get a 
diatribe and that's great news. They will in fact phone round, I get a lot 
of this, and they will have a spread, you know 'Maverick Bishop 
Holloway in Favour of ... ' or 'The Moderator of the Wee Frees 
Denounces ... ', they seem to think there's a kind of pantomime. That 
doesn't rule out the fact that there are Christians on all sides of these 
debates who are experts, conservative experts, liberals, fine, they state 
their point of view. But for a church as such, I think to be in the 
pronunciation business on highly technical stuff like this, is something 
they have to be careful about. I think it's legitimate for them to appoint a 
commission and to produce a report, and maybe even to take a line, a 
cautious line, just watch the cloning thing. The Church of Scotland is 
quite good at this with its 'Church and Nation', 'Science and Technology 
Unit', all of that and they produce documents that other people can read. 
They will say this is in favour, this is against, that kind of thing. I think 
they can make themselves look stupid. The Anglican Church, for 
instance, ruled out contraception till 1948. Now what was sacred in 1948? 
That a thing that was sinful in 1947 could suddenly became virtuous in 
1948? That's why I think they need a bit more modesty and a bit more 
provisionality, and perhaps state their thinking saying this is where we 
are now, but I think they should cork Annie. 
IS: People get frightened of putting too much certainty into a system, 
in that, when the system falls down your whole faith thing falls with 
it. 
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RH: Oh yes, yes. You're bereft, yes. That's where I think churches should 
be wary of being authority systems and I think there should be a strong 
element of provisionality and irony in everything that we say. I think 
that for me an enduring principle, an enduring end, is acknowledging 
that the powerful run things to suit themselves. It should be one of the 
roles of a church that follows Jesus to want to balance and neutralise, to 
some extent, the effect of that on the weak and the poor and the victims. I 
think that's a good general principle. That's a good socialist principle. 
Socialists tend to get all mixed up about the best means to do that so that 
they tum fundamentalist about nationalisation. I think all 
fundamentalisms are wrong. But apart from that I think the church 
should be a little more modest in the way it goes on about stuff. It has 
been so terribly wrong in the past, mainly about women, but about lots 
of other things too. 
JS: Have you got any final word of advice or caution, or suggestion that 
you think might be useful to me? 
RH: I think you should try and distinguish between factual reporting and 
honest expressing of your own opinion. And not use one as a disguised 
version of the other. There's no absolutely objective reporting but I don't 
also see why you shouldn't be passionate in the expression of your own 
opinions on the subject and maybe just your own gut reactions to stuff, 
you know. 
JS: Thank you so much for such an interesting interview. 
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APPENDIX III 
INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR IAN WILMUT: HEAD OF 
DEPARTMENT OF GENE EXPRESSION AND DEVELOPMENT 
AT THE ROSLIN INSTITUTE 
This interview took place on 5 September 2002 at the Roslin Institute 
in Edinburgh. Professor I. Wilmut was primarily responsible, along 
with his colleague Dr. Keith Campbell, for cloning Dolly the sheep 
from an adult Finn-Dorset's mammary cell. She was not the first 
sheep to be cloned, but she was the first to be cloned from an adult 
cell, and up until her birth in 1997, most scientists had not believed 
that to be possible. At the time of the interview Professor Wilmut was 
submitting a research proposal on human embryos through his ethics 
committee (the full process is explained in the interview). On the 9 
June 2003, the HFEA granted the Roslin Institute a licence to produce 
and maintain embryonic stem cells in culture.1 The interview was 
taped and I have edited it after transcription, whilst endeavouring to 
retain the conversational feel of the interview. For ease of reading, I 
have put my questions in bold font. 
JS: As I understand it, the advantage of therapeutic cloning is that 
an individual clone will be able to produce stem cells that won't be 
rejected by the recipient. Is that correct? 
Prof W: That's the expectation, yes. There is actually a very small 
caveat about that, which nobody yet knows the answer to. Some cell 
surface proteins actually come from the mitochondria, which are the 
very small organising cells that mostly make energy. Some of those 
proteins come on to the cell surface and there is a question as to 
whether if you clone an egg with different mitochondria that these 
proteins might get on to the cell surface. If that were the case it would 
cause a problem. The people who know about this say there are ways 
of dealing with that if it proves to be an issue. However, they would 
certainly be much more like the patient than cells that come from 
anywhere else so there would be an advantage. 
JS: What sort of things could the mitochondria inside the egg 
influence? 
Prof W: They could influence all sorts of things, although the effects 
are not expected to be very large. I suppose I tend to come at these 
things from an agricultural end. People who've looked at milk 
1 From the HFEA Press Office at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/ Archive, 
pA. 
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production in probably thousands of cows, certainly hundreds of 
cows, can find a very small proportion of the difference between 
cows, which they can attribute to the mitochondria. It's very small, 
probably 5% or something like that. That would be one way of 
looking at it, another way, of course, is if some disease is associated 
with the mitochondria. Some of these are identifiable, so you could 
look and see. All of these issues are issues that you need to have in 
mind, but they're probably not big issues. 
JS: I spoke to Mary Warnock at the Edinburgh Book Festival and 
asked her a question about therapeutic cloning. My concern is, if it 
were ever to take off as a commercialised venture (Prof W: Yes) then 
nobody seems to have actually thought about the donors, the 
women (Prof W: Yes) that would be required. If we've got 
potentially a hundred and twenty million people to be cured, which 
was recently quoted (Prof W: Is that right?) Yes, I'll come to that 
question in a minute; my concern is the 120 million women whose 
individual eggs (Prof W: Yes) would be needed for each therapeutic 
clone. When I put this question to Mary Warnock she said basically 
I'd got my science wrong and that we wouldn't need all these eggs, 
but to be honest I don't think I've got my science wrong. 
Prof W: No. aS: Because otherwise you could just use embryos from 
IVF, couldn't you?) Yes that's right, that's right. 120 million, it sounds 
a very large number doesn't it. If you start back at the beginning with 
cell therapy, let's call it, no cloning involved, right. In the community 
I mix in there isn't a consensus about how important immune 
rejection will be. It's also clear to me that you have to think about 
different situations, so that, for example, inside the nervous system 
(the brain, spinal cord and so on) there is very little immune rejection. 
People call it immune privilege, they say there's no rejection, that's 
probably going too far, but there's very little. In which case it might 
not matter where those cells come from. There are some other 
situations where the disease is auto-immune, like type one diabetes. 
It's a while since I asked anybody working in this area, but when I 
did, nobody knew how the auto-immunity process happens, so they 
didn't know exactly what would happen if you put the same cells 
back. 
JS: So there might be a problem doing that? 
Prof W: Yes, in that situation. But the classic one, which most of these 
conversations seem to relate to are situations like the heart, for 
example, where it's probably not auto-immune. You are going to get 
massive immune response. I guess you've got different organs, the 
heart is one, and the liver is another, where you will get 
immunological differences. The people who are active in this area 
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give very different opinions as to how important these immunological 
differences really are. Some people will say that you only need an 
array of, say 20 different cell lines or 200 or whatever the number is, 
fairly small numbers and beyond that immune rejection is not so 
important, you can treat it fairly well. 
JS: Sorry to stop you, but can I ask you to clarify what you mean by 
cell lines, I'm a bit confused about the stem cell banks and cell 
lines, presumably, they could be from any embryo. 
Prof W: Yes. So some people would say all you need is whatever their 
number is, and sometimes it's as low as 20 and sometimes it's up to 
200, and that's all you need. That would get you close enough to, let's 
say, most people. I think there might be some people who would be 
so different that they would fall out. Opinions vary, some scientists 
will say that, others will say no that's not true, what you need is to get 
a perfect match. Again, it probably varies for different tissues. 
JS: Could these cell lines be taken from any embryo? 
Prof W: Any donated embryo, yes. So one of the issues the 
community needs to think about is, if the number were 20, they 
would have to be very different. So probably that would mean 
different racial groups as a way of getting as bigger mix as possible. If 
the number really were only 20, you could probably get all of them by 
donation over a period of time. If the number is 200, probably you 
could achieve this, but it could take quite a long time, just by chance. 
If the number is 2000 or more, then you probably have got a good 
case to clone some embryos to then get what you want. If it were 120 
million, I find it hard to believe that it is '" 
JS: No sorry .... (ProfW: That's patients?) Yes, it was a recent 
documentary on the BBC entitled Creation, first in the series called 
'How to Build a Human', which featured the American firm ACT in 
Massachusetts (Prof W: Yes) trying to clone a human embryo for 
stem cells. In that film, the guy, Cibelli, said that a recent survey, 
although he didn't say where it was from, showed that therapeutic 
cloning could offer cures for potentially 120 million people. 
Prof W: Yes. You see another way of looking into it, I mean, I think 
the fundamental thing to all of this is nobody knows. You won't get 
consensus. But another way of looking at this is to think about bone 
marrow donation -is it the Anthony Nolan Trust? It probably does 
vary with different tissues, but clearly with that tissue, the bone 
marrow, they want a perfect match. In which case you probably are 
into, I wouldn't be surprised if it is millions, but somebody speaking 
there would know. It probably varies from one condition to another, 
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of one tissue or organ to another, but it's probably true to say that 
nobody really knows. 
JS: To go back to the cell lines, when you're talking about these 
numbers 20,200, whatever, can you tell under the microscope if the 
stem cells are slightly different in one embryo from another? 
ProfW: No. You'd have to do microbiology. It's the same as with 
bone marrow donation, where they take some of the cells and do tests 
to see what immunological types they are. You'd have to do the same 
things with cell lines. Unfortunately because these are genetically 
controlled you can't even tell from the parents. You may be able to 
look at the parents and things may came together in the right way to 
give us what we want. However, there's only ever going to be, 
depending on exactly what the mix is, a one in two or a one in four 
chance, that you'll actually get the mix that you want, because that 
embryo will get half from each parent. 
JS: Is that the same thing as when they're talking about tissue 
typing for embryos when they want to match the right embryo for 
another sibling? (Prof W: Yes, yes, exactly that, yes tissue typing is a 
good phrase.) That's helpful, thank you. Now there are some 
scientists -I've read in the New Scientist - who say that adult stem 
cells are being discovered, which can differentiate. I was wondering 
how viable the prospect was of using these adult stem cells, because 
another article that I've read said that adult stem cells may not yield 
sufficiently viable stem cells, so would they be as full of juice as it 
were? 
Prof W: The main thing I would say about most of these situations, I 
suspect, is that we don't know. Most of the generalisations come from 
mouse experiments, the human work's coming along behind it, but 
guided by, informed by the mouse work. The generalisations are that 
embryo stem cells are immortal, that's exactly the word people use; 
that they will last forever. They'll certainly last for a very long time. 
Therefore you can get very large numbers of them; the principle is 
unlimited. It's actually wrong when you come to the crunch, we've 
been using embryo stem cell lines (mouse embryo stem cell lines ) in 
our research and they just ceased to be normal after having taken 
them from one dish to another. You grow them up in a dish till they 
get crowded and then you separate them. They went through 19 pass 
outs, then they just went clunk: they were not really useful after that 
so this idea that they're immortal is an exaggeration. 
Therefore you can get as many numbers as you want. If you get your 
organisation right; you multiply first before you make them go down 
particular routes, in principle you can get as many neurones or 
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muscle cells, or whatever it is that you want, as long as you get the 
organisation right. With regard to adult cells, our information is that 
they do have a shorter life, as you say, therefore you can't get as many 
and there's a worry that they wouldn't last as long in the patient. 
There are obvious ways of trying to overcome that. It's likely to be to 
do with telomere lengths in the cells, which we can extend very 
easily. So of all the problems which would be listed in this area that 
would be a comparatively easy one to overcome. 
JS: In a lot of the conditions that therapeutic cloning was offering 
cures for, things like Parkinson's or Alzheimer's, you're actually 
dealing with older people whose adult stems cells are probably 
beginning to degenerate in their bodies anyway. (Prof W: Yes) So 
from my point of view -as again I'm always looking at the donor 
egg, because nobody seems to have thought about the women who 
are going to provide all these eggs - (Prof W: Yes) embryonic stem 
cells may be preferable from their clone (Prof W: Yes) than from 
their adult bodies? 
Prof W: Yes. That's certainly the argument that the embryo stem cell 
people would offer. What people would be saying now, I'm sure 
you've heard it directly, is that there's far more confidence that we 
can get what we want from stem cells, that they will have a normal 
life span. Whether that judgement would still be true 2,5 or 10 years 
from now, who knows? 
JS: Thank you. There's another thing that came out in the New 
Scientist, my source of scientific information - the same company 
that were featured in the programme were working on 
parthenogenic embryos to harvest stem cells. Now that would 
actually prevent the destruction of embryos (Prof W: Yes) so it 
would get them off the hook with a lot of religious people, but they 
would still need a large availability of eggs, (ProfW: Yes) so how 
viable do you think this alternative route is? 
Prof W: Not. It's for a different reason. There's a group of genes that 
are known as the imprinted genes, whose function depends on which 
parent it comes from. You have two copies of almost all genes, the 
function of a particular copy depends on which parent it comes from, 
so that, I'm not very good at remembering which is which, you'll 
have some genes which control fetal growth, where, for example, the 
copy from the father will work but the copy from the mother doesn't 
work. Now if you've got a parthenogenetically activated egg this 
copy doesn't exist, so there'll be no copy of those genes functioning. 
They don't only work during the fetal stage, they're very important 
during the fetal stage, but they're also important later. It's this 
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requirement for a copy from each parent, which is the reason why 
parthenogenesis won't produce offspring, because it's just lethal. So 
without knowing exactly just how it would go wrong, the fear would 
be that if you grew embryo stem cells from these embryos and put 
them into patients something would go wrong with the function. It 
might be that they would function in some tissues, if having a father's 
copy weren't important for, let's say the liver, fine. However, if it's 
important for the organ that you're trying to repair, then it's not really 
worth it. 
JS: And it's so experimental that you might not realise what the 
situation is till you've got it in somebody? 
Prof W: I think this will be true for a lot of things though, and I think 
that one of the other questions that society has to look at is 'How do 
we go if these potential treatments aren't safe?' So there will be lots of 
experiments putting human cells into mice, which are genetically 
deficient so they don't reject cells, that is, they don't have an immune 
response. There will probably be some studies where they're put into 
bigger animals; it's not the size that counts it's the fact that they'll live 
longer. In farm animals you can see how these cells function over a 
number of years. 
The next step would be to put the cells into a patient who was going 
to die anyway, because he or she has got nothing to lose, so they 
would be willing to try a new treatment. When that begins to work, 
the system will begin to say, okay, now let's start to do this in others. 
It is a very important question, which, because it's a few years away 
yet, we can't really try to answer. If you look at the research papers 
you will find that some of the experiments, where cells are put into 
mice, it's rats actually, are being done now. That's how people know. 
So they put human cells into rats, and then look to see if it appears to 
correct the condition at all. 
JS: It's interesting, I know it's probably not quite a strict analogy, 
but it didn't happen with IVF (Prof W: No) because IVF went very 
quickly from mice (Prof W: Yes) into human beings (Prof W: Yes) it 
didn't even go through primates did it? (Prof W: No.) As I 
understand it. (Prof W: That's correct, yes.) So a lot of the women 
were actually paying to be guinea pigs ... 
Prof W: That's correct. We were very lucky. There's no question that 
biologists outside the reproductive clinics recognise that, no question. 
Some of the people in the clinics recognise it, but not all. You will, 
sometimes, at meetings get debates between two groups of people, 
where people will say there's a new treatment, for example, which 
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would produce sperm for a man who didn't have any of his own. It 
might be where the man's partner is beginning to get to an age where 
she's going to become less and less fertile, that it's appropriate to take 
a risk. The clinicians, I suppose, I don't think it would be fair to say 
this is financially driven, I think this is probably ... 
JS: Is it research driven? 
Prof W: It's partly research driven, partly probably genuine 
compassion as well, actually. I mean, these are people who sit and 
talk to patients and have to say I'm sorry I can't do anymore for you, 
which wouldn't be very nice. I'm sure some of it's genuine 
compassion. Other people, somebody like myself, who wouldn't have 
to face the couple, would say you might produce a child that could be 
damaged in some way. Now, of course, the HFEA would stop if there 
was something like that, you wouldn't be able to do that in this 
country. So there's less chance of it happening now. You're absolutely 
right the first IVFs, we were very fortunate .... 
JS: Do you think that my concerns are valid about needing ova? 
Prof W: Right, let's address that particular issue. lean' t actually tell 
you the number of ova in the ovaries at birth, several hundred of 
oocytes, and of course, most of these are wasted. Actually, working it 
out over a 30- 40 year period of one a month, it's hundreds ... almost 
all of them are wasted. So it becomes, as it were, a tissue donation 
issue that, I don't know if you carry a donor card ... 
JS: Well yes, but it's interesting, I'm too old now with my ovaries, 
but I wouldn't want my ovaries used - anything else, but not my 
eggs. 
Prof W: This is probably the reason why the people who do think 
about the biological point of view hesitate to raise it. It was discussed; 
I think you'll find it was discussed. I don't know how much it was 
recorded in the Donaldson Report, I happen to know the reproductive 
biologist on that. So it could be tissue donations ... 
JS: Would that be viable from cadavers?2 
2 I was exploring these possible sources of ova with Professor Wilrnut from what 
might be SCientifically pOSSible; however, since this interview the HFEA have issued 
two press statements banning the use of ova from either cadavers or fetal tissue. 
('HFEA does not allow donated eggs from deceased women', 15/10/2003 and 
'HFEA confirms legal position on use of fetal ovarian tissue', 1/07/2003) 
h!!rd/ww'Nhfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/Archive.l p.3. 
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Prof W: Well, it would obviously depend on the reproductive health 
of the person concerned. Now the techniques to grow these eggs 
don't exist at the moment. In terms of the tens of thousands of 
patients being treated in the future, and say, by then that this is the 
way to resolve the issue, then the techniques could be worked on as a 
matter of fundamental biological interest. For example, what controls 
the egg to grow may be discovered because it provides information 
on some causes of infertility. This could be used in infertility 
treatment, so it's not just for cell therapy. So, if this really was an issue 
and if it proved to be the best way of dealing with things and it was 
socially acceptable, then, 120 million sounds a bit exaggerated .. . 
However, you could certainly get tens of thousands of oocytes in 
principle at some time in the distant future. 
JS: It's interesting that you thought if large numbers of eggs were 
needed they might be harvested from aborted fetuses. Wouldn't 
that bring in another difficulty? (ProfW: Yes it would) Would they 
be too immature to be useful, anyway? 
Prof W: It would present another problem with maturation, but no I 
would have thought not. You remember there was a lot of publicity at 
some point because the Edinburgh sci~ntists ... 
JS: Yes, I remember Richard Holloway making a comment about it. 
There is something ethically chilling about taking the eggs of a 
fetus, who has had no chance of a life herself, but I just wondered, 
because sometimes things that society finds unethical in its current 
era, a hundred years down the line, they become acceptable. 
ProfW: What I think, if I can use this, (please refer to Diagram 1.) I 
don't know if will make sense to look at this, but we can try. The 
classic way that developmental biologists used to think is that you 
have an egg, it gets fertilised, becomes a blastocyst and, of course, 
then develops to become a person or an adult. 
Developmental Plasticity • role of stem cells 
Diagram 1. 
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The view was that this is very much a linear process, you go that way 
and then that's it. What people have found in the last five years, 
through the ways of getting embryonic stem cells, and perhaps adult 
stem cells and differentiated stem cells, is that this is much less of a 
linear process than we might have expected. So clearly, one of the 
things in this diagram is, you take a cell from the patient, you do 
nuclear transfer and in principle you can get another adult. This 
means that the nucleus is much less fixed than we had previously 
thought - there's much more flexibility. 
But what people are beginning to do with these adult cells is to show 
that adult stem cells will probably change into different types of stem 
cells. What research, the dotted lines rather than the solid lines (see 
Diagram 2.), is beginning to discover, is that if we take adult stem 
cells and treat them in particular ways, we can make them become 
something more equivalent to an embryo stem cell, for example. A 
question to ask might be, I can we find ways, or even, do we need 
adult stem cells, or can we take a differentiated cell, and make it go 
back round these?' In other words, I personally see this whole area of 
biology as being very new, very open, and likely to be the solution to 
the issues that you're raising. I don't know how, I don't pretend to 
know how, but I would like to think that some of our research might 
contribute to it. 
Developmental Plasticity 
Diagram 2. 
Certainly, the ways in which we will actually solve these issues, 
practical issues,let's say in 30 or 50 years time, will be very different 
from the sort of things that we're thinking about now. So frankly, I 
don't see the need for tens of thousands of oocytes, I think that's very 
unlikely. It's more likely that they'll find a way of taking cells from an 
adult, maybe some of the types of adult stem cells that people are 
talking about, and treat them using knowledge, some of which will 
come from the cloning world, some of which will come from other 
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sources. What happens during cloning is that that nucleus gets 
exposed to things in the egg, which could bring about changes, so we 
could go back and be able to control all of development. What 
happens in the culture experiments with stem cells is that there are 
things outside the cell which act on it to make it go from one thing to 
another. 
So, if people take adult stem cells say, for example, from the bone 
marrow, and put them into an animal and then find them in the liver, 
the reason why they've changed is because of things in the liver, 
which say to that cell you can become a liver cell rather than being a 
bone marrow cell. Now if you just crank the plot back, 10 years would 
comfortably cover it, 5 would just about cover it, none of that was 
being thought about 5 years ago. So there's a complete revolution in 
this area of thinking, which people are still working through. 
Scientists don't turn like a switch, they take quite a long time for new 
ideas to percolate, and you hear pennies dropping in the back of your 
mind, that's another implication of all of this. So the implications of 
this will go on being uncovered for 5, 10, 20 years; that's how I see 
your problem being solved. 
JS: Thank you. Do you think that ethical difficulties actually do 
influence the research, for example, the fact that society finds 
experimentation on the embryos an issue, would that lead scientists 
to try and find different ways of getting stern cells? 
ProfW: To be very pedantic about your question, I think, because of 
regulations, the answer is yes. What would happen if there weren't 
regulations I'm not sure. If it were left to personal judgement, it 
would depend on the person, wouldn't it? In this country, it's clear 
that the legal framework says that, if, for example, we want to clone a 
human embryo, or even produce an embryo by fertilisation, we have 
to have a very good reason to do it. We have to be doing something, 
achieving something that we can't achieve in any other way. So 
certainly the regulations do make a difference. 
JS: Given the lack of research on women's bodies and the effects of 
repeated superovulation (Prof W: Yes) does it concern you that if 
large numbers of eggs were needed -if you were wrong in your 
suppositions, for example, for we don't know how things will turn 
out - might this affect the lives of young women possibly 
precipitating early menopause and early onset of osteoporosis? 
Prof W: Yes, I don't know, it's a little bit out of my area, how does the 
system decide how many times it will treat a patient, is there a rule? 
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JS: Well, I think basically, if you're willing to pay (Prof W: Yes) you 
can have as many goes as you want because if you go to a clinic that 
says look we can't treat you, I think probably the NHS clinics might 
say, look you've reached the end of the road, but there's probably 
always going to be a private clinic somewhere that will do it. 
Prof W: There's a very small risk with the superovulation procedure, I 
don't know what the risk incidence probability is, but there is a small 
risk. However, there's another slightly different way, so I will tell you, 
for example, that the proposal we're developing - it hasn't gone 
forward yet - but the proposal we're developing would be to take 
eggs from smaller follicles so that the woman would not have to be 
superovulated. Now they will be less developed so our research effort 
will be put into growing those eggs on to the later stage. We believe 
that would be really less unpleasant; I mean, you can tell me how 
unpleasant the side effects are, nausea and other problems associated 
with superovulation? That wouldn't happen. The health risk is 
because of the risk of bleeding and if you're not puncturing large 
follicles then there is much less risk attached and so on. This sort of 
thing is taken into account, the actual precise question you ask, I don't 
know. 
JS: Even the harvesting of them is much more difficult than it is of 
male gametes, (Prof W: Yes) if you don't have a general anaesthetic, 
because that carries a risk; it is actually quite a painful procedure. 
Prof W: I have two daughters, 30ish, you can imagine in the family 
situation, they'll be, let's be hopeful, optimistic, by the time I have a 
health problem they'll be menopausal by then. 
IS: But it might be your grandchildren, your granddaughters ... I 
have addressed this in the paper that I've written. By constructing 
woman as a self-less giver, you could commercially 'pharm' and 
exploit poor women, but also, even in your own family, (Prof W: 
Yes) there'd be huge pressure (ProfW: Indeed there would) because 
it would be the young girls, the 18 to 20, 30 year olds, it would be 
the granddaughters. 
Prof W: I think, this is a bit different, but, if you speak to the 
companies who might one day offer this sort of treatment, they don't 
imagine treating the older people, with let's say Parkinson's, for 
example, it would be the early onset cases that they imagine treating. 
So I think the idea, which I must admit I probably carelessly, 
inadvertently, implied that the 70 or 80 year old patient who begins to 
suffer will be easy to treat, is not actually the way the companies 
envisage it. In the first place, they think about the people with the 
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longer life spans, and probably a smaller number. I suspect that that 
120 million is scooping up everybody. 
IS: Oh, I'm sure it was, you know, they cite 'a survey', but they 
never said who had actually done the survey. (Prof W: Yes) On the 
other hand, being cynical of our society, I mean in the Western 
hemisphere, if you've got wealthy, elite 80 year olds with 
Parkinson's who will pay a lot of money (Prof W: Yes) then I'm sure 
those original intentions may go out the window, especially with 
big business and American health insurance (Prof W: Yes, yes). 
Prof W: I'm sure you know that in this country we can't pay for eggs, 
it's impossible, so that's blocked.3 I think that the way this whole 
technique will come about is that it will evolve in different ways. 
Some particular cases will be picked out earlier, with some it will be 
appropriate to take a risk and there will be other conditions where the 
immune response is not an issue, where it will be possible to deal 
with them in a simpler way. There'll be some conditions, which will 
be treated quite quickly, probably, a fairly small number of years 
before the first and it will evolve from there. People will learn, not just 
from the basic research on the patient, but also from the patients 
themselves. But I just don't see the sort of things that people are 
envisaging in detail now will be the way in 10 years time,let alone 20 
or 30 years time, because the biology will go on changing. Some 
people would write off therapeutic cloning, some people would say 
that you're never, ever going to do that, now I wouldn't do that, but I 
do think from a therapeutic point of view, it will affect the small end 
of the spectrum, only very special cases. 
Let's say, for example, that if you put the same cells back into a 
diabetic you do not get the same response. For example, to put 
immunologically matched islets back into a juvenile diabetic, say at 
the age of 20, then you've got an average of 60 years left. You could, 
of course, have spent quite a lot of money on that doing a health 
benefit analysis. This isn't a commercial analysis, but the cost, the 
current treatment of diabetes, the insulin and so on. My father was a 
long term diabetic, but in those days it was the old-fashioned 
approach to monitoring health, such as giving insulin appropriately. 
Nonetheless, the failures, the blindness, the loss of sensitivity in the 
limbs, things like that, then it really would be appropriate, you'd be 
spending quite a lot of money. 
3 I have discussed the case in Chapter Three, where women were paid for their eggs 
in this country and have commented further on it on page 267, which includes 
Chapter Three's page and footnote reference. 
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One way of doing that might be to clone. But the idea that,let's say, 
you'd spend the same amount of money on a patient with open 
Parkinson's, it's just not right. Partly, because of the biology, because 
the immunological response would be a lot less in the grey member. 
Whereas for the diabetic the consequences of taking irnmuno-
repress ant drugs for 60 years would be considerable, the 
consequences for a 80 year old, if you need to take immuno-
repressant drugs would be a lot less. So there'll be all sorts; people 
tend to think of this as being one condition, it's just not. There's a 
whole range of different conditions and situations and so on. 
JS: I suppose if you were taking a clone of someone who'd got early 
onset diabetes that stem cell may in, say 30 years, do it again, if 
that's the way it's programmed ... (ProfW: It's a possibility, yes, 
you'd have to learn). But then if you were 30, it would give you, 
possibly, another 30 years freedom from it, so you could do it again 
when you were 60. (Prof W: Yes) 
Prof W: Another thing about diabetes is that it's not immediately life 
threatening as: No) so you can keep the patient going. I mean, one of 
the drawbacks that people point out about cloning is that you have to 
organise, get the eggs, clone, grow to the blastocyst, isolate the stem 
cells, test them and prove they're okay, produce isles, prove they're 
okay and pop them in, it can take months before they're ready. 
At this point the second side of the tape ended. I was, however, 
privileged to ask Professor Wilmut further questions. I asked him 
about his position as a member of the Church of Scotland and he said 
that although he was on the Board of Social Responsibility, 
personally, he was agnostic and not a member. I asked him about the 
serendipity that he often refers to in his book and if he thought that 
was the work of the Spirit. He said no, because it works both ways 
and would then apply to the bad things that happen. He said his 
motto, which could be his epitaph, was this: 'continue ambitious 
research, but be cautious in application'. In other words, research as 
widely as you can, everything, but be very cautious how you apply 
that knowledge. 
For, often the biggest impact of a specific scientific discovery turns 
out to be different from what was envisaged at the time of its 
inception. As an example of this, he cited the work undertaken into 
artificial insemination, which was originally carried out to prevent the 
spread of venereal disease in cattle. The techniques were built up in 
the 30s and 40s, but in the 50s a pioneering paper was written by 
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Robertson and Rendell, which suggested that if you were going to use 
artificial insemination, you should look at the quality of the bulls first, 
this changed the whole application of the technique. 
I asked Prof Wilmut whether he was surprised about the widespread 
interest in Dolly and he said yes. He expected that there would be 
media attention at first, but thought that it would die down, however, 
it has never gone away. I also asked him if Roslin had an ethics 
committee of their own and he said that they do. There are two 
committees, one is an animal committee, which considers the 
proposed animal research and deliberates on contentious issues. This 
committee includes one outsider. 
The other committee considers any proposed human research and 
consists of 8 members, 6 of whom are outsiders. The ethical process is 
both complex and lengthy. Any project, which involves research on 
humans (presumably embryos), has to go before this committee and 
then before the management at Roslin. This takes place before it is 
explored by the ethics department of the selected clinic/ s that will be 
involved and by the investors who are putting up the finance. Only 
then, if all are in harmony, will an application to the HFEA be 
considered. Three members out of the eight on the ethics committee 
are women. The Chair is an expert in genetics law and the other 
outsiders have embryology or medical expertise, including the 
philosopher. They were selected for their specialist knowledge and 
for their capacity to give the required commitment to the committee. 
Reflections on the Interview 
I am extremely grateful to Professor Wilmut for the two, undisturbed 
hours of his time, which he gave up for this interview and for his 
patient consideration of my questions. It will always be a treasured 
memory of my PhD research. That Professor Wilmut could have been 
bothered to devote two hours in a busy day to a theology student's 
research says a great deal about his commitment to the ethical aspects 
of his work. In addition, that I was able to put my questions about the 
BBC documentary, 'How to Build a Human' to such a renowned and 
eminent pioneer of the scientific community, was an enormous 
privilege. Professor Wilmut was able to quash some of the 
programme's claims that I had found spurious by his extensive 
knowledge of both the specific intricacies of embryology and the 
ways in which scientific endeavour works in the biotechnology 
community. His insistence on the lack of certainty of how science might 
develop, and therefore its unpredictability, was refreshingly honest. 
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However, from my position of critical reflection, I do have some 
concerns regarding his responses. As a scientist, who admitted having 
had qualms over the first IVF practices, I felt he did not apply 
sufficient hermeneutics of concern to the potential uses and abuses of 
scientific research, even, and perhaps especially, to that which he 
himself was undertaking. Whilst, he made his position absolutely 
clear, 'research all, apply cautiously', nevertheless, he should have 
learnt, post-Dolly, that when one opens the Pandora's box of 
discovery, one no longer has control on the latter half of his mantra. 
Whilst, his responses demonstrate that it may well be possible to 
undertake therapeutic cloning for stem cell therapy without recourse 
to using ova from millions of women, allaying my concerns regarding 
the documentary featured in Chapter Three, nevertheless, I would 
assert that he retained a position of innocence regarding the powers 
of biocapitalism. 
A good example of this was his insistence that women would never 
be paid for their eggs in this country. In Chapter Three, I cited a case 
whereby women were paid for their eggs, because the pharmaceutical 
firm concerned were able to find a loophole in the HFEA regulations.4 
The reason the ova were needed was for research into ovum 
maturation, and a licence is required from the HFEA only if eggs are 
to be fertilised. Consequently, the principle of paying for gametes 
could be bypassed due to the details of the research programme. 
Ironically, the research that Professor Wilmut was proposing to 
undertake was on egg maturation. (I have no idea, but it may even be 
the case that this was his research.) 
The point I wish to emphasise, is that, whilst on the one hand 
Professor Wilmut was alleviating my concerns regarding the 
exploitation of women for their ova in therapeutic cloning, he was, at 
the same time, contemplating different research that required access 
to women's gametes. As I have pointed out in footnote 2 of this 
Appendix, currently the HFEA regulations are quite clear that ovaries 
from fetuses and cadavers cannot be used and that women should not 
be paid for egg donation. Yet, I would assert that, from both Professor 
Wilmut's own research and the potential of stem cell therapy, human 
ova could still be a sought-after commodity. 
An interesting post-script to this interview is the recent 
announcement in the Guardian that Professor Wilmut has been 
granted a licence from the HFEA to clone human embryos in order to 
research motor neurone disease.5 The press statement said that 
donated embryos from IVF couples would be used. 
4 See Chapter Three, p. 132; footnote 59. 
5 l. Semple, 'Cloning hope for neurone disease', the Guardian (29/09/04), p. 12. 
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APPENDIX IV 
INTERVIEW WITH DR JAMIESON: EMBRYOLOGIST AT GLASGOW 
ASSISTED CONCEPTION UNIT 
This interview took place on 21 January 2003 at the Glasgow Assisted 
Conception Unit based at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary. Dr. Jamieson is a 
member of the Health Professions Council and has recently been appointed as a 
member of the HFEA. The interview was taped and I have edited it after 
transcription. For ease of reading, I have put my questions in bold font. 
JS: How long have you been involved with clinical IVF? 
Dr J: Since 1984, I was a geneticist before that and got sidetracked into this. 
JS: What significant changes have you witnessed since 1984? 
Dr J: There have been a lot. Well, there has been a huge improvement in the 
success rate. The HFEA have brought regulation to the field and embryologists 
are now much better trained than they were initially. We were pretty much 
pioneers in the beginning developing the techniques, but now we have 
excellent training programmes for embryologists in the UK. Also we have a 
much more professional workforce. 
JS: What procedures do you offer at this clinic? 
Dr J: We have IVF, rCSI, donor insemination and egg donation on a limited 
programme, however, we don't do any GIFT.l The history of the department 
was involved in developing the techniques of growing multiple follicles so we 
have a very large practice of treating unexplained infertility with ovulatory 
problems. 
JS: Do you do any pre implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)? 
Dr J: We do. We have a clinical licence for it, but we haven't secured the 
funding yet. So we're hoping to become the Scottish Centre for PGD, but at the 
moment it's in its embryonic stages. We are one of the five centres in the UK 
that have a licence. 
JS: What particular conditions would you be doing that for? 
I ICSI (Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection) is similar to IVF, but a single sperm is injected into an egg. 
GIFT (Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer) requires the removal of eggs, but they are mixed with the sperm 
and returned immediately to the fallopian tubes, not placed in a petri dish to fertilise. 
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Dr J: Before you can be licensed in PGD, you have to prove your expertise in 
diagnosing that particular problem and provide evidence for the HFEA to that 
effect. 50 far we're only licensed for sex-linked disorders. Only patients with 
that particular need have a realistic chance of being treated by us in the 
iJ1l.mediate future. 
IS: How long have you been involved with intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection 
(ICSI)? 
Dr J: It's about 7 or 8 years now. 
IS: Are there any follow-up studies undertaken on any of the pregnancies or 
on the children born? Primarily with ICSI, but also with any of the other 
assisted conception techniques? 
Dr J: There are a limited number of follow-ups. The HFEA collect information 
on the births of any congenital abnormalities, of gestation, weight, sex, but 
that's all the information they collect. 50 you have a certain amount of 
information about conditions at birth. 
JS: Is that from all the children? 
Dr J: Yes, all the children born as a result of assisted conception, all the births 
are recorded. 
JS: So how does that work from your point of view? Is it your responsibility 
to give them that information? 
Dr J: Yes. When a woman has a pregnancy scan, we give her a form and a letter 
and ask her to return it to us when she has delivered. A certain proportion lose 
the letter, but we have a responsibility to get in touch with them. We're very 
lucky that our population is reasonably local, so we do manage to get 99.9% of 
the follow-ups. Some of the London clinics have a lot of people coming from 
abroad and they have more trouble following up the outcomes. The outcome of 
the treatment is very important. For example, if you had somebody coming in 
to your clinic and you weren't sure if they were suitable for IVF or IC5I, one of 
the options would be to treat half of the eggs with IVF and half with leSI, in 
order to find out what the appropriate treatment would be in the future. 
However, the HFEA, being anxious to follow up the treatments, don't want you 
to put one of each of the embryos back together, because if a child were to be 
born, you wouldn't know which one it was. So if you choose to halve the eggs 
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in this way, you can only put the IVF embryos back or the ICSI embryos back, 
except in a small number of exceptional cases. 
JS: When I had IVF I was never given a leUer from my clinic and told to 
officially report back when I 'd had my babies. Because of this, I'd wondered 
if perhaps follow-up was something that had been recommended by 
Warnock but wasn't actually taking place. 
Dr J: It does take place. Can I ask you where you had your IVF? 
JS: I had two goes at Hammersmith, which were not successful, then I went to 
Midland Fertility Services ... 
Dr J: Oh yes, at Aldridge. 
JS: I don't know whether it was because I went back to show them the babies 
anyway, but I didn't have a leUer to take with me, or anything like that. 
Dr J: No, that's the way we do it, but there is a legal responsibility to do that, in 
the last ten years certainly. Because of the confidentiality regulations we have to 
do it through the patient, we think that's the best way to do it. We can't ask the 
hospital to report it to us because that would be a violation of the 
confidentiality laws. There are a very limited number of follow-up studies that 
go further. For instance the Brussels group has done one on ICSI. 
JS: There are some queries about the children born from ICSI, that they may 
be more prone to certain syndromes and have abnormalities, is that right? So 
everyone's followed up to birth and from then a few studies continue? 
Dr J: Yes there are limited studies, but they are local. 
IS: What about research on women and the effects of IVF on their bodies? 
Dr J: These are very limited. There have been some reports of women having 
ovarian cancer following stimulation, but there is a limited, very limited follow-
up of women. You know 20, 50 years down the road somewhere, following 
people through the menopause etc would be a possibility, but there are a 
limited number of studies. 
JS: Do you know of any such research? 
Dr J: There possibly is some, but I don't know of any. I'm sure there will be ... 
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JS: I'm not so sure there will be actually (laughs) I think women are left out 
of the equation far too much. 
Dr J: Yes, yes. 
IS: For instance, it would have been helpful to have undertaken a long-term 
study to see whether superovulation effected menopause (Or 1: Yes) 
particularly with say early menopause and osteoporosis (Dr J: Yes). That 
study might actually have been very helpful in thinking about therapeutic 
cloning if girls, young women, are going to be expected - I know we're 
looking into the future a bit - to superovulate to produce eggs for these 
therapies. None of these studies have been done with IVF to say whether that 
is safe (Dr J: Yes) in the long-term or not. 
Dr J: I think it's likely they will be done, but again they're likely to be local, not 
national, and you probably need that to get the proper data. 
IS: Okay, but there will be a funding issue ... 
Dr J: As always ... 
IS: Has any research been undertaken on the psychological effects? 
Dr J: Yes, there are quite a few published studies in Human Reproduction; and 
the counselling group, the British Infertility Counselling Association, their 
members are involved in that. 
JS: Originally IVF was supposed to be only for women with blocked 
fallopian tubes, I know this is no longer the case, but what percentage of 
infertile patients are you now able to treat? 
Dr J: I would say 95%, because even the severely infertile men can be helped. 
Older women are still a major problem, due to the limited number of eggs that 
are available. You can treat them, but success i., low. 
JS: What are your dinic's current success rates? 
Dr J Currently the live birth rate is at 25% per cycle started. We also have a 
freezing programme, which has a 20% live birth rate. 
IS: Those are high figures, aren't they? 
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Dr J: Yes, yes, they're good. We had the highest success rate in the last patient 
guide for embryo freezing, so that's a big part of our programme. We'll be quite 
conservative; we will actually withhold a transfer in a fresh cycle if the patient 
is slightly unwell or maybe has become hyperstimulated, and freeze the 
embryos. We have a very good chance of success once the hormone problem 
comes back to normal. However, in terms of league tables that would be 
counted as a failed cycle, so that's one of the pressures on people. We have to 
ask ourselves, 'do we want to be top of the league table at the expense of the 
patient?' We've always taken the view that safety comes first, but the frozen 
cycles contribute greatly to the pregnancy rate in an overall context. 
JS: That's quite a boon, because, obviously patients don't have to go through 
superovulation. 
Dr J: Absolutely. 
JS: Do you break the statistics down by age? 
Dr J: We don't treat anyone over 40 because our patients are NHS patients. 
IS: Are they all NHS? 
Dr J: We have a very small number of private, self-funding patients through the 
university, but that's relatively new. The NHS funds 95 % of our patients; each 
of the Health Boards has an age limit and they also specify the number of cycles 
of treatment a patient can have. 
IS: And how many treatment cycles can they have here? 
Dr I: It depends on who they're with, either two or three cycles. A treatment 
cycle for us consists of a superovulation and all the embryos that come from 
that cycle, which means we may have two, or even three, transfers from one 
cycle. That's how we calculate it. We don't think it's fair for one person who has 
a large number of eggs to have a fresh cycle and two frozen ones and be told 
that's finished. They have two or three stimulations depending on the Health 
Board. 
JS: That seems very good and from that you've got 25% success rate? 
Dr J: Yes, 25% for fresh embryos. 
IS: Do you have statistics for women over 35? Is there a marked difference 
between the age groups? 
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Dr J: We don't notice any difference until ... I think the last time we did the 
statistics it was 38. Above that age, we saw a reduced pregnancy rate, but there 
wasn't a huge difference. We tend to have a fairly clustered age group, sort of 
25 -35, so we may have less of a spectrum perhaps than private units who may 
take a higher proportion of older women. 
JS: I think the private clinics do that more because they have to go there (Dr. 
J: Yes). Now you do egg donation here (Dr J: Yes) do women who donate eggs 
get any special favours? 
Dr J: Not at all, they just get travel expenses. We have a very small number of 
people that might be called altruistic egg donors. If there has been any 
publicity, or a television programme, quite a lot of women come forward and 
we send them an information pack. A large number will drop out at that point, 
once they realize what's involved. If they wish to continue they'll get an 
appointment with the doctor who deals specifically with egg donation. A 
limited number of people come forward to give an anonymous donation, there 
are a higher number of people who are willing to donate for a sister or a friend; 
known donors are slightly higher. 
JS: Do any of the women going through the programme offer to donate eggs 
if they have a surplus? 
Dr J: No, again '" you'll be aware of egg-sharing schemes OS: Yes), which I'm 
not a great fan of, for various reasons, but the incentive there is financial. The 
people going through our programme, if they have extra eggs they prefer them 
to be in the freezer, just in case it doesn't work. We don't approach them to ask 
either, as we don't think this is appropriate. 
JS: No. Its a different thing with your clinic being 95% NHS (Dr J: Yes). How 
long do they have to wait for treatment, what's the average waiting list? 
Dr J: It's only about 18 months at the moment; again it depends on the Health 
Board. But the waiting lists are relatively short, they used to be about three 
years, but now it's a year to 18 months, which is quite good. 
IS: So if you had your superovulation and two further attempts with your 
frozen embryos, then you'd have to wait perhaps another 18 months for 
another go? 
Dr J: No, no, you'd come straight back. 
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JS: You do? That's really good. 
Dr J: Once you've been through the screening you can have your first treatment 
as soon as you like. We prefer people to have their treatments in a reasonable 
time frame from the management point of view, because it helps us to manage 
the budgets, we need to know how many people to bring off the waiting list 
and so on. It's best for us, but some people don't wish to do that. They may 
have a year in between treatments from their own choice or else they may have 
two or three treatments very close together. There's no restriction. The waiting 
list is only for the first treatment. 
JS: I was going to ask more questions about donated ova, but really they 
would apply to clinics where people were egg sharing. Statistics, and I'm not 
sure if they're true or not, say that 70% of women who receive donated ova 
have actually got functioning ovaries and there is some evidence that because 
they are older they are under pressure to take a donated egg. There have been 
claims that, in the States, clinics will actually refuse older women treatment 
unless they take donated eggs. I'd also read on the Internet that the American 
clinics were doing unethical things to improve their statistics, like putting 
younger women to the top of the queue. 
Dr J: We don't ... I mean, there's pressure to succeed, in that you wantto do the 
best for the people who come to you for treatment You would certainly be very 
anxious if you were significantly lower than the other clinics, but perhaps we're 
in the privileged position that we don't feel the pressure to manipulate or it just 
doesn't help. 
JS: And perhaps being NHS funded gives you some protection from this? 
Dr J: Yes to a certain extent The Health Boards still have the option of saying, 
we're not sending you any more patients, they will go to Dundee because 
they're doing much better, so its still a pressure. 
JS: The other question I was going to ask is that if they can afford to pay is 
there any limit on the number of times women can try? But that doesn't apply 
to you? 
Dr J: I was always impressed that people were given a realistic response, if 
people had a very low success rate, they didn't let them come back. 
JS: Have you any ethical qualms about any aspects of your work? 
Dr J: Not qualms, there's nothing that I do that I'm not comfortable with 
ethically. I once worked in India with an ex-clinical colleague, who is an ethical 
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person, and they found in India that without regulation, without the ethical and 
moral stance, that you could find yourself being asked to do things that we 
wouldn't agree with. I do try to warn people who go to do work outside the UK 
that they've got to be very careful that they're not going to be compromised in 
any way, because we do get used to the framework here. 
J5: What sort of things might one be asked to do? 
Dr J: Well, this didn't happen at the clinic that I was involved in, butI'm told 
there are clinics that buy an ICSI microscope, but never take it out of the box. 
They tell patients they're having ICSI, but actually they're having donor sperm. 
J5: That's awful... 
Dr J: Yes, but this is a different culture, I'd like to think. Quite horrific ... 
J5: What do you think about the embryo, are you quite happy with the 14 day 
ruling? 
Dr J: Oh, absolutely. There's nothing that we've been involved with that grows 
embryos longer than blastocyst - day 5 or day 6 - and if you accept that the 
embryo is... that you can work with the embryo in any way, then there has to 
be a finite point and day 14 does seem quite appropriate. But I'm unaware of 
any work at all that actually goes beyond the blastocyst stage, so I don't think 
the 14 day rule is a problem for most people working in the field. 
J5: You personally don't have any qualms about working with the blastocyst, 
in the sense that say the Roman Catholic Church would say that it's a human 
being from the moment of conception? 
Dr J: I'm always aware that I have a responsibility to the embryos, but I 
consider them as potential life and not ... I don't think I could do the work I do 
to be honest, it would be unbearable, but that's the belief I had before I started 
the work. They have potential and therefore we have responsibility to look after 
them to the best of our ability. 
J5: Have you got any fears for the future of assisted conception techniques? 
Dr J: Yes, we just have to look at the headlines from cloning and Mr Antinori, 
even at the ethical context of what they're trying to do and whether we should 
do it or not. I don't believe they have done it or even attempted to do it. 
However, Antonori probably has and it's been done without a proper scientific 
workout. So it's been undertaken whilst completely exploiting the patients, who 
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are coming forward desperate for help, and the risks involved are huge. That 
type of work does worry me. 
JS: Do you require patient's consent for all research undertaken on embryos? 
Dr J: Yes, yes. The HFEA consent form has a box specifically about consent. 
Also they can tick for research if they wish to. If we were going to ask them to 
donate any embryos, which weren't suitable for transfer or freezing, we would 
also ask them to fill in a specific consent form for the research project involved. 
JS: How many embryos do you currently transfer back to the uterus? 
Dr J: Two, we changed before the HFEA required us to do so, and the 
pregnancy rate went upl 
JS: Oh, that's very interesting. 
Dr J: It coincided with an improvement in our success rates, but we still have 
30% twins. So the HFEA are now asking whether we should be considering a 
single embryo transfer and the HFEA itself is also looking at whether there are 
people who should only have one. 
JS: Nowadays with freezing being so good (Dr J: Yes) it doesn't really matter, 
because if you've got nine fertilized embryos (Dr J: Yes) you can just spend 
nine months having one returned, just like you would in normal conception 
(Dr J: Yes). 
Dr J: I think there is a clinic in Sweden, where you can have as many embryos 
transferred as you like as long as it's one at a time. Again people will feel a 
compromise with success rates and the patients will feel a conflict with cost, but 
we're certainly looking to see if there's a group of people that we could 
comfortably transfer a single embryo. 
JS: The irony is ... as someone who actually got pregnant with twins, it can be 
so fraught, not the wonderful experience that you've dreamed about. I was 
very lucky mine didn't go into special care and all the rest of it, but it was 
still a hell of a first year. It's very expensive as well, when you're successful... 
Dr J: When I'm doing a lecture to a patient group coming through, I show, a 
picture of one baby and say I'm sure you'd be happy with this. Then I show 
twins, a lot of people see that as the ideal, and then triplets, which is obviously 
not ideal. They all see that triplets are a bad outcome, but I'm not sure that 
people realise that twins can cause problems. Most of the time it's okay with 
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twins, but we do occasionally get a poor outcome. The complications are higher 
with twins than with singletons, with early birth and so on. However, I think a 
lot of clinics are just getting used to the idea of two embryo transfers, so to go to 
one might be too much for them, but that will come. 
JS: Another thing is the hidden costs to the Special Care Baby Units (Dr J: 
Yes, yes) the private clinics get all the profit and the NHS gets drained 
resources which is hardly fair. (Dr J: Yes, as a consequence, absolutely) You 
said you are now a member of the HFEA ... so congratulations (Dr J: Thank 
you) how did that happen? Were you invited or did you apply? 
Dr J: You apply. There were a number of people who were invited to apply. But 
you are appointed by the Department of Health under the Nolan Principles of 
Public Office. There was a fairly gruelling interview against fairly stiff 
competition, so I was very pleased. I've just had my first meeting last week, a 
very interesting group of people. 
]5: How do feel about a small group of people being given really quite big 
ethical decisions to make on behalf of society, (like the decision made over 
the Whitakers and the Hashmis over PGD)? 
Dr J: I think the composition of the Authority does enable it to make ethical 
decisions with the mix of people who are appointed; there is always a majority 
of lay people. We have, for example, the Bishop of Rochester on the Authority 
and a Professor of Philosophy from York University and Clare Benn from 
CHILD representing patients' groups on the committee. That is why such a 
selection of people with those varied backgrounds and skills are put together -
to make those decisions, which are not taken lightly. You'll be aware that the 
authority of the HFEA to make those decisions has been challenged by CORE, 
but is going back to appeal. I think a critical point is when the HFEA doesn't 
feel able to make a leap in decision making on behalf of society and that is the 
point when they have to go to public consultation, like in the case of donor 
anonymity, for example. And we'll just have to see how the review works out. 
JS: Like sex selection, I suppose, because that's another thing there's been a 
consultation on. 
Dr J: Yes, that consultation has been requested by the Department of Health 
and they asked the HFEA to do it. So it wasn't the HFEA that initiated it, as a lot 
of people think. 
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JS: Do you think the Masterton case that hit the headlines had something to 
do with that? 
Dr J: Is that the case in Fife where the little girl died? as: That's right, yes). It 
possibly brought it to public attention. The last time consultation was 
undertaken, sex selection for family balancing was considered too trivial a 
reason to allow it at the embryo stage. It'll be interesting to see what the 
response is this time.2 
IS: Do you find the HFEA helpful in regulating the clinics and do you think 
they've got enough teeth? 
Dr J: I think they've been hampered by lack of funding, the HFEA was formed 
more than 10 years ago now and until this year the income they had was the 
same. The funding was capped. Whenever we treat a patient there is a fee to be 
paid for that treatment cycle, so, inevitably, the income to the HFEA went up, 
but when it went up beyond a certain limit Mr Brown got it. So it's only now 
that I think it's being properly funded. The inspection process will be 
strengthened and the policy department will be able to do its work more 
efficiently. They'll have more staff to perform the task that they're actually 
asked to do. 
IS: Do you think it will prevent situations, as much as is humanly possible, 
like the incidence of embryo mix-ups that hit the papers last year? 
Dr}: We can never, ever say that a mistake can't happen. It's quite interesting, 
because it was a mix-up in a very overworked laboratory, which turned out to 
be a major factor. We were asked to introduce double witnessing for all of our 
procedures; many of our procedures were already double witnessed anyway. 
However, it has had huge implications for the workload in the laboratory, the 
number of people you have and so on. Some embryologists were quite offended 
that their working practice, which they considered safe, had to have this extra 
check in. More recently, most embryologists that I've spoken to, find it very, 
very reassuring that they have a witness. It's not so much the process that is 
important, which is done accurately anyway, but that you can show that you 
did it to the right standard. 
JS: It's similar to when I was nursing; in the end checking drugs makes you 
feel safer. 
Dr J: One thing we've always done is when a patient comes in for an embryo 
transfer we don't say I are you Mrs Bloggs?' we ask them their name, because 
2 See Chapter 3, p.24, footnote 31 for details ofHFEA consultations on sex selection. 
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people in that stressful situation might just say yes. It mustn't be a passive 
response, we ask for a date of birth as well, and then the embryologist and the 
doctor sign it. The safeguards are there. 
JS: Well thank you very much, is there anything you'd like to ask me? I could 
stay here another hour talking to you but I'm conscious I've already gone 
over your time. 
Dr I: Yes, I'm a bit busy today; I've got to attend the induction course for the 
HFEA tomorrow and Thursday. 
IS: Good luck with that anyway, I'm very pleased for you that you got on 
there, I'm sure it will be very interesting. 
Dr J: I'm only the second embryologist that's been on it unbelievably. There 
have been lots of professors of obs and gynae. 
IS: Gosh, it's funny isn't it? I mean the embryologist, it's like the Steptoe and 
Edwards partnership, the public got the 'Steptoe is responsible', (Dr J: Yes) 
but it was Edwards who approached him and he'd been working on mice 
embryos for a decade before he did so. 
Dr I: We've just had the Association of Clinical Embryologists' Annual 
Conference here in Glasgow and because we have been getting so much bad 
publicity due to everything that's happened, we actually invited the press in for 
briefings. They were very interested in what we were saying. We're being a bit 
more pro-active and getting our story over. as: Yes, because you're sort of the 
'backroom boys') Yes. (IS: No offence) Well it's true and a lot of us are not 
particularly comfortable about doing it, but we think it's important. 
IS: Well thank you very much. Do you mind me asking do you get any 
remuneration for going on to the HFEA? 
Dr I: Yes I do and it's published in the Annual Report as to how much. It's 
voluntary so I do the HFEA work in my own time and it doesn't conflict with 
myNHSwork. 
IS: Thank you. 
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